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gift exchange
Since Marcel Mauss published his foundational essay The Gift in 1925, many anthro-
pologists and specialists of international relations have seen in the exchange of gifts,
debts, loans, concessions, or reparations the sources of international solidarity and
international law. Still, Mauss’s reflections were deeply tied to the context of interwar
Europe and the French colonial expansion. Their normative dimension has been
profoundly questioned after the age of decolonization. A century after Mauss, we may
ask: what is the relevance of his ideas on gift exchange and international solidarity?
By tracing howMauss’s theoretical and normative ideas inspired prominent thinkers and
government officials in France and Algeria, from Pierre Bourdieu to Mohammed
Bedjaoui, Grégoire Mallard adds a building block to our comprehension of the role
that anthropology, international law, and economics have played in shaping interna-
tional economic governance from the age of European colonization to the latest
European debt crisis.
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The History of a Political Idea
Gifts, Trusts, Reparations, and Other Fetishes of International
Solidarity
The Gift is probably the best-known essay by a French anthropologist. It was written
by Emile Durkheim’s nephew Marcel Mauss for the first volume of L’Année socio-
logique published after Durkheim’s death.1 The universal theory of gift-giving
practices it provides has been at the center of many postwar disputes between
French social theorists,2 from Claude Lévi-Strauss3 to Pierre Bourdieu4 and Jacques
Derrida,5 as well as many central United States (US) theorists.6This influencemight
explain why it is still required reading for anthropology students in France, the
United States, and many other places.
At the same time, as Lygia Sigaud has demonstrated, there are many “disconti-
nuities in the interpretation of The Gift.” In particular, she notices a “general
indifference to Mauss’s preoccupations with rights and obligations”7 in the postwar
reception of The Gift, and a contemporary focus on the moral and non-utilitarian
webs of meaning associated with everyday (market) exchanges.8 This focus on
everyday forms of “commodity fetishism”9 – when commodities are granted the
personal qualities of the former possessors and the moral power of the community
which produced them – although associated with remarkable developments in
contemporary social theory,10 contrasts deeply with Mauss’s interest in understand-
ing international exchanges between sovereign entities and in pursuing a dialogue
with legal theorists on the role of evolving conceptions of sovereignty in changing
forms of trade and commerce.
Indeed, this book argues, Mauss conceived of his essay as the coronation of
a decade-long interest in the history of international contractual obligations among
sovereign groups (tribes, empires, nations, etc.), expressed when the latter exchange
prestations (a term difficult to translate into English, which refers to the services given),
“apparently freely given, yet coercive and interested.”11 Mauss’s focus on the question
of sovereignty, its origins and manifestation, as well as on gift exchanges conceived as
visible fetishes of international solidarity, has been lost to most sociologists and
anthropologists who have applied his model to the local rather than international level.
Why is this so?What wasMauss’s real focus when he wrote his famous essay on the
origins of international solidarity, and why have we forgotten it? What were the
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academic conversations and public controversies in which his essay intervened?Was
it merely an essay in the anthropology of law, contracts, and exchanges, or was it also
a political tract that placed anthropology at the forefront of debates on global
governance? How did Mauss conceive of the relationship between his anthropolo-
gical essays more generally, and his political reflections, in which he discussed the
best ways of restoring order and solidarity in a shattered European political land-
scape, marked by Germany’s defeat and French expansion in its new colonies? If the
two sides of his work were so linked, what was the legacy of his anthropological
approach to international solidarity in debates about global governance before and
after decolonization?
This book tries to answer these questions by historicizing the production and
reception of Mauss’s ideas on gift exchange, especially as the latter have intersected
with other ideas developed by international law scholars and colonial administrators
about international financial and global commercial governance, both within
Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world. The argument is situated
at the confluence between the sociology of political ideas and expert knowledge,
sociological studies of global governance, and the intellectual history of colonization
and decolonization, particularly (but not only) in the French context.
Building upon recently published scholarship which highlights the role of the
early twentieth-century “return of the gift” – to cite Harry Liebersohn12 – as
a political discourse, grounded in the new discipline of anthropology, this book
indeed starts from the premise that the anthropology of gift exchange was not just
a scholarly preoccupation with the local mores of distant and “archaic” societies.
In fact, when Mauss articulated a discourse on the exchange of gifts, he built upon,
and reframed, the work of political and legal theorists who sought to answer
centuries-old questions: What is the good form of government? How can political
societies of different natures solve the problem of international order while main-
taining the freedom of, and the solidarity between, their members? How can an
international society sustain itself over time and develop a sense of solidarity among
its interacting sovereigns when their constitutional politics differ drastically in kind?
In showing how different generations of anthropologists, colonial administrators
and legal scholars used Mauss’s model of gift exchange to answer these questions,
this book shows how Mauss, his followers and his critics applied the notion of gift
exchange in various contexts to reflect upon international relations between
sovereign entities; and how they thus placed anthropology on equal footing with
international law and economics in debates about good global governance.
In particular, it recovers and traces Francophone expert struggles over what good
governance has meant since the interwar era in the French field of power – broadly
conceived – through the lens of a series of contemporary distinctions between
different political imaginaries of solidarity, shaped by different disciplines and
articulated around different conceptions of Europe’s role in the management of
global affairs.
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1 THE IDEA OF GIFT EXCHANGE AND THE PROBLEM
OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER
This book positions itself in the growing literature on global governance that is
concerned with understanding the intellectual underpinnings of evolving interna-
tional legal arrangements in the twentieth century before and after decolonization:
in particular, the relation between the evolution of international law and the
changing institutional architecture of global governance. It seeks to locate Mauss’s
specific contribution with The Gift, and that of some of his followers and disciples
who drew inspiration from that essay, in what Michel Foucault would call the
domain of “governmentality,”13 and, more specifically, the type of discursive tech-
niques that proliferated in the twentieth century to govern the international circula-
tion of goods, commodities, financial obligations, and other material exchanges
which tied together nations in a dense web of contractual obligations. It adds a new
building block to our comprehension of the role played by various disciplines
(anthropology, international law, economics) to the shaping of discourses and
practices associated with the rise of European solidarity, the end of colonialism,
and the beginning of globalization, by looking at the role of French-speaking
anthropologists and their epigones in these debates – whose importance is often
overlooked in recent intellectual histories of global governance.14
Methodologically, it follows what Foucault called a “genealogical approach,”15 as
it traces the evolution of the model of the gift in the long twentieth century back to
Mauss’s writing. By model, I mean the formulation of a general law which expresses
a relation of causality: here, between the circulation of material things and the
creation of a moral sense of obligation between contracting parties. Indeed, unlike
other monographs on legal intellectual history, which focus on one distinct period,16
this book thus traces the genealogy of various conceptualizations of gift exchanges
within French anthropology and their relation to debates on global governance over
more than a hundred years: from the European division of colonial territories in the
late nineteenth century, to the attempts to recreate conditions of European solidarity
with the League of Nations, the transformation of the United Nations under the
pressure of decolonization, and attempts to create a more equitable New
International Economic Order (NIEO) as popularized by Third World chief jurist
and diplomat Mohammed Bedjaoui (1929–) during the oil crises of the 1970s.17
The recent book The Return of the Gift: European History of a Global Idea by
Harry Liebersohn prepares the groundwork for such an endeavor.18 Liebersohn’s
work is particularly interesting, for it traces how the circulation of gifts became an
object of problematization in the discourses on colonial governance and what we
could call today North–South relations of those late eighteenth- and early nine-
teenth-century British philosophers concerned with the establishment of a modern
form of “good government” at the time of the expanding colonial administration of
ethnically diverse populations by the chartered companies, like the East India
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Company. The administrators-turned-ethnologists in these companies sought to
better understand the logic of the colonial subjects’ economic practices for the
purpose of extracting more resources without risking political revolts.19 In so
doing, they rehabilitated the ideology of “gift giving as an exchange of favors to
create bonds of obligation and loyalty, which was a pervasive feature of English as
well as Indian society, with patronage between more or less powerful politicians,
between authors and aristocrats,” but which nonetheless came under the attack of
utilitarian “intellectuals of nineteenth-century Europe.”20
In particular, exchanges of gifts as a way of creating social and legal obligations
across societies and nations (or “races,” in the language of the time) appeared to
British utilitarian thinkers like JamesMill to “be a vestige of the old order” abolished
in continental Europe by the French Revolution, “and a disturbance in a modern
democratic society.”21 Utilitarian intellectuals, like Jeremy Bentham, drew sharp
distinctions between their own practices of government – enlightened, rational,
modern, formal – and the practices – personal, unpredictable, premodern, based on
the material exchange of gifts – of those whose rule they replaced in the overseas
territories where colonial private interests were expanding. Even if some of the
utilitarian apostles of bureaucratic rulemaking agreed with Max Weber that, while
the modern administration of the economy liberated political subjects, it also
carried the risk that individuals would experience life in an “iron cage,”22 most of
them believed it was necessary to break down the authority of interpersonal net-
works. Thus, the model of the gift disappeared from the realm of political theory in
most of the nineteenth century, although it survived in the everyday practice of
colonial administrators.
Before the turn of the century, the importance of the gift survived only in
“amateur” rather than professional anthropological discourses produced by admin-
istrators of the East India Company: the latter not only practiced the exchange of
gifts with Indian authorities so as to establish the legitimacy of their presence (and
thus fell under the British utilitarians’ accusations of corruption and undue personal
enrichment), but they also turned themselves into field ethnographers, forming
what Marc Flandreau calls the “bureaucratic modality”23 of mid-nineteenth-
century British anthropology. Still, these amateur nineteenth-century anthropolo-
gists kept their gift exchange practices outside the field of political theory, and the
institutionalization of anthropology had yet to take place in the greatest colonial
power of the nineteenth century – the British Empire.
The model of gift exchange found its way back to theories of good government,
as Liebersohn shows, through early twentieth-century anthropology rather than in
political theory or economics: more precisely, through anthropological writings
published in English by German anthropologists expatriated in the United
Kingdom and the United States, and by Frenchmen like Mauss. Although fin-de-si
ècle British anthropology was largely at the service of financial investors and bond-
issuing companies,24 some exceptions did exist: Franz Boas (1858–1942), Richard
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Thurnwald (1869–1954), and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) were the three
among the most important fieldwork anthropologists – in contrast to Mauss, who
forever remained an armchair anthropologist and philologist – whose writings aimed
to rehabilitate the gift as a model of good global governance. Before the writings of
Mauss, they each tried to demonstrate that there was nothing premodern in this form
of government, and that in fact, those “modern” political societies which denied the
legitimacy of obligations formed out of the material circulation of gifts were not only
less reflexive but also more unjust and threatening to individuals than those which
had an appreciation for the wisdom of the obligations created through interpersonal
exchange.25
After Mauss, the anthropologists’ scholarly preoccupation with gift exchange
marked the return in political discourses of a particular answer to the centuries-
old questions raised by political theorists: what is the good form of government? Can
we – and if so, how to – design institutions capable of imposing a quasi-legal
obligation to bond the contracting parties of an international exchange? How
could this sense of obligation be shared when contracting parties (nations, ethnic
minorities, empires, colonies, etc.) shared no other cultural, technical, religious,
legal, and moral characteristics in common, other than the exchange itself? Mauss
proposed that the observation of the exchange of gifts in many different societies
could serve to draw lessons applicable to understand and improve the relations
between European and non-European political societies.
Analyzing the legacy of Mauss’s ideas on gift exchange in such a manner thus
requires that we follow in the footsteps of Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer who,
along with Bruno Latour, have developed a socio-history of ideas, in which aca-
demic disciplinary discourses (including physics but also anthropology) are treated
as original solutions to the problem of knowledge as well as providing solutions to the
political problem of order; and political discourses are treated as also providing
solutions to the epistemic problems of knowledge, not just to the political problem of
order.26 This “symmetrical” methodological perspective on The Gift starts from the
assumption that Mauss’s political and anthropological writings were intrinsically
connected, and that his main source of political concern and theoretical reflection
had in fact an international rather than domestic dimension.27 In other terms,
Mauss’s anthropology was an attempt to answer the political question of order in
general and international order in particular, and his political writings on sovereign
debt crises28 or international obligations attempted to demonstrate the veracity of his
anthropological thesis about the centrality of gift exchanges in themaking of war and
peace, conflict and order, brutality and civilization.
Whereas Liebersohn’s story starts with the British rejection of the model of the gift
in nineteenth-century political theory and ends with its return in early twentieth-
century Anglophone anthropology,29 this book starts with Mauss’s political and
anthropological writings and follows the legacy of this idea in French (or rather,
Francophone) political, anthropological, and legal discourses deployed by a wide
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range of public intellectuals, from French colonial apologists to Third World
intellectuals and legal theorists, who wrote about economic cooperation between
the North and South in the context of French colonization and decolonization.
It thus shares with Liebersohn’s a key premise: that Mauss’s ideas on the gift were
part of a transnational discussion between anthropologists, legal scholars, political
theorists, and statesmen on the management of international commercial and
financial relations in general, and colonial relations in particular; and at the same
time, that it is imperative to capture the association between anthropological, legal,
and political ideas in a diachronic perspective, focused in one context (either
Anglophone or Francophone), while being attentive to the cross-pollination
between the two traditions.
In doing so, the argument intervenes in a growing literature on the place that
anthropology and the social sciences have served in the making of colonial rule as
well as in the operation of international markets. Within the latter field, since the
seminal writings of Tal Asad, Bernard Cohn, and up until the more recent history of
anthropological writings and their relation with financial globalization by Marc
Flandreau, historians have focused mostly on the Anglophone or German-speaking
literature produced in anthropology.30
Historians of French anthropology, like Alice Conklin, Benoı̂t de L’estoile,
Federico Neiburg, and Lygia Sigaud, to cite just a few, have mostly focused on the
relation between colonial administration and the French anthropologists’ work in
the field of museography, as the latter justified their fact-collecting missions by
claiming to help the colonial subjects safeguard a cultural heritage – as in the
preparation of the famous 1931Colonial Exhibition in Paris.31 But Maussian anthro-
pologists not only helped foster and shape a taste for “the primitive,” through their
counseling role in the preparation of colonial exhibitions or the private collection of
non-Western artifacts, African masks and other fetishes, they also developed
a discourse on the power that gift exchanges have to hold societies together. While
building on French historians’ narratives, this book digs deeper into the history of the
discipline of anthropology and its relation with colonial administration. Indeed, it
shows how the core of French anthropology’s classics – like Mauss’s foundational
essay The Gift – is filled with preoccupations that reflect broader social considera-
tions deeply enmeshed with the politics of European powers inside and outside
Europe.
This book thus fills a gap in the history of French anthropology, as it identifies the
traces of Mauss’s interventions in the political debates of the time, the echoes and
discursive shifts, the repetitions and euphemisms, and all other influences that can
be traced between Mauss’s texts and those of his contemporaries, beyond his
immediate community of intimates and colleagues, and across generations, extend-
ing for instance to the study of anti-colonial thinkers in the age of independences.32
In so doing, the book also draws on a series of monographs by French political
historians who have explored the trajectories and writings of these intellectuals,
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academics and legal scholars with whomMauss interacted.33 But, strangely enough,
most of these historians have left the figure of Mauss outside of their investigation,
and thus, have not paid attention to the importance of the model of the gift in the
political reflections of Mauss’s contemporaries – maybe because, in contrast to
Jaurès, Blum, or Thomas, Mauss remained an academic throughout the years,
and did not reach commanding positions in any government.
In exploring this link, this book thus unearths important changes in the percep-
tions of gift exchanges from the prewar to the interwar and the postwar eras, from the
question of the Congo to the question of Algeria, and the attempts to decolonize
previous models of gift exchange. This deep relation between the model of the gift,
the colonial imaginary, and anthropology of “inter-societal” relations may also
explain, so I claim here, that these very ties then made some aspects of Mauss’s
work unacceptable at the time of decolonization, leading his work to be reinter-
preted accordingly. If the publication of Mauss’s The Gift may have signaled the
return of the gift, it was also the moment when it reached its zenith, as Mauss’s
solution to the problem of international order was later discarded by many disci-
plines, including the adjacent disciplines of economics and international law, at the
time of decolonization. Assuming the philosophy of the gift may again come back in
the near future, the title of this book could have been “the eclipse of the gift.”
This book offers a new interpretation of Marcel Mauss’s The Gift and of its legacy
in the social sciences as well as in international public law and finance – all fields
addressing the politics of sovereignty and engaging in debates about global govern-
ance. Taken together, the following chapters will portray a very unorthodox picture
of the epistemic and political goals that Mauss’s model of the gift was meant to
achieve. From the 1970s onward, The Gift was thus read as providing a universal law
explaining how interpersonal and disinterested relations can emerge from the
circulation of gifts at the local level,34 most notably by a Francophone movement
of social scientists, economists, sociologists, and anthropologists, who in the early
1980s founded the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste en sciences sociales (associated
around their reviewMAUSS) devoted to the empirical study of gift-making practices
and the history of Mauss’s ideas (their production and reception).35 This book
inevitably challenges their interpretations of Mauss’s model of the gift, as these
social scientists drew from Mauss the idea that even in modern capitalistic econo-
mies, pockets of “gift exchange” modeled after noncontractual and non-interested
relations (such as the “social economy” and “non-monetized exchange systems”)36
continued to exist, and that they needed to be unearthed and lauded for the good
they provided to both local and larger communities.37 This debate also crossed the
Atlantic to the United States, where institutional economists like George Akerloff38
took inspiration from The Gift to theorize about the incompleteness of contracts and
the necessity of preserving social relations based on trust in the economic sphere –
thanks to the protection of “gift economies” within otherwise distinct “market
economies.”39
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Not only were these concerns only secondary (if present at all) to Mauss when he
wrote The Gift, but my argument also suggests that he may not have been in
agreement with the reading that MAUSS and their Anglophone epigones (like
bestselling anthropologist David Graeber) made of his text.40 In fact, this book
challenges the notion of the gift economy conceived as a coherent self-enclosed
sphere where local economies are ruled by non-market norms, motivations, and
mechanisms. In contrast, it claims thatMauss’s model of the gift (developed not only
in The Gift but also in The Nation and his political writings) serves to understand
heterogeneous systems of international trade and finance which intersect across
multiple sovereignties, traversed by various systems of law and varied forms of
political sovereignty, in which contracting parties follow self-interested as well as
disinterested motivations. As Mauss famously wrote, the gift or the “system of total
prestations” is a “total social fact,”41 which partakes in economic logics as much as it
belongs to the realms of law, morality and politics, and whose specificity lies in its
hybridity: indeed, the system of “prestations” may be what various political societies
can hold in common when they differ in every other respect (law, politics, culture,
morality, techniques, etc.).
To understand what his notion of gift exchange truly meant, and why Mauss
and some of his students remained obsessed with the question of international
solidarity when they promoted the study of gift exchanges, it is necessary to
understand how this obsession came to be, and how it can guide our reflections
on the contemporary and future organization of international relations in their
economic, political, and legal dimensions. These are the key objectives of the
following chapters.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK’S CHAPTERS
After this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the broad methodology, the scope of the
analysis, as well as the cast of intellectuals whose writings are surveyed in the other
chapters and their overall relations of co-optation, conflict, and competition in the
French academic and colonial fields. Methodologically, this book not only seeks to
trace the genealogy of theories of gift exchange in anthropological, legal, economic,
and political discourses, and to relate the latter with sociological changes affecting
the place of anthropology in the French academic field; rather, it also claims to
provide some important lessons on how to conduct a historical sociology of intel-
lectual debates from the colonial to the postcolonial contexts. Indeed, it moves
beyond a purely intellectual history project by drawing on sociological concepts first
operationalized by Christophe Charle and Pierre Bourdieu in the sociology of
intellectuals and intellectual fields.42 Although a classical Bourdieuan field-
theoretical approach is useful to characterize how Mauss and his network of peers
situated themselves in the French field of power, it shows why it is important tomove
beyond this purely national perspective and to pay special attention to the
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transnational ties existing between the colonial and the international fields, as in the
neo-Bourdieuan scholarship developed by George Steinmetz.43
After surveying the contours of the metropolitan and colonial fields in which
Mauss became an important player at the time of the publication of The Gift,
Chapter 3 then situates Mauss’s thinking on the international solidarity created by
the exchange of gifts, which he published in The Gift in 1925 as part of the 1923–4
volume of L’Année sociologique, within the intellectual trajectory of the
Durkheimian school of sociology, and the specific understanding of the notion of
“solidarity” that it developed in a context in which the notions of European order
were deeply questioned. It focuses more specifically on the relation betweenMauss’s
anthropological reflections and his political writings on European financial issues
and the question of German reparations in the early 1920s. Indeed, Mauss’s essay
The Gift addressed similar themes as those he discussed with colleagues and friends
on the politics of European financial solidarity, sovereign debt cancellation and the
question of German reparations paid to the Allies. Mauss was fully involved in the
collective effort led by French solidarist thinkers, legal scholars, and politicians who
were responsible for inclusion of the reparations provisions in the Versailles Treaty,
which tried to settle the peace. In arguing that anthropology shows that the material
exchange of gifts has always created a sense of reciprocal obligation among the
sovereign parties to the exchange, Mauss proposed a most optimistic vision of the
power of gift exchanges to restore European cooperation, financial solidarity and
sustainable peace after the traumatic experience of the Great War. Through the
accumulation of historical and ethnographic precedents, Mauss’s legal anthropol-
ogy also took a jurisprudential turn, as he sought to convince his readers that the
policy of partial sovereign debt cancellation – where the idea of a moratorium on
payments figured prominently – which he promoted, was grounded on a vast survey
of anthropological facts. Indeed, Mauss made clear both in his 1925 essay and in his
political writings of 1922 and 1924 that the Allies needed to give the Germans time to
recover economically before they could give back to the neighboring populations
who had suffered during the Great War.
In many ways, the story of German reparations and European solidarity proved
Marcel Mauss wrong: the exchange of services (“prestations”) and goods does not
always create a sense of moral obligation and solidarity between the exchanging
parties. Even though one could argue that, on the contrary, Mauss’s repeated
warnings to his contemporaries went unheeded, and the specific rituals he claimed
were necessary for this sense of European solidarity to emerge were disregarded
many times by the French and German nationalists, Chapter 4 shows that Mauss
himself took this political failure as an opportunity to reflect more generally on the
conditions that could lead international economic exchanges to either destroy or
strengthen moral and political solidarities between sovereign parties. To show how
Mauss’s earlier reflections on European solidarity were generalized to the broader
colonial context, Chapter 4 first explores the range of colonial discourses that
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emerged before the Great War from within the socialist and solidarist circles in
whichMauss participated. It focuses in particular on the criticisms raised against the
abuses of the chartered companies in the Congo which were voiced by Mauss’s
socialist friends in the French national Parliament and by the French Committee
for the Protection andDefense of Indigenous Populations (hereafter, the Indigenous
Committee), in whose activities Mauss participated in the 1900s. Second, it presents
a more reflexive and less-known phase inMauss’s thinking about the power of gifts to
foment a sense of “inter-societal”44 (or international) solidarity in the colonial
context. Mauss’s publication record suggests that he abandoned his reflections on
gift exchange after his 1925 publication of The Gift. But now that we can read
Mauss’s manuscript The Nation (which Mauss continued to edit at least until after
his election to the Collège de France in 1931, although it remained unpublished in
its full version until 2013), thanks to the formidable work of transcription which was
conducted by Jean Terrier and Marcel Fournier, we can better understand how
Mauss’s earlier reflections on solidarity found in The Gift related to debates about
French interwar colonial policy, in which Mauss also participated by training
colonial administrators at his Institute of Ethnology. With his writings and teaching,
Mauss presented a coherent research program and a progressive political agenda
which moved away from the mercantilist exploitation of the colonies, but which
nonetheless participated in solidifying the French administrative and colonial pre-
sence overseas thanks to the benevolent management of a “giving” French Empire.
Chapter 5 focuses on the legacy of Mauss’s ideas on gift exchange from the
colonial context to the postwar struggles of decolonization in Algeria. As Marcel
Mauss died in 1950, he did not live to see the limits and subversion of the discourse of
gift exchange in colonial administration, and the outcome of the wars of decoloniza-
tion, marked by two historical turning points: 1954 and the peace between France
and (a divided) Vietnam; 1962 and the peace with an independent Algeria. But some
of his students did. Two in particular updated their master’s reflections on the
conditions that could preserve the French imperial solidarity between the metropo-
lis and its overseas territories in the postwar era: Germaine Tillion and Jacques
Soustelle. Chapter 5 shows how Mauss’s concepts of gift exchange and integration
were deployed and reframed by Germaine Tillion and Jacques Soustelle in the
Algerian context in a new sense: departing from Mauss’s The Nation, they proposed
that the Algerian territories should remain integrated with the French metropolis in
the short and long term, so as to form a new stage of integration beyond the national
(and thus purely inter-national) and to allow the exchange of gifts between the
metropolis and Algeria to continue for the benefit of both parties. In their view, such
consolidation of the economic and financial ties between Algeria and the French
metropolis should be guaranteed by a change in the constitutional and political
organization of the French Republic itself, so that the two societies could truly
merge their institutions in a post-national sovereign Republic. To propose a multi-
cultural, transnational, and postcolonial understanding of integration was a radical
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departure from the creation of a society of independent nations, which had been
the League of Nation’s objective in the interwar period and the goal that Mauss
espoused.
Chapter 5 also explains why a new generation of anti-colonial anthropologists who
came of age in the Algerian field of power during the Algerian war reacted so strongly
against the normative use of the idea of gift exchange by older colonial adminis-
trators and anthropologists to argue in favor of the continued French presence
overseas in debates on global governance. If Soustelle managed to impulse
a highly unlikely constitutional reform when de Gaulle came back to power and
tasked Soustelle with writing the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic, his
writings on gift exchange in the context of the Algerian War lead to a counter-attack
by liberal political scientists, who asked the French metropolis to stop framing the
colonial and Algerian issues in terms of gift exchange, and to redirect trade and
investments away from Algeria, in accordance to purely market-based criteria.
The model of gift exchange not only came under attack from metropolitan political
scientists, but also from ethnologists like Pierre Bourdieu, who criticized Soustelle’s
language of generosity and transnational gift exchange between the metropolis and
Algeria as a kind of deceitful rhetoric meant to hide the reality of colonial relations
marked by a century-long process of acculturation, alienation, and exploitation.
With Bourdieu’s writings on Algeria, anthropologists of gift exchanges left the terrain
of the politics of global governance and sovereignty (to the benefit of international
law scholars) and turned to the practices they characterized as gift exchanges at the
local level. The anthropology of the gift, which had been intricately linked to the
defense of the French colonial destiny, was thus invested with new meanings, and
relocated at the local rather than international level in order to survive as a legitimate
epistemic model for anthropologists, sociologists, and ethnographers.
If the international and transnational dimensions of solidarity created by the
exchange of gifts were evacuated from the discourse of French anthropology shortly
before Algeria’s independence, Chapter 6 shows how international public law
further distanced its normative ideals from the model of gift exchange in the
postcolonial context. The strong normative implication of the discourses praising
gift exchanges in the context of French colonial rule, which anthropologists and
colonial administrators had developed from the 1920s to the 1960s, led to their
rejection by “Third World”45 foreign policy elites and international public lawyers
in the context of the financial and economic dimensions of state “succession”
entailed in the transitions from colonial empires to newly independent states.
Chapter 6 traces that process by analyzing how Algerian intellectuals formed in
France when the debate about decolonization was raging, argued with and against
Soustelle’s theory of postcolonial integration to criticize the policy of bilateral
“cooperation” between the former colonial power and the newly independent states
which the French state wanted to impose on its former dominions in Africa after
1962. Chapter 6 focuses on the trajectory of Algeria’s foremost foreign policy
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architect and prominent international law scholar, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and his
struggle in favor of the establishment of the NIEO, which included, but was not
limited to, the repudiation by newly independent nations of all debts they may have
contracted during colonial times. In contrast to other histories of the NIEO, which
focus on the writings of Anglophone authors,46 this chapter traces back the intellec-
tual origins of theNIEO to the Francophone interwar context and the debates on gift
exchange which opposed colonial administrators, anthropologists, and economists
in the Algerian and metropolitan fields of power. It explains the intellectual and
political origins of the Algerian rebellion against the continuation of privileged
“cooperation” between former metropolises and colonies, by surveying the work of
these Algerian diplomats who promoted the NIEO and advocated the globalization
of gift exchanges through “global negotiations” (on oil exchange and debt relief for
instance) betweenNorth and South, in an attempt to “decolonize”Mauss’s model of
the gift.
Still, the efforts of the promoters of the NIEO to give a new global validity to
Mauss’s model of the gift were dashed by the advent of neoliberalism and the
deregulation of markets it imposed. The latter eventually marked the downfall of
the gift ideology as a principle of global economic governance. Chapter 7 draws
some conclusions by highlighting the role of broader changes in the global govern-
ance architecture associated with neoliberalism, which may explain why Mauss’s
original fixation on the problems of colonial trade and European financial solidarity
were lost to future generations of anthropologists and economists after the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system and the transition to a world of fluctuating market-based
parities between currencies after President Nixon decided to let the dollar float in
1973. Indeed, Mauss’s analysis of the role of gift exchanges made sense mostly within
a system where states were formally in full control of exchange parities, and where
the currencies were indexed on the price of gold. In a world in which speculative
market logics were introduced in the heart of financial statecraft and policymaking,
Mauss’s analysis of gift-making practices by state representatives no longer made
sense in any useful way.
Thus, we can explain why Mauss’s reflections on gift exchange are no longer
associated with his broader thoughts on the origins of international solidarity, and
the interwar disputes about colonial governance. There are, of course, explanations
of the misinterpretations that crowd the history of The Gift that pertain to the logics
of the French academic field more narrowly conceived: misinterpretation from one
generation to the next is not a surprise in the French academic scene, where many
ambitious young men ritualistically claim a founding father as the precursor to their
own theory, at the same time as they kill the adopted ancestor through disfigurement
and misrepresentation.47 In this case, the reasons for the collective amnesia are
deeper: when conventional market logics came to dominate all international eco-
nomic relations in the late 1970s, thus putting an end to the glorification of gift
exchange, it was no longer illogical to consider that Mauss’s primary relevance to
12 Gift Exchange
the problems of the time was to help anthropologists and economists distinguish
between different kinds of market logics (socially embedded logics vs. speculative
and antagonistic logics).48 Thus, this chapter situates the reasons for the loss of
relevance of Mauss’s ideas on international gift exchange and global governance in
the creation of the new international financial order of the neoliberal globalizing
world. It also explains why these reflections on gift exchange have never been as
relevant as they are today for our reflection on the future of political, legal, and
financial relations in Europe, after the successive financial crises which have
affected the eurozone since 2008.
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2
The Cast
Marcel Mauss and His Legacy in the French Fields of Power
Many commentators of The Gift have found the objectives that Mauss sought to
accomplish with this publication hard to fathom. In fact, to understand the constellation
of meanings surrounding this obscure text, we have to situate it in its proper socio-
political context: the author was Marcel Mauss; the publication outlet was a sociology
journal called L’Année sociologique; the year of publication was 1925; and the city in
which it was published was Paris. All of these four markers are important to better
understand which goals Mauss sought to accomplish with this publication.
This chapter thus first reviews the situation of Mauss relative to his immediate
circles of interpersonal relations at the time he published The Gift, before taking
a higher-level perspective, by describing the logics of the French fields of power in
the interwar period. Indeed, this chapter shows that, although a classical Bourdieuan
field-theoretical approach to intellectual fields is useful to characterize how Mauss
and his peers situated themselves in the French field of power, it is also key to situate
them at the intersection of the colonial and the metropolitan fields, whose tensions
and conflicts determined how The Gift was later received.1
1 SITUATING THE GIFT IN ITS IMMEDIATE CONTEXT OF
RECEPTION
The Gift was the product of an accomplished and still rising institution-builder,
Marcel Mauss, who benefited, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu,2 from the right type
of social capital – economic capital recycled into academic and intellectual capital
thanks to his uncle’s mentorship. In 1925, his centrality in the academic field was no
longer contested either inside or outside France, especially in the Anglo-American
academic worlds. His discipline was in a period of exceptional growth, which
resulted both from external political factors – the expansion of the French Empire
as a result of the 1919 peace of Versailles – and more local factors – the infatuation of
Parisian art collectors for “primitive” fetishes. Mauss was part of these multiple
circles which overlapped and accumulated over the years (see Figure 1): the worlds
of socialists that agitated the Latin Quarter during the time of the Dreyfus affair, the
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policymakers and industrial planners during the war, the elites from high finance
who were involved in international financial negotiation during the German repara-
tions debate, as well as the colonial administrators and beneficiaries of the colonial
expansion who gathered important artistic collections in the interwar period. These
partially overlapping circles constituted the readership that Mauss targeted with his
polemical essay on the nature of the gift.
In order to better understand the goals that Mauss sought to accomplish with the
publication of The Gift, let us start with the first marker: the author. Marcel Mauss
was born on May 10, 1872 to a Jewish family which had lived in Alsace-Lorraine, the
most eastern part of France, until his father moved to the small town of Epinal
(situated in Moselle, France) in order to keep his family French, as Alsace and
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figure 1 Marcel Mauss’s circles of friends and collaborators
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Lorraine had been annexed by the German Reich after the defeat of the Second
Empire of Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte in early 1871. Marcel’s father died at an early
age, leaving the young Mauss to become a “rich young man,”3 as his uncle, the
sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917), wrote to Mauss (his elder sister’s child).
To sum upMauss’s education and academic career very succinctly: at 21, he came
to Bordeaux to prepare the agrégation of philosophy under the tutelage of his uncle,
Emile Durkheim – who, being his elder by only fourteen years, was halfway between
an uncle and an older brother – and he successfully passed this competitive exam in
1895. Then, in contrast to some of his friends, like Paul Fauconnet (1874–1938), who
became a professor of philosophy in a French lycée, Mauss enrolled in PhD studies
with Sylvain Lévi (1863–1938), an eminent Indologist and philologist who was
a professor at the École Pratique des Hautes Etudes (EPHE) and then at the
Collège de France, and who developed a particular fondness for his student Marcel
Mauss.4 Although he did not complete his dissertation on prayer, thanks to Lévi,
Mauss found a lecturing position at the EPHE in 1901 to teach “The history of
religion among non-civilized peoples.” With the interruption of the Great War,
which he spent as a translator in the British army, Mauss continued to teach at the
EPHE, but also became the Director of the Institute of Ethnology (created in 1926)
at the Sorbonne, and in 1931, after several unsuccessful bids, he finally obtained the
“chair of sociology” – the first one ever created – at the Collège de France. He taught
there until 1940, when he was put into retirement two years early as a result of the
anti-Jewish laws passed by the Vichy regime. He spent the war in Paris, with his wife
(whom he married in 1934, but with whom he had no children), and died in 1950.
The second part of the equation is also important: the journal in which The Gift
was published, L’Année sociologique (L’Année). Indeed, L’Année gives an indication
of the first circle of scholars and intellectuals with whom Mauss interacted (see
Figure 1), whom he impacted throughout the course of his life. EmileDurkheimwas
teaching in Bordeaux in 1898 when he founded L’Année, a biannual review which
published mostly book reviews surveying the most recent works in German,
American, British, and French sociology, history, and anthropology, as well as
a few long essays – like the one Mauss wrote with his friend Henri Hubert titled
“The Nature and Function of Sacrifice,”5 or The Gift. The scarcity of the essays
published in L’Année, coupled with the international diversity of the books that were
reviewed, certainly played a key role in the wide reception granted to The Gift in the
Anglophone world. Indeed, many prestigious authors, like James Frazer (1854–1941),
the famous author of The Golden Bough,6 whomMauss had met and befriended in
Oxford in 1898,7 eagerly expected to receive their copy of L’Année to read their own
book’s review: what author would not want to have his book reviewed by young
talented Frenchmen who also fought for progressive intellectual causes? As they
focused their editorial efforts on producing many book reviews – long before the
London or New York Review of Books obtained the recognition they have today –
Durkheim and Mauss not only turned L’Année into a formidable vitrine for Anglo-
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American intellectual production in France, but they were also able to present the
French “school of sociology” to the outside world – especially the Anglo-American
worlds.
Mauss’s essays were given particular attention as he played a leading role in the
editorial team. First, although his uncle was critical of Mauss’s versatility, which had
prevented him from writing a single-authored monograph before the First World
War, Mauss wrote about 2,500 pages out of the 11,000 pages that were published in
L’Année before the war – almost a fourth of the contributions.8 Second, Durkheim
relied on his nephew to recruit young progressive Parisian intellectuals attracted by
sociology to write for L’Année. Young French academic talent could be found, then
as well as now, at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS), and although not a graduate
of the ENS himself, Mauss befriended most of the young ENS students during the
Dreyfus affair (see Figure 1). The students had publicly asked for the revision of the
trial of Captain Dreyfus: a Jewish officer from the same eastern part of France as
Mauss, who was declared a traitor and sent to a labor camp by a military tribunal
with almost no evidence (and which eventually turned out to be based on forgeries).
Although Mauss was on a study trip abroad – first in Oxford and then in the
Netherlands, before he returned to take (and then teach) classes at the EPHE in
Paris – when the Dreyfus affair broke out,9 when he came back, he met most of the
most ardent Dreyfusard intellectuals; he participated in many of their initiatives10
and he enrolled most of them in L’Année.11
Among these Dreyfusard intellectuals whose writings or personal papers I have
surveyed to research this book, we can cite: Albert Thomas (1878–1932), a star student
of the ENS who was convinced by the famous librarian of the ENS, Lucien Herr
(1864–1926, whomDurkheim had befriended in 1883),12 to join the Dreyfusards, and
who would later have a strong influence on the group, in particular during the First
World War when he became Minister of the Armament and enrolled the whole
editorial team of L’Année to work on the war preparation effort. François Simiand
(1873–1935) was a philosophy student at the ENS who turned to the analysis of law,
society, and economics under the influence of Durkheim and who soon joined the
editorial team of L’Année in charge of socioeconomic questions, before becoming,
according to Mauss, the “intellectual master”13 of his Minister Albert Thomas
during the Great War.14
Henri Hubert (1872–1927) was another ENS graduate and laureate of the agréga-
tion of history, whom Mauss met when the two attended Sylvain Lévi’s class at the
EPHE,15 and whose common fight for Dreyfus led Durkheim to call him a “family
member”16 – he would later become first the assistant to, and then the curator of, the
Museum of Archeology of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Like Simiand, Hubert spent the
war planning industrial defense preparedness, with a specialization on the produc-
tion of tanks, and later remained in close contact with Thomas, establishing con-
nections and exchanging ideas between the latter and Mauss.17
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Not all the ENS students who worked for L’Année were close toMauss: some kept
their distance from his overbearing presence, like Célestin Bouglé (1870–1940), who
first conceived the project of creating L’Année18 and who founded and directed the
Center of social documentation at the library of the ENS. From there, he had
a strong influence on the next generation of anthropologists, like Claude Lévi-
Strauss, and sociologists, like Mauss’s younger cousin Raymond Aron (1905–83),
who worked for Bouglé in the 1930s. Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945) was another
ENS student who had fallen into Durkheim’s orbit, but not under Mauss’s influ-
ence. Halbwachs defended a dissertation on housing expropriation practices in
Paris, at the same time as he developed a Durkheimian sociology of the working
class – before entering the Ministry of Armament under Albert Thomas from 1915 to
1917.19During the interwar period he turned to topics involving collective memory20
while teaching in the newly liberated University of Strasbourg (in Alsace).21 Hubert
Bourgin (1874–1955) was yet another ENS student who had met Thomas andMauss
when they fought for Dreyfus, and also spent the war in the Ministry of Armament.22
These were the men who worked to establish L’Année.
During the Dreyfus affair, this group of politicians, professors, and students
multiplied initiatives in the field of publishing and continued education for
workers of the Latin Quarter where they studied and taught: they created the
Société nouvelle de librairie Bellais where they diffused many tracts on social-
ism and socialist cooperatives; they created the École Socialiste in the Latin
Quarter23 and the Bourse du travail des cours sur le mouvement syndical, which
they put in motion from 1898 to 1910. Mauss even attempted to develop joint
actions with socialist and non-socialist cooperatives, the latter led by the legal
scholar and political economist Charles Gide (1847–1932) – the uncle of André
Gide (1869–1951), the famous gay novelist and leading editor who received the
Nobel Prize in literature in 1947. Charles Gide was a lawyer by training but also
a professor of political economy who would be elected in 1923 to the first chair
in cooperative studies created at the Collège de France – and who would later
help Mauss get elected to the same prestigious institution. Before the Great
War, Charles Gide helped non-socialist cooperatives successfully merge at the
European level with the socialist cooperatives coordinated by Mauss,24 and after
the Great War, Mauss and Charles Gide crossed paths again, when Gide acted
as France’s representative to the Reparations Commission, while Mauss was an
editor of the socialist journal Le Populaire, who wrote on the issue of German
reparations, as I will explain in the next chapter.25
For a short period, the famous poet, editorialist, and pamphleteer Charles Péguy
(1873–1914) joined these young progressive intellectuals, but he soon left the
Librairie Bellais after a political and personal disagreement with Mauss and
Herr – other sentimental reasons might have been at play, as Péguy later regretted
that he could no longer see the young Mauss, whose “elegance and carnation were
the dream of [his] sleepless nights, the image of [his] feverish desires.”26
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The fashionably dressed dandy whose dissolute life was seriously judged by his uncle
Durkheim,27 Mauss made quite an impression on his fellow comrades. In addition
to being a young professor at EPHE, he was thus what we would call today an
energetic “community organizer,” although one who preferred to coordinate coop-
eratives across regions and even countries from his base in the Latin Quarter, rather
than one who spent time in the South Side of Chicago.
Now, and third, the year of publication of The Gift is also important: 1925. In the
small intellectual Parisian milieu, 1925 differed from the prewar years in important
respects. By that time, the Great War had taken its toll on Mauss’s generation, and
the Third International had split the international socialist movement in two,
leaving on one side those who believed in a reformist strategy whereby social change
would be accomplished within the existing constitutional framework (thanks to
elections); and on the other side, those who followed Lenin and wanted to export
the Soviet Revolution to the whole world.
Before the war, Mauss had been a fellow traveler of the French socialist party
founded by Durkheim’s friend, Jean Jaurès (1859–1914), whom Durkheim had met
when Jaurès was a student at the ENS, where Durkheim prepared for the agrégation
in philosophy. Mauss had met Jaurès first in Bordeaux, thanks to Durkheim, and
then again during the Dreyfus affair.28The twomenmet with a former student of the
ENS, Léon Blum (1872–1950), by then a young rapporteur at the Conseil d’Etat (the
highest court in administrative law) who wrote the legal defense of Emile Zola when
the latter was attacked for libel after publishing his famous Dreyfusard article
“J’accuse . . . !”29 Mauss later contributed (with Jaurès) to the creation of the journal
L’Humanité, and from the beginning sat on its board of trustees as one of two
representatives of the new political party, the “Section Française de
l’Internationale Ouvrière” (SFIO), created by Jaurès in 1905 (see Figure 1).30
These socialists had deep ties to the ENS,31 leading French historians of the socialist
movement in France to call their form of socialism “socialisme normalien”:32 even
Blum had been admitted to the ENS before being expelled for poor attendance,
distracted by his high school best friend André Gide, with whom Blum conducted
his poetic and literary endeavors before turning to politics.33
If effervescence characterized the early years of the twentieth century for these
young French socialists, the early 1920s were very different from the prewar decade:
when Mauss published The Gift in 1925, he was 53, no longer a young man. In fact,
the war had turned him into the dean of the Durkheimian school of sociology, as
most of the prewar collaborators of L’Année sociologique had died or had left
academia. Jean Jaurès was the first French casualty of the war: he was assassinated
by a young nationalist a few days before the war broke out, as he was on his way to
write an op-ed in L’Humanité in which he planned to defend the cause of peace and
call on European socialist parties to unite against the coming war. To cite just a few
others, we can mention Mauss’s cousin and Emile Durkheim’s son, André
Durkheim (1892–1915), in whom the elder Durkheim had placed his hopes for an
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intellectual heir, and who was soon joined in death by his father who died of grief in
1917; or Robert Hertz (1881–1915), who was one of Mauss’s best friends among the
collaborators of L’Année, and was killed in Verdun. Hertz had been one of the
ardent figures of socialisme normalien and like Mauss before him,34 he had gone to
study the anthropological school in the United Kingdom – the British later recog-
nized him, through the voice of Edward Evans-Pritchard (1902–73), as the next
Durkheim.35 He was gone too.
With the Great War not only did many collaborators of L’Année disappear, but
some dreams associated with their cooperativist utopia also died. The utopia they
had pursued before the war was strongly influenced by the ideology of “solidarism,”
which was developed by a nebula of jurists and legal scholars interested in the
notions of solidarity, debt and contract, in which, indeed, one could count
Durkheim and Charles Gide,36 but in which Léon Bourgeois (1851–1925) was the
most prominent and influential intellectual at the time: Bourgeois was a lawyer by
training, an essayist, and the founder of the “Radical Socialist” Party, who became
the head of the French government in 1895 – a position he kept only for a short
period of time, due to parliamentary opposition to his attempt to pass a progressive
income tax (finally created during the Great War). Bourgeois was influential in late
nineteenth-century France for diffusing the notion that every individual was born
with a “social debt” which they needed to pay back in order tomaintain the existence
of the social bonds (or solidarity) between individuals of the same nation. Such
a moral and social philosophy, expressed in simple terms, asked those who had
received more to give back more to society than those who had received less. This
principle may seem self-evident now, but it was not so at the time: remember that
Bourgeois’s government fell after parliamentary opposition against his proposal to
introduce progressive income tax – something that is widely accepted today. After
the war, Bourgeois was nominated to be the first President of the League of Nations
in 1919 after a long-lasting effort in favor of obligatory arbitration of interstate
conflicts in the Hague conferences, an activity for which he received the Nobel
Peace Prize in 1920, even though some could have argued that the Great War had
precisely proven that arbitration was not binding enough to stop conflicts from
escalating.
As Mauss was involved in the socialist party created by Durkheim’s friend Jean
Jaurès rather than in Bourgeois’s radical party, claims that his intellectual agenda
reflected a solidarist inspiration may look like an oddity. But solidarism worked as
a loose ideology before the Great War,37 and as Marcel Prélot writes, Jaurès’
socialism, and that of the generation he inspired, was a “quasi-solidarism”38 – just
as the solidarist position of Charles Gide was “quasi-socialism,” if socialism, as
envisioned by Emile Durkheim, was a “tendency to organize” relations between
individuals, firms, contractual partners, and other forms ofmodern beings associated
with the industrial life under the democratic rule of law.39
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Furthermore, the socialists and solidarists argued ardently that the cause of
peace in Europe was their main priority: they planned to avert a war in Europe
by uniting workers across borders and by calling for a general transborder strike
of workers in case of an imminent risk of war in Europe. For instance, the
French socialists sent a delegation of the Parliamentary Group for Arbitration to
Bern, Switzerland, in May 1913 for a conference on Franco-German entente,40
which included important socialist figures like Jean Jaurès and Marcel Sembat
(1862–1922) – a close friend of Marcel Mauss and Bronislaw Malinowski,41 who
wrote on international affairs for L’Humanité before becoming the Minister of
Public Work during the war with Léon Blum as his chief of staff.42 For them,
international solidarity between European nations was of higher value than
a global communist revolution: at least, that is what French socialists believed
until Jaurès’s assassination, which, on the eve of the war, was the electroshock
that woke them up from their dogmatic dreams.
Mauss’s prewar actions as a public intellectual had been in fact characteristic of
this broad solidarist philosophy. For a decade before theGreatWar,Mauss defended
the cause of European solidarity by intervening in the European “cooperativist”
movement, which mushroomed outside the party system and outside the state’s
purview to challenge a strict understanding of market operations. These coopera-
tives abided by a notion of solidarity which was conceived in terms very close to Léon
Bourgeois’s normative (and utterly positive) understanding of social solidarity and
anchored on such legal notions as the “quasi-contract”:43 solidarity was made
manifest by an active mutualization of wealth, contracts, and duties in the sphere
of exchange (rather than that of production) by the social groups themselves.44
By forming cooperatives in independence from their state’s diktats, individuals
found a way to express their solidarity against the disaggregating forces of contem-
porary markets. As Bouglé later wrote, in this conception of solidarity, individuals
consider that “the State stops being the lawgiver who brings the tables of the law from
some distant Sinaı̈: it is in the river of everyday life, in the current of private law, that
the State finds its reason to intervene.”45
The primary purpose of the cooperativists whomMauss represented was thus not to
appropriate the means of production and challenge the state’s authority, which is why
Marxists and socialists like Mauss clashed on the value of cooperation for the workers’
cause. TheMarxist parties – one of which was headed by Karl Marx’s son-in-law, Paul
Lafargue (1842–1911), whom Mauss confronted directly46 – prioritized the goal of
bringing down the capitalist system in France, and Germany over all other objectives.
WhereasMauss defended themultiplication of consumer cooperatives, or wholesales,
the orthodoxMarxists condemned these cooperatives for delaying the coming revolu-
tion by allowing workers to collectively bargain cheaper prices.47 Mauss defended
wholesales and cooperatives of workers for exactly the same reason: workers benefited
from higher living standards by reducing their costs of living and mutualizing
resources against the risks of modern life (work accidents, early death due to poor
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health in urban centers, unemployment, etc.). Furthermore, by participating in
cooperatives, workers developed international ties with other cooperatives in
Europe, which helped them create solidarities across national boundaries and in
relative autonomy from their state’s purview.48
But even if Marxists and non-Marxist socialists clashed before the war, the SFIO
had managed to keep various socialist families together before 1914. With the proof
that pan-European workers’ movements had failed to stop the war, and with the
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the split between Marxists and non-Marxists in the
French socialist movement was made official and irreversible – at least until the mid
1970s. In 1920, the prewar SFIO was split as a direct result of the Bolshevik
Revolution, and more than half of the socialist party left to form the French
Communist party and took with them Jaurès and Mauss’s old journal L’Humanité
in their suitcases. Thus, the leading post-1920 intellectuals of the remaining SFIO,
Blum andMauss, kept the keys of the old SFIO and took over another much smaller
socialist journal, Le Populaire, to express their minority views on international
politics and the need to counter the Soviet Revolution: this journal was partially
funded by Blum, Belgian cooperatives, and private donors, and issued 2,225 copies
a day when it was first published in April 1921, in contrast to L’Humanité, which
issued 200,000 copies a day in 1920.49 As far as Mauss was concerned, he still
believed in the solidarist notions of solidarity, quasi-contracts or tacit contracts,
which not only found their way into his scientific essays, like The Gift, but also
infiltrated his political writings, as in Mauss’s 1924 essay on Bolshevism, in which he
criticized the lack of Soviet recognition for the existence of “tacit international
contracts”50 between nations bound by debt relations, but he no longer represented
the majority view in the left wing of the political spectrum. Thus, the year 1925
marked a time of maturity for Mauss, if maturity can be signaled by the proliferation
of younger intellectuals expressing views more radical than one’s own on the main
problems of the time.
Fourth, and last, Paris was the place of publication of The Gift. Paris had
recently been the center of the world, as the diplomatic negotiations that settled
the Great War had taken place there for more than a year. In the mid 1920s, it
remained a city of contrasts: it was the capital of an ailing nation, which
depended on German reparations to reconstruct the villages and industrial
plants destroyed by the war in the former fighting zone; but it was also the
capital of booming empire, with newly gained colonies from the Germans – in
Togoland and Cameroon – and a new zeal for large-scale ethnographic explora-
tions of the ethnically diverse populations living in its colonies. Paris was
becoming the city of the Colonial Exhibitions, of the new artistic movements,
with the excitement for the new “Negro art,” which first attracted the small
group of artists, collectors, anthropologists, and curators gathered around Mauss
and Paul Rivet (1876–1958) – a doctor and ethnographer who specialized in
South America, Rivet was assistant curator at the Museum of Natural History in
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1925, but was soon selected to be the director of the Museum of Ethnology of
the Trocadero in 1928 (which became the Musée de l’Homme in 1937).
Mauss was a direct witness, if not a player, in this artistic revolution. The bridge
between the academic and artistic worlds and the world of collectors was facilitated
by Rivet’s assistant at theMuseum of Ethnology: Georges-Henri Rivière (1897–1985).
Rivière, on top of his job at the Museum of Ethnology,51 was also the private adviser
of David David-Weill (1872–1951), the director and heir of the Lazard Frères bank in
Paris, whose immense wealth was put to the service of art collection, which he
donated generously to many Parisian museums (like theMuseumGuimet on South
Asian art).52 Thanks to these political, academic, and aesthetic transformations in
Parisian life, Mauss’s reflections on gift exchange inspired intellectuals and politi-
cians beyond the first circle of socialist and Dreyfusard thinkers with whom he
crossed paths before the war. In the mid 1920s, Mauss became actively involved in
the institutionalization of ethnology in Paris, at the nexus between academia and
French colonial administration. The young ethnologists who worked at the
Museum of Ethnology were formed at Mauss’s newly founded Institute of
Ethnology in Paris, which finally came into being in 1926 with Mauss and Rivet as
its two secretary-generals (see Figure 1).
The creation of the Institute of Ethnology in 1926 allowed ethnologists to serve as
a bridge between the aging generation of colonial administrators and reformers to
the newcomers in the field of colonial administration. The management of the
Institute gathered many eminent scientists, most of whom were well doted in
colonial capital: it was codirected by Marcel Mauss, with Paul Rivet and Lucien
Levy-Bruhl (1857–1939), a cousin of Alfred Dreyfus, who had befriended both
Durkheim and Jaurès at the ENS. But it also comprised colonial administrators,
especially in the Council of the Institute, which included prestigious professors at
the Collège de France, like Louis Finot (1864–1935), a close friend of Sylvain Lévi,
who directed the French School of the Far East (EFEO), one of the most important
institutions for the colonial administration of Indochina, and Colonial Governors,
like Maurice Delafosse (1870–1926), who also taught at the Colonial School.53
At the Institute of Ethnology, and then at the Museum, Mauss’s students learned
how to collect, identify, date, classify, and display the artifacts and fetishes they
brought back from their ethnological missions, and they mingled with the art
collectors of the worlds of high finance, like the Rothschilds and Lazards, who
funded their missions abroad. Rivière, whose sister later conducted ethnographies in
Algeria54 with Mauss’s doctoral student Germaine Tillion (1907–2008), organized
more than 60 exhibitions at the Museum in less than a decade, some with Mauss’s
students, like the South Americanist Alfred Métraux (1902–63), or the Maya specia-
list Jacques Soustelle (1912–90) – who replaced Rivière as assistant to Rivet in 1937
when Rivière became the director of the Museum of Popular Arts and Traditions.
Soustelle was also a graduate of the ENS and among the most talented of Mauss’s
PhD students.
The Cast 23
This Parisian collaboration, which was based on the exchange of gifts between art
collectors, ethnologists, and curators, was fruitful for all. Without it, Mauss’s famous
essay might never have been published, as it was thanks to a generous gift by David
David-Weill that Mauss published the 1925 volume of L’Année sociologique – the
first one published since the end of the war – in which The Gift was printed. David-
Weill and other art collectors also funded many of the big ethnographic missions
pushed forward by Mauss, like the Dakar-Djibouti Mission (1931–33) led by Marcel
Griaule (1898–1956), another of Mauss’s PhD students who toured French Africa
from West to East in search of all the artifacts he could put his hands on.55 For
Mauss, this was a new world, well suited with his Parisian dandyism, full of energy
and optimism for the possibilities offered to French ethnology by the French
imperial expansion.
2 MAUSS’S RELATIVE MARGINALITY IN THE FRENCH
METROPOLITAN FIELD OF POWER
To move beyond the immediate circle of colleagues and friends whom Mauss
targeted with the publication of The Gift, and to view the development of their
ideas from a higher viewpoint, it makes the most sense to draw on the field-
theoretical approach first developed by Christophe Charle and Pierre Bourdieu in
the sociology of intellectuals and intellectual fields. Armed with their concepts, we
can study how such a publication as The Gift helped Mauss redraw social bound-
aries between disciplines in the French academic field; and which resources and
forms of capital circulated in the academic field at the critical time when the
disciplines of anthropology and ethnology were becoming institutionalized under
Mauss’s leadership.56
It is remarkable how much the anthropologists, economists and international law
scholars who developed Mauss’s ideas on gift exchange and who were part of the
overlapping circles already described looked alike in terms of their social capital:
most of them were men – until Mauss’s students, indeed all of them were men –
often from a bourgeois or at least urban background, and they graduated from the
top French public schools like the ENS. Furthermore, they most often represented
a subcategory of elites whom Pierre Bourdieu, drawing on the sociology of religion,
has called the “heresiarchs”:57 those elites with enough social capital to reach the top
echelons of state power, but still not quite to the top, as one key dimension of their
identity kept them in a situation of vulnerability.
Most of Mauss’s peers (as cited in Figure 1) were indeed religious minorities, like
the Gides (uncle and nephew, both Protestant), or Durkheim, Blum, Lazard, and
Mauss, who were all well assimilated Jews or “Juif d’Etat”58 as Pierre Birnbaum has
called these “secularized Jews devoted to the public service of their country who . . .
identified completely with the laic universalism of the modern French state,”59 and
who attained positions as high civil servants. Their sense of attachment to the elite
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was fragile, as they knew their standing in the circles of state insiders could be subject
to the moods and whims of the long-established Catholic or aristocratic elites who
sometimes allied with the mobs to threaten these newcomers. When they did rise to
the top, as Léon Blum did in 1936, when he became the head of the French
government as the leader of the Front populaire party coalition, they were still
vulnerable to the attacks of both mobs and political–administrative elites:
in February 1936, Blum survived a lynching when his car got stuck in a nationalist
protest, and immediately after his election, he was attacked in the French
Parliament by right-wing parliamentarians for being the first Jew elected as the
leader of the French government. In 1940, the Vichy government arrested him
and put him on trial for treason, before turning him over to the Nazi authorities at
the end of the war – which hemiraculously also survived, when his group of political
hostages deported to Buchenwald was freed by the Allies.60
To give another illustration, one can citeMauss’s friend,Max Lazard (1875–1953),
whom he also thanked for a generous gift toward publication in the volume of
L’Année sociologique in which The Gift was published.61 As in the case of Mauss’s
trajectory, it is clear that Max Lazard’s career was largely determined by the quantity
and quality of social capital he received at birth: he was the son of Simon Lazard,
one of the founders of the Paris bank Lazard Frères, and the cousin of David David-
Weill, who managed the affairs of the Paris branch during the interwar period (see
Figure 1). Marcel Mauss and Max Lazard’s professional development ran along
parallel courses, accounted for by a common social background. Both came from
Jewish families from Alsace-Lorraine; they were deeply patriotic and attached to the
French Republic at the same time as they were very much open to the British and
US academic worlds (something not taken for granted at a time when German
academia entertained a strong attraction among French colleagues); they fought for
Dreyfus’s rehabilitation and conceived it to be their duty to intervene in public
debates as experts with knowledge grounded in their discipline; they had key access
to insider knowledge thanks to their network of peers as well as their social and
family relations. Still, Mauss and Lazard made different choices, and their endow-
ment in terms of economic, social, and cultural capital may account for such
differences. Max Lazard did not follow an ambitious uncle in Bordeaux, but
found his way to New York thanks to the generous help of his father and uncle’s
business partners, where he completed a PhD on economic cycles causing unem-
ployment at Columbia University.62 Later, like many of Mauss’s friends and peers,
he entered Albert Thomas’s cabinet at the Ministry of Armament and then followed
Thomas to Geneva when Thomas became the head of the newly created
International Labor Organization (ILO).
One of Marcel Mauss’s PhD students, Jacques Soustelle, aptly expressed the
feeling of vulnerability – or fragile legitimacy – which many of these men felt
based on their religious, or rather ethnic, affiliation (as religion was also ethnicity
in France): as a Protestant growing up near Lyon, Soustelle read the history of the
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Reformation when he was 10 and thus learned very early on “that [he] belonged to
a minority, that France was his nation [patrie] and that French was his language, but
that the French state had often been their enemy.”63 Very few among Mauss’s close
circle of friends did not have dramatic firsthand experience of this enmity of the
French state during the course of their life. For Mauss’s generation, first came the
Dreyfus affair, when anti-Semitism was ardently fought for in the nationalist press
and in the courtrooms. Then came the Vichy regime, which first downgraded the
civic rights of Jews, and then actively participated in organizing their extermination
during the Nazi occupation. The Second World War in particular took a strong toll
within Mauss’s circle of colleagues for the precise reason that many of them
belonged to religious minorities, especially Jews: most importantly, ten anthropol-
ogists who were members of the Musée de l’Homme group, one of the first
Resistance groups created in occupied France in 1940, were arrested and executed
by the Nazis in 1942: Anatole Lewitsky, Boris Vildé, Léon-Maurice Nordmann,
Georges Ithier, Jules Andrieu, René Sénéchal, and Pierre Walter; only Yvonne
Odon and Georges-Henri Rivière survived. For her part, Germaine Tillion, another
of Mauss’s PhD students, joined the group upon her return from Algeria to Paris in
1940 – she was arrested with her mother in 1942 and deported to Ravensbruck (where
her mother died),64 and from where she survived to publish the first ethnographic
analysis of the concentration camp system. Paul Rivet, who, as director of theMusée
de l’Homme, shared responsibilities in the group, survived the chase by the Nazis
thanks to his exile in Colombia and thenMexico, where his former assistant Jacques
Soustelle brought him to participate in the activities of the Free France until his
return to Paris in 1945.65 Although not Jewish himself, Maurice Halbwachs was
killed by the Nazis in the Buchenwald concentration camp in March 1945, after
being arrested for harboring his son (who committed acts of resistance and was
Jewish according to the Nazis, since his mother was).
Mauss himself survived the Nazi occupation, even living in the occupied zone,
without experiencing deportation, which in itself was an oddity: Marcel Fournier,
Mauss’s biographer, believes that Mauss benefited from the active protection of
either German anthropologists, who appreciated his work on the Germanic tribes
and the Celts, or that of the Minister of Labor and Cooperation in the Vichy
government, Marcel Déat (1894–1955), who had worked with Lucien Herr and
Célestin Bouglé at the library of the ENS before adhering to Blum’s SFIO, before
creating a new party representing “neo-socialists,” with the active support of
Mauss.66 Still, although Mauss was neither assassinated nor deported by the
Nazis, he suffered tremendously from the war years, as did his close entourage:
with the first decrees passed by the Vichy government and the Nazis in the occupied
zone, he was forbidden from teaching either at the Collège de France or at the
Institute of Ethnology, and had to resign from all his functions; later he even had to
leave his apartment when it was requisitioned by the Nazis.
26 Gift Exchange
As the following chapters will detail, a concern for the perils and dangers looming
over the head of Mauss and his immediate circle of friends was never absent from
Mauss’s mind, andmanifested itself in moreminor publications at the time he wrote
The Gift: although anti-Semitism was not explicitly mentioned inMauss’s essay, and
contemporary readers would be hard pressed to find any suggestions that the selec-
tion of cases of gift exchanges that he surveyed in his essay betrayed a worry for the
revival of anti-Semitism in the interwar context, the next chapter shows that such
a concern was made clear in his other political and academic essays which he
published right before the publication of The Gift. To find an explicit rebuke of
the anti-Semitic representation of Jews as greedy individuals unable to give, which
Mauss found in social science essays and “political apologies of the most vulgar
type,”67 one had to read Mauss’s book reviews in the same volume of L’Année
sociologique in which The Gift was published – something that the new edition of
The Gift prepared by Jane Guyer will make easier for English-speaking readers68 – in
which he denounced the anti-Semitism of German scholars who distinguished
“between the societies and classes in which altruistic exchanges are common, and
the societies and classes which are parasites of the exchange systems (aristocracies,
plutocracies, Jews).”69 Mauss’s editorial choice explains why contemporary readers,
most of whom will not read The Gift in the large volume of L’Année sociologique in
which it was published, are not conscious that, indeed, these anti-Semitic writings
on gift exchange were very much present in Mauss’s mind, and he made a point of
attacking them throughout his life.
3 MAUSS’S CENTRALITY IN THE COLONIAL FIELDS
Although a classical Bourdieuan field-theoretical approach is useful to charac-
terize how Mauss and his network of peers situated themselves in the French
field of power in the interwar period,70 it is also important to move beyond this
purely national perspective, as the specific discipline – anthropology – and the
specific group of intellectuals – Mauss’s circles – on which it focuses requires us
to pay attention not only to the purely metropolitan French academic and
political fields, but also to the transnational ties existing between the colonial
and the international fields.71 Indeed, as George Steinmetz writes in his post-
Bourdieuan history of the German colonial field, any historian of intellectual
fields should avoid “the dangers of error due to a nation-state-based approach
which are exacerbated in the case of imperial sociologists, many of whom spend
a great deal of time overseas in research sites or historical archives, interacting
with scholars and laypeople from the colonized population and from other
metropolitan nations.”72
In this regard, the creation of the Institute of Ethnology in 1926 not only gave
Mauss a way to increase visibility of his approach to ethnography in the French
metropolitan academic field, but it was also supposed to give a rightful place to
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ethnology in the colonial field, from which it had been absent until then. Ethnology
had not been a priority for the French Republic before the war.73 Since the
establishment of the Third Republic in the early 1880s, the Paris-based Colonial
School had been the main center of training for colonial administrators.74
As William Cohen writes, in 1914, “the administrative section of the Colonial
School was the first functioning program specifically established to train men
[of the metropolis] for civil service positions,”75 who were required to gain at least
one year of formal training from the Colonial School. Students were trained in
a purely formal and universalist manner, with no attention paid to the local context
into which these men would be sent.
Before the war, students in the Colonial School learned accounting, history of
French colonization, and Roman law,76 as their professors in the School assumed
that “there cannot be ten different ways to organize a family, to conceive of property
or of a contract.”77 The emphasis was on legal knowledge: students had to enroll in
a Bachelor of Arts in law in parallel to their training at the Colonial School.78
Language requirements were particularly limited (Arabic being the dominant
language taught in the School), and sometimes oriented toward languages of little
value in the colonial territories. Maurice Delafosse, a former bush administrator was
one of the only teachers of African customs, language and history at the Colonial
School.79 Furthermore, most of the trainees were metropolitan citizens, as the
administration of the School had bowed to the recriminations of the sociologist
Gustave Le Bon (1841–1931), who claimed that training colonial subjects in Paris
(as the British had done in London) would only excite their passion for national
independence and their desire for a modern lifestyle far from their material condi-
tions of life.80 Thus, it was an understatement to say that the Colonial School had
little use or regard for the kind of knowledge that ethnography could bring to its
curriculum. In the early 1920s, Robert Delavignette, who took over the direction of
the Colonial School after the departure of Georges Hardy (1884–1972), a former
colonial officer in Morocco, still lamented the fact that “ethnographic reports were
considered taboo [by most colonial administrators in the field] and buried away in
the administrative files.”81
As far as the field of power in Algeria was concerned, strong resistance also
prevented ethnologists from gaining a say in the training of French adminis-
trators in Algeria, although the sources of blockage were different in Algeria and
in West Africa, as Algeria was a settler colony with a large presence of citizens of
the French Republic. Until after the Second World War, the University of
Algiers, which provided a large contingent of French administrators in Algeria
(judges, lawyers, law clerks, etc.) was strongly segregated between those students
who studied French administrative, criminal or civil law in Algeria and who
were mostly of European descent; and those students of Arab or Berber descent
who remained concentrated in sub-tracks specialized in the study of customary
law – Muslim law in the case of Algeria, but also local codes from Kabylia.82
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In none of the curricula did ethnology appear as legitimate. Muslim law
students from Algiers – where the only school of law in Algeria was created in
1879 – were expected to confine themselves to the study of Muslim law in order
to become oukils authorized to plead a case before a cadi in a Muslim court,
and students in French law who studied in Algiers did not take an ethnology
test.83 As a result, in 1910, only seven out of the 300 lawyers located in Algeria
were of Muslim descent (representing a mere 4 percent),84 and forty-five years
later, in 1955, that proportion had hardly improved, with fewer than twenty
lawyers of Muslim descent out of 400 registered lawyers in Algeria.85
In Algeria, the segregation of the state officials was thus not grounded on any legal
discrimination, but on the self-perpetrating prejudices of the educational system and
the professional organizations that controlled entry into the legal profession in the
colonial field in Algeria: namely, the bar associations of the main cities of Algeria
(Algiers, Oran, and Constantine), which maintained a strong boundary between the
study of both systems of law: French and customary law. In fact, the Algiers bar
association systematically ignored the jurisprudence of the Court of Algiers,86
which, in 1882, had decided that admission to the bar was not dependent upon
acquisition of French citizenship by Algerian Muslims: as obtaining the latter
required Algerian Muslims to renounce their observance of Muslim laws, the
Court had reasoned that it amounted to forced conversion (or at least, a turn toward
secularism) unwelcome to most.87 But in the 1920s and 1930s, the Paris or Algiers
bars still denied the right to exercise to law graduates fromMadagascar, Algeria, and
Indochina, who were not full citizens of the French Republic.88 And the situation
worsened in the 1930s, in the context of an increasingly competitive legal market,
marked by the economic downturn and the naturalization of many European Jewish
refugees who practiced law in their country of origin. By then, the bar associations in
both metropolis and overseas territories lobbied for even more restrictive conditions
on access to legal professions, thus further strengthening the boundary between the
serious study of French law and the less interesting study of local legal systems,
which they left to the colonial subjects, and to ethnologists indeed in the Institute of
Ethnology.89
Confronted with such lack of interest in the contribution that ethnology could
bring to the training of French administrators and lawyers in Algeria or West Africa,
Mauss started writing letters to the Ministry of the Colonies in the early 1900s, when
he lamented “the paucity of interest for ethnography on the part of the state, the
public and the learned societies,” which explained why the “entirety of ethno-
graphic work is done by the British and the Americans”90 – but to no avail.
Already in 1902 and 1907, after his trips to the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, Marcel Mauss had written memorandums addressed to the Minister of
the Colonies in which he appealed (in vain) to the patriotism of the minister to
create a “Bureau of French Ethnology similar to the American Bureau created at the
Smithsonian.”91 For Mauss, the terrible state of ethnological knowledge in France
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explained the “multitude of mistakes found in the French literature on the supposed
barbarism of the Negroes of Congo,” which stood in “sharp contrast with the work
done in Germany by [Adolf] Bastian (who died in the field).”92
In the absence of a national home for ethnology, Mauss feared that French
anthropologists and colonial administrators would have to continue to rely on the
German institutes to find ethnographic facts, as the latter “not only collect data
among populations of German colonies, but also in other parts of the world,
including in the French colonies”93 – a fact he underlined to alarm the French
Ministry that German ethnography may have ambitioned to administer the local
populations under French tutelage. AsMauss added in his prewar letters, “there is an
abysmal difference between our negligence and the model organization of the
Germans and Americans,”94 which could not be blamed on financial constraints,
“as the Institutions created in Berlin are only those of Prussia, a country much
smaller than France.”95
But in 1926, the situation had changed. The selection of the name “Ethnology”
rather than “Anthropology” forMauss’s new Institute was indicative of the division of
labor between the two disciplines in the French metropolitan academic field at the
time. For years, Mauss fought against the state funding of scientific chairs in
raciology and somatology, which was the only chair created in France for anthro-
pology before the creation of the Institute of Ethnology. Anthropology was less
important to Mauss than ethnology, as the former was based on the observation of
“racial traits that can endure a long time after a civilization has lost its mental, social
and national singularity,”96 so its development, and particularly that of somatology,
was not urgent. In contrast, cultural ethnography and museographic sciences were
eminently pressing tasks for Mauss, as cultural practices and artifacts could disap-
pear in one generation after the French occupation of new territories, which is why
Mauss, Rivet, and others took to heart the mission to revive the Museum of
Ethnology of the Trocadero at the same time as they created the Institute of
Ethnology, as Alice Conklin and other historians have showed.97 At the same
time, Mauss pushed for the creation of a French science of “ethnography,” which
he defined “as the science which describes and classifies races, peoples, civilizations,
or rather, that part of the science which focuses on the races, peoples and civiliza-
tions of an inferior rank, which differs from that other part called ‘history’ or
‘folklore,’ which describes the peoples of the East and of ancient Europe.”98
This last sentence should have any contemporary anthropologist who declares to
be a Maussian think twice before taking at face value Mauss’s definition of the
discipline. Of course, ourMaussian colleagues in anthropology today do not think of
themselves as being involved in the study of “the races, peoples and civilizations of
an inferior rank,” and Mauss retains a definitive attraction among anthropologists
because of his universal erudition and his attention to complex linguistic
phenomena.99 But, for Mauss, the reasons for the development of “descriptive
sociology” (or “ethnology”) in the colonies or in Algeria were not only scientific
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but also (and maybe more importantly for the minister) practical ones. Ethnology
had practical implications for the art of colonial government that anthropology
lacked: the measurement of crania may be of interest to racist criminologists inter-
ested in the science of eugenics but it does not tell you how to extract taxes from local
populations without breaking implicit or secret sacred obligations for which tax
collectors can be sanctioned by death. Mauss took considerable pains to convince
the Ministry of the Colonies of the practical benefits that could derive from the
development of ethnology in France.100Even though, asMauss wrote to theminister
in 1913, “the utilitarian consequences” stemming from the creation of a “purely
scientific Bureau or Institute of ethnology will be indirect, they will be
considerable.”101 Indeed, as Mauss emphasized time and again in his memoran-
dums on the topic, “nowhere is it truer that in colonial policy that ‘knowledge is
power.’”102 As Mauss wrote:
it is of utmost political importance that we be informed of the state of mind of the
millions and millions of Negroes whom we pretend to administer without knowing
them, either in the Congo, Guinea, Sudan,Madagascar, as well as the salvage tribes
of Annam, Laos and Tonkin, who are understood only by a few zealous military
men, who nonetheless lack the time and resources to produce adequate descrip-
tions of their mores.103
It was thus a major breakthrough forMauss to obtain the creation of an Institute of
Ethnology in Paris in 1926, and that the Institute of Ethnology later managed to
obtain an important say on the knowledge deemed legitimate by the political and
administrative authorities for the selection of future administrators in the French
colonial field. At the Institute, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mauss thus gave for
instance a class titled “Ethnological Lessons for the Use of Colonial Administrators,
Missionaries and Explorers,”104 and in 1927, Mauss even obtained the opportunity to
teach a twenty-four-week class on ethnology at the Colonial School.105 Mauss’s
multipositionality, and the interlocking of advisory boards in the various training
centers of colonial administrators, certainly helped him build the legitimacy of the
newly founded Institute of Ethnology in the eyes of theMinistry of the Colonies and
the Colonial School. Even if ethnographic training at the Colonial School did not
always translate into its use in the field,106 the role of ethnology in the curriculum of
the Colonial School changed with the collaboration Georges Hardy started with
Mauss and his Institute of Ethnology. Hardy greatly raised the prestige of his school
by strengthening the academic content of its curriculum and by organizing pre-
paratory classes in the “grands lycées,” which previously only trained students to the
grandes écoles like the ENS and the École Polytechnique.107 Thus, entry into the
Colonial School became a valued alternative for the smart young students who had
failed the competitive exam for either of these alternatives, and who did not want to
go in French law schools straight out of high schools. These smart students were
likely to be attracted by Mauss’s charismatic erudition: at the Colonial School,
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thanks to the fact that Mauss himself, and later his most brilliant students (like
Jacques Soustelle andMarcel Griaule) taught classes in ethnography, trainees could
engage with the most interesting research in anthropology, sociology, and ethno-
graphy. Maussian ethnology had moved to the center of the orthodoxy in colonial
sciences, along with French law and colonial economics.
As George Steinmetz writes, “the socio-spatial contours of imperial socio-
scientific fields,” such as the one under study here “are shaped by the analytic object
itself – by the empires being studied.”108Thus, George Steinmetz’s reflections on the
necessity for historical sociologists interested in the study of empires to not only
contextualize the struggles of important thinkers in the metropolitan field of power,
but also in the colonial fields, rings particularly pertinent, as the men and women
who studied under Mauss’s supervision the past, present, and future of colonial
relations in the French context not only drew upon the social capital they accumu-
lated in the metropolis to move on with their career in the metropolitan field of
power, but also on what Steinmetz has called “colonial capital”109 (a form of capital
valued in the state structures outside the metropolis, whose certification was
grounded on the demonstrated knowledge of the mores of colonial subjects) to
ground the legitimacy of their claims to colonial administration.
Rather than studying the circulation of social capital in one field only, we
historical sociologists interested in the relation between the academic and political
fields should then study the intersection between institutional logics in multiple
fields: in the Algerian and West African colonial fields for instance (see Figure 2),
various ministries (like the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Colonies), various
private interests (like colonial banks and chartered companies that operated in the
Congo for instance), as well as various institutions of higher learning (like the
Colonial School or the Institute of Ethnology) had gained a stake in the colonial
game, and the study of their interactions should be located in the specific fields in
which these institutions operated.
As a result of such differentiation between various fields of power in the French
colonial age, the “colonial capital” with which aspiring colonial administrators and
anthropologists started their careers was spent with varying effects depending on
whether they used it to fight ideological and administrative battles in the fields of
power in the metropolis, in Algeria, or in the colonial field in West Africa, for
instance. These men and women who circulated around Mauss not only institutio-
nalized ethnology in the Frenchmetropolis, they alsomoved in an environment that
is best described as a colonial field: it can neither be reduced to the purely French
metropolitan field, nor to an international anonymous space. And this colonial field
can in fact be subdivided in various sub-fields: the colonial field in West Africa,
where careers of colonial administrators typically started at the Paris-based Colonial
School, where Mauss started to teach ethnology in the late 1920s; and the Algerian
field of power, where many more passageways existed with the metropolitan field,
thus enabling an intense circulation between academic, political, economic, and
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administrative elites from the metropolis and Algeria. The Algerian field itself was
not reducible to the other colonial fields, as its administrative elements fell under the
authority of the Ministry of Interior and other Ministries in charge of deciding
essential questions in the three Algerian departments that France claimed to belong
to the French Republic itself. Representing where various institutions are situated in
these various fields in the interwar period, Figure 2 can help sociologists and
historians, although only schematically, highlight the existence of institutional
forces beyond the immediate level of Mauss’s circle of interpersonal relations.
Rejecting the metropolis-centered view of fields is key to explain some critical
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figure 2 The colonial, Algerian, andmetropolitan fields of power in the interwar period
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and carried on with his thoughts on gift exchange, as their lives moved beyond the
colonial and metropolitan fields. In particular, George Steinmetz’s perspective of
fields can help us explain why these intellectuals and administrators could accumu-
late high levels of social capital in the colonial fields – including Algeria, West
Africa, East Africa andMadagascar, and Indochina – that could later be translated in
the metropolitan field, at least during specific periods, and why their colonial capital
suddenly became irrelevant after decolonization.
Here, the career of Jacques Soustelle not only illustrates how ethnographic
knowledge was used to accumulate political and social capital in the colonial and
metropolitan fields, but also why the sudden destruction of the colonial field after
the Second World War so dramatically affected the life opportunities of these
ethnologists/colonial administrators who drew on Mauss to think about interna-
tional and colonial relations in terms of gift exchange. During the Second World
War, it was first thanks to his connections from the ENS and theMusée de l’Homme
and the ethnographic fieldwork that he had conducted in Mexico (whose indigen-
ous populations from Yucatan Soustelle had long observed) that Jacques Soustelle
“converted” his anthropological/academic capital into political cash: in 1939, when
the war with Germany started, Soustelle was nominated in Mexico to become the
head of propaganda services for the Central American region, a post he then used to
raise funds for the Free France after General de Gaulle’s June 18 call.110 In 1942
Soustelle entered de Gaulle’s government in exile in London as Head of
Information, before becoming the head of the intelligence service
in November 1943, after the government moved from London to Algiers; then
Minister of Information in May 1944, and Minister of the Colonies
in November 1945. His career, judged from that point of view, was strongly
embedded in the French metropolitan field of power, at least until he started
accumulating, due to the specific circumstances of the Second World War, some
capital in the Algerian field.
Soustelle’s political career extended far beyond the boundaries of the metropolitan
state: for more than thirty years, he consistently transferred the academic capital he
accumulated in the metropolitan field into political capital valued in the colonial and
Algerian fields of power; and vice versa. For instance, when the Gaullists lost the 1946
elections, Soustelle convinced deGaulle to form a broader trans-party movement (the
Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) in 1947), which he led as secretary general
and director of the parliamentary group for the next eight years, until Pierre Mendès
France named him governor general in Algeria in January 1955. Soustelle’s recogni-
tion as a skilled politician and an eminent anthropologist certainly intervened in
Mendès France’s decision to appoint him as the highest civilian authority in Algeria,
just twomonths after the beginning of the insurrection launched by the Algerian Front
de libération nationale (FLN) on November 1, 1954.111 Then, Soustelle helped de
Gaulle by fomenting a coup in Algiers in May 1958, which brought the Fourth
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Republic to its knees and de Gaulle back to power (and Soustelle back to the
government as Minister of the Sahara and Atomic Energy).
But after de Gaulle dramatically shifted gears on the issue of Algerian indepen-
dence, Soustelle left the government, and, after 1961, spent eight years in clandestine
exile and permanent movement to hide from de Gaulle’s private intelligence
officers-killers (the so-called barbouzes), as the war between Gaullists and pro-
French Algeria supporters raged within the French intelligence circles – until the
events of May 1968 diminished the authority of de Gaulle. Back from his exile in
1968, Soustelle could still count on the active support of Parisian academics, like
Claude Lévi-Strauss, to land a job back in academia and at the French Academy,112
but he was no longer able to influence either national or international politics.
4 THE COMPETITION BETWEEN DISCIPLINES IN THE COLONIAL
FIELDS OF POWER
By situating the development of anthropology and international law in relation to
both the French colonial fields of power and the metropolitan field of power, the
next chapters will explain how anthropologists, who specialized in knowing the
mores of the colonial subjects whose lives their state or concessionary companies
administered, used their specific knowledge and their accumulated colonial capital
to push for specific arrangements between the metropolis and its overseas territories,
sometimes in alliance with, at other times in opposition to, other professionals such
as jurists (specialists of international and/or colonial law), economists (specialists of
colonial trade and finance) and the bureaucrats and policymakers involved in
colonial affairs.113 Indeed, the colonial fields in which Maussian ethnologists gained
a stake were not empty, but already populated by different experts, who fiercely
defended their jurisdiction over colonial policy. Once they gained entry into the
colonial fields, ethnologists needed to form alliances not only with colonial admin-
istrators who were politically close to them, like Léon Blum, or his Minister Marius
Moutet, or some governor generals like Marcel de Coppet, but also with other
experts coming from other disciplines like international law, colonial law, or public
finance.
The notion of a colonial field is thus helpful to situate the space in which these
debates and conflicts between disciplines took place, for instance, between ethnol-
ogists and economists as well as high civil servants in charge of the colonial trade
policy, like Edmond Giscard d’Estaing (1894–1982) who had long opposed the
socialist views defended by Léon Blum or Maurice Viollette on the necessity for
France to engage a “generous” colonial policy based on gift exchange between the
metropolis and its overseas territories.114 Men like Edmond Giscard d’Estaing had
very different trajectories fromMauss’s students: for instance, he was an inspector of
finance who was the High Commissioner of the Rhineland under French occupa-
tion during the early 1920s before becoming the administrator of French banks in
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Indochina, and then the father of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1926–), who preceded
François Mitterrand (1916–96) as President of the French Republic. His views on
colonial trade were quite typical of the opinions and expertise found in the French
Treasury.115 Edmond Giscard d’Estaing often found himself arguing against the
logic of the gift exchange and the integration of colonial subjects (Algerian subjects
in particular) in the body politic of the French Republic, which was defended by
some of Mauss’s students, like Jacques Soustelle. For Giscard father, if the metro-
polis wanted to be generous, it had to find the best investment opportunities for its
capital rather than prioritize sending it to Algeria, where investments could be
wasted.
When they intervened in the debates on colonial policy, high civil servants who
had a training in finance, like François Bloch Lainé (1912–2002), an economist who
became France’s Treasury Director in 1947, and whose great uncle was none other
than Léon Blum, did not look at the ethnographic facts collected by ethnologists or
colonial administrators, but at instruments of macroeconomic policy, such as
France’s balance of payments. On this basis, they often came in direct conflict
with Mauss’s students, as they argued that the logic of continued gift exchange
between the metropolis and its colonies turned “the logic of the Colonial Pact
upside down” as “France provided the metropolitan francs which allowed its
colonies to keep a dramatically unbalanced balance of payments,”116 as a result of
their imports of industrial goods produced in the French metropolis. To understand
the shifting meanings of the notion of gift exchange, it is thus essential to contextua-
lize the debates in which ethnology positioned itself in the range of disciplines that
claimed a stake in the colonial field.
In the interwar period, ethnologists not only had to defend their legitimacy against
economists and trade specialists, but also against international law scholars, some of
whom were sympathetic to the Durkheimian ethnologists gathered around Mauss,
while others paid little attention to the local legal contexts in which the French state
imposed its legal norms and rules when it expanded its influence to Algeria or West
Africa. As Martti Koskenniemi demonstrates, after the Great War, some interna-
tional law scholars had been influenced by the Durkheimian sociological approach,
like Georges Scelle (1878–1951),117 who was a collaborator of L’Année sociologique,
and who taught both at the University of Paris and the Institut des Hautes Etudes
Internationales, an institute founded in Geneva with the support of the Rockefeller
Foundation118 to serve as an observatory for the study of the emerging world society –
now the Graduate Institute, where I happen to find myself teaching and writing.
Confident in the ability of the League of Nations to generate international solidarity
through cultural, legal, and economic exchanges, Scelle taught that political–legal
ties of a quasi-federal nature would almost naturally emerge amongmember states of
the League of Nations if exchanges between a plurality of political societies prolif-
erated – in ways that were reminiscent of theMaussian notion that political societies
moved up the scale of integration as they practiced gift exchanges, as I will show
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later. Like Mauss’s students at the Institute of Ethnology, Durkheimian interna-
tional law scholars did not oppose colonialism: they found in the League of Nations,
and themandates it granted to the French and British Empires in Africa and beyond,
an opportunity to bring diverse political societies toward higher levels of civilization,
so as to foster world peace and international solidarity.119
In contrast, the ethnological lessons that Mauss and his students could draw on
gift exchanges by studying the interactions between legal norms in the colonial
context, were much less appreciated, if recognized as legitimate at all, by interna-
tional law scholars who worked in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs before
the Second World War. For many of those jurisconsults, international law was
merely an instrument to be used in the service of European great powers: for
them, paying attention to the legal norms recognized by colonial subjects amounted
almost to an unpatriotic gesture aimed at hurting the absolute rights of the colonial
power.120 For instance, Jules Basdevant (1877–1968), a professor of international
public law at the University of Paris and Sciences-Po Paris, who worked for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a jurisconsult in the 1930s – a position he quit in 1940
when Pétain came to power – and a member of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) from 1946 to 1964, was quite typical of this generation of jurisconsults.121 Like
Albert de la Pradelle (1871–1955), who taught at the University of Grenoble, before
founding the Paris-based Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales, andmany other
jurisconsults, Basdevant “made no secret of his distaste of the solidarists’ sweeping
generalizations”122 about history’s progress toward a more integrated international
society, and their unlimited hope in the power of economic interdependence to
generate new quasi-constitutional legal norms between a plurality of political com-
munities. In his work as jurisconsult, Basdevant was not only ardently in favor of
France’s colonial mission, but he was also particularly oblivious of the legal and
contractual obligations that colonial subjects had recognized (and had been recog-
nized) as theirs: for instance, from 1918 to 1920, when he was charged with the official
task of publishing the French Record of treaties and conventions, he excluded most
of the treaties signed by the French state with African and Asian sovereigns (with the
exception of those signed with Ethiopia and Liberia), even those signed by the
representatives of the Third Republic with the Algerian emirs (like Abd El-Kader),
Nigerian kings (like Samori Touré, the grandfather of Seku Touré, the first president
of independent Guinea) or East Asian emperors, which had been ratified and even
published in the Journal Officiel.123 Basdevant’s symbolic act of exclusion perfectly
reflected the colonial mindset of some French jurists, for whom the only purpose of
these conventions had been to secure the nonintervention of other European great
powers when the French Republic claimed African territories as its own.124
To understand the reception of Mauss’s ideas in the colonial field, it is thus
necessary to reconstruct the logics of these various fields during the times when
Mauss was writing and publishing. Furthermore, if one wants to understand how the
reception of his ideas on gift exchange evolved over time, it is important to describe
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the mechanisms of intergenerational struggle that worked these fields from within.
Indeed, from the interwar period to the postwar era, these fields experienced
dramatic changes. For instance, after the Second World War, the emergence of
strong law schools outside Paris, in which new disciplines like political science,
geography, or Weberian political sociology were combined with international law,
changed how international law was being taught, and challenged the association
between the study of international law and the defense of French colonialism. In this
approach to international law, there was little use for the lessons that ethnologists
could draw from their study of legal customs, but rather, the emphasis was placed on
understanding the relations between legal rules, the life of domestic and interna-
tional bureaucracies, and the agendas of political parties that pushed for the reform
or conservation of existing legal rules.
The strength of this new approach to international law was evident for instance in
the Law School of the University of Grenoble, in which Claude-Albert Colliard
(1913–90) served as dean for a long time, and where Mohammed Bedjaoui came to
study until he graduated in 1956, with a doctorate in international law. Colliard was,
in the words of Bedjaoui, the “perfect example of the radical socialists of the Third
Republic, who hated colonialism”125 – a subject he also taught at Sciences-Po
Grenoble, fromwhich Bedjaoui also graduated, and where he took Colliard’s course
“Imperialism and the Economy.”126 In his realist approach to international law,
ethnology, and the ethnographic study of cultural, social and economic exchanges
between political societies, had no place – but this no longer meant that those who
sponsored this approach adhered to a pro-colonial ideology, in contrast to interwar
international law scholars like Jules Basdevant. Affirming the exclusive rights of
states to author international law (against the pluralist Durkheimian precepts found
in the study of law as practiced in the colonial field) stood in harmony with the goal
of achieving recognition of statehood for independent colonies,127 and thus, with the
study of the administrative and legal criteria that international legal scholars had so
far used to define statehood. In this new postwar academic context, ethnology in
general, and the ethnography of gift exchange, had to change to remain relevant to
the political debates of the time and the pressing question of colonial reform.
5 THE IMPERIAL INVENTION OF “THIRD WORLD” INTELLECTUALS
At last, this book hopes to convince sociologists and historians to adopt the neo-
Bourdieuan view of fields in order to explain continuities that were masked by the
sudden process of decolonization for the former colonial subjects: for instance, the
French (second-class) citizens from the colonies (or Algeria) who experienced high
social mobility in the French academic or colonial fields before decolonization, and
who remained in positions that straddled two fields of power after national indepen-
dence – both in the former metropolis, where they kept many ties, and in their newly
independent states, where they often rose to the top tiers of power. For instance, the
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intellectual trajectory of Bedjaoui and those of his mentors Ferhat Abbas
(1899–1985) and Ahmed Francis (1912–68) – a doctor who had studied medicine in
Paris (obtaining a doctoral degree in 1939) and who had practiced in Setif, like
Abbas – were deeply rooted within the French fields of international public law and
colonial policy.
In other histories of international law in which such intellectuals figure promi-
nently, such as in Balakrishnan Rajagopal’s International Law from Below,128 there is
a tendency to treat such intellectual and political elites from “the Global South” as
“Third World” elites, as if their trajectory was tied only to their newly independent
nation-state and to the Third World more generally. Doing so may lead historians of
international law to ignore the processes of capital transmission and accumulation
that had started in the French metropolitan field of law before the beginning of
national independence.
The historiography on the New International Economic Order (NIEO) provides
a good example of how historians can forget that key notions associated with this
broad program found their historical and intellectual origins in the French aca-
demic fields. After Algerian independence, the mid 1970s were an intense period of
Algerian diplomatic activity, which in turn explains why no international lawyer
from the Third World exercised a similar influence and role as Mohammed
Bedjaoui on the definition of the NIEO program.129 For twenty years, and until
hopes to reform the economic international system waned after Margaret Thatcher
was elected PrimeMinister in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan President of
the United States, Mohammed Bedjaoui indeed played a leading role in formulat-
ing the legal doctrine behind the economic program of the NIEO.130 As Special
Rapporteur to the International Law Commission (ILC) he steered the work of
eminent legal scholars who, through their participation in the ILC, reported to the
UN General Assembly on points of law for which the General Assembly had sought
clarification.131 For this reason, the publication of his acclaimed book Towards
a New International Economic Order, published in 1978 by UNESCO,132 was not
only the work of a learned scholar of international public law but also the platform
on which a “Third World Lawyer tried to structure the struggle of the Group of
77,”133 as Balakrishnan Rajagopal writes.
But, in fact, Bedjaoui’s reach extended beyond the confines of international
organizations and reached far into the Franco-Algerian bilateral relation: after
serving as Algeria’s Minister of Justice until the late 1960s, he became the Algerian
Ambassador to France (1970–9) when the nationalization of French oil interests in
Algeria was undertaken, before he moved on to other prestigious postings, first as
Ambassador to the UN in New York (1979–82), and then Judge at the ICJ for almost
twenty years. Furthermore, it is impossible to understand his career and his intel-
lectual trajectory without placing them in the history of the French metropolitan
and colonial fields of law before and after Algeria’s independence. Indeed, the few
Algerian lawyers and legal scholars who, like Bedjaoui, used their legal status,
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expertise, and skills to defend Algerian independence after the Second World War
were all trained in the metropolis, and evolved in the metropolitan field of law,
whether they were of European, Arab, or Caribbean descent.
The very low number of Muslim lawyers practicing French law before 1962
explains that the mobilization of the legal profession (or rather, the “legal complex”
to use the concept developed by Terence Halliday, Lucien Karpik, and Malcolm
Feeley in their study of political lawyering)134 in favor of Algeria’s independence,
which provided its legal experts to the Francophone anti-colonial movement, did
not originate from the colonial field but rather from themetropolitan field. Halliday,
Karpik, and Feeley do not make the distinction between the colonial and metropo-
litan fields of power that George Steinmetz makes. But this duality is an important
factor explaining how political lawyers mobilized in the Francophone anti-colonial
movement, and the difference one finds for instance between the mobilization of
Algerian and Indian lawyers prior to their respective independences.135 In the latter
case, political lawyering existed in the colonial field – with the Indian Supreme
Court becoming an important guardian of political liberties – where class and
ethnic identity did not determine the legal status of the practicing lawyers or the
content of their decisions when sitting in court.136On the contrary, as Ataouia Kralfa
shows in her analysis of the bar associations in Algeria, most of the practicing lawyers
in the colonial field in Algeria were located in positions that were strongly deter-
mined by their class, race, and gender, and they had little room to maneuver around
these socio-ethnic boundaries.137
The division of the French academic field, with strong and autonomous metro-
politan institutions, and weak and subordinate colonial institutions in Algeria, thus
protected those anti-colonial students who, like Mohammed Bedjaoui, left Algeria
to study and have an academic career in metropolitan France. This was particularly
true in the more practical side of the field of law after the Second World War.
French historians of the legal field like Sylvie Thénault have showed that the lawyers
who represented FLN terrorists who were arrested in Algeria in the 1950s were more
protected from the repression of French authorities when they were based in Paris
than when they belonged to the Algerian field of law.138 After 1954, lawyers of either
European or Muslim descent who practiced in Algeria and who defended the FLN
were fiercely chased by the French administration, and often placed in detention
camps, like Amar Bentoumi (1923–2013), who left Algeria in 1957 to join the Algerian
Provisional Government (in French, GPRA) after escaping the French watch,
before becoming Algeria’s first Minister of Justice in 1962 – before Mohammed
Bedjaoui.139Metropolitan lawyers, like Jacques Vergès (1924–2013), a French lawyer
of Caribbean and Vietnamese origin, enjoyed more freedom than his Algerian
colleagues to delegitimize French law by using the courtroom to publicly denounce
the torture of political prisoners – what Vergès called the defense “strategy of
rupture”140 that he and other FLN defenders practiced after 1957. Lawyers in
Algeria, some of them close to the Communist party, were also arrested and placed
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in detention camps, like Elie Guedj, Albert Smadja, Louis Grange, and Kaddour
Sator. Several of them were even killed, like Amokran Ould Aoudia (1925–59),
murdered by the French secret services as he walked out of his law firm.141
Assassination attempts were also ordered against them when traveling to Algiers, as
in the case of Tunisian-born Gisèle Halimi (1927–).142
In fact, this division between the metropolitan and colonial fields of law, which
structured legal practice in France before the independence of Algeria, had a strong
impact on the evolution of the field of law in the early years of the Algerian Republic.
The fact that Algerian Muslims were forced into separate tracks, with
a specialization in the study of local customary law rather than French law (or
international law, for that matter), meant that very few of the Algerian Muslims
trained in Algeria before the war could administer justice after 1962, and that among
the French judges who sat in Algerian courts, very few had developed some knowl-
edge of the legal customs that Algerian Muslims of various ethnicities followed.
Thus, an independent Algeria had to train and then hire an entire cadre of judges
and Algerian magistrates. As Mohammed Bedjaoui said in a personal interview in
spring 2017, as Minister of Justice from 1963 to 1970, he faced the “immense
challenge of replacing the colonial legislation with the Algerian legislation,”143
and the French judges with Algerian judges. Indeed, French Algeria had “reserved
all positions of judges to French citizens” as they had “represented a sector of
sovereignty that Algerians should not control.”144 Until these positions were filled,
the Algerian Republic could either choose to use the judicial “cooperation” planned
by the Evian Agreements, and rely on French coopérants to be the lawful officers and
judges of the independent Algerian state, or find its judges elsewhere.145
After Algeria’s independence, Bedjaoui thus immediately recruited the few
Algerian presidents of bar associations who had impeccable anti-colonial credentials
to serve as the judges, like Abdel Khader Francis, a lawyer and president of the local
bar from the district of Relizane to the west of Algiers, who was the brother of Ahmed
Francis, Algeria’s first Minister of the Economy and Finance. And rather than
drawing on former French judges who had held positions in Algeria (in the
French colonial field), he tried to recruit French coopérants from the French
metropolitan field but not as judges: he used them instead in lower administrative
and clerical functions, as well teachers and administrators in the University of
Algiers, where he became dean of the Law School during the same period as he
was Minister of Justice (1963–70).146 It was a process of decolonization of the
administration of justice that took some time in the making, but that was essential
to the dissolution of the colonial field of power in Algeria.
The following chapters thus pay particular attention to both continuities and
displacements in the colonial and metropolitan fields of power before and after
decolonization. They show why it is important to consider former colonial subjects
who were treated as second-class citizens before decolonization and former colonial
administrators/ethnographers who ruled over the fate of these populations as part of
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a post-national field during and after the colonial period. In particular, they demon-
strate how the logics of the colonial field before and after decolonization were key
not only to understand the trajectories of Mauss and his collaborators within the
broader field of power, but also to reconstruct the changing reception of their
published work, especially as the latter touched upon the main themes that Mauss
sought to address in his reflections on exchange of gifts: that is, the origins and




The Gift and European Solidarity
Marcel Mauss and the Politics of Reparation in Interwar Europe
In 1923 and 1924, as Marcel Mauss was preparing the rebirth of L’Année sociologique
in which he would publish The Gift, the European public was captivated by the
sovereign debt crises which threatened the stability of European economies. At stake
was the sustainability of the interwar legal order created by the Treaty of Versailles,
signed in June 1919 between Germany and the Allied Powers, and strengthened by
the League of Nations and the Reparations Commission, which calculated the
amount of debt that Germany owed to the Allies – France especially. Barely five
years after the end of a war of unprecedented human cost for the European
continent, the specter of division and armed conflict was again haunting
European nations.
The main questions that contemporaries of Mauss asked about German repara-
tions were not very different from those that sovereign debt managers and central
bankers ask today about Greece’s debt: Were they sustainable or too high for the
German economy? Should their amount be reduced or the schedule of their
payments renegotiated? Should the creditors extend a temporary suspension of
payments (a moratorium) to Germany so that the German economy would have
a chance to recover, after which Germany could repay in full what it owed to its
creditors? But the traumatic memory of a conflict that had claimed almost
ten million lives made it impossible for Mauss’s contemporaries to answer these
questions on purely technical aspects. Whether Europeans agreed, or not, to settle
the financial issues which had been central to the resolution of the conflict deter-
mined whether they would live another war – an evenmore destructive war – in their
lifetime or not.
If contemporary historians like Sally Marks now argue that German reparations
were sustainable for the German economy, and that their odious character was
merely a myth, exploited by postwar German political elites to consolidate political
power and justify their opposition to the postwar settlement,1 the dominant view in
France at the time was that reparations were a sanction against the Germans’
wartime behavior. The French and German publics saw the attribution of repara-
tions as the ascription of a moral, or as Martti Koskenniemi argues, a “metaphysical
43
guilt”2 placed on the German state, and thus no renegotiation could be opened, for
the latter would have betrayed the memory of the fallen soldiers of the Allied
nations. For Germany to be reintegrated in the concert of civilized European
nations, its government had to pay the reparations owed to the populations of
France and Belgium whose regions had been destroyed by the fury of the conflict.
Such a public perception ledmany historians to argue that the Treaty of Versailles
was too punitive, too one-sided in its assignment of responsibility and guilt, pointing
to the seemingly “unprecedented” reparations as restraining conditions that
strangled postwar economic development and cooperation: John Torpey for
instance, sees in the “reparations” provisions of the Versailles Treaty an “unambig-
uous form of ‘victor’s justice,’ which were resented accordingly.”3 Some historians
believe they were the source of the political disorder which led to the rise of the
Nazis and the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe.4 They implicitly relay
the views expressed at the time by German intellectuals, legal scholars, and politi-
cians who also presented the Allies’ requests as a series of “Diktats,”5 and who
considered that these German reparations constituted an “odious debt” which the
vanquished nation – although it signed the Versailles Treaty – did not consent to
pay.6
Mauss was deeply engaged in the debate on German reparations. In his op-eds in
Le Populaire, Mauss blamed the nationalists in the French government for framing
German payments as sanctions: he wrote, “the ones who carry the blame are the
idiots who implemented the Versailles Treaty: the French Minister of Finance,
Mr. Klotz, the right-wing press . . . the stupid crowds who believed in their claims
that ‘Germany will pay’ whatever formidable sum the French requested.”7
According to his view, it was possible to reschedule payments or cancel some part
of the German reparations if such renegotiation helped restore European solidarity
and order.
Many socialist and progressive leaders in France shared Mauss’s view of the
reparations. Some, like Mauss’s colleague Léon Blum, the leader of the French
socialist party at the time, tried to define a third way in the socialist journal Le
Populaire, as he rejected the type of unilateral cancellation of debts decided by the
Soviets which had shocked Mauss’s contemporaries, as well as the strict adherence
to treaties espoused by nationalists.8ForMauss and Blum, had theGermans decided
to unilaterally cancel their reparations obligations, they would have ruined the trust
of European nations in international cooperation and would have invited war in
response. But these French socialists also denounced the lack of flexibility of the
French government in the implementation of the economic stabilization program
decided by Germany’s creditors. Mauss and Blum argued instead in favor of “giving
time” to Germany, so that it could reconstitute its finances, honor its financial
commitments in the future, and bring the other debt-ridden European economies
back on track with peace and prosperity. The future of the European continent, and
its centrality in world affairs, was at stake.
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Furthermore, socialists around Mauss valued the concept of reparations in which
they saw the manifestation of a new type of quasi-contractual relations between the
peoples of Europe. In 1923, Léon Blum told German socialists that the reparations
were the first pan-European redistribution policies consistent with the new notion of
justice réparative. As he said, “The principle of reparations reflects one of the idealist
inspirations of the Treaty of Versailles. It is neither a punitive sanction,” Blum
added, “nor a war bounty, but a reparation for damages caused.”9 For him, the
philosophy of reparations embodied in the Versailles Treaty reflected a new pro-
gressive conception of the state, whose legitimacy derived from its ability to safe-
guard the payment of social debts that its citizens had explicitly or tacitly contracted
when forming a nation. Blum insisted that “this is the first time this principle is
applied, and it is the basis for a new Law,” and adding that “the commitment of
Germany toward France and Belgium is only a consequence of the commitment of
France and Belgium toward its own victims, which is entirely new.” Blum gave
a powerful argument to illustrate that claim: “until then,” he continued “a man
whose house was burned by the war had no right to claim reparation from the state,
which could object that there is a risk of war, when it is a supreme imperative. This
notion of reparation is a new right, a rule of collective solidarity, a principle of
national insurance, in which the socialists could only place their hopes.”10
Mauss fully agreed with his fellow socialists. Whereas international financial
relations had been completely absent from Mauss’s prewar reflections, they rose to
the top of his political and intellectual agenda after the GreatWar. In the early 1920s,
Mauss thus spared no effort accusing the nationalists on both sides of the Rhine of
misrepresenting the logic of reparations and sovereign debt relations, which embo-
died the values of multilateralism and dispassionate management in global affairs: it
was the first time indeed that a multilateral Reparations Commission was granted
the responsibility to determine the amount to be paid by Germany to the different
allies (France, but also Belgium, the UK, etc.) in a quasi-scientific manner.11
The Reparations Commission should be heard, so Mauss argued, especially when
it proposed to reschedule the payment of German reparations in order to make that
debt sustainable and place the German economy on the path of economic recovery
and reintegration in the concert of honorable European nations. There had to be
a third way between communist disorder and market discipline, along the lines that
Blum and the French socialists defined.
The reparation question included in the Versailles Treaty was thus at the very
heart ofMauss’s concerns at the time he wrote TheGift: in particular, the question of
how European solidarity could be rebuilt by having Germany pay reparations to the
Allies, and how Europe’s economic recovery could erase the scars left by the Great
War and reinstitute Europe at the center of global affairs. This proximity raises the
following questions: did the anthropology of the gift that Mauss tried to elaborate at
the same time as he wrote on international economic governance help him develop
a specific understanding of the problem of international order that other kinds of
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discourses, like economics or international law, failed to reveal? If so, what perspec-
tive did the anthropology of the gift open for Mauss’s contemporaries interested in
the question of international order?
After tracing the origins of Mauss’s conception of European solidarity back to his
wartime experiences, this chapter describes the intellectual and administrative
origins of the philosophy of reparative justice, which influenced some of the authors
of the post-1919 international economic order. By analyzing how Mauss and the
French socialists who participated in the war effort, especially at the Ministry of
Armament, interpreted the meaning of the new financial international order erected
by the reparations provisions contained in the Versailles Treaty, the chapter makes it
clear that Mauss used his anthropological essay to back up his arguments in favor of
debt rescheduling and a moratorium on payments with anthropological facts:
especially facts about the temporal conditions that must be respected in order for
reparations and other policies of debt forgiveness to create international solidarity in
a postwar context.
The Gift, so I argue, was a way for Mauss to mobilize anthropology in a juridical
battle to establish precedents that would prove that the gifts are always given back if
some unspecific amount of time separates the gift from the counter-gift. Indeed,
Mauss established that the type of debt exchange that he advocated in the context of
the German reparations debate had a long presence in European (in particular
Germanic) legal culture and practices of gift-making. In that sense, The Gift can be
read as a normative justification of the policies of sovereign debt rescheduling that
Mauss initially advocated with regard to German reparations and inter-allied debts:
anthropological knowledge helped Mauss argue that the idea of a debt moratorium
extended to Germany was in fact a perfectly normal measure to restore a European
sense of solidarity, rather than an exceptional favor, and the most secure way to
preserve the European continent from another major conflict.
1 THE WARTIME EXPERIENCE OF ALLIED FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY
A traditional historian of ideas would certainly start a chapter on the notions of
solidarity, contracts, and reparations with a survey of the important predecessors who
influenced Mauss’s conception of contractual law and social obligations, which can
be traced in The Gift and in Mauss’s earlier essays: for instance, in his 1921 article on
an “ancient form of contract among the Thraces,” in which he first demonstrated
that ancient European societies had developed a “system of total prestations,”12 very
similar to the one described by Franz Boas in his ethnography of the Kwakiutls’
“potlatch,” which led him to conclude that the logic of gift exchange that he later
claimed to have uncovered was indeed universal. Such a historian would then
emphasize the intellectual debt that Mauss owed to his uncle, Emile Durkheim,
who defined the notion of solidarity in sociological terms in his famous book De la
division du travail social,13 but also the inspirationMauss drew from Alfred Fouillée,
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another sociologist and philosopher of law; or from Léon Bourgeois and Charles
Gide, who, like Durkheim, differentiated between societies depending on their
forms of the solidarity – “mechanic” or “organic,” depending upon how societies
organized the division of labor.14 This is not the perspective that I adopt in this
chapter.
Instead of a pure intellectual and disciplinary history of ideas, I would like to
contextualize the key notions such as debt obligations, reparations, quasi-contracts,
which Mauss introduces in The Gift, by identifying their meanings when they
circulated within the political debates of his time, which related to the question of
Allied solidarity during the Great War; and afterwards, with the question of German
reparations to the Allies. If Mauss and his friends had helped workers create
cooperatives and wholesales before the Great War, the protracted conflict soon
revealed the necessity of European nations to launch a total war, in which all
economic sectors, all genders, and all ethnicities were to be mobilized. As the war
mobilization escalated, the young Durkheimian intellectuals soon helped industri-
alists create cooperatives, and bankers as well, with the patriotic goal of helping the
democratic Allies win the Great War against the German autocrats and their allies.
It is interesting to see how the notions of solidarity and cooperation, far from
disappearing from the vocabulary of the socialists and Durkheimians who had
been the most fervent advocates for peace before the war, took on this new meaning
during and after the Great War: the international solidarity manifested by the
alliance treaties was translated into a gigantic effort of contractualization and
mutualization of the economic wartime effort of the French, British, and
American war industries against Germany and its own allies.
During the war, Albert Thomas and his Ministry of Armament realized one of the
most important reorganizations of industrial production and international trade in
modern history, which was directly inspired by the prewar cooperativist movement
in favor of wholesales and mutualization of contracts.15 This effort was largely
concentrated on the war industries and their financing, as the latter had to meet
strict production goals for the allied armies to keep up with Germany’s efforts. For
these industries to be able to increase their productivity, Thomas forced workers and
industrialists to sit at the table to negotiate conventions fixing salaries, production
targets, and labor conditions. The Ministry also negotiated procurement plans with
Allies to ensure access to raw materials and industrial goods not produced in France
as well as to ensure the stability of its currency, in order to be able to meet its
financial obligations throughout the course of the war.16 Thus, the state did not
substitute itself for the private initiative, but it helped private interests organize
themselves at the industry level so as to optimize the division of labor and the
organization of trade for the allies’ interest – thus creating a sense of solidarity
between the classes within the same society and across societies.
Even if Mauss did not directly participate in planning the war effort, as he found
a role as a translator attached to the twenty-seventh division of the British army, he
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obtained firsthand knowledge of the initiatives undertaken at the Ministry of
Armament to turn the cooperativist philosophy into concrete action. “L’Année
holds the keys” to the Ministry of Armament, as Durkheim anxiously wrote to
Mauss in August 1915.17 By 1915, the Durkheimians were heavily involved in the
industrial planning effort. Simiand and Halbwachs were trying to find new opti-
mized ways to reconfigure the international division of labor between the Allies in
an attempt to create what we would today call “global commodity chains,” by
bringing, for instance, British coal with Algerian minerals into the same chain of
production.18 Long gone were the days when Hubert, Simiand, Mauss, and
Durkheim divided the book reviews among their little group for L’Année
sociologique.
Simiand was not the only trained economist inspired by solidarism and socialism
to join Thomas at theMinistry of Armament. Among other legal scholars of solidarist
inspiration, we can cite Israel William Oualid (1880–1942), born in Algiers’ Jewish
community, who, like all other Durkheimians, had been a member of the League of
Human Rights founded during the Dreyfus affair, and who would later write
important work on the costs of the Great War with Charles Gide, as well as works
on money, tariffs, and exchange rates.19 Arthur Fontaine (1860–1931), a former
student of Polytechnique and chief inspector of work, who entertained a brilliant
Parisian life with parties attended by artists and novelists like Charles Gide’s nephew
André Gide,20 and who later worked to found the International Labor Organization
(ILO) with Albert Thomas, also joined the group.21 Among these men, Mauss
entertained a rich correspondence throughout the war with his best friend and
coauthor, Henri Hubert, mobilized in 1915, whom Albert Thomas wrote had
become the “soul of the automobile service” in the Ministry, before engaging in
economic and political negotiation with Russia in 1917, and then overseeing the
restitution of works of art by the Germans to the Belgians and French after the war.22
Last, one other economist joined Thomas’s team: Max Lazard, the son of Simon
Lazard of Lazard Frères,23 who had known Simiand andMauss at least since 1908.24
Max Lazard entered Thomas’s cabinet before being sent to Washington to organize
the purchase of war materials on behalf of the French war industries (which had thus
mutualized their calls for materials), and then working together with Arthur
Fontaine on drafting the articles of the Versailles Treaty that established the ILO,
which he joined with Thomas and Fontaine after its creation. As reflected in his
correspondence, Mauss remained in close touch with Max Lazard before and after
the war, as the two men continued to contribute financially to the same socialist
cooperative until at least 1927.25Theymixed at social events with some cooperativists
de passage in Paris, like Robert Hunter (1874–1942), an American sociologist,
philanthropist, and activist involved in the fight against child labor.26 Even when
Thomas was replaced at the top of the Ministry of Armament in 1917 by Louis
Loucheur (1872–1932), another Polytechnicien and self-made man in the
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construction sector in France, some of the Durkheimians like Halbwachs left, but
the Ministry kept the same orientation.
During the war, Paris was thus not an uninteresting place to live in, and the
Ministry of Armament not a bad location to start planning the shape of the postwar
financial order in Europe. If, as recorded by Marcel Proust, the nightlife had
dramatically changed compared to the glorious days of the belle époque, as many
of the young aristocrats who entertained parties and salons had been killed in the
trenches, the daily life of Ministry officials was full of stimulating intellectual
opportunities for the young sociologists and economists interested in participating
in the reorganization of the war economy. It was also full of opportunities for the
young Durkheimian sociologists to develop new friendships with the French bank-
ers associated with the financing of war procurement: indeed, the officials of the
Ministry of Armament also had to make sure that the French state could meet the
payments due to the Anglo-American Allies in exchange for weapons and other
military materials. In this regard, the presence of Max Lazard, whom Mauss knew
well, in the Ministry ensured that the other Durkheimians would have access to
some of the prominent members of the newly founded inter-allied Commission on
Exchanges, charged with the stabilization of the franc during the war, and who
included André Lazard (1869–1931), Max Lazard’s brother, among its members.
If Mauss knew Max Lazard well before the war, he may, although it is not
certified, have met André Lazard, as the latter also spent the first two years of the
war working as a translator in the headquarters of the British army of General Haig.
Mauss later acknowledged in The Nation that a friend of his at the Commission on
Exchanges provided him with key insider knowledge about currency stabilization,
and it could have been André Lazard.27 In 1916, after joining the service of Governor
General Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934) in Morocco and then Lyautey’s services at the
Ministry of War, when the latter became Minister,28 André Lazard was sent back to
work at the Lazard bank, which was the Banque de France’s operator of the
exchange market, and at the newly founded Commission on Exchanges.
The presence of the Lazard Frères owners in this Commission was perfectly justified
by the fact that the question of exchanges was indeed deeply related to the market of
gold, and that the bank Lazard Frères had carved out a very specific role for itself in
that market: at the turn of the nineteenth century, the bank invested in a new line of
business – the transfer of gold from the US to France (and vice versa).29
With the prewar system known as the “gold standard,” any transaction could
indeed be monetized either in local currency or in gold. Importers thus had an
interest in paying in gold rather than in local currency if the price of the latter was
higher than the amount of gold they would have to ship to the exporting country.
Around the time of the Dreyfus affair, the first generation of Lazard bankers, a family
of French Jews who had left the eastern region of France after its annexation by the
Germans in 1871, had established a network of banks in Paris, San Francisco,
New York, and London, and started operating on the gold market in 1884, for
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“other reasons than profit,”30 according to Alexandre Weill, one of the bank’s
founders. Prestige was one of these reasons: indeed, in the 1880s, the Banque de
France had started to invest massively in the acquisition of gold, in order to foster the
activities of its importing and exporting industries, so that they might one day benefit
from the relative differences between the price of gold and the local currencies
where they exported or imported goods. Thanks to their investment in the purchase,
transport, and sale of gold, the Lazard banking network thus created a privileged
relationship with this very prestigious client: the Banque de France, which relied on
its discretion to conduct its “gold policy.”31
For the Lazard bank, helping the French central bank even when it was not the
most profitable line of business was not a disinterested act, although it was also
a manifestation of the banking partners’ patriotism: as the founder of the Weill
dynasty (later the David-Weill dynasty) liked to remind his family, a serious financial
establishment could not always seek short-term profits, but it had to shoulder its
clients in times of crisis, in the hope of being given back profits in times of opulence.
As Alexandre Weill wrote, “reciprocity [between a creditor and its client] imposes
itself. If we give this, we must obtain that. Donnant, donnant, this is the law of
business.”32 As he added, “When profit margins are reduced, we have to keep serving
our clients with the same zeal as before, and we can even take advantage of these
business cycles, as we may gain new clients rejected by the indifference of other
financial institutions.”33 This precept was all the more true when the client was as
prestigious as the Banque de France, and in the transition from peacetime to
wartime.
The Lazard bank faithfully applied this principle when the war with Germany
broke out in 1914. At the onset of the war, the bank J.P. Morgan had obtained
agreement from the British government to serve as the sole intermediary for all
purchases of food and war material in the United States – organizing a kind of
“wholesale” whose task was to obtain better prices than could be obtained by
individual British bidders. Understandably, J.P. Morgan wished to play the same
role for the French government.34 But the Paris and New York Lazard branches
objected to the fee that J.P. Morgan had negotiated for all transactions (soon
amounting to billions of US dollars) – which was duly relayed by the French
press. Very quickly, the Lazard Frères bank succeeded in securing their role as the
main transporter of the gold that the Banque de France loaned to the French
government to pay the collateral on US and British sales of war material.
Throughout the war, they didn’t charge any fee for the services they offered to the
French government, despite the fact they obtained a quasi-monopoly on the
exchange of gold.35
This offer was not the only gift that the Lazard bank offered to the French nation.
Lazard Frères also helped the French government launch large national subscrip-
tions (emprunts nationaux). Indeed, as real patriots, they fully supported the mission
defined by the French Prime Minister Ribot:
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Wehave to bring the reserves we have. At this time, egoism is not only synonymwith
cowardice and treason, but it would also be the worst foolhardiness. What should
these reserves become if France shall not be victorious? They would become the
ransom asked from us rather than the price of victory. This is why the army of
French savings shall arise: like the army that fights, it is the army of France.36
In fact, this willingness to form close ties with the French central bank, and to gain
prestige from a reciprocal relationship formed by the mutual exchange of services
and gifts, was continued by Alexandre Weill’s son, David Weill (later David David-
Weill), when the franc became the target of speculative attacks in the mid 1920s. But
we will come back to this other episode later. What matters here is that within “the
army of French savings,” the Lazard bank partners certainly had reached the rank of
a four-star General by the end of the war, and the Lazard brothers provided a unique
source of information on the operations of Franco-American operators in high
finance for the Durkheimian officials in the Ministry of Armament – and through
them, for Mauss, who became extremely interested in financial affairs during and
after the war.
Indeed, if, after the war, Mauss remained interested in the question of workers’
cooperatives and was consulted as an expert on the subject by Albert Thomas (the
Director of the ILO in Geneva until his premature death in 1932),37 he moved on to
discuss mostly topics related with high finance in a series of publications in La vie
socialiste and Le populaire, the latter a journal partially funded by the new leader of
the SFIO (Léon Blum), Belgian cooperatives, and private donors.38 With the
disbanding of the Commission on Exchanges following the end of the war, one
the main questions that preoccupied Mauss and other Durkheimian friends of his,
like Henri Hubert, was whether or not France would be able to meet the financial
obligations it had contracted for the service of its war debts; and whether or not
France’s monetary policy would dramatically increase the price of those debts. This
is why Mauss and his friends praised the work of the Reparations Commission,
which, after the Versailles Treaty was signed, was endowed with the responsibility to
help France and other bankrupt European nations shoulder their debt and stabilize
their currency in order to avoid the eruption of another deadly conflict.
2 GUILT AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE GERMAN REPARATIONS
SCHEME
Today, it may not appear evident that the work of the Reparations Commission
prefigured the postwar role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as stabilizer
of currency parities,39 which is why it is important to come back to the history of the
legal concept of reparations in the peace negotiations: it is necessary if we want to
understand why Mauss found it crucial to write about the debt swaps that the
Reparations Commission organized between European nations, and to hail it as
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an exemplary model of global governance in the field of international economic
relations. Indeed, many historians continue to see in the “reparations” provisions of
the Versailles Treaty a form of victor’s justice, which imposed an odious and
unsustainable debt on a vanquished nation; and they see in the Reparations
Commission the arm of the creditor nations, like France, whose revengeful instincts
were revealed when the latter invaded Germany’s richest regions when Germany
defaulted on its debt servicing obligations.40
During the Great War, it is true that many French nationalists conceived of
reparations as a rightful penalty against the crime of aggression committed by the
German Emperor against the Belgian and French armies rather than as
a mechanism of macroeconomic stabilization. That interpretation was particularly
fashionable among the French jurisconsults in the Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and the Enforcement of Penalties (hereafter,
Commission on Responsibilities), formed at the end of the war to prepare parts of
the Versailles Treaty. The German responsibility in causing the war was debated in
the Commission on Responsibilities, which concluded that Germany was indeed
responsible for the war and recommended the prosecution of the German emperor
for the violation of “international morality and the sanctity of treaties” – a demand
that was included in the section on penalties (articles 227–230) of the Versailles
Treaty.41
The discussion of this notion of responsibility actually started in the early days of the
war when the French government tasked none other than Emile Durkheim to write
an official document challenging the German doctrine according to which the out-
break of the war had been Russia’s responsibility.42 As Durkheim wrote to his nephew
in December 1914, he believed that his brochure established the “irrefutable demon-
stration” of Germany’s responsibility in starting the war.43 Then, in a publication
commissioned by the French government on the role of war in the German “men-
tality,” Durkheim went even further: he wrote that the responsibility of the German
state in the declaration of war was not only imputable to a series of fateful tactical
decisions by the German leadership which forced the Austro-Hungarian Empire to
declare war on Serbia and thus on Russia, but it also corresponded to broader general
traits in the “German mentality”44 – a claim he found less irrefutable, as he later told
Mauss.45 Inmany ways, the notion of responsibility found in these essays, written at the
beginning of the war, was still ambiguous enough to be interpreted as criminal guilt or
as simple financial responsibility in the civil law sense.
In the Commission on Responsibilities, the French were represented by
a politician and a legal scholar with political leanings far from the Durkheimian:
André Tardieu (1875–1945) and Ferdinand Larnaude (1853–1942). Tardieu, an
editorialist and right-wing politician who would go on to become President of the
Council (Prime Minister) of France, served as adviser to Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau (1841–1929) in the peace negotiations. As the deputy of the Territory of
Belfort, a small department that had been carved out from the larger regions of
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Alsace and Lorraine,46 and which had symbolized the heroic resistance of the
French against the Germans in the 1871 war, Tardieu was ardently nationalist –
and even anti-Semitic – as well as imperialist; in fact, he was involved in various
scandals of the French administration of the Congo before the war, which placed
him in direct confrontation with Jean Jaurès and Albert Thomas, as discussed in the
next chapter. Politically, Larnaude stood halfway between Tardieu and Bourgeois:
although the latter had been one of Larnaude’s mentors, Larnaude’s strong anti-
German feelings brought him closer to Albert de Lapradelle, a jurisconsult for the
Minister of Foreign Affairs with whom Larnaude participated in a committee work-
ing to define the legal notion of reparations.
For Tardieu, Larnaude, and other French jurisconsults, the French demands that
Germany pay some reparations after the war manifested the continued “national
union” against the enemy and the clear expression of the French state’s will to win
the economic peace after winning the war. It was motivated by the duty to sanction
Germany for its unacceptable behavior during the war and its criminal responsibility
in the multiplication of war crimes (invasion of a neutral country,47 state terrorism
against civilian populations, use of gas, and chemical warfare).48 In the deliberations
of the Commission on Responsibilities, Larnaude and Tardieu repeatedly argued
that the reference to Germany’s “responsibility” as a state should in fact be discussed
in the context of international prosecution of the crimes committed by the German
army.49 The final Commission Report argued that a failure to punish violations of
the laws and customs of war in defense of absolute sovereignty would “shock the
conscience of civilized mankind,” emphasizing that “the public conscience insists
upon a sanction”50 (which was how they framed the question of reparations).51Thus,
in this sense, responsibility was conceived as the mark of criminal guilt.
When the Council of Four (Allied heads of state), which decided the final
wording of the Treaty,52 presented it to the French and British public opinion, the
nationalist interpretation of German reparations (as a blame and sanction against
Germany’s conduct) seemed to prevail: the press, outraged over German war crimes,
called for retribution and ascribed moral guilt to Germany for the atrocities of the
war. Calls to “Hang the Kaiser”53 and punish war criminals played an especially
prominent role in the British parliamentary elections of 1918.54 The British proposal
to prosecute the German Emperor also met with enthusiastic approval from the
French Premier, Georges Clemenceau,55 who presented the peace settlement to his
compatriots as a complete vindication of France’s 1870 defeat: France legally
recovered the territories that it had lost in 1870 (Alsace and Lorraine) and obtained
new colonial territories (like Cameroon and half of Togo, the other half going to the
British, which also gained German colonies in East Africa, when Japan obtained
German colonies in the Pacific), as well as reparations from the Germans.
But even if Tardieu and Larnaude rejected the notion that reparations could be
tied to France’s alleged “responsibility” to compensate for war damages,56 or that
reparations would express some form of social solidarity between citizens of the same
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nation (France) or continent (Europe), another more progressive and positive
understanding of the “duty to repair” existed at the time, in which reparations
were indeed tied to a notion of solidarity that was to become the basis of a new
right for citizens in Europe: the right to have one’s properties restored if destroyed
because of a war. The ambiguity over the meaning of “reparations” and their
consequences – in large part a product of the decentralized process of negotiation
of the Versailles Treaty57 – was thus due to the presence of conflicting forces in the
French field of power, which resulted in a power struggle over the meaning of the
financial obligations created by the Treaty.
Against the nationalist interpretation, the notion of responsibility was associated
with generous calls to act responsibly in favor of European postwar financial
solidarity – which is how Mauss and his friends, like Gide, Blum, or Hubert,
understood the concept of responsibility. Solidarists read in the sixteen articles
(231–247, and all the annexes) of the Versailles Treaty the description of
a collective institutional machinery set up to decide the amount of, and monitor
the payment of, German reparations, so that Germany could be reintegrated in the
European community of responsible states. On the one hand, solidarists admitted
that these articles established “the responsibility [rather than guilt] of Germany and
her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated
Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war
imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies” (article 231). But
on the other hand, the Versailles Treaty also planned the establishment of
a Commission of Reparations, to determine the extent to which Germany could
“make complete reparation for all such loss and damage done to the civilian
population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property during the
period of the belligerency”58 (article 232).
Furthermore, the Versailles Treaty also specified that Germany would “make
a special issue of bearer bonds” (article 232) to restore the properties of civilians, the
final amount of which, as well as the schedule of payments, depended on the
recommendation of the Reparations Commission (article 233),59 which shall “give
to the German Government a just opportunity to be heard.” This last sentence was
especially important, as it meant that the reparations philosophy did not hinge on
the German admission of guilt, but instead, the recognition of some collective
responsibility among European nations in repairing the war damages caused by
states to Allied populations especially, as the latter had suffered to a much greater
extent from the war destructions than the Germans.60
For the solidarists, the notion of reparation was thus based on the notions of
financial responsibility and solidarity found in other legal texts, such as a law passed
by the French Parliament that tied together these notions of responsibility. This law,
passed on October 22, 1915, stated in part: “The Republic proclaims the equality of
all Frenchmen and the solidarity of nations in supporting the costs of war; the
damages caused in France to the movable properties and real estate property, by
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acts of warfare, open the right to a complete reparation.”61 As Charles Gide later
commented, this law expressed a form of “national solidarity, which had never
before been expressed in such an affirmative way by France” – after previous wars,
like in 1870, “it was said that the victims of the war might be compensated for their
loss, but nothing was done, and nobody had raised to the possibility of complete
reparation.”62 As Louis Loucheur (Albert Thomas’s successor as Minister of
Armament in 1917 and then Minister of Liberated Territories in 1921 and 1922),
explained to Chancellor Rathenau in mid June 1921, the reparations provisions in
the Versailles Treaty were a direct emanation of the same philosophy that had
inspired the French 1915 law establishing the state’s new duty to repair.63
Léon Bourgeois and Louis Loucheur moved the analysis of reparations architec-
ture away from the political debates about alleged German “guilt” and back to the
progressive elaboration of a body of international law concepts, such as collective
responsibility, duty to repair, collective insurance. They were actively involved in
this effort to promote recognition of a European social debt to the civilian victims of
the war: Europe had a debt to those Belgians and Frenchmen whose private wealth
was destroyed because their possessions were located on the battlefield. Léon
Bourgeois, who was the rapporteur on the Versailles Treaty to the French
Parliament, saw in the principle of reparations a formidable advance for European
civilization precisely because the treaty clearly distinguished reparations from
indemnities, as the Allies did not ask “any indemnity from Germany in compensa-
tion for the military expenses.”64 As Bourgeois added, the American delegation had
opposed the inclusion of war costs, as the Germans had only accepted reparations for
civilian losses in their “pre-armistice agreement.”65 Eventually, they settled for
a sum which was close to 160 billion francs – to compensate the French civilian
population mostly for damages directly caused by bombardments (85 billion) and
pensions to war invalids and widows (60 billion) – and they excluded the payment of
an indemnity (to reimburse war costs) which would have amounted to another
143 billion francs.66
For solidarists, special financial measures included in the Versailles Treaty thus
simply ensured that the Allied populations would not suffer more than the German
population from the financial burden created by war debts – which would have been
the case in the absence of reparations, as most destruction had happened on Belgian
and French soil.67 For them, the reparations scheme illustrated the broad philoso-
phy of financial responsibility that the architects of peace asked all European nations
to observe. Indeed, according to the peace settlement with Germany (and Austro-
Hungary), each state was asked to act responsibly in order to maintain the collective
order and to accept some redistribution to equalize the burden of war debts.
The notion of financial responsibility was not only found in the Versailles Treaty
signed between the Allies and Germany, but also in other peace treaties, like the
Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, signed in September 1919 by the Allies and the
successor states to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. These peace treaties
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established the idea that old debt contracts between the defeated central European
empires should be honored by the new nations formed after the war. Past debt
contracts could be restructured only in extreme circumstances, if the people had not
consented to the borrowing and the proceeds had not benefited the people at the
time debt was contracted.68 All the newly created states in Central Europe had thus
to accept to pay debts that they had not contracted, in order for Europe to remain
financially stable. Alexander Sack (1890–1955), a Russian émigré who worked in
France on the question of sovereign debt restructuring in the context of state
succession, found only one example of cancelled debt in Europe: that of Poland
(a new state created out of the association of territories formerly under either
German or Russian authority and control), which was relieved from a small part
of the debt (an amount to be fixed by the Reparations Commission) contracted by
the Germans to fund their occupation and colonization of Polish lands (article
254).69
This reading of the financial provisions contained in the peace treaties was thus in
line with the general solidarist ideology of Charles Gide and Marcel Mauss, for
whom to repudiate debts in a unilateral way – as the Bolsheviks had done – would
have been a crime against the principle of reciprocity, or interdependence.70 For
Mauss, when Bolsheviks rejected the Tsarist debts and confiscated the property
rights of foreign nationals on Russian soil, they had failed to honor “the tacit
international contracts”71 – in solidarist parlance, the quasi-contracts – and had
destroyed the national and international trust in the Soviet regime, leading to the
“disappearance of the sources of all social life: trust and good faith”72 – a conclusion
with which Max Lazard was in total agreement, as he wrote to Mauss.73 For Mauss,
the negative international reaction to Russia’s revolution was thus the logical con-
sequence of Russia’s inconsequent ignorance of the founding principles of interna-
tional law (good faith and avoidance of unilateral acts), since “a State has only the
right to apply its laws to its citizens and to the foreign nationals who are residents, but
it has to avoid giving the appearance of committing any injustice and any violations
against tacit international contracts, e.g. against public and private international
law.”74
It is important to contextualize these debates about financial responsibility in the
political discussions of the German reparations and Europe’s financial order, as our
analysis of Mauss’s notion of gift exchange, which he introduced in this context, may
be misguided by more recent utilizations of Mauss’s concepts in the context of
present-day debates about international economic governance, which are marked by
the ever-widening opposition between left-wing thinkers and anthropologists, and
the multilateral financial institutions, like the IMF, which impose unrealistic con-
ditionalities on debtor states, in Europe and elsewhere. But, in fact, a world separates
the present-day calls for unilateral debt cancellation proposed by left-wing thinkers
such as David Graeber or Eric Toussaint – the Belgian historian and president of the
Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debts, who was selected in 2015 by the
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left-wing President of the Greek Parliament, Zoe Konstantopoulou, to conduct the
“citizen audit” of the Greek debt75 – in the context of the present-day Greek
sovereign debt crisis, and the calls in favor of “financial responsibility” expressed
by Mauss and Gide in the immediate post-Versailles context. Even if present-day
anthropologists like Graeber claim to be inspired by Mauss, when they argue for
instance in favor of unilateral debt cancellation, the latter wrote extensively on the
sacred duty of all nations to honor their debt.
3 THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURATION
MECHANISMS IN QUESTION
If the Great War hit hard the group of Durkheimians, with the death of Durkheim
father and son, it also failed to disband them, and the economic aftermath of the war
focused their attention on the same question: whether the wartime industrial
cooperation and financial solidarity between Allies could survive the end of the
war, or whether the defeated Germany could be included in the circle of Allies in
order to restore a sense of European solidarity, in particular against the Soviet threat.
These questions were indeed central in the writings of the Durkheimians –Mauss in
particular – that focused on the role of German reparations in the restoration of
international solidarity and economic prosperity in the European continent, where
new nations had carved a space for themselves on the debris of the Central European
empires.
Among those who argued that the Versailles Treaty served to establish
a framework for the financial organization of international solidarity in Europe
after the war, Marcel Mauss became particularly active: from 1920 to 1924, Mauss
published more than forty editorials in Le Populaire, in which he defended his
reading against those in the right-wing government, who, like Louis-Lucien Klotz
(the Minister of Finance from 1917 to 1920 and a Jewish native of Alsace, like Mauss
himself) or André Tardieu, had claimed that reparations were due to France because
of Germany’s guilt in starting the war and later conducting atrocities.76 As Mauss
wrote about Klotz, he was “the only Jew who does not understand a word of finance,”
and he suspected that George Clemenceau, the French President, “perhaps display-
ing satanic tendencies,” had nominated him as Minister of Finance to “expiate the
sins of Israel and of the nation”77 and turn him into a scapegoat for the German
public, who would later associate the requirement that Germany pay formidable
sums to France with a transnational Jewish plot.
In contrast, Mauss consistently lauded the work of the multilateral Reparations
Commission gathered in Brussels in December 1920 to recalculate the amount of
the reparations. The Reparations Commission included many among Mauss’s
friends and cooperativist collaborators, like Charles Gide and Louis Loucheur
representing France, and Jean Monnet (1888–1979), who was also a friend of
André Lazard, representing the League of Nations as its first Secretary General.78
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The French team led by Gide also included Charles Rist (1874–1955), a professor of
law and economics who coauthored with Gide the Histoire des Doctrines
Economiques, and whose book on La Déflation was lauded by Mauss in
L’Année;79 as well as Arthur Fontaine, the labor inspector and philanthropist, who
joined Albert Thomas and Max Lazard at the ILO in Geneva after the war. Mauss
was convinced that the French government should follow the recommendations of
the Reparations Commissions, which had become the official institutional conduit
for the harmonization of national accounts in Europe as well as for negotiations of
sovereign debt rescheduling in a globalizing world economy conducted across the
Atlantic.80
At a time of reopening European markets and European-wide investments in
reconstruction efforts, members of the Reparations Commission believed that it
should fully participate in the establishment of a common legal architecture govern-
ing financial flows – in the same way the IMF played the role of ensuring currency
stabilization from the end of the Second World War to the dismantlement of the
Bretton Woods system that occurred with the end of dollar–gold convertibility. For
Charles Gide and his collaborators, reparations were meant to fairly balance the
price of the war among the warring parties so that European solidarity could be
reconstituted on sustainable grounds.81 As Charles Gide and Albert Thomas’s for-
mer collaborator IsraelWilliamOualid noted, “[a]mong the damages resulting from
the war, we have the debts that each warring party has contracted, which weigh to
a greater extent on the victors than on the vanquished.”82 This imbalance in the
weight of the war debts between victors and vanquished was precisely what the
German reparations were supposed to eliminate: there was no point asking
Germany too much to pay, or too little.
The debt imbalances resulting from the unequal distribution of war destructions
in Europe meant a kind of macroeconomic system of debt redistribution should be
found for each sovereign debt to be sustainable. As Mauss wrote, in Brussels:
illustrious experts (Irving [Fisher] from New York, [Charles] Gide from Paris,
[Arthur Cecil] Pigou from Cambridge) agreed on the substantive claims that it
was necessary: 1) to fix a rational reparations policy based on a reasonable estimate of
the credit and debit of each warring party; 2) to devalue depreciated moneys in
proportion of that estimate; 3) in themeantime, to find enough international capital
in order [for central banks] to let enough gold circulate to restore the gold
standard.83
Thus, the Reparations Commission conducted what the IMF now calls debt
sustainability assessment (DSAs) as a preliminary step before any negotiation of
the amount of German reparations it was legally mandated by the Versailles Treaty
to ascribe to the Germans. This turned the Commission into an essential mechan-
ism of financial transfer and macroeconomic regulation. The holistic and forward-
looking strategy adopted by the Reparations Commission to treat the problem of
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reparations meant that economists integrated reparations within the broader context
of Europe’s sovereign debt problem – or rather, they inferred the reparations from
the overall credit and debit of each European nation, including an overall estimate
of all the wartime debts contracted to domestic and international actors.
The numbers were the product of a collective study commissioned by James
Shotwell (1874–1965), an economic and diplomatic historian at Columbia
University and Director at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, to
support the work of the Reparations Commission.84
From the assessment of the credit and debit of each nation, the Reparations
Commission inferred how much debt (including German debt in the form of
reparations) could be written off for each nation. For example, the experts deter-
mined at the Brussels Conference “that France owes 219 billion prewar francs in
loans,” mostly borrowed on French capital, and to a small extent (about one-sixth, or
38 billion) on foreign (British and American) creditors.85 “This amount,” Gide
continued:
corresponded exactly to our estimate of the general wealth of France; or if we prefer
to measure interest rather than capital, it corresponded to 14 billion francs-gold, to
which were added 10 billion francs-gold in pensions to invalids, widows and
children (a debt also contracted because of the war), which meant that France
had to pay 24 billion francs-gold of interest, e.g. more than 70 per cent of the total
yearly income which was not over 35 billion.86
The French debt was thus unsustainable if the Germans refused to pay some
reparations, which is why international experts computed that Germany would
need to pay annual payments of 3 billion gold marks each year for forty-two
years – an amount that seemed more reasonable than the initial French govern-
ment’s proposal, which had asked Germany to pay forty-two annual payments of
12 billion gold marks (to reimburse a total Allied need of 200 billion gold marks with
France claiming 110 billion gold marks).87
The assessment of the credit and debit of each European nation was the pre-
liminary step before the implementation of a general policy of debt cancellation or
stabilization of all Europeanmoneys (not just themark): “a legal change in the value
of the money, a procedure which we call ‘stabilization,’ a euphemism” for the
reevaluation of the debt, as Gide wrote. The Reparations Commission demanded
that all nations (including the French) assess exactly how much debt they could
support and how much they would have to write off. For Gide and Oualid, France’s
creditors, for instance, should not expect to recover the entirety of their wartime
loan, as “the taxpayers would have to give away the entirety of their fortunes to pay
back the nation’s debt to the stockholders (or 70 percent of their yearly income).”88
As Mauss wrote, it was of paramount importance for the French people to realize
that from “creditors of the whole world, the French people have become debtors,
whose creditworthiness . . . depended on their ability to retain gold” and to “stabilize
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the French franc”89 at its right parity with the gold standard, e.g. at the amount of
gold the French central bank possessed inside France and in obligations outside.
In 1921, the Reparations Commission seemed to work relatively well: in anticipa-
tion that the Germans would not be able to pay their reparation debt for that year,
Germany’s creditors engaged in a new round of negotiations on reparations, which
ended in London in May 1921 with the London Agreement. The British asked
France to honor legality rather than occupy the Ruhr, as the Versailles Treaty
stipulated that sanctions should occur after a default of payment, and not in
anticipation of a default.90 With the London Agreement, the German reparation
debt was restructured in order to avoid seeing Germany default. The Reparations
Commission set a new total at 132 billion (rather than 200 billion) gold marks to be
paid in two steps: first the Germans would pay the annual interest and amortization
of a loan of 50 billion gold marks used for Allied reconstruction (corresponding to
2 billion gold marks per year, the sum that the Germans had proposed to pay in 1919,
plus some 26 percent of the benefits of German exports); second, after German
economic recovery, the Germans would pay the interest and amortization on
another Allied loan for the remaining 82 billion gold marks.91 This was a major
“haircut” on the public debt owed by Germany to its neighbors, but it wasn’t sure it
would be enough to solve the problems in the long term.
Unfortunately, the same problems that plagued Germany’s currency and
Europe’s economic recovery in 1921 resurfaced in 1922: the 1921 London
Agreement between Allied governments had only postponed the solution to the
problem of German reparations, but it had failed to address the institutional weak-
ness of the Reparations Commission, which could only hope that their recommen-
dations would influence macroeconomic policies in France as well as in Germany.
But hope and persuasion was all they got, since the German government largely
ignored its calls for stabilization, while the French government continued to insist
on full payment of the renegotiated sum. In 1921, Germany had failed to pay the
annuity because it stumbled upon two ongoing problems: inflation first, and the
balance of payment second. Indeed, the German chancellor failed to convince
the German financial conglomerates to stop issuing credits, thereby raising the
mass of monetary instruments in circulation in Germany, which fueled what
Mauss called the “policy of bankruptcy” of the German government, as “the
German Republic wished to demonstrate that it could not pay the reparations that
the Allied bankers believed it capable of paying.”92 As Loucheur told Léon Blum
in July 1922, while the two were elected deputies, Germany should be “sincere and
clear about its desire to comply with its international legal obligations,” when
instead, its monetary policy “encouraged the plunge of the mark,” to the discredit
of its “standing and its interest,” which were intrinsically associated with France’s
“ability to be repaid.”93
Furthermore, the payment of reparations heightened Germany’s balance-of-
payments problems: due to the large decrease of its foreign exports during the war
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and postwar eras, Germany did not have enough foreign currency to pay reparations
with French and Belgian francs and British pounds. As a result, Germany had to sell
marks (rather than exported goods) to buy foreign moneys and pay what it owed in
reparations, and the speculation against the mark led to further depreciation.94
The French government then lobbied for the stabilization of the mark95 and agreed
to bypass the German problem of buying foreign currencies with payment in kind,
in coal or cession of shares of the industrial coal conglomerates upon which France’s
steel industries depended.96 But German industrialists, aided by the British, who
opposed the creation of large Franco-German cartels in the coal sector, successfully
opposed a tax on capital and only agreed to increased taxation on wage earners to
generate new revenues – which could never generate enough cash to pay the
reparations.
This is why in 1921, the Reparations Commission proposed to engage a much
larger and more comprehensive round of multilateral debt cancellation by the
creditors of Germany and France: this idea of multilateral debt cancellation had
been first formulated at the very beginning of the work by the two British negotiators
in the Reparations Commission, John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) and Robert
Brand (1878–1963), a British colonial administrator in South Africa and a London
banker. The world-famous British economist and his colleague had expressed their
conviction that “the United Kingdom would benefit more in the long-term from the
cancellation of French war debts, and the international prosperity that would result
from a parallel settlement of the reparations questions.”97
Keynes, who later participated in the Brussels Conference during which a first
“haircut” of German reparations had been decided, had been one of the first to
propose that the British and Americans should make the first gift by cancelling the
inter-allied debts that France (and to a lesser extent Belgium and Italy) owed them.98
Then, so Keynes reasoned, the reparations to be paid by Germany to France could
be scaled back to a reasonable level, as France and Italy would not insist on receiving
as in-kind reparations the German coal that Austria needed. Besides, for Keynes, the
inter-allied debts were “odious debts” as the loans that France had contracted in the
United States had not paid for investment in productive economic activities, but had
been used to fight a war in which the United States had claimed to act as an ally, not
by providing men but weapons.99 As Brand had said, justifying their proposal, “when
everyone adopts egoist tactics, it is human to reject altruism, but if we do not all want
to suffer, onemust make the first move, and it is within our tradition and character to
do just that.”100
But in 1922, the Reparations Commission had been unable to convince states to
move beyond a partial and limited “haircut” granted to Germany. In 1922, there was
no longer any talk of partial debt cancellation among French solidarists, including
Mauss, as the British government reimbursed all the war debts it owed to the United
States after the Cannes Conference, which had failed to generate a consensus on the
question of reparations among Germany’s creditors. So, there was no longer any
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hope that the United States would erase the wartime debt that France owed to the
New York bankers. Although Mauss had believed that a multilateral partial cancel-
lation of sovereign debts might have been an interesting solution in the early days of
the reparations debate, in 1922 this solution no longer appeared acceptable: the
British payment of their wartime debt meant that the French should do the same as
the British, and reimburse first its inter-allied debt, as “a people gets richer by paying
its debts, because . . . of all the credit it gets from the world.”101
The priority, then, was for the solidarists to convince the French government to
accept some debt rescheduling of the German reparations, by delaying German
payments and extending the number of their annuities. It was a legal trick meant to
avoid irritating the French nationalist press, which would have balked at the idea of
giving Germany another haircut on the sum of reparations it owed to France. But
the French government of Raymond Poincaré (1860–1934) conditioned his agree-
ment to reassess the schedule of German reparations to the reevaluation of the war
debts that France owed to its own creditors: the British and the American banks
(especially J.P. Morgan, which floated loans to the British and the French for almost
half a billion dollars in 1915 and 1916).102 Indeed, after the Cannes Conference, the
French government asked for Germany to either pay in full the large sum negotiated
at the time of the Versailles Treaty, or for the Allies (the United States in particular),
to cancel part (or all) of the debt that the French owed to them as a result of their
purchase of war material. This was a tough negotiating position.
For Mauss, when the French asked the United States to write off their debt first,
they committed the same mistake as the Soviets when the latter “declared the
Russian state bankrupt.”103 As the US bankers and the US government warned the
French in July 1922, they may agree to lower the inter-allied debts, but as Mauss
wrote, “if French leaders were to wait for this before their own revision of reparation,
they shall wait in vain.”104 Prefiguring his reflection in The Gift, Mauss observed the
reality of the politics of sovereign debt: no nation wanted to be the first to give, as
a gift would be perceived as a sign of weakness, and not of strength. This was
a misperception that Mauss wanted to change. In Le Populaire, Mauss told his
fellow socialists that if the French cancelled part of the German debt, then “the
British and the Americans could not but do the same, but the British and American
taxpayers would never admit that the interests of a debt contracted by France would
be cancelled if the French creditors were not first treated in a similar way,”105 i.e. if
France did not devalue the franc (and its national debt to French creditors) by
60 percent (in 1922 Mauss estimated the franc at 40 percent of its prewar value).
Such was the context in which Mauss first wrote about the need for France to
make a large gift to the Germans, and to see the circulation of sovereign debts as
based on the principles of a gift exchange economy.Mauss proposed that the French
should follow the precedent of the British government after their victory over
Napoleon: “after victory, the British lent France some money . . . the gold with
which the government of Louis XVIII operated during its first month was British
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gold which was introduced into France thanks to the Rothschilds,”106 the ancestors
of the Jewish bankers who proposed to stabilize the mark and franc in 1922. In the
absence of such a gift, Mauss believed that German default of payment was bound to
occur again in 1922. Then, inflationary cycles would continue to destroy Germany’s
ability to meet its reparations payments. This was unfortunately the most likely
outcome, asMauss was very pessimistic about this possibility. As he wrote in 1922, the
French public was misled by:
the German wish to demonstrate that Germany could not pay the reparations that
the Allied bankers believed it capable of paying, and which, for that reason, had let
its gold and its credits be exported outside of its soil, with the result that the whole
wealth of Germany was now depreciated . . . and the German public no longer
trusts the mark, but places its faith in foreign currencies instead.107
In addition to discussing the necessity for France to extend large gifts to its former
neighboring enemy, Mauss’s op-eds discussed another available instrument to
restore European solidarity: the idea of a moratorium on German reparations,
which he believed could be more acceptable to the French public. Indeed, Mauss
argued that if “the State stops paying its debts during a certain amount of time [until
it proceeds to devaluation], then it can resume its payment, which even if reduced,
would again be payment in gold, and with amortization of the debt.”108
The socialists of the SFIO, especially Blum, agreed: Blum insisted, “Germany
must meet its obligations, but to do so, we must give her the means to recover
economic prosperity.”109
The temporal sequence advised by Mauss, Hubert and Blum in 1922 looked as
follows: first, France and its Allies would make a large gift to Germany by writing off
a large amount of the reparations debts; then, Germany would take the time to
reorganize its economy and financial system; and, finally, Germany would pay back
the original gift by reimbursing its restructured debt. As Mauss underlined, it was
important “that 1) the Allies should grant a moratorium long enough to recover its
payments on its budget surplus, 2) that they should reduce the German debt to
a reasonable level, 3) that the Germans should balance their budgets; 4) that they
should stop inflation which meant adopting a higher interest rate.”110 Mauss’s
position was also shared by the British government, which urged German Foreign
Minister Rathenau to apply for a moratorium on payments, rather than accept to
default.111
Thus, Mauss introduced in his political essays of 1922 an original concern for the
temporality of debt repayments, which manifested in his reflections on the inherent
asymmetry of interstate relations. The extension of a moratorium was a useful way to
avoid deadlock between the French government and its Anglo-American creditors
over which nation would make the first gift, or, rather, which nation would be the
first to write off part of the debt that the others owed it (and what conditions would be
made on that gift), and whether default of payment would be met by sanction.
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As Henri Hubert wrote to his former Minister, Albert Thomas, the moratorium –
short of solving all the institutional problems affecting Germany’s financial health –
could be a short-term patch placed on the hemorrhage of German marks, and it was
certainly more useful than extending a short-term loan to Germany for them to pay
their reparations annuity, or erasing another section of the German debt, which the
French adamantly opposed:
Having the Germans pay 30 billion to the Allies, as this dishonest idiot of Keynes
[who was arguing for a major “haircut” in today’s parlance, from 132 billion to only
30 billion] is as hard as getting Germany to pay the 132 billion gold marks fixed in
London. The real problem is a problem of instrumentation, and the instruments
that have been used so far are just ill adapted to the situation . . . At the present
exchange rate, it is as ridiculous to ask the German government to use marks to pay
for the material [industrial equipment, coal, etc.] that it is legally obliged to send to
France as reparation-in-kind, as it is to force Germany to buy foreign currencies to
pay the few millions it has to pay in cash for reparations. The credit lines that the
financial sector may extend to the German government will not help them pay what
they owe to us: the money lent will be immediately used to temporarily restore the
value of the mark, but as a result of speculative attacks, the amount of the loan will
be immediately pocketed by the speculators who bet on the downfall of the mark.112
Thus, any loan extended to Germany will fail to produce the desired outcome.
Here’s what our politics should be: We should propose without any delay
a complete moratorium on the payment of reparations in cash, and as long as
needed for the current system of payments to be reorganized – a period which will
last for no less than six months.113
But the French public also found the moratorium impossible to accept, as long as
the Anglo-American creditors refused to erase the debt that France owed to them.
The French nationalists insisted that German reparations were the continuation of
war through other means. Helping the Germans recover first economically, before
forcing them to pay reparations, smelled of high treason. Mauss and other solidarists
had good reason to be worried.
At the end of 1922, the situation indeed seemed hopeless. J.P. Morgan refused to
cancel the debt that France owed to the bank: instead, he agreed to float a loan to
Germany so that it could avoid a default for 1922, and proposed that, in exchange,
France write off some of the amount of reparations.114 Responding to J.P. Morgan’s
offer, the government of Poincaré agreed to a partial debt rescheduling but used
a subterfuge: in inter-allied negotiations with the British and American govern-
ments, Poincaré agreed to write off only part of the 82 billion gold marks that
Germany had to pay in the future, not any of the 50 billion gold marks that it had
to start reimbursing immediately. This was in line with the programwhich Raymond
Poincaré had promised to implement when he formed his nationalist government in
France, after the French right-wing press had called for a policy of sanctions: France
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could, for instance, seize “collaterals”115 if Germany failed to honor its reparations
debts.
The whole debt renegotiation scheme was thus on the verge of collapsing. For
Mauss, the fault was Poincaré’s, whose financial solution was a “fake sacrifice since
the French would only renounce payments that could not be made, while asking the
British and American taxpayers for a large gift,”116 i.e. the immediate cancellation of
inter-allied debts. Confronted with the risk of a German default of payment, André
Lazard then encouraged the Lazard Frères of London to extend a long-term credit to
the German government so that Germany could meet its financial obligations for
1922 – but he warned his associate in London to proceed with the utmost confidenti-
ality, as any association between the name of Lazard and a credit extended to
Germany risked backfiring against the French branch and spur a rise in anti-
Semitic attacks against the Lazard Frères as a consequence.117
Indeed, on top of the financial instability, anti-Semitism and nationalism were on
the rise and showed their ugly faces when a right-wing fanatic assassinated the
German Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, during the reparations conference of
bankers held in June and July 1922. His assassination showed the price that German
politicians (especially Jews) would pay for agreeing to negotiate with the Allies, and
it ended the negotiations of a moratorium on German payment. The German
nationalists, as Mauss had feared, started to associate the payment of reparations
with a transnational Jewish plot. Does it seem so extraordinarily strange to us?
In a way, it does, and at the same time, we should recall that when Greek Finance
Minister Yanis Varoufakis called on the Greek government to abandon any plan of
unilateral debt cancellation (if only partial) and negotiate instead a moratorium on
payments and a debt rescheduling arrangement with the Troika (the IMF, the
European Central Bank (ECB), and the European Commission (EC)) in charge
of ensuring the full implementation of the plan imposed by Greece’s creditors –
a plan very much like the one that Mauss proposed in 1922 to solve Europe’s
sovereign debt crisis – many Greek nationalists and left-wing radicals saw in his
public statement the proof that he was taking his orders from the Jewish billionaire
George Soros and thus part of a Jewish conspiracy to destroy the birthplace of
Europe’s democratic traditions of sovereign autonomy.118 Sadly, history often repeats
itself, as either farce or tragedy.
4 THE GIFT: IN SEARCH OF LEGAL PRECEDENTS FOR THE
MORATORIUM ON REPARATION PAYMENTS
The difficult renegotiation of European sovereign debts raised one of Marcel
Mauss’s central lines of questioning in The Gift: How to jump-start a cycle of gift-
giving in a noncooperative game? At the same time as Marcel Mauss and Henri
Hubert wrote about the necessity for France to make a true gift to Germany by
granting it a moratorium on payments, the two friends – butMauss especially – were
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thus engaged in the rebirth of L’Année sociologique, in which Mauss eventually
published The Gift among many shorter review essays. As said previously, Mauss
finally put together the new L’Année sociologique of 1924 thanks to Max Lazard and
David David-Weill of Lazard Frères in Paris, the very same family of bankers whose
financial policy he lauded in Le Populaire.119 The new volume of L’Année socio-
logique also contained other important essays by Mauss’s collaborators, in particular
François Simiand,120 whom Mauss regularly consulted on the question of the
stabilization of the franc,121 although the latter did not agree with Mauss on every-
thing. It was thus not a surprise that the questions raised by the reparations dispute
found their way into the sociological volume.
The topic of Mauss’s essay was indeed very similar to the one he tackled in his
political essays, as Mauss believed that the exchange of gifts in all kinds of societies
was akin to the payment of debts, and international debts in particular, by modern
nations.122Mauss sometimes even used interchangeably the notions of gift and debt,
for instance when writing on the potlatch among Northwestern American Indians:
their economic system is as much based on credit as is the economic system of
civilized peoples . . . Indians do not have any writing device and therefore, their
transaction must be public to be secure. The potlatch consists in contracting some
debts on the one hand, and in paying some debts on the other hand. This economic
system is so developed that the capital possessed by all the individuals associated
with the tribe far exceeds the quantity of values at hand [the liquid values, Keynes
would say]. In other words, this society shares with our society similar properties: if
we desired to pay back all our debts, we would not be able to find enough money to
pay them. When every creditor seeks the reimbursement of his loan, it creates
a disastrous panic which hurts the community for many years.123
As seen in this quote, Mauss distinguished the partial payment of debt called
potlatch (paying off one loan and taking out a new one)124 – which can easily be
done by “writing off” the debt of some nations when the economy is based on
writing devices – and the total reimbursement of debts, when the debt is
completely paid off and the bond between creditor and debtor erased. For
Mauss, the potlatch did not erase the debt, nor did it erase the social bond,
between creditor and debtor nations. The potlatch just redistributed the debt
within a community of nations whose common destiny was made manifest by the
acceptance of the redistributed (and consolidated) debt. The “regime of contrac-
tual law and system of economic prestations”125 known as potlatch actually
strengthened the bonds between communities as it articulated a set of legal
duties, “the duty to give . . . the duty to receive . . . and the duty to give
back.”126 The Gift thus detailed the socio-legal conditions which ensured that
the partial payment of (national and international) debts would increase (inter-
national) solidarity. Indeed, Mauss asked: “What is the legal rule and the incen-
tive which . . . forces the gift received to be obligatorily given back?”127
66 Gift Exchange
Mauss was also very careful to underline that the logic that presided over the
exchange of gifts belonged to the realm of sovereignty: it was practiced for and by
sovereign powers; and to the extent that Mauss’s reflections related to debt issues,
they concerned mostly sovereign debt, and not the reimbursement of ordinary loans
between private members of a tribe. The logic of the gift was indeed the exact
contrary of the utilitarian logic of petty merchants, who did not understand that
economic exchanges of gifts were not just economic actions but also political acts of
alliance-formation.128 For Mauss, it was thus essential to distinguish the act of gift-
making, which was a political act, from the utilitarian logic of speculation.129
In rituals of gift-giving, national leaders rejected the petty logic of bargaining as,
by giving, they sought to establish the honor of their nations, and even their super-
iority in the gift-giving contests or “wars of properties.”130 For instance, in the
ceremony practiced by the Kwakiutls of the American Northwest, there was no
bargaining, but the parody of a declaration of war, in which the gift-giver acted as if
he did not give anything, “as if the thing given was ignored . . . even distrusted . . .
after it has been thrown to its feet by the gift-giver whomust affect a fake modesty.”131
The Gift is an interesting textual hybrid, as it integrates for the first time Mauss’s
reflections on a series of published ethnographic findings – in particular, from the
writings of German-trained but English-speaking ethnographers, like Boas,
Thurnwald, and Malinowski – as well as archaeological findings, which he mostly
borrowed from his best friend Henri Hubert, who had written with Mauss two of the
latter’s most important articles on the functions of sacrifice and of magic in L’Année
sociologique at the beginning of the century.132
The lives of the two friends were intrinsically tied at many levels: intellectual,
since after their first essay on the nature of sacrifice, Hubert decided to focus on gift
exchanges and other contractual forms in ancient European societies (like the Celts
and the Germanic tribes),133 while Mauss decided to study and teach at the EPHE
on similar topics in the context of non-European societies (India especially, but not
only); financial, as Mauss’s mother had lent some money to Hubert to help him buy
his home;134 emotional, as Hubert named his first son “Marcel” in reference to his
best friend, whom he considered his son’s uncle;135 and social, as Hubert’s circle of
friends overlapped in many ways with Mauss’s own circle. Indeed, Hubert’s other
best friend from his student years was Marcel Drouin (1871–1943), who had married
the sister of André Gide’s wife,136 and who had cofounded with Gide La Nouvelle
Revue Française, where the young Blum, André Gide’s best high-school friend and
Mauss’s collaborator in Le Populaire, published his early essays.137
If anthropologists today are familiar with the worlds of the Trobrianders, those
Argonauts of the Pacific, and the Kwakiutls of the American Northwest, I have had
more than one anthropologist colleague tell me that she always wondered what role
the equally important sections on Germanic tribes played in Mauss’s now classical
text. Where did these findings on Germanic tribes come from? And what purpose
did Mauss seek to achieve by placing them after the description of the kula or
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potlatch systems? A first answer may be that, by doing so, Mauss drew inspiration
from Hubert’s work on the Germanic tribes, and that he included archaeological
data from Europe’s past practices of gift exchange to generalize the observations of
ethnographers into a universal theory of solidarity and gift exchange, based on all
ethnographic, archaeological, and historical facts known to the savants of the time.
Fine: that is an important part of the puzzle. There is a second equally plausible
answer, which relates to Mauss’s methodological preference: that Mauss was pri-
marily a philologist, who liked to reinterpret recorded tales and texts from the whole
world, rather than a field ethnographer who liked to conduct primary fieldwork in
territories previously unknown to Western scientific teams (archaeologists, ethno-
graphers, biologists, etc.).
There is another (complementary) way to explain why Mauss gave so much space
to his description of Germanic gift-making practices, which is more sensitive to the
porosity of the boundary between Mauss’s political and academic writing: that
Mauss sought to back up his political claims that the Germans would understand
their legal obligations if part of their debt was written off, or if they were granted
a moratorium on payments, by pointing to legal precedents of the potlatch in the
Germanic legal tradition. As Mauss insisted, “Germanic societies . . . have such
a clearly developed system of exchange with gifts, voluntarily and obligatorily given,
received and given back, that one would have trouble finding an equivalent”138
except, perhaps “in the practice of gift-exchange found by Mr. Malinowski in the
Trobriand islands.”139 As Mauss wrote, “the gifts play such an important role in the
legal culture found among the Germans” and the “persistence of such mores” is so
evident that “they must be very solidly grounded on strong roots in the German
soul.”140 Indeed, with the exchange of gifts, old Germanic nations (as well as nations
in the Pacific and other parts of the world) exchanged the “fundamental proof of the
military, legal, economic and religious recognition of the leader of a nation.”141
The two logics of gift exchange and market exchange were inherently antithetical,
added Mauss, who wrote that in Germanic society the logic of the gift was so strong
that “Germanic civilization was a long time without markets . . . and in earlier times,
this civilization only developed the potlatch.”142
Thus, Mauss used his academic writing as a venue to diffuse a solid anthropolo-
gical justification of the kind of financial policies he and other collaborators of
L’Année, like Henri Hubert, discussed in their conversations and private letters as
well as in their op-eds. The two worlds of politics and science were not so far away in
France, or in the countries taking part in the discussions of the Reparations
Commission. For instance, in 1924, Mauss had written to that not-so-little economist
whom Hubert so passionately disliked, John Maynard Keynes, to ask him whether
the Royal Economic Society would be interested in receiving L’Année, and sending
books to review to its editorial board.143 Sensing that Mauss may have been animated
by, if not carried away by, such political considerations, Hubert wrote to Mauss that
his conception of the Germans’ sense of obligation was a bit hopeful, and certainly
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biased by his contemporary preoccupations with Germany’s understanding of its
legal obligation to pay back reparations:
The question of whether, and how international trade can modify an economy of
the kind of the kula trade, is quite problematic [in your essay]. Let’s take what you
write about the ancient Germans: you write that Germanic law did not include the
possibility of market exchanges. But the Germanic world in the bronze age cannot
exist without markets. Indeed, there was not one atom of copper or tin in Germany,
and this is still the European country with the highest number of discoveries of
bronze objects. Germans have exchanged metal against amber, and there was
a market for amber. I can certainly explain the paucity of terms in the Germanic
vocabulary to refer to market exchanges. There has been a long eclipse of markets
during the Iron Age, but then, the profound influence of the Celts has been felt,
with the diffusion of the words leihen andWerth, and all the system of pledges and
confiscations. I have thousands of traces of exchanges with foreigners which fol-
lowed purely economic logics. It all depended on the specific periods, as the
phenomena did not follow direct lines, but rather, they drew cascading
patterns . . . This is why I expected that you would tell us much more about the
evolution of economic logics after the ancient Germans, by describing how Roman
law affected the situation . . . And what you write about the fact that there is still
something of that kind [as the potlatch] in our social fabric is very nice, but
contradictory with what you said about the instability of these forms of economic
exchange: I can see some stability in the Celtic world, in Ireland or in Gaul, but I do
not see such stability in the Germanic society. These are issues which you should
study without any consideration for their political and/or moral dimensions.144
Hubert’s criticism of The Gift thus focused on what he knew best and what Mauss
knew least: the Germanic culture of gift exchange. For Hubert, the Germanic world
was rife with market exchanges as far back as the Bronze Age, for in fact all of the
bronze used in Germany came from other countries, traded against amber – and
claiming otherwise was disingenuous. Henri Hubert was more a specialist on the
Germans and the Celts than Mauss was, as Hubert had taught a yearly class on the
ancient Germans in 1924 and 1925 at the School of the Louvre (Paris’s major art
history school),145 and he was still working on his book The Celts, which Mauss later
edited and published after Hubert’s death in 1932.146 Meanwhile Mauss had only
published one article on the Thraces, who, like the Celts and the Germanic tribes,
lived in the confines of the Greco-Roman world.
In general, Hubert was quite critical of Mauss’s essay,147 which he found at times
“quite foggy and imprecise” especially in word choice. In particular Hubert thought
the expression “prestations totales” unfortunate, as he wrote that “there’s always
something that escapes the realm of prestations” (something more sacred for
instance), at the origins of group solidarity.148 But Mauss saw in the exchange of
gifts or “prestations” (a word with legal meaning, as it was also found in the Versailles
Treaty) the perfect illustration of how old Germanic nations understood the
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formation of international contractual bonds; it encompassed how “[c]lans with
tribes, great extended families within the clans, chiefs and even kings” interacted
outside “the closed circles of their own groups” and how they forged “links, alliances
and mutual assistance [contracts which] came into being by means of the gage
(pledge or collateral) . . . and acts of generosity.”149 Thus, Mauss insisted that these
exchanges united different collectives and he appeared to stick to his point that all
Germanic tribes manifested their sense of total (economic, social, cultural, reli-
gious, political) belonging through such ceremonial exchange of goods and ser-
vices – hence, the use of the term “prestations totales.”
IfMauss was guilty of an exaggeration – or rather, an essentialization, according to
his friend Hubert – about the rules observed by Germanic tribes in their practices of
exchange,Mauss would have agreed it was because of the political goals he sought to
accomplish with his essay. The elective affinity between Mauss’s academic and
political agendas was most visible with his reflections on the temporality of gift-
making practices in the Germanic context. Applied to the interwar context, Mauss’s
analysis of gift exchanges and the origins of international solidarity could not but
echo the discussions that Hubert, Blum, Thomas, himself, and many others had on
the desirability of granting a moratorium to the Germans. If the readers of The Gift
followed his argument to its logical end, they would understand that if Germany was
granted a moratorium on the servicing of its reparation debts, it would no doubt start
reimbursing in full the reparations once hit by economic recovery. The logic of gift
exchange required that the Germans start paying back reparation debts only after
some time had passed – otherwise, the payment of reparations would look like the
extraction of a war bounty by former victors and neutral bystanders.150 Mauss’s
reflections on the gift showed that such a moratorium was not an exceptional
demand placed upon the French government by unworthy allies, but a universal
rule of good global governance, which placed trust and long-term reciprocity over
the strict conformity to contractual obligations asked from debtor nations, even in
self-defeating cycles, which hurt both debtors and creditors.
In The Gift, Mauss indeed found that certain anthropological conditions related
to the rituals and temporality of gift-making practices were necessary for the quasi-
legal obligation to “give back” after a first gift to be observed. As Mauss told his
readers, “Time is necessary to execute any counter-prestation: the idea of a ‘term’ is
always implied” in the exchange of gifts, “when people exchange visits, when they
contract marriages or alliances, or when they establish peace.”151 Indeed, saidMauss,
citing Simiand, with the exchange of gifts, nations created bonds between past and
future.152 The exchange of gifts always escaped the present, as gifts were not even
looked at by the gift-giver and the gift-receiver, and always heralded counter-gifts in
the future. In contrast, market exchanges could only occur in the present, without
concern for the past and future of the co-contractors: in market exchanges,
a complex system of credit allowed economic agents to anticipate, in the present,
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the future returns of a deal, and to agree on the payment of interests at themoment of
the transaction.153 But that was not how nations manifested their solidarity.
Thus, Mauss found in the anthropological discourse a way to justify his
concern for the temporality and asymmetry inherent in the type of negotia-
tions from which a sense of European solidarity could manifest itself through
the global management of Europe’s financial affairs in the Reparations
Commission. Rather than seeing reparations obligations in purely legalistic
and economic terms, he looked beyond the question of whether the German
state had met its contractual obligation by paying the exact amount in due
time, and he introduced the notion that European solidarity could only be
constructed on solid ground anthropologically if the exchange of payments
and “prestations” followed a certain temporal rhythm – which he feared
could not be reduced to the contractual temporality of a simple debt con-
tract, with its highly predictable schedule of payments. For a European sense
of solidarity to emerge from the reparation payments, the temporality of their
occurrence could not be aligned on the linear sequence envisioned by the
French nationalists: payment or default followed by sanctions. As seen in this
reading of The Gift, the gift that Mauss asked France to make by stabilizing
its money, writing off part of the German debt, granting a moratorium on
payment, and expecting future debt forgiveness from its Anglo-American
allies, was more than a purely monetary policy. Rather, such an act would
have represented a fundamental change in France’s alliance policy, as well as
a fundamental change in how France conceived the temporality of debt
exchanges.
5 THE OBLIGATION TO GIVE BACK, AFTER SOME TIME:
A CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL AGENDA?
Many readers of The Gift, when they understand that Mauss’s interpretation of
the anthropological “facts” presented therein was more rather than less affected
by Mauss’s political inclinations, want to know more about the latter. If Mauss
was a self-declared socialist, what kind of socialism was he representing? Did
his positions evolve during the course of the 1924 run-up to the electoral victory
of the SFIO, which led Blum’s party to become France’s first political party
(although one that was unable to govern, for it lacked a majority)?
As anthropologists, sociologists, and historians, we are trained to doubt the
validity of uncontrolled historical parallels. But the earlier reference to
Varoufakis’s position in the present-day debate about the management of the
Greek debt crisis may be helpful to position Mauss in the range of policy
positions debated at the time. In each sovereign debt crisis, both men offered
a middle course, or third way, between a radical policy of unilateral sovereign
debt cancellation154 and the harsh implementation of a program of sanctions
The Gift and European Solidarity 71
(or “conditionalities,” in modern day IMF parlance) that liberals and neolib-
erals imposed to the debtor nation to ensure that the servicing of the external
debt would follow the schedule of payments decided by its creditors. In so
doing, just like Varoufakis has been accused by radical left-wing activists, like
Eric Toussaint, and a large section of the Syriza party, for failing to denounce
the “odious” (and hence illegitimate and illegal) character of a large part of the
debt owed by Greece to its European creditors,155 Mauss was suspected of
having sold his soul to the tycoons of financial capitalism – in particular, the
Lazards, whom he counted among his friends – by some of the more radical
left-wing intellectuals, like François Simiand, who also wrote on the repara-
tions question.
Before I give voice to the left-wing criticism of Mauss’s position in favor of debt
rescheduling and moratorium – rather than debt cancellation – it is fair to first
present the criticisms that Mauss mounted against the French liberals and right-
wing nationalists, which he published in twenty-eight articles in Le Populaire
(from December 1923 to May 1924): in these articles, he strongly criticized the
sanctions that the government of Raymond Poincaré implemented, when it sent
the French armies to occupy the Ruhr, after the Germans defaulted on their 1922
reparation obligations.
For Mauss, the French occupation of the richest Western German regions
showed to Germans that reparations paid to France were not a token exchanged to
place Europe’s economies on a path to economic growth and financial stability, but
rather, a kind of indemnity that France extracted by force to pay for the costs of war
and occupation from a nation which France still treated as an enemy.
The reparations that Germany was supposed to pay to France were immediately
used to pay the costs for France to maintain occupation forces within and around
a defeated Germany. As Mauss wrote, the militarization of the French response to
German default meant that France had to bear the “costs of keeping a standing army
for three years: these were two billion gold-marks that went to the bailiff rather than
to the victim,”156 i.e. the Belgian and French families whose properties were
destroyed.
In the early 1920s, French troops were also dispatched in Syria and Lebanon
(former Ottoman provinces which had allied with Germany during the Great
War), where they opposed the army of Feisal at a cost which Mauss estimated
to be 1 billion francs (half of the yearly German reparations).157 Furthermore,
French troops were maintained in Morocco (where Germany had expressed
territorial ambitions until 1905) at an estimated two and a half billion francs
over five years;158 and, most importantly, loans to buy French weapons were
extended to Poland and Eastern European states of the petite entente for a sum
of 2 billion francs (the very sum that the Germans failed to pay in 1922), so
that these nations could threaten Germany from the east.159 It meant that
France did not intend to use reparations to restore European financial
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solidarity but to strengthen its military position vis-à-vis its former enemy.
France either prepared for war, or had never really ended the war, in the
eyes of many contemporaries.
Furthermore, Mauss bet that France would not prove capable of adminis-
tering the industries of the Ruhr, and he was soon proven right: French
engineers failed to produce the same amount of coal from the Ruhr as the
Germans,160 largely because Berlin adopted a policy of “passive resistance” in
the Ruhr by paying workers to stay at home, which forced Paris and Brussels to
send French and Belgian engineers and workers to man the trains and mines of
the Ruhr.161 As a result, “whereas the Germans had sent 11 million tons of coal
to France in ‘reparations in kind,’162 by invading the Ruhr, the French govern-
ment spent millions to only produce four million tons and bought from the
British their coal to supply the difference.”163 In this light, the occupation of
the Ruhr looked like a complete economic fiasco, which no one, not even
Louis Loucheur, who acted privately to broker a compromise between the
French and German authorities, could salvage.164 In many ways, the episode
conjures the more recent memory of the failed and ineffective policies that the
Troika implemented in Greece as part of the “conditionalities” that Greece was
forced to accept after the event-which-must-not-be-named: the 2010 Greek
“default.”165 In the Greek case, too, the sanctions resulted in a massive eco-
nomic contraction of the national income.166
The French occupation of the Ruhr took the whole German nation hos-
tage, and as Mauss wrote in The Gift one year after – maybe with the sad
smile of the prescient Cassandra on his face – the “Rhine gold” could also
prove “fatal to the conqueror,” as many old songs on the “theme of the fateful
gift, which turns itself into poison” have warned generations of students of
Germanic folklore, which plays on “the double meaning of the word Gift as
gift and poison.”167 As Mauss wrote in The Gift, the idea of holding
a collateral, depending on the nature of the collateral, could either be clever
or stupid. Indeed, as he wrote in his academic essay, “our word ‘gage’” found
its origins in the German legal culture: it comes “from wadium (in English,
wage),” which refers to “the contractual bond.”168 And as Mauss continued,
“[i]n Germanic law, each contract, sale or purchase, loan or deposit, entails
a ‘gage’ or collateral: one partner is given an object, generally something of
little value like a glove or a knife, or perhaps – as with the French – a pin or
two.”169 But invading the Ruhr to get a grip on the black “gold of the Rhine”
(coal) could not be called the exchange of a “gage,” as the latter must be “an
object of little value.” At least, readers of The Gift would be able to under-
stand that.
If they didn’t read The Gift, the readers of Le Populaire could get a grip on
the wisdom contained in old Germanic tales by merely looking at the eco-
nomic situation of France and Germany one year after the beginning of the
The Gift and European Solidarity 73
Ruhr occupation. In Germany, the financial crisis convinced the government
to stabilize the mark by creating a devalued new money: the Rentenmark,
created on November 15, 1923. As Mauss lamented, “the French army in the
Ruhr, which is on a French payroll . . . finds its subsistence on location, spends
money on location, and exports so many francs that . . . the Germans and the
little German girls are full of francs, which they now sell,”170 as they started to
trust their new currency. Partly due to the stabilization of the mark, the franc
suffered in January 1924, as indeed, the “Germans started to prefer their renten
mark to the franc, and even to gold. Therefore, they gave away masses of
francs.”171 The effects of a lax monetary policy were similar in Germany and
in France, although the responses lagged in the short term, as France started to
feel the effects just as Germany recovered. The franc, which was exchanged
against the British pound at 50 francs for 1 pound at the beginning of 1923, was
then exchanged at 75 francs for 1 pound in the summer of 1923, and by the end
of the year fell to almost 100 francs for 1 pound. The effects of these sales of
francs were combined with the desperate need for France to buy foreign
currencies at the end of 1923, when the French government realized, too
late, that they needed to buy more coal on foreign markets. This situation
led to an increasingly rapid depreciation of the franc, which Mauss, a patriotic
socialist, bemoaned.
At last, for Mauss and Blum, the fateful invasion and occupation of the Ruhr
marked another important fatal casualty: the spirit of multilateralism, which had
animated the Reparations Commission until then. Indeed, after the 1922 German
default, the Reparations Commission failed to transform itself from a site from
where experts compared national accounts to deduce the amount of debt transfers
necessary to ensure the financial stability of the European economic area, into
the authority in charge of deciding when a “credit event” (a default in modern
parlance) had occurred, and which policies to apply afterwards. The Versailles
Treaty had not granted the Reparations Commission the authority to establish
penalties and sanctions against the defaulter nor to establish an order of priority
among the creditors whose interests were harmed by the default. As a result, after
the Commission found Germany in default of its coal payments in January 1923,
it could not stop the government of Raymond Poincaré from sending troops to
occupy the Ruhr. Charles Gide had hoped that default of payment would be
treated otherwise, and lamented that “international public law lagged years
behind private law, where the idea that an insolvent debtor should be jailed or
dismembered was no longer fashionable.”172 Unlike the Troika today, the main
interwar multilateral financial institution was not complicit in the decision of
creditor states to send the debtor state in the “debt-prison,”173 but it was too weak
to resist revengeful creditors.
Mauss thus concluded that, in order for France to create a sustainable
European (and Western) political order after the Great War, it was essential
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to buttress the legitimacy of multilateral institutions like the Reparations
Commission, and that France should give time to Germany rather than impose
harsh measures that would make the German debt unsustainable. That being
established, it is still unclear how his position could be criticized from the left.
Here’s how: for some of the most left-wing French socialists, Mauss’s model of
the gift, and its application to contemporary financial issues (with its emphasis
on the moratorium, to give time to the Germans for them to rebuild their
economy), seemed to place the goal of restoring France’s financial solidarity
above that of speeding up an international revolutionary upheaval. The same
arguments that had been used by the Marxists against Mauss’s cooperativist
endeavors before the war – that they would delay the coming of a Revolution –
were expressed against Mauss’s notion of gift exchange, and its application to
the European sovereign debt crisis.
By calling for the coordinated and simultaneous stabilization of the mark
and franc in 1923 and 1924 (at a parity with gold fixed by the Reparations
Commission), Mauss wanted to prevent the French middle (working) class
from falling into ruin precisely at the time when the German economy
recovered. At the time of the heightened risk of hyperinflation of the franc
and the rush for foreign currencies, Mauss asked the government to “devaluate
the value of the franc at the same time as taxing the gains made on the
capital.”174 He rejected the idea that France could, like the United Kingdom,
pay its debt and come back to the prewar parity with gold. Rather, the French
government should accept to diminish the value of its currency, thus reflecting
the new situation, and tax the capital that Frenchmen could be tempted to
export abroad in a context of high inflation. In particular, with the latter
measure, Mauss targeted “the French bourgeoisie, and even the French
petty bourgeoisie, which have been touring the occupied countries like con-
querors going for their bounty, in the hope of profiteering from the exchange
rate, which disfavored the poor Germans, and which allowed the Frenchmen
to live like little princes.”175 For Mauss, the “many Frenchmen . . . who
purchased houses and hotels in the Rhineland, even in Berlin . . . in enemy
territory,” and who therefore exchanged francs against marks, committed
“crimes against the credit of the State and of the Nation.”176 As he concluded,
“it was the French capitalist, cosmopolitan par excellence,177 who got rid of the
national currency”178 in the crisis of late 1923, when the price of the franc
spiraled downed.
Other left-wing intellectuals disagreed with Mauss. Of course, if the French
government refused to pay inter-allied debts until the Germans paid reparations
in full, the franc would continuously depreciate, and this situation would work
to the advantage of speculators who could move their capital to foreign lands,
buying lands and goods where the currency was more stable.179 But as Simiand
wrote to Mauss, he “found it hard to reconcile his position on monetary
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questions” with that of Mauss, “as he disagreed with everything” that Mauss
wrote on the topic. In particular, “he found it surprising that Mauss supported
the ideas of the French central bank,” which insisted on fighting the deprecia-
tion of the franc above all. Simiand thought this goal was in complete contra-
diction with the “revolutionary goals” of the socialist party. Indeed, he wrote,
“if the monetary depreciation has the revolutionary ability to ruin the middle
class, and if this ruin fulfills the socialist goals, why would the socialist party
want to save the franc”180 as Mauss advised?
The difference between Mauss and Simiand can be easily illustrated with
how each perceived the outcome of the Ruhr occupation when evaluated
according to the goals they assigned to the socialist movement. As the collapse
of the mark, which followed the French occupation,181 deprived the German
government of any leverage with respect to economic matters, the French
occupying powers renegotiated directly with the German industrialists of the
Ruhr to obtain reparations payments in kind or cash. The French adminis-
tration in Dusseldorf reached an agreement with the German industrialists
in September 1923 which worked directly against the interests of German
workers:182 the industrialists ended the policy of “passive resistance” and
gave the French 18 percent of the coal produced in exchange for the abolition
of the pro-labor laws passed by the Weimar Republic.183 This situation
shocked Mauss, but not François Simiand, who argued that the social situa-
tion in Germany was by now explosive, and conducive to a revolutionary
upheaval.184
To Simiand, Mauss’s argument in favor of a comprehensive rescue pack-
age, based on the logics of the gift exchange, which would protect the
interests of the German and French middle classes, unduly privileged finan-
cial responsibility over the transnational revolt of the working class against the
German and French industrialists. Simiand was not completely wrong in his
assessment that Mauss’s views comforted more conservative voices in the
world of high finance. Giving priority to the maintenance of a peaceful
European financial order over an international revolution clearly put the
middle-aged socialists like Blum and Mauss on the side of the conservatives
in the socialist party. As Henri Hubert (who was not a socialist himself) wrote
to Albert Thomas (taxed for being one of the least revolutionary voices in the
old socialist party), in 1923, although he “would not go as far as saying that he
had influenced Mauss to the point of turning him into a quasi-reactionary
thinker, [he] was surprised to see that Mauss was getting closer to his view as
he was writing on politics,”185 and added, “he sees the France which is not
socialist.” This viewpoint led Mauss, according to Hubert, to think that the
more conservative socialist Albert Thomas should leave the ILO in Geneva
and come back to lead the French socialist party, claim victory if the left-
wing coalition won the 1924 elections, and break with Blum’s policy of
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“support with no participation” by accepting a Ministerial post in the future
coalition186 – something that Thomas rejected because he believed that he
had a better position at the ILO to “keep the sympathy of the working
masses.”187
Simiand was also right when he asserted that Mauss’s notion of gift
exchange, with its emphasis on long-term and noncontractual reciprocity, as
illustrated by the undetermined German moratorium on payments, had
become the rallying cry of an unlikely rapprochement between bankers and
socialist intellectuals: both were found for instance to be active in the Stable
Money League, which had lobbied for the moratorium on German payments
of their reparations, followed by the stabilization and devaluation of European
moneys since 1921 – rather than the restoration of their prewar levels of parity
with gold – and was successively presided over by socialists like Norman
Thomas (a leading American socialist and six-time presidential candidate),
solidarists like Charles Rist (Charles Gide’s coauthor and collaborator at the
Reparations Commission), as well as Max Lazard (Albert Thomas’s deputy at
the ILO), and bankers, like Louis Rothschild (Austria) and Sir Josiah Stamp
(from the Lazard bank in London).188 As Guy de Rougemont shows in his
history of the Lazard Frères bank, André Lazard and David David-Weill and
some of their key partners like Josiah Stamp had indeed become central figures
in the battle to stabilize the franc: they were those who managed to convince
the French central bank to stabilize the franc at its past exchange rate after it
was attacked in March 1924.
This alliance of pro-stabilization bankers, politicians and public intellec-
tuals finally obtained its most manifest victory when, in early 1924, the
managers of Lazard Frères in Paris and New York bet that the quick depre-
ciation of the franc did not follow any economic logic other than pure
speculation, and that a coordinated response from the Banque de France
and Paris-based and New York-based banks could actually work to stop the
depreciation. The restoration of the alliance of Allied bankers identified early
on the main causes of the depreciation of the franc on international markets:
for them, Italian and Austrian speculators drove the depreciation, as they took
very large short-term loans in francs, which they converted immediately into
US dollars or British pounds, thus driving further the depreciation of the
francs, which allowed them to reimburse their loans with a big profit thanks
to a favorable exchange rate.189 At the beginning of 1924, the administrators of
the Banque de France did not agree, but when the value of the franc reached
the critical level of 130 francs exchanged for one British pound in March 1924
and the franc couldn’t find any buyers in New York, panic seized them, and
they finally agreed to follow the Lazard’s strategy: in March 1924, J.P. Morgan
was tasked with raising more than 100 million dollars to fight the “battle of
the franc,” while Lazard Frères were asked to raise 4 million pounds in
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London. In Paris, David David-Weill and his associates monitored all sales of
francs in Amsterdam, Genoa, Frankfurt, Berlin, Vienna, London, New York,
and Paris, and used the money loaned to the associated banks to buy them
immediately, in order to sustain the rate at which the French currency was
exchanged.190 In five days the “battle of the franc” was won, as the pound
went down from 123 francs back under the symbolic bar of 100 francs.
The press, even Le Figaro, lauded the coordinated action of Lazard Frères
and Morgan, and at the end of the month the pound passed under the bar of
80 francs. Their allied victory had the additional advantage of ruining the
Austrian and Italian speculators as the latter could no longer reimburse their
short-term loans at a profit.191 The Viennese stock exchange, from where most
of the speculative attacks originated, looked like a “devastated battlefield”
according to the Viennese Times correspondent.192 Their strategy, combined
with a loan that J.P. Morgan floated to Germany, allowed Germany to pay
part of the reparations it owed to France, which in turn allowed France to pay
back part of its inter-allied debts to the US. The intricate link between the
political and economic logics that Mauss assumed to exist in gift exchanges –
and sovereign debt swaps that are meant to preserve peace – had resisted the
test of reality.
Informed of these high finance strategies by his friends at the Lazard bank,
Mauss turned Le Populaire, although a socialist journal, into an echo cham-
ber where the international action of Lazard Frères bank was consistently
lauded for conforming to the logic of gift exchange. As Mauss wrote in March
and April 1924, the franc stopped plunging when “international finance gave
for the franc and saved it”193 by buying francs in order to show that one could
trust the French nation to hold its obligations. In all fairness, the Allied
bankers behaved like good doctors to bring the franc back to its real value:
they started buying francs while the enemies (the Italian and Austrian banks)
continued to speculate against it; and as they did so, they made quite a lot of
money since they successfully bet that the value of the francs would rise
again.
6 FIGHTING FOR CURRENCY STABILIZATION AND AGAINST
ANTI-SEMITISM: MAUSS’S PRIORITIES
The relationship between Mauss’s conclusions in The Gift and the conversa-
tion Mauss developed with socialist and solidarist intellectuals on the ques-
tion of European solidarity, war reparations, and sovereign debt forgiveness
has not been properly understood.194 With the recent exception of Frédéric
Ramel,195 Marcel Fournier, and Jean Terrier,196 “rare are the commentators
who associate Mauss’s scientific studies with his normative conclusions,”197 as
Sylvain Dzimira notes – one could add the names of Jane Guyer198 and Keith
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Hart,199 in the Anglophone world. Even among those who pay attention to
that link, scholars have mostly related Mauss’s anthropological writings with
his political writings on domestic issues, like the creation of a welfare state,200
or the convergence of his approach with economic sociology.201 But a joint
reading of Marcel Mauss’s political writings on reparations and his anthro-
pological writings on the gift economy shows that they both derive from the
same matrix: Mauss’s desire to identify the conditions for a sustainable and
peaceful international order that would prevent another devastating war in
Europe. Rather than assuming that the former were only political texts and
the latter only scientific texts, they must be seen as a coherent body of work,
which shapes the contours of a normative model of multilateral sovereign
debt management.
The ambition here is not only to trace the genealogy of the concepts of gift
exchange and cooperation in various academic disciplinary discourses, and to
associate the latter with the strategies of academic entrepreneurs or the effects of
“invisible colleges”202 and their institutionalization in academic niches,203 but also
to see how academic disciplines have used the discourse of the gift as an epistemic
solution to the problem of knowledge and as a normative solution to the problem of
order in different times: in particular, in the context of the interwar European debt
crisis.
By publishing The Gift, Mauss sought to carve a place for anthropology in
the range of comparative sciences (like history, sociology, and religious stu-
dies), which could be mobilized for the scientific study of reparations, for-
giveness, debt, financial solidarity, and other Durkheimian and solidarist
notions. By combining normative concerns and scientific explorations of the
working of gift exchanges in international financial relations, Mauss reassured
himself (and his readers) that the normative model of gift exchange he
advocated to create European solidarity after the Great War had a serious
anchor in the comparative knowledge of human societies. Anthropological
knowledge of gift-making practices helped his contemporaries understand the
legal (the evolving conceptions of contractual law and sanctions), political
(the anti-imperialist alliance management policies), and anthropological (the
ritual and temporality of gift-making practices) dynamics at work in issues of
reparations and sovereign debt cancellation, which were so prevalent after the
Great War.204
With anthropology, Mauss hoped to ground his normative model of the gift
on a quasi-universal analysis of societies and their relationship to war and
peace. Whereas Gide, Simiand, Blum, and Lazard were lawyers or financiers
trained in either economics or law, Mauss mobilized the discourse that
anthropology produced on the noncontractual elements of international debt
exchanges in order to highlight the role of temporality in the formation of
international solidarity through the exchange of debts. As he showed, if the
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goal of reparations was not just to sanction a state crime committed by
Germany during the Great War, but also to create European solidarity,
France had to accept that the temporality of debt payments would remain
ambiguous rather than follow a clear calendar of payment. France had to
recognize the role of uncertainty, asymmetry, and discontinuity in the rela-
tions between debtor and creditor nations for obligations deeper than the
purely contractual to manifest themselves. Only the extension of a moratorium
on the German payment of reparations could introduce a beneficial term
between the wartime destruction of properties and the act of giving back.
By placing the current sovereign debt crisis and its management in a long
line of precedent, which included many instances in Germanic history, Mauss
hoped to convince his contemporaries that the multilateral rescheduling of the
reparations owed by Germany to the Allies was the only way to build European
solidarity.
Mauss’s perspective on international economic governance was also attentive
to the cultural perceptions of ethnic groups, and how the latter strongly
affected the perception of economic solutions. The financial conservativism
that Hubert applauded and Simiand denounced in Mauss’s reflections on
Europe’s debt crisis was justified by Mauss’s fear that the ruin of the French
middle class would not bring a socialist revolution, but the accentuation of
nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic trends in European countries.
The French right-wing representation of bankers was characteristic of the
implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) anti-Semitic attacks against the “cunning
Talmudists,”205 as Blum would be called by a French deputy when he stepped
in as France’s prime minister twelve years later, who deceived the good “old
Gallo-Roman nation,” to enrich themselves. Mauss was very conscious of the
“stupidities of L’Action Française”206 and other anti-Dreyfusard journalists who
relentlessly attacked “the Jewish and Protestant bankers”207 who worked to
defend the value of the franc. In 1924 Mauss saw the rebirth of anti-Semitism
not only in the popular press, but also under the pen of social scientists and
historians.208
In The Gift one can only be surprised by the fact that he made no mention
of the practice of Jewish communities giving a tribute to European monarchs
to ensure their continued existence within the Christian kingdoms. Silences
and omissions are as important as explicit additions and long developments.
Such omissions revealed a carefully thought out intellectual and political
agenda: in the same way Mauss had fought anti-Semites who attacked
Dreyfus, claiming that he defended all men rather than only a Jew, in his
scientific essay Mauss avoided attacking the anti-Semitism of those who
believed that gift exchanges were not practiced by Jews.209 He preferred to
claim that all peoples practiced gift exchanges, including the Germans: in
The Gift, he elaborated a universalistic message, according to which all races
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and ethnicities (in the language of the time) were equally recognizant of the
three obligations found in gift exchanges: the duty to give, the duty to receive,
and the duty to give back. If gift practices were universal, then, they were
therefore practiced by Jews.
In his op-eds in Le Populaire, Mauss attacked the anti-Semitism of the anti-
stabilization coalition much more explicitly: for instance, he skillfully inversed the
stigma placed upon American and Jewish European bankers by the nationalist and
xenophobic French press, according to whom the foreign bankers of international
finance were the cosmopolitan enemies selling the franc. Mauss fought head-on
against this racist stigma by arguing that it was:
the foreigners who read clearly in our books: the foreign bankers know exactly the
value of our gold and our merchandise which cover both themass of paper-francs in
circulation and our loans (both short-term and long-term) . . . and when the franc
[was] attacked, we [were] weighted, and our paper money [was] tested, just like the
bad gold money of the king was tested by goldsmiths and money-changers, the good
bourgeois, the Jews and Lombardi with their cupel and blowlamp.210
For him, the episode of the “battle of the franc” illustrated how Jewish and Protestant
bankers had become France’s true allies: as he wrote, the franc stopped collapsing
when “the J.P. Morgan Bank started buying francs, as well as the ‘five Big’ banks in
London that were associated with the Rothschild Bank and the Montagu Bank.”211
French Jewish banks also gave for the franc, in particular, the Lazard Frères Bank of
Paris, directed by André Lazard and David David-Weill.212 The stabilization of the
franc proved that investments did not follow a purely utilitarian logic, as the
“cosmopolitan” French bourgeoisie and their imperialistic government believed.
For Mauss, the conformity to the model of gift exchange proved that “universal
peace and inter-allied Entente could not but raise our credit.”213
Mauss’s efforts, in many ways, were vindicated, as his recommendations were
partly heard in 1924: after the “battle of the franc” was won, at last, all state parties
(including the United States) gathered at a large multilateral conference to make
compromises and gifts in the form of organized debt rescheduling.214A committee of
experts worked on a comprehensive stabilization plan (known as the “Dawes Plan,”
written under the chairmanship of US Vice President Charles Dawes),215 based on
their review of Germany’s capacity to pay reparations and France’s capacity to pay
inter-allied debts. As the Allied bankers’ strategy worked, putting an end to the
depreciation of the franc, Louis Loucheur finally succeeded in convincing
Raymond Poincaré to move toward the acceptance of the new plan. As Léon
Blum wrote in Le Populaire in April 1924, at last “the experts, disavowing the policy
of Poincaré, declared themselves in favor of a moratorium”216 along the lines that
Blum and Mauss advocated inside the SFIO against its more revolutionary ele-
ments: “during the first years, limited contribution of the Germans to the Allied
reparations effort by payments in kind” until the Germans could accumulate
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enough money to start paying back. Poincaré “was forced to change his general
policy, and to adopt the principle of increased taxation [on income and profits],
reaching budgetary equilibrium, paying back debts rather than inflating the printed
money.”217
The SFIO leadership also managed to cash in on this political victory in electoral
terms. Ultimately Mauss’s efforts were rewarded when the Cartel des gauches won
the election in May 1924, with Blum’s SFIO as the first party in the new parliamen-
tary majority. This victory, which left the editing team of Le Populaire exhausted,
convinced Blum and Mauss to stop the publication of editorials, ending Mauss’s
series of articles on sovereign debts and gift exchanges. Had he also published all he
had to say at the time? Maybe, but also, after the electoral victory of 1924, it was
expected that Mauss would distance himself from the old SFIO and the politics of
the left, as he had moved closer to the solidarists (like Charles Gide and Charles
Rist), “progressive” liberal thinkers (like Max Lazard), “conservative socialists”218
(like Albert Thomas), and even “neo-socialists” (likeMarcel Déat),219 some of whom
invested their energies in expert committees tied to international organizations, like
the French Association for Social Progress,220 whose main agenda was the creation
of an international committee to control credit and exchange rates – a function that
the IMF would take over during the Bretton Woods era.
Was Mauss right to point at the necessity for social scientists to attack both the rise
of anti-Semitism and the speculative logic of markets where exchange rates were
priced?When one knows how European history unfolded ten years after, his writings
were certainly prescient. Indeed, problems continued to plague the sovereign debt
disputes, even after the socialist electoral victory of 1924 and the acceptance of the
Dawes Plan. The proposals of reform of the international financial system, which
Mauss and Hubert discussed in the aftermath of the “battle of the franc,” went well
beyond what Dawes and the US financial specialists had made the Europeans
accept: for the two friends, the stabilization policies that they had already discussed
in spring 1924 could only be a temporary patch placed on the hemorrhage of francs
from which France had suffered. In 1924, they were convinced that it was necessary
to go beyond and transform the Reparations Commission into a large financial
wholesale in charge of administering German finances, as Hubert underlined in
a letter to Albert Thomas (in which he reported having discussed the matter with
Mauss, and being in agreement with his friend):
The Reparations Commission is the biggest financial organization in the world.
It has 60 million marks in deposits, and it can claim the whole amount of the
reparations due by Germany to the Allies: 132 billion marks. Furthermore, it
administers the financial aspects of the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine.
It’s only missing a few agencies and some sizeable autonomy. To strengthen it, it
should be shouldered by the League of Nations. That being done, it could then help
Germany fight against downward speculation on exchange rates . . .My argument is
backed up by the precedent of the inter-allied control of exchange rates, which
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clearly helped stabilize the franc during the war. Thus, we need to find
a mechanism that provides foreign currencies to a clearinghouse established by
a Consortium of German banks, which could administer all payments for goods
imported fromGermany. German banks know how to coordinate. The Reparations
Commission could supervise the working of this clearinghouse . . . It would thus
play the role of a very big international bank, and the Reparations Commission
would then be at the center of payments between Germany and the rest of the
world. With all these bonds, these deposits and shares, it would have an immense
credit in the whole world. It could even raise taxes on payments, for instance, on
customs. In exchange, it could act as lender of last resort, should Germany suddenly
need some cash. In this way, the Reparations Commission could administer
Germany’s whole sovereign debt due to the Allies, until Germany could claim its
autonomy back.221
Mauss and Hubert’s proposal of international technocratic oversight of
a nationalized wholesale in charge of a major country’s international economic
relations hardly resonates with the themes of the current radical European left,
which still has to grapple with the fact that a Troika composed of the ECB, the
EC, and the IMF, has taken over key administrative roles of the formerly
sovereign Greek state. In the 1930s, Mauss’s perspective on gift exchanges left
little room to the social question of how to improve the welfare of the working
class, but it had the merits of addressing the main international issues of the time:
Mauss foresaw that the authority of the Reparations Commission would not
survive the rise to power of the National Socialist Party, and that with a default,
and Germany’s active rearmament, war would soon follow.
In general, Mauss criticized the French socialists for failing to take as seriously as
he did the rise of Adolph Hitler in Germany: as he wrote to Blum in 1933, Blum’s
“irresponsible predictions on the short-term fall of Hitler”222 led him to take his
distance from the old SFIO. The divorce between Mauss and the SFIO that Blum
completely controlled in the early 1930s, was finalized. As Mauss wrote to his old
friend and colleague to explain why he left the old party:
What are we going to do when, the franc being detached from the value of gold, the
gold standard will end? What are we going to do when Hitler will raise his army?
These are the two questions that keep me thinking all the time.223
In 1933, Germany defaulted on both reparations and foreign debts:227 out of
the 132 billion gold marks the Allies wanted Germany to pay, Germany had paid
only 22 billion gold marks in reparations to European nations (including
9.5 billion to France), which left France to pay about seventy percent of the
costs of the interwar reconstruction.228 No one was surprised when Nazi
Germany unilaterally cancelled its debt, since its leaders had argued for years
that they did not recognize the legitimacy – and even humanity – of its creditors,
whom Nazis presented as Jewish bankers who had conspired with French
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nationalists to make Germany pay for the whole of Europe. The German default
of 1933 – which contrasted with the financial responsibility showed by most of the
successor states of Eastern Europe that had been “hesitant to interrupt service [of
the debt] on the grounds that much of their debt had been arranged under
League of Nations auspices”229 – proved that Nazi Germany rejected the
whole philosophy of solidarity in Europe, and its associated system of macro-
economic governance. The German state did not see itself responsible for the
fate of those whom it considered non-Aryan populations in the interwar era:
instead, Hitler claimed that the new Reich had a higher responsibility (beyond
that recognized by treaties) to defend and protect the interests of all ethnic
Germans, wherever they might be located (especially in new states with large
populations of German-speaking minorities), thus challenging the sanctity of
territorial boundaries drawn by the postwar treaties. Not long after, war ensued
in Europe, and soon after, it engulfed the whole world into its most deadly
conflict. Racial hierarchy, anti-Semitism, and war of the races became the
dominant principles of European international politics for the next ten years.
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The Gift as Colonial Ideology
Marcel Mauss and French Colonial Policy before and after the
Great War
As Lygia Sigaud has claimed, among interpreters of The Gift there is a “general
indifference to Mauss’s preoccupations with rights and obligations”1 – despite the
fact that Mauss conceived of his essay as part of a broader exploration of the
evolution of contractual law, the rules of commerce, and themaking of international
solidarity, which stems from the globalization of trade and finance. In so doing,
Mauss continued his uncle’s exploration of the “noncontractual elements of
contracts,”2 but at the same time he displaced his uncle’s focus when studying the
origins of solidarity. In contrast to Durkheim, who distinguished between
a “mechanical solidarity,” which he observed in “archaic” societies characterized
by the absence of a division of labor in the sphere of production, and an “organic”
solidarity, which he observed in societies with a higher level of division and
complementarity between the various productive forces,3 Mauss focused on the
sites of exchange of goods and “prestations” to distinguish between various forms of
international or intersocietal solidarity. With this move from production to
exchange, Mauss no longer postulated that solidarity assumed the existence of
a tightly bounded society within which individuals experienced solidarity.
After reading The Gift, Mauss’s British colleague, Bronislaw Malinowski
(1884–1942), had sensed – although he misunderstood it – the radical change of
perspective from Durkheim to Mauss, when writing to Mauss in 1925 that:
I have read your admirable article in AS [L’Année sociologique] proofs with great
interest. Remarkably enough, I have come to very similar conclusions in working on
the problem of law (now in print) . . . But as you no doubt realize, both you and
I give the coup de grâce to Morgan’s concept of clan unity – also emphasized by
Durkheim. If reciprocity is the keynote of primitive sanction, it really relegates
solidarity at best to the second rank. Your article disposes of 90% of [Durkheim’s]
Division du travail social.4
While Mauss would have certainly disagreed with Malinowski that the analysis of
solidarity was anything different from the analysis of reciprocity, and that the former
should be restricted to the analysis of “in-group solidarity” (as in studies of “clan
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unity”), it was true that his approach to solidarity (or what I would call “out-group
solidarity”) was different from Durkheim’s perspective. Mauss was primarily inter-
ested in understanding an international process – or rather, an “intersocietal”
phenomenon, as sociologists like Mauss claimed that not all societies had reached
the national level of development – which he characterized as a system of gift
exchange.
The idea that sociologists and anthropologists could study intersocietal solidarity,
and that the latter could take many forms, not all of which corresponded to how
solidarity was understood and experienced by modern nations, was in fact related to
another little-known aspect of Mauss’s essay, which is the relation between Mauss’s
reflections on the gift exchange and the changing contours of the new imperial
ideologies that French colonial administrators delineated after 1919 when attempt-
ing to reform the relations between the French metropolis and its colonies. Until
now, commentators of The Gift have paid little attention to the colonial context
which foregrounded Mauss’s reflections on international solidarity.5 But now that
we can readMauss’s manuscript The Nation,6 thanks to the transcription conducted
by Jean Terrier and Marcel Fournier, we can better understand how Mauss’s
reflections on solidarity related to debates about French interwar colonial policy,
and the relationship between European solidarity and centrality on the one hand,
and the search for global peace and progress on the other hand.
By looking at Mauss’s analyses of systems of reciprocal exchanges in the colonial
context, this chapter questions whether, and how, Mauss refined his analysis of
contemporary international politics when the latter diverged from his (optimistic)
normative model of gift exchange. In 1925, Mauss proposed a bold conclusion at the
end of TheGift: that most systems of reciprocal exchanges of “prestations” lead to the
recognition of a duty to give back, and thus increase the sense of solidarity between
exchanging partners. But at the time Mauss published The Gift, the rise of anti-
Semitism, which was associated in Germany with a discourse that targeted the
reparations provisions of the Versailles Treaty, indicated that he might have been
too optimistic. In this broad context, Mauss took a step back to understand how
contemporary politics of international solidarity diverged from his normative model
of gift exchange, and what hidden variable could explain the differences between
predicted outcomes – that gifts between the exchanging partners are always repaid
and that they strengthen international solidarity – and observed reality.
This chapter shows how Mauss reevaluated his normative and theoretical model
of the gift to deal with the biggest international issue of the time: the relationship
between European and imperial solidarity. In The Nation, Mauss provided a general
framework for understanding the positive and negative effects of the reciprocal
exchange of prestations between sovereign peoples in the context of the French
interwar Empire. In many ways, this geographical refocus – or rather, this geogra-
phical extension – of Mauss’s anthropology of the gift to the whole world led the
solidarist thinkers, like Gide, Thomas, Jaurès, Oualid, and the longtime Minister of
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the Colonies, Albert Sarraut (1872–1962) to tackle one key issue which Mauss had
not addressed in his 1925 essay: How do societies understand the contractual obliga-
tions stemming from gift exchanges when they present highly disparate levels of
development (or in Mauss’s terms, of “integration”)? Must such contractual obliga-
tions be reciprocal, as Mauss claimed in The Gift? Or do societies across various
levels of integration understand such obligations in different ways? Could the
exchange of gifts accelerate the race to war, economic exploitation, and military
occupation? Or could it still work as a buffer to prevent war and disintegration from
erupting in this context?
By answering these questions, this chapter demonstrates how Mauss’s anthropo-
logical writings in The Nation contributed to nuance his original vision on gift
exchange published in The Gift. It proceeds as follows. First, it shows how Mauss’s
writings echoed those of influential interwar colonial reformers like Albert Sarraut
and other “progressive” apologists of the French Empire, who sought to reform the
Colonial Pact in the interwar period, and it traces the origins of their interwar
reflections in the prewar criticisms raised by Albert Thomas, Jean Jaurès, and
Charles Gide, among others, against the abuses of colonial subjects by the chartered
companies. It centers in particular on the criticisms raised against the chartered
companies in Congo which were voiced by the French Committee for the
Protection and Defense of Indigenous Populations, in whose activities Mauss
participated in the 1900s,7 and by Mauss’s socialist colleagues, like Jean Jaurès and
Albert Thomas. Looking at these prewar debates gives an important insight into the
socio-historical genesis of key concepts used byMauss in The Gift (like “prestations,”
“gifts,” or “generosity,” “contractual gifts”) and found in political discourses on
colonial reform. It also highlights the continuities between the prewar and interwar
struggles between intellectuals and colonial administrators in the colonial field:
André Gide’s famous 1927 denunciation of the exploitative practices of the chartered
companies in the French Congo finds its origins there.
Then, the chapter shows how Mauss’s reflections in The Nation inspired the
doctoral students he gained after the creation of the Paris-based Institute of
Ethnology. The preoccupation of Mauss’s students for the effects of varying levels
of integration on the working of gift exchanges was driven by the French Empire’s
colonial expansion, and the new reformist mandate that Mauss gave to the ethnol-
ogists and colonial administrators who came to work under his supervision. Mauss’s
students were sent to the colonies and other non-European contexts to assess the
validity of his model of gift exchange when exchanges circulated within and across
societies characterized by various levels of integration. Looking at the political and
administrative battles in which Mauss’s students were involved in the colonial field
leads to the following conclusion: Mauss’s model of gift exchange gave these young
reformers a powerful theoretical incentive to treat as an empirical question –
whether the French Empire had a positive effect on the integration of colonial
societies – what many orthodox colonial administrators considered as a matter of
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unquestionable principled belief – that, indeed, it did have a positive influence.
Mauss’s influence led them to question the main assumption under which colonial
administration operated, or at least, to doubt its universal validity. But it did not go as
far as to encourage them to rebel against the French presence outside of Europe; far
from it.
1 SOLIDARIST COLONIALISM: THE INTERWAR DEFENSE
OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE
Before the Great War, France’s President of the Council Georges Clemenceau had
famously claimed that the French dream of colonial expansion was a mirage that
distracted from France’s military reconstruction and future revenge against
Germany. Many intellectuals agreed, like Maurice Barrès (1862–1923) and
Déroulède (1846–1914), who lamented that the Republic’s colonial project consisted
in replacing the “two sisters” of Alsace and Lorraine that France lost after the 1870
defeat with “twenty servants.”8
But after the experience of the Great War, most French politicians had turned
themselves into public apologists for colonialism. The French socialists in particular
no longer saw in empire a dangerous terrain of war: this had been a serious concern,
especially for Jean Jaurès, after Germany and France had clashed over the occupa-
tion ofMorocco. But since the defeat of Germany in 1919, they believed that colonial
expansion would go hand in hand with a permanent stabilization of national
frontiers in Europe.9 As Raoul Girardet writes, the colonial expansion “had given
back on the promises placed in it”10 during the Great War: not only did 30,000
Berbers fight for France in the Great War, as Maurice Barrès had predicted in 1911,11
but about 1 million soldiers came from overseas to defend the French trenches
against the German advances – and out of these million soldiers, which included the
famous “Black force”12made up of colonial regiments from Senegal, one-fifth (more
than 200,000) were killed in combat.
In the 1920s, among the left-wing parties, only the Communist party was thus
clearly opposed to colonialism on principled grounds, and consistently denounced
the socialists like Blum as “lackeys of imperialism,” when the latter said, for instance,
that he refused “to confuse themovement of liberation of oppressed peoples with the
proletarian emancipation movement”13 – a statement Blum made during the 1920
Congress of the SFIO, during which the communists seceded and formed their own
party. From the opposite side of the political spectrum, only the most racist fraction
among right-wing nationalists, such as Charles Maurras (1868–1952), continued to
criticize France’s engagement with non-European “races” outside of Europe in the
interwar period.14
Policymakers and colonial reformers who reorganized the field of colonial prac-
tice in the 1920s believed that colonialism was not in itself an evil, but a force for
good, especially if it accelerated the national integration of the colonial society and
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its future integration in a world of interdependent nations. They found much hope
and promise in the fact that the Great War had dramatically intensified a sense of
imperial solidarity among the metropolitan population and political parties: in
particular, trade with the colonies had also dramatically increased after 1919.
Where it corresponded to less than 13 percent of general foreign trade in 1913, twenty
years later it had doubled, reaching almost 27 percent in 1933.15
Among these administrators and public intellectuals who came to dominate the
French colonial field, the influential Minister of the Colonies, Albert Sarraut
(1872–1962), publicized his views in two widely influential books: one published in
1923, and another in 1931, the year of the International Colonial Exhibition in Paris.
Sarraut, who had spent the war as Governor General of Indochina, held the position
of Minister of the Colonies from 1920 to 1924 (and from 1932 to 1933), as well as
Minister of Interior from 1926 to 1928 (and from 1936 to 1938), during which period
he was in charge of domestic affairs in Algeria (as Algeria fell under the Ministry of
the Interior). Albert Sarraut and the colonial reformers like Marcel de Coppet
(1881–1968), a friend of the Gides (particularly André, the novelist and nephew of
Charles), wanted to turn the French Empire into the leader of a new solidarist
experiment in colonialism.
As Sarraut wrote in two chapters, titled “The Colonial Obligation of France” and
“The French Colonial Doctrine,” based on lectures he gave in the mid 1920s before
students of the Colonial School,16 the French people were uniquely positioned to
help non-European societies reach what US development theorists likeWalt Rostow
would later call a more “advanced stage of development.”17 Sarraut asserted that
“Frenchmen are altruistic; their genius reflects a taste for the universal; their
humanity, their sense of right, fairness and beauty foment the altruistic conceptions
which they develop well beyond the national confines to expand to humanity as
a whole their dreams of justice, solidarity and fraternal goodness.” As he added,
“Christian or secular, soldiers for the King or Republic, Frenchmen feel the obliga-
tion to give and to give oneself so that they can bring the lights of civilization to races
less fortunate than theirs.”18 When Sarraut found evidence of brutal and egoistic
exploitation in France’s colonial history, it was only due to the “trial-and-error”19
nature of France’s colonial advancement, rather than French official state practice,
which, to him, was interspersed with numerous examples of altruistic gifts and
counter-gifts on both sides.
Sarraut’s apology of French colonialism, which he mixed with calls for a policy of
“generosity,” explicitly asserted the moral superiority of French colonialism over
that of the British and German: for him, what fundamentally distinguished the
French national character from the Anglo-Saxon character was the rejection of
the ideology of racial purity and superiority held dear by the latter.20 As he told the
students of the Colonial School, the colonial contract should no longer be char-
acterized by an “act of force,”21 as in the beginning of colonial expansion, but it had
to become a “fact of law,” almost a “total social fact” in Maussian language.
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In contrast to German law scholars like Carl Schmitt who rehabilitated the theory of
terra nullius to justify why the European powers could claim a right to rule overseas
territory,22 Sarraut slayed the idea that the benefits that France should derive from
the colonial relations derived exclusively from a right of first occupation – the act of
“taking”23 recognized at the Berlin Congress of 1885 in which the European great
powers divided colonial possessions in the Congo – or that the duration during
which that right should be exercised depended upon the commercial benefits that
the metropolis could derive from the exploitation of the colony’s riches.
Of course, this call for an altruistic form of colonial gift exchange represented
a great departure from the French nineteenth-century justification of colonialism,
which started with the loss of Haiti in 1825 and the subsequent invasion and
pacification of Algeria after 1830, paid for by Haiti,24 and which King Charles
X justified with the necessity for France to extract from Algeria the agricultural
products (cacao, sugar, etc.), which France could no longer extract from the lost
colony of Saint Domingue. This economic motivation, as well as a military strategy
that did not rule out extermination against the Regency of Algiers and the troops of
Abd El Kader, had been associated with some problematic episodes in French
colonial history, so did Sarraut timidly acknowledge, but this time of ruthless
colonialism was over.
With the end of the Great War began a period of “reciprocal gifts” between the
French metropolis and the colonies, as Sarraut believed: if the reality of colonial
relations still proved the contrary, at least, the idea of a new colonial “contract” was
widespread in the discourses of colonial high administrators as well as academics
and colonial administrators. One can think of the writings of Hubert Lyautey
(1854–1934), the famous General who pacified Northern Madagascar in the 1890s,
and then the frontier between Morocco and Algeria in the early 1900s; or those of
Georges Hardy (1884–1972), a friend of Lyautey and a former ENS student who
defended a PhD thesis in history on the mise en valeur of Senegal; or in the public
speeches of Hardy’s successor as Director of the Colonial School, Robert
Delavignette (1897–1976), who also worked with Lyautey and the Museum of
Ethnology team on the organization of the 1931 International Colonial Exhibition
which celebrated a century of French colonialism in Africa.25
For these colonial reformers, progress in the European administration of the
colonies could be made if the metropolis adopted a “giving colonialism”26 truly
inspired by the principles of a coherent solidarist doctrine. The gift, conceived in
solidarist terms as an implicit contract between two political societies,27 which were
engaged in reciprocal exchange of “prestations,” created obligations and duties for
both. Applied to the colonial doctrine, the recognition of contractual rights meant
that certain acquired colonial rights like property rights or the right of first occupa-
tion – those rights based on purely “dogmatic fictions,” against which Sarraut
opposed “living, positive and productive right”28 – should be disregarded.
Colonial powers had instead the obligation to pursue a “higher utility,” as peoples
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everywhere had “a superior right which is the total right of the human species to live
a better life on this planet, a life fuller of material and spiritual riches, which can be
best achieved thanks to the solidary collaboration between races.”29 Against that
“total right,” the right of “first occupation” held no power, as a “right that prevents
humanity from benefitting from its right of universal progress is not a right: no race,
no people, has the right to egoistically cut itself off from the universal movement of
life . . . as the whole of humanity has the right to live off the totality of natural riches
dispersed on the globe.”30
For Sarraut, since 1919, the French state no longer understood the colonial
contract as an absolute “right of the most powerful” but as a “right of the most
powerful to help the least powerful”31 to extract the most of a territory’s natural and
human reserves for the benefit of all, including first and foremost those least power-
ful, but also other European nations. In fact, Sarraut explicitly related the develop-
ment of the colonies with the making of a European order based on the Versailles
Treaty in which European nations would cooperate with one another for the
development of all. As Minister of the Colonies in 1920, he proposed a plan,
which was rejected by the Parliament, in which aid to the colonies would be
financed by the German reparations payments.32 Of course, his plan was imperiled
by the failure of the Germans to pay reparations in the 1920s, with the effect that
grants-in-aid were not extended to the colonies, at least until 1930, when the French
Parliament finally let the colonies float loans for a total of 5 billion francs –
a decision, which as William Cohen writes, had the unwanted and unanticipated
effect that the servicing of colonial debts soon “used up an excessive proportion of
their budgets.”33
Even if the record, in purely financial terms, proved that the French Republic had
not been particularly generous with its colonies, as the indebted colonial treasuries
(rather than the metropolis) paid a major share of administrative costs in French
Africa, and the cost of economic development devolved to the colonies themselves
to a greater extent in the French Empire than in the British one,34 most French
colonial administrators and intellectuals with a stake in the colonial field argued the
contrary. Mauss was no exception. When he wrote The Nation, Mauss was a little bit
less disingenuous than Sarraut in his analysis of French colonial history, as he
pointed to specific moments when the French had spread racist ideologies, from
Napoleon’s time in Saint Domingue to the early twentieth-century practices of the
French concessionary companies in the Congo,35 but he remained in general an
apologist of the French ability “to give” to its colonial subjects so as to create some
form of positive solidarity.
Forever an optimist in his writings, Mauss was not far from agreeing with Sarraut
that the French “honor derived from the fact that,” against the ideology of racist
superiority and the mercantilist inspiration of the Colonial Pact exemplified by the
early British colonial enterprise (which doomed those peoples whom Sarraut called
the “inferior races”36 to an everlasting specialization in raw material extraction and
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agricultural labor), France was the first colonial power to understand the “human
value of retarded races and its sacred obligation to respect and develop such human
value.”37 The French interwar experiment in colonialism would prove that the
“inferior races” could slowly join France in the joint management of all human
affairs (not just raw material extraction but also industrial manufacture) without
losing their singularity. For Mauss, there was reason to believe that a positive process
of development had taken place under the experience of late French colonialism: as
he wrote in The Nation, “whatever the crimes of imperialist colonization, it pushed
away Barbary, war, slavery, andmisery in important parts of the globe.” He added, “it
[is] still better for a Moroccan to be governed by Frenchmen than by warlords, for
the Arab to be under the British rather than Ottoman tutelage.”38 But was it, really?
It is an understatement to say that contemporary historians strongly disagree with
Mauss’s assertion.39
2 THE NATION: MAUSS’S SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE
DEBATE ABOUT FRANCE’S COLONIAL DESTINY
Mauss’s biased perspective on the French Republic’s experience with colonialism
may be evidence of the association between anthropology and colonial apology – or
an attempt to civilize colonialism to ensure its long-lasting presence – which has
been condemned by postcolonial scholars like Talal Asad.40 But before drawing any
conclusion, it is worth pausing to try to understand Mauss’s singular contribution to
the debate about France’s colonial destiny.
Reading Mauss’s unpublished manuscript The Nation in parallel with Sarraut’s
essays, one cannot but be impressed by the complementarity of views between
scholars and politicians involved in the colonial field on the issue of whether
French colonialism could be characterized in terms of gift exchange between the
metropolis and its colonies, and the related question of whether it had been good for
the social, political, and economic development of the colonies. But whereas
The Gift formulates an unequivocally optimistic view on the ability of gift exchanges
to create solidarity between nations, the unpublished work which Marcel Mauss
spent most of his time writing in the 1920s – the manuscript of The Nation – was
much more careful when assessing the relationship between the two. What colonial
administrators like Sarraut took as a matter of principled belief – that French
colonialism was altruistic and beneficial to the colonies – Mauss considered an
empirical question, which could be answered differently depending upon the
various contexts in which the French Empire had extended its tentacles.
During the 1920s, as Jean Terrier and Marcel Fournier assert, if “Mauss insisted
on the fundamental openness of societies, the porosity of social boundaries, and the
circulation of goods and ideas . . . as exchanges express the ‘constitutive mix [mél-
ange] of all things, values, contracts and men,’”41 Mauss considered that these
exchanges of reciprocal “prestations”42 between societies could have both negative
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and positive effects, depending on the types of “borrowings” (emprunts in French)
that circulated from society to society (whether the latter concerned civilizations,
techniques, aesthetics, religions, or legal forms),43 and the structural elements
present in the context of exchange. In The Nation, Mauss questioned whether
colonialism (whether altruistic or not) had actually created political solidarity and
community out of contractual exchanges across and between societies. The answer
was unclear to him, or rather, not as clear as he had wanted it to be in The Gift – or as
Sarraut, Lyautey, and other colonial apologists had claimed.
To answer this question, Mauss first needed a scale, a ranking, an index, or some
form of benchmark that would allow him to decide whether colonial societies had
moved up or down the ladder of development – or “integration” – as a result of gift
exchanges between the French metropolis and themselves. In The Nation, Mauss
thus proposed a general comparative and historical framework that allowed him
(and later his students) to rank societies according to a gradation of neighboring
“degrees of integration,”44 so as to identify those systems of gift exchange which
helped the exchanging partners move to a tighter degree of integration (a positive
outcome, for Mauss), and those which harmed such integration (a negative
outcome).
At the lowest level of integration, Mauss found what he called, after Durkheim,
“poly-segmentary societies”:45 some of which lacked a permanent organization, and,
like Melanesian or aboriginal Australian societies, only gathered as a whole during
totemic ceremonies to celebrate rituals; some of which actually did present a slightly
higher level of integration, as they benefited from permanent but not centralized
political structures that checked the centrifugal forces of clans and extended
families, like in the “tribal societies” of the North American or African continents
(Sioux, Iroquois, or Bantu).
At the highest level of integration, Mauss placed the “nation,” which character-
ized societies where intermediary bodies no longer buffered relations between
individuals and the state, and where a strong sense of territorial boundaries limited
the desire for imperial expansion. Such a conception of the nation conceived as
a daily plebiscite, in the words of Ernest Renan (1823–1892), was quite in line with
the French Republican definition. Not surprisingly, Mauss found that only two
Western countries could claim the title of nations: France and the United States.
In these two nations, “the two poles in the continuum of social beings, individuals
and the society, symbolized by the state, face one another,”46 and individuals only
recognize the authority of the law of their own nation-state. Apart from France and
the United States, Mauss asserted that even if “the surface of the globe [had] been
vascularized”47 by an explosion of exchanges between formally equal nations which
were all members of the League of Nations, most political societies organizations
could not be called nations in the proper sense.48 In The Nation, Mauss “warned his
contemporaries that there is a missing echelon in the ladder that the League of
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Nations placed upon the wall of history” to reach world peace: that of the “nation,
which most societies [had] not yet arrived at.”49
To these two poles of social organization, Mauss added an intermediary stage:
“empires,” where the force of integration had deepened (compared to tribal socie-
ties) under the increased presence of a central political authority, but not to the point
of creating a centralized nation of individuals united by a common national con-
sciousness as well as by their willingness to use the state as a means of political and
social reform. Under the category of empires, Mauss listed “societies of Muslim law,
Chinese law, Hindu law,”50 as well as Tsarist Russia, ancient Greece, Egypt,
Mexico, Germany, and colonial societies.
With this typology, Mauss thus proposed a vision of colonialism that was com-
pletely in line with the interwar version of the French colonial ideology. Indeed, the
latter distinguished colonial societies by their different levels of integration. In turn,
their level of integration left them more or less close to (national) autonomy, and
determined their right to be decolonized or not. As Mauss had already written to the
Minister of the Colonies in 1913, self-rule should be postponed to a more or less
distant future, depending on the nature of colonial societies: he recognized that
“populations in Algeria and the Tonkin could, to some extent, develop and prosper
by themselves,” but that “those in New Caledonia, the Congo, and elsewhere are
completely dependent on our benevolent tutelage.”51 How colonial societies scored
on the Maussian Index could thus affect the lives of millions.
But Mauss’s typology of levels of integration could also be used to evaluate
critically the effect of colonialism on colonial societies: Mauss judged whether the
exchange of prestations between a metropolis and its colonies had positive (true gift)
or negative (fake gift) effects by observing whether the exchange of prestations
moved the colony closer to the model of the nation, in which individuals united
around the celebration of a centralized authority within their society, or whether it
led to the further fragmentation of societies and economic systems. Those systems of
gift exchange which encouraged the formation of a national consciousness and the
organization of national conglomerates were, for Mauss, those which had a positive
influence on exchanging societies, whereas those that thwarted such process of
national unification – including in the economic domain – were those which had
a negative influence.
Mauss’s implicit assumption was that “intersocietal” exchanges (rather than the
organization of labor within closed societies) are the main drivers of history, respon-
sible for how societies with varying degrees of integration co-evolved sometimes in
tandem, sometimes in a contrapuntal manner. 52 For instance, Mauss claimed that
the potlatch represented the trading practice and the specific understanding of
customary contractual obligations by which poly-segmentary tribal societies had
moved up to the level of quasi-empires,53 as in the case of the large Native American
empires, which Mauss’s student Jacques Soustelle later studied in his doctoral
thesis.54 Thus, Mauss put forward a view of the potlatch radically opposed to that
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of British colonial administrators who had passed laws in Canada prohibiting Native
Americans’ exchange practices and defined harsh incarceration charges and fines
against those guilty of practicing the potlatch – alleging that when Native Americans
practiced the potlatch, they destroyed valuables, and thus violated central Protestant
principles of individualistic wealth accumulation and capitalist discipline.What the
Protestant missionaries abhorred, Mauss glorified.55
Still, Mauss found that systems of reciprocal exchanges did not always move
exchanging societies closer to the national model of integration. Before the Great
War,Mauss realized profoundly the destructive potentialities of the colonial project:
as he had already written in 1902 to the Minister of the Colonies, “in order to be
humane, colonial administration needed to respect and use local beliefs and
practices so as to avoid a brutal confrontation” in the colonial encounter, “which
he believed should only very gradually change the economic and technological
regimes in place.”56 Mauss wrote that colonization could be “a hazardous project,
costly in time and money, which ends up producing a disaster in civilizations as old
as ours, and whose morality is as respectable as ours, and whose artistic forms are
sometimes superior to ours.”57 This point is why he believed that the French
Republic would fail its colonial subjects if it did not use as many people as possible
(“missionaries, doctors, administrators, colonizers and indigenous savants”)58 to
protect the living memory of these subjects and their culture, by collecting local
artifacts to be displayed in museums, for instance.
In the non-European context, Mauss also found that the “privately owned char-
tered companies, working under the protection of European states, have monopo-
lized the extraction of coal, rubber and oil” and had inhibited the ability of colonial
exchanges to move colonies up the ladder of integration, “leading to a great resent-
ment among the smaller nations.”59 These chartered companies did not help
colonial societies coalesce around a central legitimate authority with which the
local populations (of both European and non-European descent) could identify.
On the contrary, Mauss wrote in The Nation:
The Colonial State often appears to acquire the entirety of the product of the soil of
the colonies, or the labor of the natives for a very small sum of money, or for
nothing, or by raising taxes among the natives . . . The French colonies have long
applied this principle to appropriate the means of import and export of the colonies
exclusively to the benefit of their own capitalists, thus securing a place under the
sun for them. There are some ugly things in the modern world.60
Mauss thus initiated in The Nation a normative reflection, which was absent from
The Gift, but which was connected to the denunciation by colonial reformers of the
old Colonial Pact between the colonial state and the chartered companies, whose
exploitative practices (especially in extraction of raw materials like rubber) could
lead to mass extermination or political rebellion if they brutally extracted all the
social and natural resources of the French Empire. What we may call the
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“monopoly colonialism” of the chartered companies was an essential component of
the “Colonial Pact,” whereby the colonial subjects consumed metropolitan indus-
trial products and extracted rawmaterials for the benefit of concessionary companies
that had been awarded by the metropolis an exclusive monopoly over large portions
of the colonies. Mauss found that the latter were thus maintained in a state of
economic dependence due to their overspecialization in agriculture or raw material
extractive economies.61 Rather than opening colonial economies to the opportu-
nities of global markets, Mauss criticized the fact that the colonial monopolies that
flourished under the French state’s authority produced effects that ran contrary to
the “mandates” that the League of Nations had endowed to the French and British
Empires after the Great War: e.g. to create, through cultural, social, and economic
exchanges, the conditions through which colonial subjects could arrive at
a developed stage where they could be given the authority to rule themselves in
interdependence but also independence from the metropolis.62
At last, closer to Europe, Mauss accounted for the breaches in the recognition of
reciprocal duties made manifest with the question of German reparations by the
various levels of integration reached by different political societies in Europe, the
relative newness of the collective experience of national consciousness in Europe,
and the “permanence of dynasties of German descent” in German political life,
which might still be influenced by “the traditions of the police state that character-
ized the Austrian or Russian model” of state formation.63 Mauss found that the
“persistence of upsetting elements” within European nations, like Germany, whose
territorial boundaries and financial duties had been explicitly written in the
Versailles Treaty, could explain why the German state had not benefited from its
participation in a network of European neighboring nations to grow an open
national consciousness.
In The Nation, Mauss thus focused on trade and financial forms of exchange as
the main factor responsible for the development or contraction of a national con-
sciousness within various historical – both European and non-European – contexts.
This was a fine and ambitious intellectual program, which nonetheless failed to
challenge the colonial mindset of the colonial administrators who glorified French
colonialism. Indeed, by blaming mostly the chartered companies and the Anglo-
Saxon or German imperial experiences, Mauss avoided raising the possibility that
the French Republic bore an essential responsibility for the destruction of colonial
societies – whether the state had put in place formal structures facilitating the
economic exploitation of the colony, the establishment of settlers or the total
annexation and assimilation of colonial subjects.64 Mauss’s perspective completely
failed to take into consideration whether imperial state structures (and specific forms
of constitutional organization) played a role in the maintenance of exclusion and
fragmentation within colonial societies; and whether colonial societies should
immediately declare their political independence or not. Mauss even wrote that
he regretted that many political scientists and legal theorists, likeMaxWeber (whom
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he did not hold in high esteem),65 confused the two notions of state and nation, and
that they privileged the study of the former over the latter: for Mauss, the questions
which related to political status (the constitutions and treaties through which
sovereignty manifested itself) had less importance in asserting the positive or nega-
tive effects of colonialism than the question of the contractual ties and social
obligations that stemmed from the organization of international economic
exchanges between peoples.66 As Mauss wrote in the introduction to The Nation,
he did not consider the study of “problems of sovereignty, of the Constitution, of
democracy, of the evolution of legislative or administrative powers,”67 or the histor-
ical study of diplomacy and treaty-making practices, with emphasis on “secret, or
rather, purely diplomatic and anti-democratic” practices of contracting,68 to be
relevant for the comparative study of various forms of national consciousness.
In this respect, his views strictly belonged to the interwar era, during which it was
next to inconceivable that such an apparently robust colonial edifice as the French
Empire of 100 million subjects could be destroyed in the near future; or that the
decision to grant independence to France’s colonies could come either from
the colonial subjects themselves or from a quasi-supranational organization like
the League of Nations. In fact, the political priority that Mauss assigned to the
League of Nations was to bring its member states closer to one another, so that the
League could become an association of “neighboring nations,”69 in the scale of
integration. Of course, Mauss admitted that there was nothing natural in this
convergence: no superior law of history dictated that nations would move closer to
each other as a result of increasing exchanges between them. As Mauss wrote in
The Nation:
it is clear that modern nations will not be able to reach a sufficient stage of
internationalism necessary to guarantee amutual peace until they succeed in giving
one another material proof of relative disinterestedness [désintéressement relatif], in
exchangingmutual services of all kinds, economic in particular. Perpetual peace, to
the extent possible, can only be established among equally good and serviceable (if
not idealist) nations, which agree to sacrifice a reasonable portion of their interests
for one another.70
This was a dream worth pursuing still, and Mauss believed that the French nation
could start implementing it with its colonial possessions.71
3 MARCEL MAUSS IN THE CONGO: THE LATE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY STRUGGLE OF THE INDIGENOUS
COMMITTEE AGAINST THE CHARTERED COMPANIES
While the case of Marcel Mauss’s relation to colonialism hardly falsifies Tal Asad’s
claim that the development of anthropology as a comparative science was deeply
tied to the colonial mindset, the analysis of Mauss’s ideas on the power of chartered
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companies also complicates it. In The Nation, Mauss condemned the chartered
companies and their despicable practices of forced labor implemented without any
state sanction, their dishonest financial tendencies which consisted in setting any
cost they incurred against the budget of local governments, and themoral corruption
that they entertained among the Parisian editorialists, politicians, and speculators
who united to defend their role in the Colonial Pact. Indeed, Mauss saw in the
“private appropriation, under the authority of the great [European] states, of many
basic commodities necessary for the life of other nations (coal, oil)”72 a deeply
problematic development associated with modern industrial forms of colonialism.
All of these factors led to the destruction of a spirit of national solidarity, both in the
colony and in the metropolis.
That Mauss rehabilitated the normative model of gift exchange in modern
political thought at the same time as he struggled against the power of the chartered
companies may seem paradoxical to historians of political ideas. Indeed, since Harry
Liebersohn’s The Return of the Gift,73we now know that the circulation of gifts as the
preferred mode of colonial governance was denounced precisely by those late
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British philosophers who opposed the gift-
giving practices of the chartered companies, like the East India Company.74 Thus, it
may appear surprising that the “return of the gift”75 to theories of good government
found its way through the writings of twentieth-century anthropologists who
denounced precisely the same chartered companies.
This paradox, however, can be explained by Mauss’s prewar involvement in the
debate over the French chartered companies operating in the Congo. Their abuses
were blatant in the case of the Congo, about whichMauss had collected secondhand
information since 1900 in the context of his participation in a small but influential
organization called the French Committee for the Protection and Defense of
Indigenous Populations (hereafter, the Indigenous Committee), founded in 1892,
which had ties with an associate organization, the Franco-Swiss League for the
Protection of Indigenous Populations in the Congo, chaired by the novelist Anatole
France, whom Mauss consulted on the topic of forced labor.76 It was Mauss’s
participation in the Indigenous Committee that led him, maybe for the first time,
to work alongside Charles Gide.77
In 1906, the Indigenous Committee addressed a letter (co-signed byMauss) to the
Minister of the Colonies, protesting the decision made by the General Government
in the Congo “to reduce the productive capacity of the indigenous populations to
two-thirds of the productivity of workers in the French concessionary companies.”78
For Mauss and other members of the Indigenous Committee, the decision revealed
the complicity of the French administration in the Congo with the repressive
policies of chartered companies whose only goal was to force the local population
to work for them, whatever the costs for the region. The Indigenous Committee also
denounced the French officials’ toleration vis-à-vis the worst examples of forced
labor and mass killings that were performed by the chartered companies in these
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regions. Indeed, the companies routinely organized “hostage camps”79 of women to
force their husbands into accepting deforestation labor, which men otherwise
refused to perform.80 This horrible practice, which led to the death of thousands
of women due to malnutrition in the camps, was so widespread that it triggered an
official investigation, led by the delegate of the Minister in the Congo, Savoyan de
Brazza (1850–1905), who documented a wide range of mistreatment of colonial
subjects by the chartered companies operating in the Congo. Mauss collected
evidence from Brazza’s secretary, Félicien Challaye (1875–1967), another ENS
student close to Charles Péguy, who published regularly in Péguy’s Cahiers de la
Quinzaine – until the latter distanced himself from Jaurès andMauss in 1906. Later,
in 1911, Challaye continued to investigate and denounce the complicity of the Paris-
based editorialists, industrialists, and politicians with the worst exploitative practices
of chartered companies in the context of the N’Goko Sangha scandal,81 providing
arguments for the socialist parliamentarians gathered behind Jaurès – as described
below.
In fact, their campaign against “chartered companies” and “trusts” operating in
the Congo was truly transnational, as it involved many intellectuals and colonial
officers across Europe who were revolted by the situation they witnessed on the
ground: the British official Roger Casement (1864–1916) may have been the first to
denounce officially the exploitation of the Congolese populations by the “trusts,”
whose only motivation was the appropriation of short-term gains at the expense of
a long-term developmental strategy. The report on the Congo he wrote in 1903
contributed to the creation of the Congo Reform Association, which developed
branches in the United States (1905), Switzerland (1909), France (1908, created by
Challaye), Italy (1908), and Germany (1910).82
Thus, even if the association between gift exchange and the positive development
of solidarity seemed to be unambiguously positive in The Gift, Mauss and some of
the solidarist thinkers with whom he was associated in the Indigenous Committee
were deeply aware that the exchange of “prestations” could be negative as well as
positive, depending on other contextual elements, and specifically the motivations
of the chartered companies in charge of developing the concessions.
In fact, the word “prestations,” which Mauss used as an anthropological concept
in his 1925 essay, was used by that very sameCommittee to refer to the labor practices
that the chartered companies required from colonial subjects: in a letter signed in
1901 on behalf of the Indigenous Committee by Paul Viollet (1840–1914) –
a historian of ancient law (from the Gauls’ legal system to medieval customary
laws) who long served as the librarian of the Paris Law school, where he met many
specialists in colonial law – and addressed to the Minister of the Colonies, the
Indigenous Committee asked theminister to “formally prohibit that any corporation
in charge of public work in the colonies pay workers with another currency than the
legal money”; that “any in-kind payment (especially in alcohol) would be strictly
prohibited”; that the word “forced labor” [corvée], which brought up so many bad
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things, be replaced by the word “prestation” (or in English, “requisition”); and that
“women could no longer be requisitioned for digging and earthwork” so as “to limit
the number of abuses that have proliferated in Guadeloupe, New Caledonia,
Indochina,”83 and in the French parts of the Congo. In contrast to “forced” labor,
the exchange of “prestations” had to have a “voluntary character.” This did not mean
that it should adopt the exact same contractual form as a “wage,” but that its logic
should not be purely exploitative – and that some “giving back” should be realized in
the broader colonial context. In many ways, we find here the earliest trace ofMauss’s
famous definition of the “reciprocal prestations” discussed in The Gift in which
Mauss stressed their “voluntary character, apparently freely given, yet coercive and
interested.”84
In this context, the same socialist thinkers who, a few years before, had stood
against the accusers of AlfredDreyfus, like Jean Jaurès and Albert Thomas (who later
tried to use his influence as the first director of the ILO to prohibit forced labor in the
early 1930s),85 expressly related the fight for Dreyfus and the fight against forced
labor. As a result, in 1906, the League of Human Rights (Ligue des droits de
l’Homme), which they had created during the Dreyfus affair, declared itself to be
the “tutor of the rights of the indigenous populations,”86 and worked to publicize
their campaign against chartered companies.
While Charles Gide and Marcel Mauss remained private in their condemnation
of the chartered companies from the Indigenous Committee to the Minister of the
Colonies, Jaurès and Thomas took a much more public stance, especially during
a scandal that involved the N’Goko Sangha Company,87 which had obtained
a concession in the French Congo in 1899. The N’Goko Sangha case exposed the
reality of colonial administrative practices, which was all the more unfortunate in
the region whereMauss claimed, in a 1913 letter to theMinister of the Colonies, that
the colonial subjects needed most a benevolent and enlightened colonial adminis-
tration: the Congo.88
The socialists first rebelled by denouncing the commercial and labor policies of
that company on the ground. As the French local administrator in Gabon had
written in 1908 to his governor in a letter transmitted to Albert Thomas, the existing
system of exchange between chartered companies and local colonial subjects in the
Congo did not benefit the latter at all, largely because of its reliance on in-kind
payments, which did not follow any useful function. At the time, the company paid
its local colonial workers with overpriced “gun powder, which was the main cur-
rency used by the Pahouins to pay the bride’s dowry,” and “which was under the
exclusive monopoly of the Company”:89 this situation thus allowed the company to
fix whatever price (calculated in hours worked for the company) it wanted for that
good, whose sale was in fact prohibited by other European chartered companies in
the Congo region, as it had the obvious disadvantage of arming local populations –
even if it also allowed them to build families.90 Echoing the demands made by the
Indigenous Committee, Thomas proposed that the French state should impose the
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“obligation for companies to pay indigenous populations in cash and money” rather
than in kind.91
Mauss’s socialist friends in Parliament also criticized the financial montages that
the French investors organized in order to make the colonial subjects pay for the
oppressive practices which were imposed upon them and from which they suffered.
In so doing, they prefigured in part Mauss’s distinction between exploitative short-
term practices driven by utility-maximizing private agents and the logic of honor
found in the exchange of real (as opposed to fake) gifts.92 Jaurès criticized in
Parliament the short-term logics of economic exploitation in the colonies and the
financial hypocrisy of the colonial apologists who indebted future generations of
colonial subjects by having them pay for these colossal and unwanted projects.
As Jaurès said in 1911, France’s financial policy with the colonies “consists in hiding
the real costs of France’s colonial policy by multiplying threefold, sometimes
fivefold the taxes levied on local populations, and by accumulating local debt,
paid at interest rates which are highly profitable” to the French capitalists, “so as
to fund large expenses in big public construction works – the construction of roads
and railways which serve no apparent function when much more needed irrigation
systems are neglected – whose costs are placed on the accounting books of local
governments.”93
With the N’Goko Sangha Company, the financial scandal took an even more
extreme form, as the company obtained a formidable sum of money (to be paid by
future generations of colonial subjects) thanks to an arbitration procedure
denounced by Thomas, Jaurès and others. Indeed, the company, acting like
a modern-day vulture fund – like those which recently sued the country of
Argentina in New York courts after the restructuring of the Argentinian debt through
an obscure clause known as pari passu94 – asked the general government of French
East Africa to pay reparations for its failure to enforce the monopoly over the
exploitation of rubber. This monopoly had been extended to the company in the
French Congo in 1899. Less than ten years later, the company lawyers claimed that
the company had suffered from the exploitation of latex trees by German companies
located in the same territory, in violation of its rights of exclusivity,95 due to the
French state’s 1908 swap of large territories granted to the company in the Congo
and Cameroon with the German state. Indeed, they claimed that, after failing to
secure the border between the French and German territories in the Congo and
South Cameroon, the French colonial administration had let German factories
return on the N’Goko Sangha company’s territory after 1905, and that the German
companies had proceeded to even greater forest destruction in retaliation for the
(undelivered) threat of legal proceedings by the company in Germany.96 Thus, in
1910, the N’Goko Sangha company requested the formidable sum of 6million francs
in reparations from the French state, including 1.5 million for torts suffered before
1905 and 4.5 million for torts suffered after the swap of lands in Congo and Gabon.
The arbitration tribunal, where André Tardieu sat as the company representative
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and Martial Merlin (1860–1935), Governor General of French East Africa, repre-
sented the French state, found a compromise by awarding to the company
2.3 million francs, which were placed on the accounts of the general government
of French East Africa.97
For the socialists sitting in Parliament, the arbitration case was a grotesque travesty
of the reality of the colonial practices on the ground. The fact that such a company
could receive reparations from the French government in East Africa meant that the
colonial subjects were exploited twice: first by being coerced into almost-unpaid
forced labor, and second by forcing their children to reimburse the debt created by
the local government’s payment of reparations to the company. As Marcel
Labordère (1870–1946), an economist, trade cycle specialist, and a friend of
Thomas, wrote to the latter, the arbitration of the N’Goko Sangha case was
a complete setup from the start. The N’Goko Sangha Company extracted wealth
and profit from legal action against the state and from the organization of public
campaigns which hid the fact that the company had failed to fulfill its develop-
mental obligations. Indeed, when the French state first gave compensation to the
company in 1905 (by giving concessionary rights on millions of hectares in Gabon in
exchange for the de facto loss of forests in Congo), the company had the choice to
“either [accept] the gift as it was” and knowingly decide to fight the German
economic competition in the new Gabonese territory by investing economically,
or to use the new territory, where there was a known German presence, as an
opportunity to “seek even more profit by means of further legal action against the
State.”98 By choosing the latter strategy, the company not only proved to be ungrate-
ful (as it did not consider the economic potential of the millions of hectares on
which it had gained concessionary rights), but it also proved to be extremely
deceitful, as from the start it had planned to use “an arsenal of legal means which,
conveniently deployed by a reserve of friendly forces, could help it make profit in the
vast field of reparations claims at the expense of the national interest.”99This strategy
was twofold: first, the company abandoned its claims in German courts,100 where it
lacked the support of powerful voices to pressure the courts to obtain a favorable
settlement; second, it moved to the French courts where it counted on “friendly
forces”101 within the Colonial Party. These influential voices included Victor
Augagneur (1855–1931), the Governor of Madagascar in 1904 and then Resident-
General in Tunisia who has long been a socialist member of Lyon’s municipal
Council, before turning into the apostle of massive investment in rail and road
construction work.102 It also included legal experts such as Henry Berthélemy
(1857–1943), a colleague of Augagneur at the municipal Council of Lyon, who
served as legal expert in the N’Goko Sangha arbitration case.103 It also comprised
the powerful voice of André Tardieu, who wrote positively in the press about the
arbitration procedure in which he took part to protect the private interests of the
company.104
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For Jaurès, these conflicts of interest, which were characteristic of Tardieu’s
multipositionality for instance, combined with “the lack of parliamentary control
of arbitration procedures,” proliferated in “colonial affairs in general.”105 Indeed,
before becoming a leading voice in the reparations debate, Tardieu was
a parliamentarian and an editorialist at Le Temps, as well as representing the
company in the arbitration procedure. In the very critical words of Jaurès, he helped
chartered companies “earn money by stealing from the State’s budget rather than by
making profit out of its economic activities.”106 This multipositionality at the inter-
section between the metropolitan and colonial fields of power – that characterizes
the way “compradores”107 operated in Europe as well as inmany other countries from
the Global South – turned ministers into “the servants of obscure and occult forces”
which “organized the hunt for reparations”108 by predatory companies who lived off
colonial taxes (present and future).
The announcement of the award granted by the arbitration tribunal to the
N’Goko Sangha Company so much infuriated Albert Thomas, who sat on the
Budgetary Commission of the French Parliament, and Maurice Viollette
(1870–1960) – a young solidarist from the radical socialist party, whom Mauss had
known before the war, and who later served as Governor General of Algeria in the
interwar period before he became Léon Blum’s Minister of Interior in 1936 – that
both Thomas and Viollette asked for the establishment of a commission of inquiry to
annul the whole arbitration procedure.109 For them, the scandal implicated too
many French politicians within the Colonial Party, whose practices were reminis-
cent, at least to Albert Thomas, of the worst manipulations revealed during the
Dreyfus affair. Indeed, noticing that “the N’Goko Sangha company had presented
secret documents which were not communicated to the State” during the arbitration
procedure, Thomas wrote that the “State had been condemned to pay a sum which
it didn’t owe, based on secret documents, just like in the Dreyfus affair.”110
These prewar scandals are particularly interesting because they clearly illustrate
the stark differences between the singular position that French anthropologists
occupied in the metropolitan and colonial fields of power, compared to anthropol-
ogists in other European countries. For instance, British anthropologists and colo-
nial administrators who were members of the London Anthropological Society,
wore double hats as ethnographers and propagandists of the dubious financial
instruments by which concessionary companies were financed to develop far away
territories in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.111 As Marc Flandreau has recently
showed, the London-based development of learned societies, which operated in the
shadow of the London stock exchange, provided colorful description of distant tribes
to future bondholders of concessionary companies in charge of administering these
new subjects, and certified the claims of these companies before a gullible public.
In this context, British ethnographers and anthropologists found a new social
purpose, far from the disinterested pursuit of knowledge in the academic chapels
of higher learning: British ethnography and anthropology were then used to certify
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the financial worth of colonial projects sponsored by London-based learned socie-
ties, where stock brokers, investors, and indeed anthropologists met and discussed
the worth of various ethnicities for developmental (and thus financial) purposes.112
In contrast, French anthropologists who gathered around Mauss remained arm-
chair academics, who didn’t claim to know such distant territories as the Congo, but
who used the social capital and access to media that they had accumulated during
the Dreyfus affair to fight against the avatars of the British anthropologists, propa-
gandists, and financial crooks who operated from Paris. Marcel Mauss and his
socialist friends in Parliament fought against the chartered companies who claimed
to develop regions when in fact, their only source of revenue was the extortion of
French taxpayers under threat of litigation. Even if neither Jaurès, nor Thomas, nor
Mauss contested the principle that France had a civilizing mission in the non-
European world,113 and that the exchange of gifts was a priori a useful way to think
about the economic development of, and political solidarity between, the metropo-
lis and the colonies, they denounced the reality of colonial practices on the ground
that involved a perversion of gift exchanges. Their fight against vulture funds and
their sponsors, agents, and other propagandists operating from the national parlia-
ment and Paris-based press organs, thus demonstrates an important difference in the
way anthropology developed in London and in Paris.
4 THE INTERWAR FIGHT AGAINST THE FRENCH CHARTERED
COMPANIES IN THE CONGO
In the pamphlets, addresses and letters written by French socialists before the Great
War, these words – “gift” or “prestation” – functioned as positivemarkers of the French
mission in Africa: what these public intellectuals placed in the pillory was the failure
by chartered companies to uphold the ideas of honor that had justified why such
companies had been granted public powers in the first place. As Thomas explained in
the National Assembly in 1911, chartered companies like the N’Goko Sangha
Company should lose their concessionary rights when it was blatant that they failed
to honor their promise to invest in developing the region – the counter-gift that
chartered companies had to give back in exchange for their concession, to live up to
the ideals of altruistic colonialism (and the very reason “why the French state granted
concessions to these companies in 1899”).114 Indeed, “concessions were meant to
encourage chartered companies to effectively administer large territories”115 in the
absence of state and military support. That chartered companies behaved like the
worst capitalists showed that they did not understand how gift exchange between
solidary societies should be practiced – which may be one reason why Mauss under-
took to describe such “ideal” rules of gift exchange in his 1925 essay.
After the Great War, such intrepid proposals actually found their way in Mauss’s
manuscript The Nation. Indeed, anticipating the wave of nationalization of French
private companies that followed the Second World War in France – when, as in the
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case of the car manufacturer Renault, the decision to nationalize the company was
a sanction against the collaborationist behavior of the owners and topmanagement –
Mauss also advocated the nationalization of chartered companies which did not
honor their debt to the metropolitan and colonial societies.116 He wrote eloquently
in favor of the creation of socially and democratically controlledmonopolies (whole-
sales) in charge of the administration of the vast sectors of the economy presently
controlled by the chartered companies.117 Such nationalization could pave the way
toward harmonious development if it followed certain rules.
First, the notion of “nationalization” needed to dissociate the “nation” from the
“state.” The nationalization thatMauss advocated differed from the “state socialism”
embodied by the Bolshevik Revolution, as nationalization was not purely state
control of capital, but rather the “social” control of capital. Second, “the term
nationalization implied that only societies having reached the national stage in
the life of societies could logically and practically decide to nationalize
something.”118 Third, the term “nationalization is associated with the ideas of
organization, justice and legality which are absent from the term of socialism.”119
Apart from the fact that the last sentence represented quite an extraordinary
statement from someone who had claimed to cofound the SFIO, one can remark
that Mauss mentioned these ideas of legality and justice, but he did not explicitly
discuss the question of whether a just compensation would need to be paid to the
private holders of capital at the time of the nationalization. For him, a private
chartered company should indeed lose its right to exploit the soil in distant colonies
if they failed to exploit to the fullest extent the resources of colonies in an altruistic
fashion, as Albert Thomas had claimed was the case of chartered companies that
behaved like the N’Goko Sangha Company – e.g. exploiting the French legal system
and the colonial subjects, without any regard for the collective good of either the
metropolis or the colony.
When the reality defied this utopia, the solidarists, socialists, and other colonial
reformers gathered around Sarraut, Mauss, and Blum did not hesitate to denounce
the power of “trusts” and other chartered companies after the Great War. As Sarraut
was writing his book, Colonial Grandeur, and Mauss The Nation, the exploitative
practices of the chartered companies had not disappeared – far from it.
The extractive companies which operated in African colonies – in Senegal, extract-
ing peanuts; in the Ivory Coast, cocoa and coffee; in Eastern Africa, rubber and
cotton – requested unrealistically high production quotas, which local French
administrators obtained by imposing forced labor and higher taxes as well as harsh
sanctions in case of noncompliance. This Stakhanovist system most often led to
direct wealth destruction: for instance, in the late 1920s in the Ivory Coast, African
colonial subjects went to British-controlled Gold Coast to buy the cotton that they
were required to, but could not, produce, so as to avoid being sanctioned.120 Thus,
the battle against private interests still raged among the French colonial reformers
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interested in jump-starting the economic development of colonies, especially in
Africa.
In fact, the same network of solidarists and socialists who had denounced the
practices of the N’Goko Sangha Company before the war continued to denounce
similar abuses by the chartered companies that continued in the Congo. In the mid
1920s, Charles Gide’s nephew, the novelist André Gide, traveled to the Congo with
his companionMarc Allégret on invitation by the local governor,Marcel de Coppet,
who became the leading advocate against the exploitation of colonial subjects by the
large extractive companies: this time, the target was the Compagnie forestière
Sangha-Oubangui, whose stocks were ornamented with the orientalist drawing of
a young Black Amazon and elephants’ ivory tusks, as represented in this book’s cover.
This was the last French chartered company, whose privilege extended until 1935.
If we believe Gide’s report, rather than representing the young and proud Congolese
girl standing with a spear in her hand, as if ready to defend her territory, a more
realistic representation would have showed her back broken by long hours spent
collecting and transporting the rubber for the company.
André Gide first published in 1927 his famously critical report on the Congo’s
French chartered companies, as articles in Le Populaire, the journal edited by Léon
Blum (Gide’s best friend in high school), which by the late 1920s reached more than
100,000 readers, and then as a book – which Blum reviewed extensively in two
articles published in Le Populaire. Like Mauss and Sarraut, Gide refrained from
attacking the principles of human solidarity which, according to them, inspired
French colonial policy in the interwar period: he lauded many colonial adminis-
trators like de Coppet who advanced French civilization and engaged in honest
exchanges with local populations, whose living standards they helped raise by
abolishing unpaid prestations in the form of forced labor.121 He limited his denun-
ciation to the abuses he saw perpetrated against local populations by exploitative
capitalistic endeavors (in the form of forced labor, mass repression against the
evasion of absurdly high taxes, etc.),122 and by judicial trials against local populations
trying to escape forced labor: in particular, he denounced the chartered company in
charge of building the railway, the Compagnie forestière Sangha-Oubangui, for
systematically relying on forced labor (imposed on women especially) to generate
more profits. Thus, Gide’s denunciation, written by a Nobel laureate in literature,
was framed in the exact same terms as found in the letters sent by the Indigenous
Committee before the war, or in the parliamentary attacks against the N’Goko
Sangha Company expressed by Thomas.
Interestingly, Gide also remarked that the conditions of forced labor were dis-
guised in the same language of “prestations”123 which the Indigenous Committee
had advised the Minister of the Colonies to use, and that Mauss used in his essay on
The Gift to identify gift exchanges. Gide was not the only one to condemn the
inflated level of “prestations” that the French administration in the Congo required
from the colonial subjects yearly: in 1919, as WilliamCohen writes, “it was estimated
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that in order to collect enough rubber to yield the tax money designated as presta-
tion, the inhabitants had to work between sixty and one hundred and twenty days
a year, depending on the area in which the rubber was collected.”124 Thus, even if
the administration no longer used the word “corvée,” but had followed the recom-
mendation of the Indigenous Committee to the Minister of the Colonies to use
“prestation” instead, the practice had not changed much compared to the 1900s.
And although they explored both the negative and positive aspects of reciprocal
relations known as “prestations,” albeit through different formats, neither Gide nor
Mauss were completely unaware that such reciprocal exchanges of gifts and counter-
gifts conceived as free prestations could hide the most coercive and exploitative
practices.125 The notions of reciprocity, solidarity and gifts were indeed ambivalent,
as Mauss had remarked in The Gift.
In response to André Gide’s pamphlets, the administrator general of the
Compagnie forestière Sangha-Oubangui replied in an open letter, also published
in Blum’s journal, Le Populaire, that his company, having renounced some of the
privileges of a chartered company after the Great War, could not be held
responsible for the failure to administer justice in the Congo. Those to blame
were not the company officials, but the local chieftains and their associates in
a corrupt and understaffed administration.126 To him, decades of understaffing in
the French administration, and the continuation of barbaric local mores, which
included anthropophagy and the starving of prisoners taken during local feuds,
were responsible for the poor state of law and order in the Congo region, his
letter alleged.127
Still, whatever the Compagnie spokespersons said, Gide had targeted forms of
brutality in the French Empire that had long been covered up by the French
administration and that remained, at least in the Congo, well entrenched in the
colonial field of practices. The arbitrariness and brutality of the administration of
justice in the Congo, were not a surprise to colonial reformers. The French
administration, in particular under the government of Martial Merlin (Governor
General of the French Government of Eastern Africa), “had satisfied itself with
the decision to send to this colony all the administrators deemed unfit in other
colonies,”128 according to contemporaries of Mauss and Gide. As William Cohen
writes about the Congo, “no matter how inefficient or brutal, most [French]
administrators were considered good enough for service in the Congo: that colony
was the receptacle for administrators unwanted in other French territories.”129
At the Colonial School, where Mauss started teaching ethnology exactly when
Gide published his pamphlet, it was well known that colonial administrators sent
to the Congo lacked the basic training in colonial administration, not to mention
ethnology.
To be fully understood, Gide’s intervention needs to be contextualized in the
struggles that divided the colonial field at the time, and the attempts to not only
change the training of future administrators, but also the current economic, social,
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and political direction of the developmental projects undertaken by the colonial
administrators in Africa. Gide had decided to visit the Congo and Chad after Marcel
de Coppet had encouraged him to expose the continued practices of forced labor of
private companies: De Coppet met Gide with Georges-Henri Rivière (Mauss and
Paul Rivet’s assistant at the Museum of Ethnology), after being introduced by the
novelist Roger Martin du Gard (1881–1958), his best friend from military service.130
He invited Gide to observe (and criticize) the construction of the Congo-Ocean
railroad, a project launched by Victor Augagneur in 1921.131 The two colonial
administrators had long expressed many doubts, divergences and outright criticisms
about their colonial ambitions. Before the Great War, Marcel de Coppet had
worked for Augagneur when the latter was the Governor General of Madagascar.
There, he saw that Augagneur’s policy of massive investments (paid for by local taxes
and debt) obligated local populations into forced labor (generally conceived in
terms of a tax), which depleted the local labor markets of a substantial portion of
its labor force, thus impeding growth prospects in the colony.132
After the Great War, which he spent in Senegal recruiting thousands of
Senegalese soldiers whom he sent to the French trenches,133 de Coppet worked
as Sarraut’s press manager before returning to Eastern Africa, specifically Chad,
where he could again observe the effects of Augagneur’s policy (which included
the building of a railway), which he publicly criticized for its heavy reliance on
forced labor. When, after Blum became Prime Minister in 1936 and named de
Coppet Governor General of French Western Africa, it was Marcel de Coppet
who ordered his governors to abolish forced labor in the developed regions of
their colonies, and to institute instead a tax to finance further public works.134
De Coppet was one of the few registered socialists, who had long sided with
Thomas, Blum and Blum’s Minister of the Colonies, Marius Moutet (1876–1968),
whom Mauss had met shortly after the Dreyfus affair, when Moutet was a lawyer
for the League of Human Rights,135 active against the power of the chartered
companies.
Denunciations of the chartered companies were thus articulated in the 1920s by
colonial administrators well endowed with what George Steinmetz calls “colonial
capital,” which they acquired through experience in the colonial service in
Madagascar or West Africa, but also through networks of ties developed with the
écrivains-voyageurs like André Gide, or editors like Jean Paulhan (1884–1968) at
Gallimard (who worked with de Coppet in Madagascar before the Great War, and
who succeeded to André Gide as Gallimard’s most influential editor in the 1940s and
1950s), as well as politicians like Albert Thomas and Léon Blum. The ideology of
“altruistic” colonialism thus distinguished its promoters from the traditional colo-
nial economic elites, who only saw in the colonies an opportunity to obtain raw
materials at a cheaper price. As Mauss did in The Nation, or as Thomas did in
Parliament, Sarraut blamed these speculators and merchants (especially private
chartered companies) for their egoistic understanding of commerce: as he wrote,
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the latter should be made to understand that “the distant possession is no longer
a simple enclave [comptoir], a reserve of riches, a market opportunity for the
conquering nation, which comes to grab spices and sell its merchandises by pressur-
ing the local populace which it exploits without limitation.”136
This coordinated push against the exploitative practices of French chartered
companies thus gained momentum around the time Gide published his essay,
and it even found some relays in the Geneva-based international organizations
where French socialists had gained an important voice. After Albert Thomas,
then Director General of the ILO, read André Gide’s first drafts, he wrote to Gide
that he would “be happy to help him crush a number of adventurers he had
already fought against.”137 After circulating Gide’s essay at the ILO, Albert
Thomas acknowledged that the section titled “Indigenous Labor” of the ILO
read “[Gide’s] essay with passion,”138 and that in publishing it, Gide had done
a great service to the cause of indigenous emancipation. He noticed that there
was still a widespread belief among students of the Colonial School in Paris that
“forced labor serves a pedagogic mission”139 by socializing indigenous populations
in the hardships of industrial labor. Later, Thomas tried to prohibit “forced labor”
at the 1930 ILO conference on the topic, but France’s opposition prevailed
against its complete prohibition. Thus, it was not until Blum was finally elected
prime minister in 1936, that forced labor was eventually prohibited in France by
the law of June 17, 1937, which was prepared by Blum’s Minister of the Colonies,
Marius Moutet.
Before concluding on this episode, I can hardly resist mentioning that, with his
uncommon sagacity, André Gide also explored the ambivalence of reciprocal
bonds known as prestations in his novels – a little-known facet of his literary work,
which shows that fights in the colonial field had ramifications in the French
literary field as well. Indeed, in his novels, Gide consistently explored the darker
sides of reciprocal attachments, the poisonous qualities of gifts that Mauss had
also underlined in The Gift, and which seem to have fascinated him. For
instance, in his novel The Counterfeiters, published in 1925, which André Gide
dedicated to Roger Martin du Gard (de Coppet’s best friend, who later became
de Coppet’s father-in-law after de Coppet married his best friend’s daughter),
Gide deployed various intrigues which showed how the solidarity between the
characters of his novel (young boys and old men, mostly) could be negative for
their morality and overall destiny: such negative solidarity could take the form of
a dirty secret, like the secret attraction of an older man for younger boys, or the
sudden revelation of an illegitimate ancestry, or the participation in a criminal
group like a ring of counterfeiters.140 It was as if André, the son of a law professor
in Paris who died at a relatively young age, subverted the notion of solidarity that
his uncle Charles had theorized and made the founding block of his progressive
agenda for the Republic.141
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5 HOW MARCEL MAUSS’S STUDENTS FOUGHT POLITICAL BATTLES
IN THE COLONIAL FIELD
But now, back to Mauss, and to his writings on imperial solidarity and gift exchange.
One riddle which still remains in need of an explanation is why, despite the fact that
Mauss’s interwar writings generalized his reflections on the question of gift
exchange that he published in his 1925 essay, he didn’t seek to publish this manu-
script The Nation: could he have possibly feared political repercussions?
One possible interpretation of his discretion may be that he did not want to
jeopardize the creation of the Institute of Ethnology that he was in the process of
establishing at the same time as he published The Gift. The year 1926 was not
a random date for the creation of the Institute, as it corresponded to the victory of
left-wing parties that Mauss had helped win the election thanks to his numerous op-
eds on the reparations question in Le Populaire.142 At last Mauss’s two-decade-long
efforts were rewarded. The creation of the Institute finally gaveMauss an instrument
that enabled him to gather facts through his students’ primary fieldwork, as well as to
train colonial administrators to better appreciate the cultural context in which their
actions took place. The Institute of Ethnology, funded thanks to taxes levied in the
French Empire, was France’s first university training in ethnology, and it directly
targeted colonial administrators. As Alice Conklin writes, “this new [ethnological]
science was supposed to serve” the empire: according to the Minister of the
Colonies, Edouard Daladier, who agreed to fund it, the Institute would improve
the “training of colonial administrators from the Colonial School”143 created in
1889, which had never successfully provided highly skilled administrators for the
empire. As Mauss wrote in 1925, when presenting the newly founded Institute, “the
Institute serves the French Colonial Governments and Protectorates and provides
them with information about (French and foreign) missions, with studies of indi-
genous races, as well as collects documents, artifacts and thereby contributes to the
study of social facts.”144
Mauss hoped that the creation of his Institute would deeply affect the kinds of
methods that he and his students could rely on in their academic writings: for
ethnology to be relevant to the administration of colonial subjects, ethnology had
to change and become grounded on strong ethnographic field methods. Mauss’s
prewar essays on sacrifice and the origins of contractual law, which he published
with Henri Hubert in L’Année sociologique, reflected the poor advancement of
ethnographic methods in France. In these essays, the two friends explored “how
the sacrifice-gifts first emerged, when offerings to Gods were presented as gifts,” and
how they changed “when the bloody aspects of the sacrificial rites gave a penal
character to the sacrifices, and turned the sacrifice-gifts into expiatory sacrifices.”145
Mauss and Hubert mostly based their findings on their reading of the Bible and the
Veda,146 and on the application of philological methods, which Mauss had studied
under the supervision of his PhD adviser, Sylvain Lévi, the famous Indologist. At that
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point, and up until the mid-1920s, Mauss and Hubert lacked the capability to collect
primary documents and stories, which is why they mostly discussed the work of
another philologist, the British historian of religion, James Frazer and his compara-
tive history of sacrifice, The Golden Bough.147 The French colonial administrators’
lack of interest in the pursuit of ethnological knowledge before the GreatWar forced
Mauss to rely on such philological analysis of ancient texts or on secondhand
analysis of ethnographic facts, which he read in the Anglo-American ethnographies
which he reviewed in The Gift.
The year 1925 thus marked the moment when Mauss secured the centrality of his
position in a European space of science (ethnology), situated at the intersection
between the logic of colonial administration and the comparative study of gift
exchanges. The creation of this Institute in 1925 made it essential for Mauss to
publish The Gift and to keep The Nation unpublished for the time being: in his
famous article, Mauss reviewed the scholarly production of the Anglo-American and
German ethnologists148 – such as Franz Boas’s work on the Kwakiutls and Richard
Thurnwald’s study of gift-giving practices in the Solomon Islands149 – whom he
identified as the community of peers with whom he intended the young French
doctoral students in his future Institute to converse. Publishing such
a comprehensive survey, filled with references from various national ethnographic
traditions on gift exchange, had the additional advantage of illustrating the scientific
spirit of cosmopolitan solidarity among men of science and claiming a new role for
French sociology and ethnology as co-leaders in the field of ethnology with the
German and Anglo-American ethnologists.
Through Mauss’s work of citation, discussion and debate, which he displayed in
The Gift, Mauss sought to invite Euro-American ethnologists, whose ties had some-
times been severed by the Great War, to engage in close collaborative enterprises in
the advancement of this new research program: the comparative analysis of gift
exchanges which he developed in The Nation and which provided him with
a collective research program that the doctoral students of the newly founded
Institute of Ethnology could adopt to conduct single-case ethnographies. His stu-
dents would ask and provide answers to the following questions: Were colonial
practices a positive force for the development of a common political consciousness
within the colonies? Did they foster the expression of concrete forms of solidarity
between and among groups? Or did they have mostly negative effects on the
solidarity within groups and across exchanging parties, mainly, the French metro-
politans and the colonial subjects? But when answering these questions, they would
have to weigh the benefits of academic discretion over political intervention.
In many ways, the mandate that Mauss had received when obtaining funding
from the French government for his diverse endeavors (Institute, Museum, and the
Chair of Sociology he obtained in 1931 at the Collège de France), was fulfilled
perfectly, as one can see from the careers of some his students in the colonial field.
Mauss sought to ground his students in both ethnography and colonial
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administration in a deeper appreciation of each other’s comparative merits. He
sought to influence the colonial administrators he advised, by grounding their
colonial practice on a more humanistic understanding of the diversity of human
experiences, to implement a solidarist colonial policy based on the rejection of the
Colonial Pact – which was possible only if his students reached high positions in the
ladder of colonial administration.150
Bernard Maupoil (1906–44, killed in 1944 in a slave labor camp in Germany) was
a good example of howMauss taught colonial administrators, who either came from
the Colonial School, and discovered ethnology thanks to Mauss’s seminar, or who
used their free time as colonial officers to conduct doctoral research under his
supervision. Maupoil was posted in Dahomey in the mid 1930s, where he conducted
an ethnographic study of geomancy,151 thus advancing ethnological research at the
same time as he used that research to claim better knowledge (and thus better
administration) of the local populations, despite the hurdles placed by the admin-
istration to his ethnographic work.152 After 1936, Maupoil worked as a civil admin-
istrator in French West Africa under the orders of the Governor General Marcel de
Coppet, whom he lauded for the freedom the latter gave him to conduct fieldwork
“to study the ‘Fa’, the God of destiny in Southern Dahomey.”153
The careers of the ethnology students that Mauss took under his supervision were
thus, not surprisingly, protected by the same colonial administrators who battled
since the beginning of the century against the interests of the chartered companies
that Mauss denounced in The Nation, and that Gide had targeted in his essay. But in
order to secure their jobs in the colonial administration, Mauss advised his students
to carefully avoid voicing “negative views on colonization, and especially the
capitalist form of colonialism,”154 which, as he cautioned Maupoil in a letter,
could only harm the scientific integrity of their findings – as well as their careers
in the colonial service and the Institute’s reputation. As Mauss added, his words of
advice toward some of the criticism expressed by Maupoil against French colonial
interests in Western Africa “did not reflect a substantive disagreement,” but rather,
the necessity to “keep some discretion”155 over one’s political views. This prudence
was all the more necessary for Maupoil in that, with the exception of Marcel de
Coppet, his superiors in the French administration held the time he spent doing
ethnographic research against him. In 1934, for instance, he was re-affected in the
bush, far from his original fieldwork, which illustrated the mistrust that the colonial
administration still showed toward the officers who conducted ethnographic
research.156
Mauss gave the same advice to Richard Le Cœur, his favorite student, the son of
a colonial family in Morocco whose career spanned academic and colonial fields,
and whom Mauss later wanted to appoint as his successor at the EPHE.157 But
unfortunately, Le Cœur, who joined the Free French forces during the Second
WorldWar, was killed in 1944 on the battlefield during the campaign of Italy. In fact,
Le Cœur was not critical of French colonialism: the last section of his dissertation
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concluded with a chapter on Lyautey’s protectorate policy, which Conklin describes
as quite baroque: it included poems and ended with a hagiography of Lyautey’s
policy of “love” in Morocco,158 which Mauss claimed was a great
accomplishment.159 Still, Le Cœur’s first dissertation draft included some more
critical remarks on colonialism, especially as he studied the relation between the
evolution of European colonialism in the interwar era and monetary evolutions in
Europe (focusing on the difference between the franc and the mark). After reading
his student’s reflections, Mauss insisted that his thesis should not appear too Marxist
in inspiration, and that Le Cœur should also pay attention to the cultural and
pragmatic factors associated with the “colonial mentality.”160 As he wrote to his
student in 1938, “there are many other things that capital exports in the act of
colonization,” so Le Cœur should “keep Simiand and take away Marx”161 from his
theoretical tool kit. This shift would also have the advantage of limiting the criticism
of French colonialism in his final dissertation. Mauss was consistent: he wanted his
students to reform colonialism from within not from outside.
To help a cadre of young French ethnologists to conduct empirical research and
investigate the effects of colonial practices on the local peoples (or populations)
administered by the French colonial state in West Africa, Mauss also needed the
resources to pay for his students’ costly ethnographic trips. As head of the Institute,
he encouraged Franco-British scientific collaboration, such as that between his
student Maurice Leenhardt (1878–1954), for whom he obtained a scholarship from
the Rockefeller Foundation (for which he served, along with Charles Rist, as the
contact person in France),162 and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955), to do ethno-
graphic research together in New Caledonia. Maurice Leenhardt, a Protestant
pastor stationed in New Caledonia from 1902 to 1921, was a good example of the
missionaries who took classes with Mauss: as Conklin writes, Leenhardt had
“struggled for years in order to understand Kanak concepts of the sacred in order
to render Christian terms into vernacular idiom more truthfully,”163 and it was
thanks to Mauss’s dedication that his student’s thesis was published after his return
to Paris in the late 1920s.
Mauss also used his network of friends among British anthropologists – like
Charles Seligman (1873–1940) – to ask, for instance, the British colonial adminis-
trators for collaboration and free passage for the French ethnographers who sought
to do ethnographic fieldwork in African territories under British control.164 For
instance, Mauss’s other student, Bernard Maupoil, not only conducted fieldwork
in FrenchWest Africa, but also secured from the British colonial administration the
right to interview the Yoruba in British-controlled colonies to finish his
dissertation.165 Already in the 1920s, US funding and Anglo-American scientific
exchange were key to the development of French social sciences: nothing much
has changed since then.
To find resources for his students’ ethnographic “voyages,” Mauss’s entrepreneur-
ial spirit did not stop at the border of the academic world. In large part thanks to the
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Museum of Ethnology – later renamed Musée de l’Homme – the students whom
Mauss and Rivet trained there also tapped into the economic resources of the art
collectors to fund their research trips. The ties that Mauss had developed in the
world of high finance were recycled to place these young French ethnologists on
Europe’s map of art collectors, museums, and ethnologists working in the colonial
societies.166 The conversion of social and economic capital into ethnographic
capital was most apparent when Mauss helped his student, Marcel Griaule
(1898–1956), a specialist on Abyssinia and Ethiopia who graduated from the
Institute of Ethnology in 1927, to raise the funds for a fact-collecting mission that
would start in Dakar and end in Djibouti, thus crossing Africa from west to east, and
traversing mostly French but also British territories.
Mauss spared no energy for this mission: Griaule was deeply thankful for the
“effective but silent” mobilization that Mauss conducted on the side of foundations,
as Mauss, with the help of Charles Rist,167 raised about 300,000 francs from the
Rockefeller Foundation in 1931.168Mauss also lobbied his socialist friends (Renaudel
in particular) to pass a law appropriating funds for the Dakar–Djibouti Mission,
which allowedGriaule to leave (withMichel Leiris as secretary) for Dakar in 1931.169
In these endeavors, Mauss joined forces with David David-Weill of the Lazard Bank,
which had become a major shareholder in the car company of André Citroën,170
which sponsored ethnological missions and other car explorations in unchartered
territories.171Griaule’s enterprise, although criticized by some of Mauss’s other PhD
students, like Bernard Maupoil, produced an extraordinary amount of data in the
form of art, files, photographs and other artifacts: in December 1931, Griaule
reported to Mauss that his short trip through the Dogon territory had allowed his
mission to send to the Museum of Ethnology 2,000 objects, 1,500 photographs, 695
meters of shot film, 40 recordings and more than 2,400 ethnographic files on the
Dogon people alone.172 As he told Mauss, “this mission is an industrial factory.”173
A few years later, Mauss told his student Bernard Maupoil that he was proud of
Griaule’s mission, and that with such a success, “Africa cannot really complain of
the task performed by the Institute of Ethnology,”174 which had allowed Europe’s
community of ethnologists (and more broadly, the European public of the new
Musée de l’Homme created in 1937) to access a wealth of information on Africa’s
traditions and cultures, and thus to realize how rich those traditions were. Whether
the African populations fromwhich these artifacts were taken away agreed or not was
another matter. Furthermore, as Maupoil wrote to Mauss, Griaule’s mission had
made manifest the contradiction between the two goals that the Institute of
Ethnology pursued: gaining credibility for ethnography within the ranks of the
colonial administration, and attracting the attention of the broader public. As he
wrote, “the Griaule mission didn’t leave a good impression in Dahomey,”175 where
Maupoil was stationed, and Michel Leiris’s Afrique fantôme, in which the young
secretary of Griaule’s mission criticized colonial society, was a disservice to
ethnology.176 Indeed, its critical tone reinforced the prejudice in which ethnological
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missions were held among colonial administrations – thus making Maupoil’s task
much more difficult.177
The emphasis on European solidarity through colonial expansion, Franco-British
ethnological data-collection missions and the display of artifacts in ethnological
museums preparedMauss’s students to play a key role in the organization of the 1931
International Colonial Exhibition in Paris (visited by more than eight million
people, with more than thirty million tickets sold). The International Colonial
Exhibition, which marked the one hundredth anniversary of the French coloniza-
tion of Algeria, was the apex of this outreach campaign, as it sought to internationa-
lize its audience. The Minister of the Colonies, delivering the opening remarks at
the Exhibition, as well as Hubert Lyautey, the organizing force behind the
Exhibition, insisted that the colonial ideal marked a profoundly European phenom-
enon which united nations of Europe and the rest of the world in a common destiny.
For the organizers of the Exhibition, the “colonial œuvre” offered European citizens
a guarantee against the coming of a new war, both in colonial territories, and in
Europe, as the increased trade between the French and British metropolises and
their respective colonies decreased the conflicts between European powers. France’s
colonial project could really be a truly European project, and Mauss’s ethnological
science a truly cosmopolitan endeavor at the service of a more humane French
colonial project. As Lyautey wrote in 1931, “the world now sees with clarity that it is
through colonial action that it can realize the notion of human solidarity.”178
Lyautey was a figure admired and loved by Mauss’s inner circle, in particular by
Max Lazard, who appreciated that Lyautey had been one of the rare Dreyfusards
within the ranks of the military: they also appreciated that he had forced peace upon
various Moroccan tribal sheiks in 1912 through a policy of repression and “gift” or
“love,” as expressed in his deceiving language.179
As Alice Conklin remarks, the interwar generation trained by Mauss and Rivet at
the Institute of Ethnology thus not only “failed to condemn French colonial rule”180
but actively participated, along with Mauss, Rivet, Lyautey, de Coppet and other
colonial administrators in publicizing the French solidarist colonial project. Jacques
Soustelle comes to mind as another good example of a doctoral student of Mauss
who tried to apply ethnological lessons to the colonial context. Soustelle was also
a kind of “heir” endowed with colonial social capital, as, although from a modest
family with a Protestant background, early on he married Georgette Fagot, the
daughter of a close collaborator of Victor Augagneur at Lyon’s municipal
Council, before Augagneur left Lyon to become Governor of Madagascar in 1904
and then Resident-General in Tunisia.181 On a scholarship from the ENS, it was
Soustelle’s wife who first met Marcel Mauss, who was teaching at the Collège de
France and the Institute of Ethnology at the time. Mauss introduced them to Rivet,
then head of theMuseum of Ethnology, for whom the couple worked until they later
moved to Mexico, where Soustelle conducted research on the Lacandons, consid-
ered to be long-lost descendants of the Mayas.
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Even though Soustelle’s workmay seemmore distant from the realities of colonial
administration in West Africa than that of Maupoil and the other Africanists like Le
Cœur, as France had no possession in Central America, Soustelle still gave his work
some resonance in the field of colonial administration. After the proto-fascist riot in
front of the French Parliament that left fifteen dead in February 1934, Mauss, Rivet
and Soustelle participated in the creation of the Watchfulness Committee of
Antifascist Intellectuals in March 1934. They were among the first signatories, and
as such, they negotiated with other signatories, like the philosopher Alain, or the
physicist Paul Langevin (Mauss’s colleague at the Collège de France), the exact
wording of the declaration against “a fascist dictatorship” and “against the power of
the banks, trusts, and armament manufacturers who want to subvert the Republic,
the true Republic which is embodied by the people, the working, suffering, and
thinking people which seeks its emancipation.”182 Jacques Soustelle also partici-
pated in the foundational meetings at Langevin’s place, where he met
numerous communist intellectuals, including some who introduced him to Soviet
ethnography – a completely “outdated ethnography”183 – which convinced him that
fascist perils needed to be addressed, but that the communist tool kit was useless in
the battle of political ideas.
Soustelle’s activism was strongly influenced by Mauss. When Blum was elected
prime minister in 1936, Mauss wrote to Blum advising that the government should
invest in the creation of “centers of propaganda in Italian andGerman” so as “to fight
against the fascist propaganda” that had, as Durkheim had already noticed during
his wartime experience, an incredible and “pathological influence on collective
representations,”184 not only in themetropolis, but also in the colonial field. IfMauss
failed to convince the socialist prime minister, his advice resonated with Jacques
Soustelle.185 Soustelle later recalled that the realization that Hitler’s Germany was
preparing a European war, and that the French intellectuals should do something
about it, came to him as he saw an unending line of trains moving heavy armament
across Germany while he traveled with Mauss across the Third Reich in 1938, as the
professor and his student were on their way to a conference in Copenhagen.186 One
year later, in 1939, Soustelle created a center of counter-propaganda in Mexico,
where he remained posted at the onset of the war.
Like Maupoil and others, Soustelle used the comparative framework that Mauss
developed in The Nation and in his seminars to study how colonial exchanges could
lead exchanging societies closer to, or further away from, the highest levels of integra-
tion where the imperial nation was supposed to lead its colonies. In 1936, based on his
research findings inMexico, Soustelle argued that the French colonial administrators
in Africa should take inspiration from land redistribution plans he observed in
Mexico187 to capitalize on the presence of benevolent socialists in Blum’s government
during the 1936 Front Populaire and expand the social benefits granted by the
metropolis to its colonial subjects. For him, it was important to associate together
the struggle against the fascists and the reform of colonial administration.
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As these battles of ideas between socialism and fascism took to the colonial context
after the mid 1930s, Mauss also used his ties to his doctoral students, some of whom
served as colonial administrators, especially in theWest African colonial field, to get
information from the field and report back to various associations including the
League of Human Rights, which he had helped create in the context of the Dreyfus
affair. The collection of documentation they gathered included information on the
colonial companies’ abuses.188 For instance, Bernard Maupoil, who, by 1935, had
taken the presidency of four tribunals in Senegal, denounced in a letter toMauss the
collusion between some fascist elements in the colonial administration and a happy
few from both the metropolitan and colonial society, who appropriated large
benefits from the exploitation of forced or cheap labor. He decried the impunity
of the Governor General in Senegal and his main associate, “a freed and self-
enriched slave who exploited the peasants,” over the vast portion of land that his
mafia controlled, and whom the League of Human Rights left alone, as the
“negrophiles”189 there did not want to admit that exploitation could be performed
by local black businessmen as well as metropolitan companies. Maupoil thus urged
Mauss to see his friends in the League to denounce these abuses.190
In the mid 1930s, as tensions grew between left-wing and right-wing colonial
administrators, Maupoil kept Mauss informed of the cabals which divided the field
of French colonial administration between socialists (close to Marcel de Coppet,
whom Blum elevated to the rank of Governor General of French West Africa when
he became Prime Minister) and conservatives and fascists, who followed Jacques
Doriot (1898–1945), a former communist who formed a new populist party in 1936.191
As Maupoil wrote to Mauss in 1937, the fascists had the support of the son of the
former Director of the Colonial School, Maurice Delafosse: because of Delafosse
fils, who worked for the Governor General in Dakar, it was no longer rare to meet
“Franco’s men” cruising in the streets of the capital of Senegal and agitating against
the socialists.192
At the time, one of themain issues of contention between socialists and conservative
administrators in West Africa was the future of the Office of the Niger, which was in
charge of developing the valley of the Niger River thanks to a large public works
irrigation program. This Office had been set up by deCoppet, thenGovernor General
of French West Africa (before being sent to Madagascar a year later as Governor
General), and in 1928, the Government of French West Africa had already spent
400million francs for the program, in addition to the 300million that it had raised in
France – creating a debt that continued until 1986.MariusMoutet, Blum’sMinister of
the Colonies, had strongly supported de Coppet’s vision and his preference for
irrigation work rather than road construction – the latter had been Augagneur’s
trademark. But despite great progress on the ground, as Maupoil wrote to Mauss,
the Office of the Niger could no longer find capital in the metropolis in 1938.193
After 1934, with a sick wife – his former secretary, whomMauss married in January
of that year, at age 60, and who was permanently injured in a failed suicide attempt
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three weeks after their wedding,194 –Mauss had less time and energy to participate in
these political battles to reform colonial administration, even if he still followed his
students’ initiatives, and continued to follow the socialist party internal politics from
afar.195With Blum’s electoral defeat in 1938, the incoming conservative government
intended to close the Office of the Niger, and toMaupoil’s dismay, the metropolitan
socialist newspapers – some of which were controlled by the powerful colonial
interests in Lyon’s municipal council, where Augagneur, who was carded as
a socialist, still had a lot of influence – paid little attention to the effort of colonial
reformers who wanted their economic policies to benefit their colonial subjects: as
he wrote to Mauss, even the socialist press, in particular Le Populaire, was no longer
interested in reporting the attacks that the “big trusts” organized against the “colonial
administrators who risked their career by adhering to the socialist party.”196Maupoil
and Mauss agreed that it was a lost opportunity to show how ethnologists could help
colonial administrators succeed in creating the political conditions necessary for the
economic take-off of the colonies, but the resistance they encountered in the
colonial field, coupled with Mauss’s waning forces, was stronger than expected.197
Little did they know that the beginning of the SecondWorldWar would soon shatter
their existence and the world in which they had lived, where they (wrongly) assumed
that ethnology could be put to the service of an enlightened and human colonial
administration in West Africa.
6 A MIXED LEGACY IN THE COLONIAL FIELD IN WEST AFRICA
Both The Gift and Mauss’s unpublished manuscript The Nation aimed at
placing the theoretical focus of anthropology on transnational circulation and
transfers – or, in Maussian terms, “intersocietal” contacts, a term he preferred,
as he emphasized that not all societies (almost none, in fact) had attained the
status of “nation.” In The Gift, Mauss proclaimed unequivocally that the
exchange of goods, prestations, and reciprocal services was the safest way to
ensure the solidarity between exchanging societies. But The Nation started
where Mauss’s reflection in The Gift ended, as Mauss developed further his
ideas on the destructive aspects of the colonial encounter. In The Nation, Mauss
listed the practices that prevented such a reciprocal exchange of prestations
from having positive effects on both exchanging parties, especially, but not
exclusively, for the colonial subjects. Still, his criticism was limited to the
power of the chartered companies operating in Africa to provide colonies with
fake rather than true gifts: a lamentable fact which he criticized on behalf of
a policy that the philosopher Alexandre Kojève would later call the program of
“giving colonialism,”198 in a lecture delivered at the invitation of Carl Schmitt
after the Second World War.
In this unpublished manuscript, Mauss thus paid much more attention to the
obstacles that could explain why the exchange of reciprocal prestations could go
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wrong and fail to bring about the kind of international solidarityMauss wished to see
within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world. But he focused almost
exclusively on the monopolies and concessions granted to chartered companies
(especially in the exploitation, trade and administration of raw materials like rub-
ber), in which he saw a transient organizational form that could either morph into
national monopolies – and thus avert colonial wars – or could continue to exploit the
social and natural resources of the French Empire, leading to rebellion, fragmenta-
tion, and violence, and even to the collapse of the Republic, which was not protected
from the peril of fascism. Mauss’s focus on big trusts and private companies may be
where his theory of international relations and international solidarity was limited as
well as prescient.
Indeed, Mauss’s perspective was limited to the extent it endorsed the French
colonial mindset of the interwar era: Mauss almost completely missed the colonial
oppression and exploitation organized by the state itself (and the army in particular)
when looking for the sources of obstacles to the political development of colonial
societies. In the 1930s, Mauss helped his colleagues and students to denounce
practices of forced labor or other gross abuses against local populations by forwarding
information to the League of Human Rights, but in general, he advised them to
remain cautious. In the nebula of public intellectuals, colonial administrators, and
policymakers, which included, among others, Léon Blum, Marius Moutet, Albert
Thomas, Marcel de Coppet, Charles and André Gide, who lobbied the French
government and international organizations like the ILO to ban the existence of
forced labor, Mauss was a timid voice. Mauss cannot claim a large part of responsi-
bility for the victory that Léon Blum’s government experienced when it finally
abolished forced labor, even if his students and colleagues consistently lobbied against
it. And the socialists’ victory was short-lived, as the fascists and conservatives gained
power in the ranks of the administration of Senegal and other colonies of West Africa.
Not surprisingly, as the SecondWorldWar broke out, it was Félix Eboué (1884–1944),
then Governor of Chad, who rallied the government of East Africa to the government
in exile of General de Gaulle, whereas the governors of Senegal and West Africa in
General pledged allegiance to Vichy and Marshall Pétain, who sided in favor of
collaboration with the Nazis – while de Coppet, named Governor of Madagascar,
made the tragic mistake of not siding in favor of de Gaulle.
One may thus ask whether Mauss’s teachings and writings failed to prepare his
students and the colonial administrators under his supervision to support the move-
ments in favor of political independence which emerged during and after the Second
World War in the French colonies and in Algeria. This is the key question that the
next chapter will explore in further detail, although the evidence must be treated as
suggestive rather than conclusive: indeed, many of his students were killed during the
war, and one cannot predict how an entire cohort of ethnology students would have
reacted to the rise of anti-colonial movements in Indochina or Algeria, had they
survived.
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But even so, Mauss’s anthropological perspective on international economic
relations may have been prescient, considering the postcolonial fights for economic
independence led by the newly independent states after their political indepen-
dence. In the 1970s, the themes that Mauss had addressed in The Nation seemed to
come back at the center of debates on global governance and gift exchange: the last
section of The Nation, which ignored the question of political independence but
called on new states to nationalize chartered companies, promoted the policy that
French Algeria would ultimately follow when its governments decided in 1971 to
“nationalize” the oil and gas extraction trusts operating in its territory. Could these
decisions and the associated calls for a “new international economic order”199
expressed in the 1970s by Algeria and other Third World nations be then interpreted
as the last trace of Mauss’s influence in international relations? Chapter 6 will
answer this question, by showing how anti-colonial scholars and policymakers in
Algeria addressed the question of economic independence, although in a different
way than Mauss had anticipated.
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5
Marcel Mauss’s Disciples in Algeria
The Anthropology of the Gift and the Shock of Decolonization
In September 1959, Jacques Soustelle – by then Minister of Atomic Energy and the
Sahara – wrote to French Prime Minister Michel Debré, “the Algerians exist, but
there is no such thing as an Algerian people.”1 In so doing, this former graduate of
the Paris-based Institute of Ethnology, who had become the world’s leading expert in
Central American ethnology, opposed the principle of “self-determination,” which
President de Gaulle had recently advocated when he announced his decision in the
summer of 1959 to let Algerians decide their own fate. In fact, Soustelle expressed
both a political statement on the legitimacy (or lack thereof) of Algerians’ claims to
independence, and an epistemological claim: indeed, he affirmed the primacy of
ethnological knowledge over the manifestation of a political will through
a referendum on the question of Algeria’s independence.
For Soustelle, any consultation of the Algerian residents, as decided by de Gaulle,
ignored the more important realities discovered by ethnologists and generations of
French administrators in Algeria: Algeria was multiple and complex. In fact,
Soustelle wrote to Debré, the French government “shall not accept the possibility
that the Algerian people could determine, en bloc, the destiny of a unified entity
conceived as a State” as Algeria lacked the “ethnic and cultural homogeneity which
is a necessary condition for the validity of a vote in which the majority can
legitimately impose its views on the minority.”2 As he added, the “future consulta-
tion of Algerians shall thus be conceived in such a way that it leaves to ‘the peoples’
who live in Algeria, rather than to an alleged ‘Algerian people,’ the possibility to
express themselves.”3 Deciding otherwise, would, for the Maussian ethnologist
turned minister, be equivalent to accepting the “oppression”4 of the dominant
ethnic group over the less populous ethnic groups. Based on his opposition between
ethnographic diversity and democratic voice, Soustelle thus motivated his impas-
sioned rejection of de Gaulle’s pro-self-determination policy in the hope of convin-
cing Debré, who had been a staunch defender of the pro-French Algeria policy, to
resist de Gaulle’s choices.
Soustelle’s view may, at first sight, appear to depart from Mauss’s central claim
that the colonization of non-European peoples could only be justified as a means to
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foster a national consciousness and help create democratically controlled national
economic conglomerates. But it also reflected Mauss’s attachment to the idea that
ethnographic knowledge should be used by colonial policymakers as a guide for
action. Soustelle mobilized ethnographic knowledge to answer one of the most
important questions of his time: how could European statesmen decide that
a colonial people (or group of peoples) had reached a sufficient level of national
integration so as to justify granting their national independence? As we have seen,
Mauss largely eschewed the question in his interwar writings: he argued that most
societies had not yet arrived at that level of national integration,5 but he also affirmed
the principle that colonialism should foster such national integration so that a true
inter-nationalism could be built. The prospect of decolonization seemed so distant
that he never got bogged down in the practical details of whether national integra-
tion would automatically mean national independence – nor the legal conditions of
future secessions.
But in the postwar era, characterized by the revolt of the Vietnamese and then
Algerians against continued French tutelage, Mauss’s disciples could ignore the
practical issue no more. They had to take a position as to whether ethnographic
knowledge showed that Algerians were now ready for independence; and, further,
whether ethnographic knowledge should be the guide on that question, or whether
the expression of political will – expressed by guns or votes – would suffice to gain
independence. In this chapter, I thus ask: did Mauss’s students draw on the anthro-
pology of the gift exchange to decide this issue, especially in the context of the war in
Algeria? How did Mauss’s analysis of gift exchange help them justify either the
continued integration of Algeria within a greater France, or Algerian independence?
Which rhetorical resources were deployed by the mobilization of ethnology for
either pro-independence or pro-French Algeria claims?
To answer these questions, the chapter first investigates how two of the few
students whom Mauss had trained before the Second World War and who also
survived the war, Germaine Tillion and Jacques Soustelle, deployed and reframed
Mauss’s concepts of gift exchange and intersocietal integration in the context of the
Algerian War. The first section shows how they adapted their mentor’s theory of
integration to the postwar era, when the debate concerned whether the French
Republic could move toward a post-national political society, with Algeria and the
Frenchmetropolis tied together; or whether Algeria could be granted independence
without risking its implosion. For them, ethnological findings demonstrated that no
Algerian national consciousness united its citizens in a common democratic frame-
work, and more broadly, that Algeria lacked the necessary economic and financial
resources for its national autonomy. As there was great risk that Algerian indepen-
dence would mean “de-development” – e.g. a socioeconomic regression with
respect to the period of integration within the French constitutional framework –
they thus argued in favor of continued French presence in Algeria as well as for
a constitutional reform that would further integrate the various components of the
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societies “France” and “Algeria” into a post-national political body. As Giuseppe di
Lampedusa had written in 1958 in The Leopard, everything needed to change, so
everything could stay the same.
The application of themodel of gift exchange to rethink economic relations in the
colonial context in general, and the Algerian context in particular, was hardly
surprising, since Mauss founded ethnology in France at the nexus of colonial
administration and academic theorizing. Furthermore, as the French Empire had
shrunk by 1954, and as Algeria was at the center of intellectual and constitutional
debates about the future of France itself, it was natural that Mauss’s students would
apply their master’s theory of integration (and reformulate it at the same time) to
think through the relations between France and Algeria and their possible integra-
tion in a French multicultural, postcolonial, and post-national Republic. At the
same time, the theory of integration developed by Mauss’s students in the Algerian
context represented a radical departure from the creation of a society of independent
nations, which had been the League of Nation’s objective in the interwar period –
and the implicit ideological map onto whichMauss projected the possible futures of
colonialism.
Among the younger generation of anthropologists and sociologists whom Mauss
had directly or indirectly influenced, not all agreed with Jacques Soustelle and
Germaine Tillion. But, more importantly, structural transformations in the postwar
French academic field led to the emergence of the French discipline of political
science, which, as this chapter demonstrates, called into question the very notion
that ethnology had anything to say about international relations in general and the
future of Algeria in particular. Combined with the end of the French war in
Indochina in 1954, shortly followed by the beginning of the insurrection in
Algeria, these structural changes led to the rise of new voices who disputed the
legitimacy of the application of the model of gift exchange to the analysis of
international relations, and the specific conclusions that Maussian ethnologists
drew with regard to Algeria. Paradoxically, it was Mauss’s cousin, Raymond Aron,
who argued most strongly that ethnology in general, and the model of gift exchange
whichMauss had developed in particular, should no longer influence the reasoning
of the French government with regard to Algeria. Instead, Aron argued that eco-
nomics and the new science public administration should ground the judgment of
policymakers on this most complex question.
Aron’s realist vision of international relations, argued the Maussians, doomed the
Algerians, as the latter would never be able to attract enough capital to modernize
their economy – not to mention their skepticism about the Front de Libération
Nationale’s (FLN) ability to let Algerian citizens enjoy democratic rights. But the
blow that ethnologists had suffered, so this chapter then argues, eventually led to
ethnology’s downfall, and its relegation to the sciences of the local. The attack
against ethnology in general, and the anthropology of gift exchanges in particular,
was all the more fatal that it was relayed by ethnographers themselves, as the chapter
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goes on to show by focusing on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu in Algeria. To claim
that relations between metropolis and colonies could be viewed as gift exchanges
was deeply wrong for Bourdieu: remains of gift exchanges could be observed at the
local level in Algeria, but not at the international level. With Bourdieu, the idea that
the model of the gift could provide a valid heuristic to think through colonial and
postcolonial intersocietal relations became anathema, as it smelled too much of the
old colonial ideology that marked his elders’ political essays. From then on, the
chapter concludes, he and younger anthropologists applied the model of the gift
solely to talk about socioeconomic exchanges at the local level, thereby closing the
historical parenthesis during which the gift had returned as a legitimate discourse
about global governance.
1 ALGERIA: A LABORATORY FOR SOUSTELLE’S THEORY
OF POST-NATIONAL INTEGRATION
Many debates today, in France as well as in Western Europe, revolve around the
notion of “integration.” In a context of rising right-wing populism in Europe, fueled
by the instrumentalization of women’s rights to police the borders of citizenship
along the lines of race and religion, we often hear injunctions from politicians that
migrants – especially the nationals of former French colonies and Algeria in
particular – must better “integrate” into French society.6 French populist thinkers
and politicians demand that migrants and second-generationMuslims from Algeria,
Tunisia, or Morocco conform to newly reinterpreted norms of gender equality and
secularism, which are reframed in such a way so as to paradoxically make the very
“integration” of Muslim migrants and their children more difficult, as these norms
ask them to choose between certain understandings of their own religion and the
possibility to work or study in France.7 In many ways, integration, in these academic
and political discourses, has come to refer to the relation that each individual within
minority groups entertains with the political, cultural, and social mores of the
dominant group.
Even if not completely reducible to the concept of “assimilation,” the concept of
integration today has come to characterize the way individuals relate to, and absorb,
social norms. It is a social reality, which can be measured by demographers and
sociologists. In the United States, mainstream sociologists of migration have framed
their contribution to the policy debate on migration by measuring levels of integra-
tion of migrant population of different ethnicities or national origins in their host
society and by developing what they call “segmented assimilation theory.”8 This
modern use of the term “integration” (used interchangeably with that of “assimila-
tion”) is also found in the work of French social scientists who build indexes of
“social integration,” which they use to compute the relative ease with which
individuals of various migrant communities are likely to adopt the dominant social
norms and values once they interact with the majority.9 Integration is thus a loaded
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term, in a context in which French right-wing pundits have saturated the media with
their ranting against the alleged evils of multiculturalism.
Integration in the postwar era was not a purely academic term either, but its
meaning encompassed a very different political and legal reality than that which
today’s social scientists and right-wing politicians associate with the term.
The question concerned whether all French citizens (including those adhering
to the Muslim code in Algeria) could participate in the political life of the
French Republic; and what form such political participation should take. Before
the Second World War, Algerian Muslim residents seeking French citizenship
were presented with the drastic choice between their religion and customary law
on one side, and the benefits of French citizenship on the other side, with the
effect that very few had pursued French citizenship before 1946. In some sense,
it is sad to notice that French citizens are close to being brought back to this
era, as the French Parliament has decided that no one in public office (includ-
ing, since January 2018, members of parliament) can wear “exterior signs of
religion,” thus forcing practicing Muslims out of state mandates and curtailing
their right to hold public office. But this was not the case in the 1950s. With the
end of the Second World War, the constitutional architecture moved from an
imperial policy of domination to one of federal “association” within an organic
federation of “peoples and nations” working for the “harmonious development
of each civilization.”10 In the 1950s, the debate emphasized the political dimen-
sion of the concept of integration rather than its sociocultural dimension:
French politicians discussed how all Algerian citizens, including Muslims,
would participate in the political life of the nation, without asking Muslims to
abandon their adherence to their socio-cultural mores. This political integration
was pushed further in 1958, when the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic
was adopted, as I will explain now.
The heavy emphasis on the political rather than sociocultural dimension of
integration came in various stages, starting with the adoption of the new
Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1946, whereby the Republic affirmed the
constitutional integration of Algeria within France itself. The preamble of the 1946
Constitution put an end to the empire, and replaced it with a Union based “on the
equality of rights and duties, without distinction of race or religion.”11 This meant
that all Algerian citizens could be considered part of the same body politic on equal
footing with the metropolitan citizens. The distinction between citizens and colo-
nial subjects (who were to be led through the colonial relation to autonomy and
independence) was abandoned, and the 1947 Statute of Algeria considerably
enlarged the number of rights granted to French nationals in Algeria. In fact, the loi-
cadre that the various governments of the Fourth Republic debated in the 1950s in
order to fix precisely the terms of the political participation of all citizens in France’s
overseas territories (including Algerian Muslims) allowed for the possibility that
non-white populations who had been previously excluded from political
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participation would be fully integrated, without having to adopt all the social mores
of the French Christian majority.
The shift was largely a consequence of the war, after which it was recognized that
Algeria had played a key role in the establishment of the French liberating army
which had crossed the Mediterranean, and which allowed France to sit with the
other three great powers at the table of peace negotiations. The colonial subjects had
given to the metropolis: they would be granted political citizenship in return.
Integration was thus an essential component of the gift exchange between the
metropolis and Algeria. This national myth – a “myth” not because it was completely
untrue, but because it fostered national cohesion after the trauma of defeat and
collaboration12 – can be summarized in the words of Raoul Girardet: “during the
war, it happened that not only the political initiative, but also the locus and principle
of French sovereignty itself, had moved from the metropolis to the Empire, from the
continental France to the France from overseas,”13 and Algeria in particular. This
mythical narrative praising the colonies’ participation to the Resistance and France’s
ultimate victory was found for instance in the writings of postwar colonial policy-
makers like François Mitterrand, the young minister of “France from overseas” (the
new term for the Minister of the Colonies) in 1951 and 1952, and then Minister of
the Interior (in charge of Algeria) until 1955, who wrote that “with the exception of
the mandate in Syria, the Empire had not suffered from any cracks” during the war.
As Mitterrand added, “beyond the surface of personal intrigues and political ambi-
tions, the peoples (those of Algeria and Senegal, Tamatave and Conakry, Fort-Lamy
and Saigon) had given what they had been asked each time they were asked: their
men, their resources, their trust. The Empire of Asia” he continued, “held the fort on
behalf of Vichy; the African Empire remained split, with Western Africa in favor of
Pétain, and Equatorial Africa for de Gaulle, and Algeria shifting, but always in
resistance”14 against the Germans.
Although the myth of the colonies’ resistance was a greatly simplified reality, it is
true that the colonies (and Algeria in particular) participated in the French military
effort against the Germans to an extent even greater than during the First World
War: already during the German invasion of the metropolis, one-third of the 60,000
French casualties were from colonial armies, which had supplied about 500,000
men on the northern front. After the Allied troops landed in 1942 in the French
protectorates of Morocco and Algeria, public authorities in Algiers led an immense
effort of mobilization of colonial soldiers to participate in the reconquest of the
south of Italy and then France. In 1943, the French colonial battalions (headed by
General Giraud and US General Patton)15 gathered about 170,000 Frenchmen of
“European” ethnicity from Algeria andMorocco and 150,000 from the “indigenous”
populations of the Maghreb, in addition to 100,000 men from Senegal and other
African territories.
This is why French politicians debated the lois-cadres which would best
acknowledge the wartime African effort in the 1950s. Jacques Soustelle was
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a leading voice in these postwar debates about the “integration” of Algerian
subjects. Political integration for Soustelle was to be inscribed in the
Constitution of the Republic, in statutes and laws. The policy of integration
that Soustelle promoted was an ambitious attempt to create a new level of
integration beyond the national (and inter-national) integration that Mauss
had envisioned as the ultimate step for the colonies. His program was premised
on the realization that the implementation of the 1947 Statute of Algeria was
lacking on the ground, as elections to the newly formed Algerian Assembly were
notoriously manipulated, and French citizens who followed Muslim customs
were underrepresented in a segregated college of electors. As in the United
States, “separate but equal” was a contradictory motto, as the very maintenance
of segregation in political life was meant to preserve inequalities between
Algerians of European descent and those of Muslim faith. To be truly complete,
the logic of the gift exchange thus needed to reach the political and even
constitutional affairs of the French Republic.
Soustelle proposed to create a new level of transnational (and postcolonial)
integration for both the French metropolis and Algeria: a level of integration that
neither Mauss in his writings on The Nation nor any apologist of colonialism writing
in the interwar period had imagined.16 Soustelle aimed at creating a collective
consciousness in Algeria that would be completely tied to the political institutions
in Paris, rather than to those located in Algiers.17He did not advocate the creation of
an Algerian national consciousness around a new flag, a new people ruling as a an
independent sovereign in its territory, and whose relation with an independent
French metropolis would be redefined so as to become truly “inter-national.”
To the contrary, in Soustelle’s mind, Algeria was to be fully part of the French
Republic until the end of time, and Algerian populations were to be integrated in
a post-national “greater France” composed of both the Algerian and metropolitan
societies.
Integration in the political language of Soustelle was thus a multi-level concept,
which aimed at creating a new economic, social, cultural, legal, and political
reality – a total social fact – neither previously experienced, nor desired, by colonial
empires. As Soustelle wrote to the members of the Union for the Salvation and
Rebirth of French Algeria (or, in French, USRAF) – an organization he created for
the purpose of “creating a climate of solidarity between the metropolis and
Algeria,”18 and which included the former general governors of the French
Empire and ministers of the colonies (like Maurice Viollette, Roger Leonard, and
Marcel-Edmond Naegelen), as well as political elites (like Georges Bidault, Michel
Debré, and Georges Pompidou) and many central academic and intellectual
figures in the colonial field, some of whom had been closely associated to Mauss’s
Institute of Ethnology (like Maurice Delavignette, Paul Rivet, or Jean Paulhan)19 –
integration meant in the long term the creation of a “French Algeria in which the
Algerian country cannot erect a distinct state, with its distinct diplomacy and army,
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and in which the French citizen of the metropolis enjoys the full rights of an ipso
facto citizenship,”20 and vice versa. As Soustelle added, integration meant:
in the economic domain, the suppression of the trade customs between Algeria and
France and the abolition of the financial autonomy of Algeria; in the social domain,
the implementation of all [metropolitan] social laws to the Algerian territory; in the
administrative domain, a vast program of decentralization to the benefit of com-
munes carved around the many tribal boundaries that fractured the Algerian
society, and the creation of inter-communal syndicates; in the political domain,
the dissolution of the services of the Government General in Algiers, and their
reattachment to the various Ministries in Paris, as well as the creation of a Minister
of Algeria.21
In Soustelle’s view, the Minister of Algeria in the future government he called for
in the mid 1950s would be in charge of arbitrating conflicts between the various
administrative layers of power in Algeria from Paris (rather than from Algiers, which
he belittled as a “pseudo-capital of a state”).22
Soustelle thus proposed in 1956 and 1957 to repatriate all legislative sources of law
and power in Algeria to Paris, in order to protect the policymaking process from the
pressure of both white settlers in Algeria (who were fiercely conservative as far as the
protection of their economic and civic privileges were concerned) and pro-
independence Muslim populations. Soustelle’s proposal of political integration in
a greater post-national France thus went well beyond the loi-cadre project which, in
the version discussed in 1957, would grant all French colonies of the Union a local
parliament with a local government in charge of budgetary decisions.23 In the 1957
project discussed by the French Parliament, Soustelle found riskiest the proposal
that legislative and administrative power should be devolved from Paris to Algiers
(either to the governor general or to the Algerian Assembly). Although Soustelle’s
first decisions as Algeria’s governor general in 1955 had been to support the creation
of a unique college of electors for the Algerian Assembly (which marked the end of
the segregated and unequal system of representation in Algeria’s consultative
Assembly with two colleges, one for the minority of “Europeans” and one for
“Muslims”), as time went by, he saw peril in giving this Assembly more legitimacy,
as it could turn into a “constituent assembly.”24
Translated in political terms, Soustelle’s post-national theory of integration meant
that the Fourth Republic needed to backtrack the law of September 1947, which
gave Algeria a distinct “civil personality, with a special budget, as well as a distinct
administrative organization characterized by the regulatory power of the Governor
and the monitoring of budgetary matters by the Algerian Assembly.”25 The Algerian
Assembly would be kept in its purely consultative role; or be disbanded and replaced
by a Coordination Council – a kind of socioeconomic council of Algeria – located in
Paris, where the diversity of the Algerian society would be fully represented with
select members of civil society as well as representatives of municipal councils in
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Algeria. This Council would meet to discuss Algerian issues, but its role would
remain purely consultative.26 Instead of a strengthened local government, Soustelle
wanted to institute a unique college charged with the election of Algerian parlia-
mentarians directly in the French Assembly in Paris. It was the only way he found to
integrate the Algerian populations (not culturally, but politically and economically)
into a French political society whose heart would beat in Paris, far from the veins of
the Algerian body politic.
The reform that Soustelle and the members of USRAF wanted to bring forth in
the name of integration was thus not only oriented toward Algeria but also toward
metropolitan France, as it involved a deep constitutional reform of the Fourth
Republic itself. Indeed, the inclusion of all Algerian voters (no longer segregated
into various colleges) in the body politic in charge of electing representatives to the
Paris Assembly meant technically that the “Algerians would get about fifty parlia-
mentarians in the French Assembly in Paris, including about fifteen Europeans,
thanks to a proper division of the electoral map.”27 In 1956, General de Gaulle
seemed to agree with him, as, commenting upon Soustelle’s ideas, he wrote to him
that, although Soustelle did what he could as a governor general in Algeria to solve
the problem of Algerian claims to independence, the Algerian rebellion required
a “very great policy”28 – one that was not in the hands of the governor general of
Algeria, but in the hands of a constituent assembly that would give both France and
Algeria a new constitution. The “regime” of the Fourth Republic had to die for
a new constitution to enshrine the post-national level of integration in which he and
Soustelle believed: that which eventually established the Fifth Republic.29
The need to change the French Constitution explains why Soustelle spent the
three years after he left the Governor’s residence in Algiers multiplying contacts in
the intelligence community to build up momentum in favor of de Gaulle’s return to
power and the abolition of the Fourth Republic. This rebellion against the regime in
Paris climaxed with the street protests of Muslims and Europeans in Algiers, the
storming of the palace of the governor general and the creation of civilian–military
Comités de Salut Public in May 1958. Shortly after, Soustelle was recognized by the
putschists in Algiers as the de facto power in Algeria, in defiance of the French
government in Paris. Based upon this assertion of statesmanship, and threatening to
send paratroopers to Paris, Soustelle called on the government in Paris to abdicate
and to call in de Gaulle to form a new government, which would then propose the
planned new constitution written by a new constituent assembly. Of course,
Soustelle expected to lead the new government as prime minister, but de Gaulle
failed to fully honor his debt:30 if Soustelle indeed participated in co-writing the
Constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted by referendum in November 1958, he
was given a haphazard portfolio including the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the
Sahara in the government of Michel Debré.31
In many ways, Todd Shepard is right when he sees in the adoption of Soustelle’s
theory of integration and its constitutional translation in the new Constitution of the
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Fifth Republic a radical discontinuity in the French legal tradition, with its clear
nationalistic viewpoint.32 The new Constitution adopted Soustelle’s vision of “inte-
gration” between Algerian citizens and French metropolitan citizens in post-
national institutions. It clarified that Algeria was part of the French Republic, rather
than part of the French Union (Articles 3 and 75, according to which the French
metropolitan and Algerian territories were “indivisible”), in contrast to all the other
colonies whose status had been revised by the loi-cadre of 1957. With the adoption of
the new Constitution, the Algerian subjects (whatever their civil status) could now
vote in parliamentary elections for the national assembly in Paris, leading to the
election of sixty-seven Algerian deputies (including fifty-six Muslims) to the Paris
Assembly in 1959.
With the new Constitution, Soustelle and the members of USRAF had thus
overcome the three main obstacles to their reform. First:
the fear expressed by the metropolitan citizens to see the political life of the
metropolis arbitrated by the hundred or so Algerian deputies sitting in the French
Assembly in Paris; second, the opinion voiced by the Algerians of European descent
who worry that their interests will be disregarded as a result of the absorption of all
electors in a unique college [in Paris rather than Algiers]; third, the fear of the
Muslims, that the metropolitan Frenchmen shall not want this reform.33
And this indeed brought Muslim deputies to the French Parliament.
The Algerians, including the Muslims, who were consulted for the first time on
the matter of their organic link to the metropolitan body politic, voted largely in
favor of the new Constitution in September 1958. They also voted massively in the
1959municipal elections – with a participation rate of 61 percent in Algeria – despite
the threats of the FLN to murder Algerians who voted. For Soustelle, their participa-
tion was a sign of positive adhesion to the new post-national Republic.34 Little did
Soustelle suspect that de Gaulle would soon change his mind on the Algerian
question.
In parallel to these administrative–legal endeavors, Soustelle’s integration
policy pursued another goal, which may at first seem contradictory, but which
was in fact perfectly aligned with the previous objective, as both sought to
squash the emergence of an Algerian national consciousness. Like Mauss,
Soustelle acknowledged that societies did not all have the same level of integra-
tion, that the “national” integration of individuals in metropolitan France was
quite unique, and that the Algerians did not represent a “nation” in the
Maussian sense.35 But, from this observation, Soustelle drew the conclusion
that the French should not help these various Algerian communities coalesce
at the national level as a people. Rather, Soustelle and his USRAF followers
promoted a multiculturalist understanding of the French state administration in
Algeria, which prided itself on the many distinct cultural practices and social
groupings that existed within its society (the Arabs, Berbers, Bedouins, etc.), and
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which gave to each some visible presence, with no need for anybody to abandon
their cultural and religious traditions. Each ethnic group was to be attributed
quotas within the Algerian administration, which meant that some positive
measure of discrimination would be applied to reserve specific places in public
administration for various Muslim ethnicities.36
In that sense, Soustelle’s theory of integration was the exact opposite of that by
which French populists from the left and right since the 2000s have come to
understand the obligations of migrants to assimilate (“integrate,” in today’s par-
lance) the dominant customs, norms, and values of the French white majority.
In fact, Soustelle denounced the policy of cultural assimilation that the French
socialists in the government of the socialist Guy Mollet promoted until 1956.37
For Soustelle, the essential feature of the “Algerian personality” was “its
diversity,”38 and the French state had to foster such an ethnic, cultural, political,
and administrative diversity at the same time as it had to develop among Algerian
subjects a sentiment of political identification with the Paris government. In other
words, Soustelle advocated that the French state recognize the Algerians in their
ethnological diversity (and indeed distinct personality), at the same time as he
denied that they were destined to experience an independent national destiny.
As Soustelle wrote to Prime Minister Debré in 1959, “integration and personality
were not incompatible terms,”39 quite the contrary. But the danger came from
the fact that, too often, those who used the term “personality” to refer to the
Algerian society shifted imperceptibly from an ethno-cultural understanding of
the concept (characterized by a religious, ethnic, and culturally specific reality),
which Soustelle neither denied nor tried to reduce, to a political understanding –
that of a state, which Soustelle found a “deadly” shift.40
Lauding Algeria’s ethno-cultural diversity at the same time as upholding the
ability of Algerians to integrate (economically rather than culturally) into the
modern French economy and political system established by the Fifth
Republic served the same goal: to avoid the emergence of an (independent)
national level of identification in Algiers around which the various fractions of
Algerian society would unite. Consistent with this view, he presented the FLN,
which claimed to represent the national political will, as a totalitarian “Islamo-
fascist” movement, which “called for the destruction of everything European in
the Maghreb and of every Muslim who refuses to submit its will to theirs and
which calls for the forced conversion of all the survivors of its extermination
policy, as well as to the institution of a theocratic and racist state that will enter
into the Arab League.”41 For an ethnologist, that was quite a remarkably
unnuanced statement. For a politician, it was not completely off the mark,
even though it anticipated the very problematic discourse that burgeoned
after September 11 on the perils of “Islamo-Fascism” – a term that Soustelle
may have been one of the first public intellectuals to use in reference to
the FLN.
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2 ETHNOGRAPHIC LESSONS AFTER THE ALGERIAN
INSURRECTION: A DISCIPLINE IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL
RELEVANCE
The model of post-national integration between citizens in Algeria and in the
metropolis that Soustelle – and behind him, the dominant Parisian intellectual
and political elites of the USRAF – promoted as part of a broad model of gift
exchange between France and Algeria was thus grounded on epistemic claims of
knowing a certain ethnographic truth about the intrinsic diversity in Algeria’s
society, and its incompatibility with the extension of political participation to all
citizens in a separate Algerian national polity, independent from France. In general,
the articulation between such truth claims and the broader constitutional politics of
the postwar era raised the question of the relation that anthropology, ethnology, and
French constitutional politics entertained in the 1950s.
Two striking differences distinguished the relationship that the interwar and postwar
French anthropologists entertainedwith the political elites in the field of colonial power.
First,Mauss and other interwar ethnological luminaries such as Paul Rivet did not doubt
that colonialism would last until Europeans decided to end it – when colonial subjects
would have reached sufficient levels of integration. Their purpose was not primarily
geared at saving the FrenchEmpire, but, rather, at saving the local traditions whichwere
at risk of being destroyed and forgotten as all colonial subjects became further integrated
into the French economy. In contrast, after the war, Soustelle and other Maussian
anthropologists like Germaine Tillion or Claude Lévi-Strauss doubted that the French
state could much longer tame the political will to independence expressed by colonial
subjects. The end of the war in May 1945 had been marked by massacres of Algerian
subjects carried out by Algerian citizens of European descent, whose criminal action had
been covered up by the benevolent silence of the French administration. As a French
general, who oversaw the repression against Muslims in May 1945, cynically said to the
surviving Muslims in the mosque of Constantine: “I have just given you peace for ten
years.” In a way, he was right: in 1954, the FLN launched the insurrection.
Second, and even more importantly, Mauss and other solidarists like Charles
Gide had discovered and denounced the horrors of colonialism (forced labor, mass
killings, natural depredation, etc.) in a colonial context where the exercise of French
public law was notoriously inexistent, as the chartered companies had privately
organized public affairs, especially in the Congo, where the administration was
incredibly weak and embodied by corrupt officials. In contrast, Mauss’s students in
Algeria were confronted with the evils of colonialism in a context characterized by
a dense presence of French public law as well as a thick network of intersocietal and
economic exchanges between the metropolitan population and a large minority of
European settlers grouped in city centers (1million out of the 10million Algerians).
Whereas it made no sense for Mauss to envision how the Congolese subjects, almost
enslaved by the chartered companies, could be made to participate politically in the
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life of the Republic,Maussian students were obsessed with finding ways in which the
Algerian subjects ofMuslim faith could bemade to participate more in the decisions
of the Republic’s government, so as to avoid the FLN winning the hearts and minds
of the majority of non-white residents in Algeria.
These differences between the interwar and postwar concerns of Maussian eth-
nologists can best be illustrated through the evolution of the work produced by one
of the two students whom Mauss sent to Algeria in the 1930s, and who returned to
Algeria in the 1950s: Germaine Tillion. The daughter of a judge and an amateur
archaeologist,42 Tillion worked at the Museum of Ethnology (later the Musée de
l’Homme) until her departure for Algeria in 1934. After taking Louis Massignon’s
(1883–1962) classes on orientalism and religion at the Collège de France, and
graduating from Mauss’s Institute of Ethnology in 1932, she continued to attend
Mauss’s seminar until 1934. Tillion could finally do ethnographic work after Mauss
secured two grants to support fieldwork in Algeria: one for Tillion, and one for
Thérèse Rivière, the sister of Georges-Henri Rivière (Paul Rivet’s assistant at the
Museum of Ethnology).43 Although Tillion lost her dissertation manuscript when
she came back to Paris and was deported to Buchenwald as a result of her participa-
tion in the early Resistance movement of the Musée de l’Homme, she continued to
practice ethnology after the war, as well as teaching at the École Pratique des Hautes
Etudes (EPHE) from 1959 to 1970 and writing on the societies of the Maghreb and
the Mediterranean in general.
From 1934 to 1940, Tillion conducted various missions in the Aurès, among the
Chaouia tribes who lived in a tinymountainous region in Algeria.Mauss and Tillion
had chosen Berber villages – or as Tillion called them, Berber “republics”44 –
precisely because they looked as removed as possible from the French and capitalist
civilization, which allowed her to conduct an experimental test of Mauss’s ideas
about the value of commerce and intersocietal exchange on changes in integration
levels: even when scarce contacts existed, she hypothesized, these remote colonial
subjects in Algeria’s mountainous regions would entertain some exchanges with
French civilization and law, and she would be able to test whether these exchanges
moved these Berber republics closer to the national level of integration.
Mauss encouraged her to study this problem, as he was interested in having his
students learn how practices of gift exchange (here exchanges of services, like the
administration of justice, the construction of roads and schools, the collection of
taxes) between the French administration and local tribes were affected by the
differences between the levels of integration reached by each society (the colonial
and the local); and whether, in return, such contacts created a dynamic of integra-
tion across societies, or not. Tillion found much evidence of the preservation of
a Chaouia tribal public law (e.g. their unwritten system of “customary law,” whose
“rules are not binding obligations, if it is the opinion of the majority that they should
be ignored”)45 as well as of “private law” customs (e.g. their rules of marital
exchanges). But she also found some form of accommodation and inclusion of the
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French system of rule.46 The Berbers had very limited interactions with the French
administration and colonial settler populations, but they knew perfectly well how to
use the French colonial presence as a last resort, for instance, when they had
exhausted traditional means of justice and wanted to avoid a bloody settlement of
claims.47
Tillion’s ethnological research in Algeria empirically demonstrated how the
dynamic of judicial and cultural pluralism that was created by the colonial encoun-
ter worked in a peaceful yet conflict-ridden way. She focused on how local commu-
nities practiced law, religion and culture in a pluralist manner, as local populations
navigated between various systems of rules. The question of integration that Mauss
encouraged his students to raise in the 1930s was unconcerned with whether the
Algerian tribesmen and women could be made to participate in the political life of
the metropolis through the establishment of a renewed constitutional machinery.
To the contrary, Mauss had written in The Nation that he wanted his students to
move away from the study of constitutions and treaties. In the 1930s, Tillion did not
even think about the possibility for an alternative constitutional system in which all
the Algerian and metropolitan citizens would equally participate in a common
democratic polity.
The purpose of Tillion’s postwar ethnographic missions in Algeria was very
different,48 and this difference, in turn, marked how anthropologists in general,
and Tillion in particular, used the concept of integration after the Second World
War. When she first came back to the Aurès in the 1950s, the local populations had
rebelled against the French administration, leading to a massive envoy of military
forces to the region. Indeed, immediately upon the insurrection launched
in November 1954 by the Algerian FLN, Germaine Tillion was sent to Algeria by
the Minister of the Interior, François Mitterrand, under the pressing recommenda-
tion of Louis Massignon, her former PhD co-supervisor and Mauss’s former collea-
gue at the Collège de France, to study the root causes of the rebellion and to make
sure that human rights were respected in Algeria by the police forces responsible for
the repression of the FLN insurrection.49 The possibility of integration for Muslim
Berber populations, and the form that such integration would take – in a rebellious
pro-independence national movement or in the context of a greater France? – was
thus no longer an academic question but a pressing political and constitutional
issue. The question of integration was now less concerned with the capacity of
intercultural exchanges to move the Algerian peasants further from their tribal sense
of solidarity and closer to a national sense of belonging, than with the eminently
political question of whether these populations wanted to die for the end of the
French presence in Algeria.
Quite characteristically, at this point the question of integration in Tillion’s
research thus changed from an academic endeavor meant to describe how social
solidarity among local tribes and between those tribes and the French administra-
tion operated, to a political project, ultimately aimed at finding effective ways to
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retool Algerian peasants in training centers so as to give them the adequate eco-
nomic and political skills to fit in with the imperatives of a modern economy whose
prosperity would convince newly constituted Algerian voters to remain attached to
the French presence in Algeria.50 Upon returning to these villages whose families
she intimately knew – in particular, the tribe of the Ouled Abderrahmane where she
had studied about sixty families – Tillion was no longer an ethnographer collecting
stories, dreams, tales, customs, and laws, but an agent chosen by the French
government who could be used by the Berbers to publicize their views and negotiate
rights for their men and women arrested by the police; or, on the contrary, who could
betray them and give names to the French military forces. Furthermore, she had
been charged by Jacques Soustelle, Governor General in Algeria
since February 1955 and whom she had immediately reencountered when she
arrived in Algeria, with the responsibility of designing and leading a large social
program to integrate the poor Algerian teenagers and youngsters into the modern
economic life of Algeria’s urban centers – a program which she went on to lead for
several years.
As far as the situation in Algeria was concerned, Tillion and Soustelle did not
agree on everything, far from it. For instance, they parted ways during the trial of
a leading FLN terrorist, Yacef Saadi, as Soustelle was called by the prosecution as
a witness, whereas Tillion, with Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) and Massignon,
appeared as a witness for the defense (which condemned the increasing reliance
on torture by the army during the Battle of Algiers).51 During the winter of 1956–7,
Tillion had indeed participated in private negotiations for a truce with Yacef Saadi,
who had decided to launch a wave of terrorist attacks against civilians in Algiers in
retaliation against Mitterrand’s decision to execute the political prisoners sentenced
to death by the military tribunals.52 Tillion had tried to convince the French
authorities to de-escalate the conflict by stopping the execution of political prisoners
accused of terrorism, in exchange for Saadi’s decision to put an end to terrorist
bombings in Algiers – but to no avail.53
Still, the two former students of Mauss were deeply engaged in a collective effort
to position ethnography as a useful instrument of government that could be used to
make the political integration of Muslims in a French Algeria possible as well as
desirable to everybody concerned. Tillion’s approach to ethnography, and how she
articulated the lessons of her scientific approach with governmental logics in the
Algerian context, was not unique in that respect: although many of Mauss’s students
(like Bernard Maupoil, Charles LeCoeur or Mauss’s assistants at the Musée de
l’Homme) were killed during the war, those who survived, like Soustelle and Tillion,
moved their ethnographic studies to bear direct lessons to the authorities at the
center of the colonial field in Algeria.
This direct and intense political involvement with the Algerian question also
characterized the emotional attachment that anthropologists and ethnologists
showed toward debates about the future of Algerian and French political societies.
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For instance, another ethnologist who had been inspired by Mauss (although not
one of his doctoral students), and who organized big public conferences on the topic
of Algeria in the 1950s, was Jacques Berque (1910–95).54 The career of Jacques
Berque shows the influence of Mauss on ethnologists and colonial administrators
even beyond the Parisian alumni of the Institute of Ethnology. Indeed, Berque
studied at the University of Algiers, where he was influenced by the Durkheimian
legal anthropologist Louis Gernet (1882–1962), an alumnus of the ENS and
a member of Durkheim’s close circle of editors of L’Année sociologique who
specialized in the anthropology of ancient Greece. Berque became a colonial
comptroller of local tribunals in Morocco in 1934, from where he published essays
in legal ethnography – which he sent to Mauss – 55 and which he saw as being
inspired by Mauss’s essay on contractual relations, gift exchanges, legal pluralism,
and customary legal systems.
After the Second World War, Berque continued publishing on legal pluralism in
Morocco, along lines that were not dissimilar to those that Tillion followed in the
1930s. Eventually, the quality of his essays led him to accede to the Collège de
France in 1956 to teach on the societies of the Maghreb. He, too, became very
involved in debates about the future relation that France should form with Algeria.
For Berque, the debate about Algerian independence opposed those who, like
Soustelle, defended “a French rule of law in Algeria, at the same time as they
acknowledged an Algerian [total social] fact within this system,” and those who,
like him, wished to “recognize an Algerian rule of law, and within that Algerian legal
system, a French [total social] fact.”56 As this summary of the main ideological
division on the Algerian question shows, Berque concluded that France should first
recognize Algerian political independence and legal autonomy and negotiate with
the FLN as a prerequisite for the creation of new relations between France and
Algeria as two independent nations with interconnected destinies.57 Berque’s under-
standing of inter-national integration between two independent nation-states thus
remained much more faithful to Mauss’s reading of the direction of history, whose
end point they both defined as a society of independent nations, with each nation
moving closer to the ideal-type that Mauss had defined in his writings on the nation.
3 THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN LIBERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ELITES AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ON THE ALGERIAN ISSUE
Ethnographers’ strong contribution to Algerian politics in the 1950s led them to hold
particularly important positions, not only in the field of colonial administration, but
also in the mainstream metropolitan public sphere, where the question of Algeria
was ardently debated. In so doing, anthropology clashed with competing disciplin-
ary approaches to the international life of nations, in particular, political economy
and political science: two disciplines that started from very different epistemological
premises and that arrived at divergent policy solutions when applied to the issue of
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Algeria’s future relation with France. This disciplinary rearrangement in the metro-
politan academic field filtered the anthropological voices engaged in public debates.
In the interwar period, anthropology, archaeology, and ethnography had been
articulated with international public law and political economy in the explanations
of the origins and operation of European solidarity through the circulation of debts
and the solidarity between European colonial societies and their metropolis.
The postwar era was different in the sense that the two approaches more often
clashed than converged. The shift of international power away from Europe toward
the United States and the Soviet Union in postwar international affairs partly
explains why Mauss’s studies of solidarity between European societies and colonial
ethnicities were given less relevance to think about East–West relations outside the
colonial context: in the age of nuclear deterrence, formal studies on military and
political decision-making as well as sociological studies of mass media, party politics,
and administrative elites carried more weight to predict the dynamics of the Cold
War than ethnographic studies of local tribes and their religious, cultural, eco-
nomic, and family practices – maybe wrongly so, as the US military soon discovered
in Vietnam.58
The divorce between anthropology and political economy was also due to institu-
tional logics related to the creation of a new discipline that stood between the two:
political science, which was being institutionalized in the early 1950s in the French
academic field by a young guard of public law scholars and political sociologists,
who found jobs in law schools outside Paris or in the Instituts d’Etudes Politiques
(IEP). These young men, who founded the Revue Francaise de Science Politique in
1951, were interested in the study of law, state administrations, budgetary policies,
and political economy, which they related to the domestic history of political parties
and social movements rather than to the evolution of religious belief systems and
legal practices found in ethnographic explorations of the private and public lives of
African communities.
Ethnology, and Maussian ethnology especially, was notoriously absent from the
mix of academic disciplines that coalesced around the new discipline of political
science. As Jean Leca writes, institutional and political reasons explained why
Maussian anthropology failed to influence the founders of the new science of
politics, and vice versa: for him, “Mauss especially . . . but the École des Annales
at the École pratique des Hautes Etudes [EPHE, later the EHESS] in general, did
not appreciate the Institut d’Etudes Politiques,”59 and thus did not want to make the
effort of proposing classes in these institutions – in contrast with Mauss and his
students’ efforts to teach at the Colonial School in the interwar period. Reciprocally,
political scientists believed thatMaussians saw them as too close to economic power,
as Sciences-Po and the universities’ law schools had long ranked high among the
institutions where the French bourgeoisie sent its children.60 Whereas Mauss’s
former doctoral students had moved to the center of the field of colonial power,
thanks to their mobilization of cultural and colonial capital, the newcomers
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transformed their economic capital into academic and political capital in the
metropolitan academic field.
Ethnography was thus not only increasingly instrumentalized by the colonial
authorities in the context of independence wars but also relegated by competing
academic disciplines in the metropolis to the study of local communities in colonial
contexts, in Algeria and other African countries. Political scientists denied that
anthropology had anything to say about international relations, international soli-
darity (a topic they deemed peripheral to their theoretical endeavor) or relations
between states. Most political scientists and public law scholars of this generation
shared with the tenants of German-trained “realists” who hadmigrated to the United
States during the war to found the new science of international relations the belief
that the realm of international life translated first and foremost the power relations
between competing sovereign states, contracting with one another on a limited and
temporary basis, and according to their best interests.61 In France, it was paradoxi-
cally Mauss’s cousin, Raymond Aron, a former ENS student (where he had met his
nemesis Jean-Paul Sartre), who ranked among the main academic movers and
shakers who sidelined the Maussian interpretation of international relations in the
academic field.
In the early 1930s, Aron had worked at Célestin Bouglé’s Centre de documenta-
tion sociale, whereMauss andDurkheim’s ideas were deeply influential, after which
he discovered German (Weberian) sociology during a student exchange in
Germany in 1934. This was a revelation for the young man: to Mauss’s dismay,62
Aron then became largely influenced by Max Weber’s thought and German sociol-
ogy in general. After spending the war as the director of a small Free France journal
in London, Aron had not only moved to the center of the academic field, as he was
elected to a professorship at the Sorbonne, but he also became an editorialist at the
right-wing daily Le Figaro. At the Sorbonne, he headed the Centre de sociologie
européenne, from which he initiated a profound reconfiguration of the social
sciences in France, along with political sociologists and public law scholars (includ-
ing international public law) who wanted to move beyond the confines of compara-
tive administrative law and mix their study of legal and administrative documents
with a Weberian perspective on the study of political and administrative elites.
Many among these practitioners of the new discipline of political science, trained
in constitutional and administrative law, drew inspiration from the work of Max
Weber, partly under Aron’s influence, and partly because of the influence the
German sociologist also had on Maurice Duverger (1917–2014), who included
sociology and political economy in his analyses of state and international dynamics.
Compared to Maussian anthropologists who put the concept of international (or
intersocietal) “solidarity” at the center of their analysis, these postwar political
scientists placed the study of formal state structures and domestic practices of
government back at the center of their concern. Among the scholars who applied
this post-Weberian approach to the study of contemporary international relations,
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and to cite just a few, we find Charles Eisenmann (1903–80), a comparativist in
constitutional law from a long-standing family of French jurists; François Luchaire
(1919–2009), a professor of constitutional law in Paris who participated in the
drafting of the 1958 Constitution of the French Republic under the authority of
Michel Debré; Marcel Merle (1923–2003), professor of public law who wrote about
the creation of international criminal law with the Nuremberg Trials before moving
on to found a historical sociology of international relations and decolonization
movements; Jean-Louis Quermonne (1927–) a professor of law in Grenoble and
a founder of the study of the emerging European Union law; Madeleine Grawitz
(1911–2008), a professor of law in Aix and then Paris who taught international public
law and international institutions; or Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1917–94), a historian
who specialized in the study of international relations; and, at last, Alfred Sauvy
(1898–1990), who coined the term “Third World” to designate the new nations who
represented the “Third Estate” in the world society.63
The academic competition between political science and anthropology was not
without consequences for the public debate about the future of Algeria and the place
France should have in the community of Western liberal states. Indeed, in 1957,
building on recent economic analyses, Raymond Aron published a small pamphlet
that became an immediate bestseller, in which he claimed that the French debt,
which continued to grow as a result of France’s involvement in the war in Algeria,
and the plans of massive investment in Algeria promoted by Soustelle and Tillion,
harmed the economic health of the Frenchmetropolis.64 For Aron, themoney spent
on keeping Algeria in France was wasted, as it was clear that, one day or another,
Algeria would become independent and would cut ties with France. For Aron and
other realists – the Gaullists in particular65 – Algeria’s independence was not only
the natural endpoint of history, but it would also benefit the French economy: the
examples of the Netherlands and Germany showed that the amputation of the
colonial territories from European empires could lead to a highly profitable integra-
tion in global capitalist markets.66 Aron thus proposed to immediately liquidate all
French assets on Algerian territory (including unmovable ones, like properties held
by repatriated European elites) and to compensate the European landowners for
their loss.
Aron’s pamphlet was inspired by new approaches in political economy but it also
built on the criticism already articulated in the summer of 1956 by Raymond Cartier
(1904–75), a longtime reporter of the Indochina war who published a series of
articles in the French popular magazine Paris Match, in which he popularized
the notion that the preservation of the French Empire cost much more than it
benefited the French metropolis – and, more importantly, that the question of the
preservation of colonies should be judged from the sole point of view of economic
rationality.67 As the war in Algeria escalated, with the national assembly voting to
grant the president of the council emergency powers to restore order in Algeria,
Cartier asked his readers to consider whether the estimated 1.4 trillion francs that the
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French had invested in the colonies since the nineteenth century would not have
had a higher return if invested in the metropolis. As Cartier, and later Aron, argued,
metropolitan France should no longer export its capital to Algeria, but rather to the
territories of its European or transatlantic Allies.
By publishing such a provocative essay, Aron not only gave voice to those who
opposed the continuation of the socialists’ program of integration between metro-
politan France and Algeria, but he also articulated a criticism of the continued
French colonial presence in Algeria that could speak to the concerns of both
conservatives and liberals in France. His reasoning was less controversial than
François Mauriac’s criticism of the atrocities conducted by France on behalf of
colonialism (torture, population displacement, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial
killings) – a position which Soustelle disparagingly attributed to Catholic sense of
“bad consciousness,”68 which he found both illegitimate and inappropriate as the
French army was involved in battling terrorists.
Still, these were polemical proposals. At the time of the publication of Aron’s
pamphlet, the prime minister, Guy Mollet (1905–75), implemented an “assimila-
tionist” policy, which drew its inspiration from a plan that Blum had prepared in
1936 together with his adviser Maurice Viollette, when they proposed the complete
extension to the Algerian workers of the generous social rights that his government
adopted for metropolitan workers.69 Their proposal had been based on the realiza-
tion that in 1930, Algeria absorbed 40 percent of the metropolitan commodity
exports to the colonies and provided about 45 percent of the products that the
metropolis imported from its colonies,70 which meant that some form of socio-
economic harmonization should be found between the two countries in order to
conduct, in the words ofMariusMoutet, when he served asMinister of the Colonies,
an “altruistic policy”71 that demonstrated “human solidarity” and rejected a “policy
of egoism.”72 The Blum–Viollette project, revived in another form by Guy Mollet’s
neo-Fordist colonial policy, thus received the strong support of the deputies from the
cotton-producing regions like Lyon, Normandy and the North. With the legal
assimilation of Algerian subjects, Mollet thus bet on the long-term economic
benefits that metropolitan industries would derive from the rise in salaries in
Algeria: the socialists hoped that France would find in the Algerian markets the
economic opportunities that its exporting industries (like the cotton and garment
industries) needed to continue generating profits.
Even if Aron’s views initially represented aminority view in the Frenchmedia and
among the political parties, they found fertile ground among the liberal financial
elites within the French public administration who argued that the assimilationist
model wronged the French nation, as it could survive only because the French
government hid the costs of the subvention to the dying cotton industries in the
balance of payments: the costs of buying some industrial commodities produced in
the metropolis at a high price were hidden in the budget of the colonies; and the
costs of buying some raw materials also produced at a high price in the French
140 Gift Exchange
colonies were hidden in the budget of the metropolis. Some liberal economists and
administrators of colonial banks, like Edmond Giscard d’Estaing, thus lobbied in
favor of a more open vision of the empire, in which France and its colonies would
both find a role as exporters in the global economy – alongside the British Empire
and the United States.73 For instance, Giscard d’Estaing did not believe that the
colonies’ economic development should be concentrated in agricultural or extrac-
tive activities only, and he pressured the government to open French colonies to
foreign investments in order to turn the colonies into exporters of industrial goods,
and thus solve France’s balance-of-payments problems.74 For him, the preferential
treatment between France and its colonies weighed on the colonies’ ability to export
their raw materials or industrial products (should they produce any) outside of
France, and thus on their ability to accumulate foreign currencies. He also believed
it was absurd to decide by decree that “all laws should be applicable to the French
metropolis and the colonies,”75 as Blum’s government and then Mollet’s govern-
ment had tried to argue.
Political scientists like Aron and high civil servants like Giscard d’Estaing built on
the critical work accumulated for more than twenty years by the liberal economists
to criticize the socialist neo-Fordist policy as a misuse of France’s scarce capital.
Since the mid 1930s, liberal economists argued that exporting industries in the
metropolis and in the colonies needed to be competitive worldwide, which meant
that French capital should go where labor costs were lower (in Algeria for instance),
and that “the Metropolis had to accept immediate sacrifices without guarantees
[sans contreparties] to the benefit of the Colonies, where, one could hope, but with
all the assumed risks, that one day in the distant future, prosperity and industry will
blossom.”76 A truly generous policy toward the colonies meant trusting them with
the ability to turn capital investment into profitable joint ventures, so that they would
generate a foreign demand for francs by selling their products to non-French clients –
thus keeping stable the balance of payments. In general, liberal economists argued
that an apparently favorable commercial balance with the colonies had no positive
impact on France’s balance of payments, since the industrial goods that France
exported to its colonies (and which it counted as exports on the commercial balance)
were all denominated in French francs (or in local currencies only convertible in
French francs).77
In many ways, Aron’s criticism of continued French economic investment in
Algeria only hastened an intellectual and political tendency that had grown within
the ranks of administrative public elites since the mid 1930s.78 The trade specialists,
financial experts, industry and bank representatives dealing from and in the colo-
nies, who gathered at the Economic conference of Non-metropolitan France
from December 1934 to April 1935, were already not far from agreeing with the
views that Aron expressed twenty years later.79 Among them, Israel William Oualid,
the Algerian-born lawyer who had worked as Albert Thomas’s collaborator at the
Ministry of Armament during the war and with Charles Gide when the two assessed
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the costs of the Great War in the context of the reparations debate, also claimed that
the trade specialization imposed by the cotton industries was a state subvention in
disguise which, overall, did not provide any financial advantage to France: it did not
bring any foreign currency to the French Treasury, since the imports of cotton
fabrics from the metropolis to the colonies were denominated in francs.80 During
the Second World War, the economists who opposed Blum’s neo-Fordist colonial
policy mechanically rose in the ranks of the administration in the Vichy government
as the socialists were jailed (like Blum), exiled (like André Philip or Jacques
Soustelle), or killed (like Jean Zay, Blum’s Minister of Youth) by the Vichy regime.
Then, they encouraged massive capital investments in the empire because the Nazis
occupied most of metropolitan France, which meant that capital should move from
the occupied zone to Algeria. But, for these liberals, this relocation of French
industries did not mean that the salary levels in Algeria should rise to the levels
reached in metropolitan France. In 1942, when Admiral François Darlan, Minister
of the Colonies of the Vichy regime, chaired the Economic African Conference, he
followed financial specialists, like Paul Bernard (1892–1960), an inspector of finance
(like Giscard d’Estaing), who stated that the French metropolis could not extend all
social laws to Algeria if France wanted its economy to remain competitive.81
Following the same logic, the first postwar five-year plan adopted by Jean Monnet
in 1947, which integrated the colonies as essential parts of France’s postwar devel-
opment, had already abandoned the redeployment of French industries from the
(formerly occupied) metropolis to the colonies in favor of the reindustrialization of
the French metropolis thanks to US support.82
The consensus found among these French administrative elites thus reflected the
fact that, as Jacques Marseille writes, in the 1950s they had “integrated the problem
of the commercial balance in the broader andmore complex problem of the balance
of payments.”83 In the mid 1950s, they argued that French capital should come back
to the European continent and leave Algeria, which was under the threat of a future
FLN “occupation”: a prudent investment policy demanded that French capitalists
anticipate and protect their assets by relocating them in the metropolis. In many
ways, the French capitalists had anticipated on their policy recommendations.
In the early 1900s, Europe received about two-thirds (21 billion francs) of France’s
total capital exports (30 billion francs), whereas French colonies received less than
one-tenth of the total (between 2 and 3 billion francs), and the situation was not
much better after the Great War.84 This was not much, but as Jacques Marseille
shows, compared to the 1900s, by the 1950s France even halved its productive
investments (in relative terms) in Algeria: although the total of French investment
for the period 1947–58 amounted to 12 billion francs (calculated in 1914 francs),
which was equal to the absolute amount of public investments from 1880 to 1945,
a much longer period,85 total colonial investments (of which Algeria received a great
part) represented about 7 percent of the French budget from 1900 to 1914, whereas
the billions devoted to public investments by France in its colonies from 1950 to 1958
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only amounted to 4 percent of France’s budget (excluding the costs of war). Most of
this spending was directed toward avoiding the collapse of the civilian administra-
tion. Jacques Soustelle, when he became governor general in Algeria in 1955,
discovered that France’s public investments in Algeria only served to provide the
local government in Algeria with the minimum amount of cash needed for it to
function on an annual basis: the funds coming from France for the budget of Algeria
were insufficient to build new schools and hospitals.86
In 1957, Aron thus took the conclusions of liberal economists to the next step in his
pamphlet: if France had invested so little in the colonies during a half century, now
was not the time to do more, but on the contrary, to leave behind the little capital
that France had invested in Algeria and invest in Europe and in allied nations
instead. Indeed, these were the regions in which the French industries would find
the best opportunities to increase their competitiveness. Aron and the economists
read in the huge deficit of France’s balance of payments a host of problems, but,
foundationally, they concluded that the maintenance of the French Empire would
be too costly for France in the long term if drastic political changes were not made.
4 THE MAUSSIANS STRIKE BACK: TO GIVE MORE RATHER THAN TO
LIQUIDATE
When it was published in 1957, Raymond Aron’s defense of Algerian independence
and repatriation of French capital and manpower to the metropolis (coupled with
French integration in global capitalist markets) spurred an intense public debate
which was fueled by Mauss’s former doctoral students: for Soustelle and Tillion,
stopping the effort, liquidating all French assets, and pulling out would be
a demonstration of moral weakness. As good socialists, they argued that Aron’s policy
of “liquidation” of the empire would be both a failure to honor France’s collective
responsibility and a prioritization of the petty calculus of financial elites over the
French moral grandeur.87 It ran in direct contradiction with the logic of gift
exchange that they had glorified in their anthropological and political essays.
In a famous essay that followed Aron’s publication, Tillion lamented that Aron’s
position encouraged French policymakers to invest less in Algeria, as it was no longer
perceived as a safe environment. She wrote that it showed a vulgar petty bourgeois
(rather than statesmanlike) conception of economic affairs: if Mauss had long
noticed that the economy of gift exchanges was not “natural” to laymen because
gifts escape the everyday commercial logic of the market, which only sanctions
transactions that have a calculable risk of default, Tillion emphasized that fortu-
nately, “negotiations, exchanges, quarrels, reconciliations, loans and gifts are man-
aged at the level of Ministries rather than by lay people.”88 Thus, she hoped that
despite their popularity, Aron’s financial arguments would be ignored by the French
statesmen who could be expected to respect the logic of honor; and that the French
bourgeois and Algerian workers would one day “wake up realizing their nations now
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form an Entente – like the Entente cordiale [of the interwar period] – from which
they will benefit.”89 Soustelle used the same Maussian language to counter the
arguments served by the “cohort of liquidators” to the French “moderate bourgeoi-
sie, to whom it is better to speak of pragmatic reasons rather than grand principles.”90
For Soustelle and Tillion, continued payments and capital investments to Algeria
were a question of international – and thus collective – responsibility. Soustelle
acknowledged being ashamed at the idea that, as Aron proposed, the French should
place limits on the “responsibilities that the [French] Community can acknowledge
vis-à-vis a fraction of itself.”91 For Soustelle, this responsibility was either recognized
or repudiated (with the loss of honor that such repudiation would entail, as the
Berbers of Tillion or the Kwakiutls of Mauss well knew), but it could not be
fractioned and negotiated like a merchant negotiating a price on the market.92
To Tillion, Aron’s call to liquidate all French assets held in Algerian territory was
offensive for failing to recognize the solidarity that stems from the acknowledgement
of a “shared responsibility” (here between the French and Algerians) – a central
principle in solidarist thinking. As she wrote about the French responsibility in the
“pauperization”93 of Algerians, “we are both responsible and innocent – as innocent
and responsible as those who are the victims of pauperization.”94
As this debate raged on during 1957 and 1958, economic liberalism and unpro-
tected integration of the French and Algerian economies in the global markets
became the two main enemies of the Maussian polemists, who argued in favor of
the renewed circulation of gifts between the metropolis and Algeria. Tillion saw the
changes engendered by the introduction of global capitalism that Aron and the
liberals promoted as the root cause of Algerian pauperization:95 if they acknowl-
edged that two million Algerians of Muslim faith were internally displaced through
force by the regroupement law that followed the beginning of the insurrection in 1954
(when the French army rounded up village populations in camps to control and
“protect” them from terrorist attacks by the FLN), according to her, an additional
almost three million people were displaced “voluntarily” – or rather, driven by
market logics due to the pauperization of the village farmers.96 Thus, for Tillion,
it was the process of bringing a capitalist “planetary civilization”97 to Algerian
communities that was responsible for the pauperization of its displaced persons,
and thus for their overall revolt. Economic globalization was responsible for
Algerians’ protests, not French colonialism.
To Tillion and Soustelle, Aron’s proposal of immediate independence and uni-
lateral liquidation of French assets was wrong, not only because it ignored the moral
dimension of the issue – the duty to respect a sense of honor and solidarity toward the
colonial subjects who had to be treated as French citizens – but also because
the economic analysis on which it was based was flawed. Soustelle blamed Aron
for the ignorance he displayed of Algeria and for the contempt he displayed toward
Algerians, both those of “European stock” whom he wanted to repatriate, and
Muslims whom he found “not profitable.”98 During the 1958 General Assembly of
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the USRAF, Soustelle violently criticized the “damage created in the minds of the
bourgeoisie by their shameless propaganda, which evoke 800 billion francs or even
one trillion francs”99 that the war in Algeria would cost to French taxpayers – Cartier
even wrote off 1.4 trillion francs. Soustelle disputed the decision to include in the
total the operating costs of the army, which had been deployed in 1956 by the
government of the socialist Guy Mollet to the whole Algerian territory –
a decision that Soustelle regretted, as it gave the impression that the rebellion had
escalated to a full-blown war.100 For Soustelle, after careful examination, these 1
trillion francs were “reduced to 100 billion francs if economists only included the
additional costs engendered by the war, which was justified as the French govern-
ment would have paid for its army in any case, whether soldiers were located inWest
Germany or Algeria.”101
Soustelle went further in his criticism of the economic costs of abandoning
Algeria: he found Aron’s proposal to repatriate the one million Europeans in
French Algeria to the French metropolis and pay them 500 billion francs in
reparations (about 400,000 francs for each individual) upon independence of an
Algerian Arab state deeply problematic not only from a moral point of view, but also
from an economic point of view.102 Indeed, Soustelle estimated that at least 4 trillion
francs (or the total annual expense budget of the French government) would be
needed to fairly compensate the Europeans for their losses – double what Tillion
proposed to “give” to Algeria (including both Europeans and Muslims) to develop
their economy in an integrated framework with France.103 Instead, Soustelle relayed
the views of the Maspétiol Commission, which had found in 1955 that “the French
state should invest 1.3 trillion francs in ten years in order to triple Algeria’s
production,”104 not only in wine and other products from agriculture, but also in
the oil and gas sectors, in order to create amodern economy in Algeria. Translated in
administrative terms, Soustelle believed that this policy of gift exchange in which
France was the first to give could take the form of a complete integration (fusion) of
the Algerian budget within the metropolitan budget. Such a budgetary integration
avoided charging future Algerian generations for the money raised to develop the
Algerian economy in the next decade: the French metropolitan taxpayers would
immediately pay for Algerian development in their present taxes.105
Drawing implicit inspiration fromMauss’s writings about the necessity for France
to be the “first to give” in the context of the German reparations debate, Tillion
defended the model of gift exchange as a way to accompany the political
integration106 for which Soustelle called before the constitutional revolution of
1958: as she wrote, “Let’s give,” in the form of massive investments in training in
local industries, “and we shall receive in return.”107 As she further stated, “we have to
be the first to pay the price.”108 As Tillion recognized, the French government was
not going to invest massively if the region did not share the same currency, if it did
not belong to the same currency zone and did not share the same budget, and if it did
not envision the same political future – as otherwise, it would be in the “national
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interest to avoid exporting French francs”109 by spending on expensive oil produc-
tion technologies and training for a large industrial force in the Sahara when it was
cheaper to buy oil on the global market. Only if the two peoples were tied for a long
time by the common institutions established by the constitution of the Fifth
Republic would French investors and policymakers agree to sustain a massive
financial effort.
To make their case even stronger, Mauss’s former doctoral students not only
attacked the economic diagnosis behind Aron’s critique of continued French pre-
sence in Algeria, but also Aron’s prognosis that Algerian and French economic
problems would be solved thanks to the clean political separation between the
two. For the Maussians, Algeria’s independence was one possible political solution
to a political problem,110 but it was not likely to solve Algeria’s economic, social, and
cultural problems – the “total social fact” in the language of Mauss that Tillion
named the problem of “de-development” or “pauperization.” Siding with Soustelle,
Tillion strongly criticized the motivation of Aron and other high civil servants who
argued in favor of Algerian independence: as she wrote, “anti-slavery often served as
the alibi of colonialism, and one may wonder if anti-colonialism is not the alibi of
pauperization,”111 furthered by the egoistic tendencies of the French bourgeois and
their reduction of the colonial issue to a purely economic problem.112
For Tillion, with independence, the leaders of the new Arab state would be
unable to find the necessary resources to respond to the populations’ needs and to
honor their debts. A “free contract” between two independent sovereign states
created a lesser bond than that needed for the type of gifts that Tillion wanted
France to spend on Algeria. If Algeria became a newly independent nation, its
population would soon lose French aid, as Tillion cautioned that “the money given
to the poor countries by prosperous countries is useless to the former – when it does
not aggravate their condition – and, at the same time, the money represents a heavy
sacrifice for the latter,”113 which explained why the latter continuously reduced
development aid payments. Neither the United States nor the Soviets would make
such a large gift as the 2 trillion francs Tillion estimated were necessary for the
immediate retooling of a large section of the Algerian population: “to the contrary,”
she wrote “independence will not solve this problem . . . and without our collabora-
tion, these problems cannot be solved, whatever happens”114 in the political realm.
For Tillion and Soustelle, much greater sums of money than those currently spent
by capitalist states on development aid to independent new nations were needed.115
Tillion argued it would be much worse if the Algerian population was no longer
sheltered by protective French trade barriers, which maintained some aspects of the
gift logic to the relations between France and Algeria: too few Algerians benefited
from social security, modern medical facilities, and high attendance rates in French
schools (including by Muslim children), which meant that an independent Algeria
risked collapsing.116 From raw calculations, done simply by extrapolating the budget
of one family multiplied by the total number of Algerian families, Tillion concluded
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that the independence of an Algerian state would increase Algeria’s problems of
economic poverty, cultural alienation, and political resentment: she predicted that
the European economic elite would leave Algerian cities to their fate, when it was
precisely in these city centers that the social, cultural, and economic problems were
being solved by the programs of economic integration she had helped set up since
Soustelle hired her in 1955.117 As Tillion wrote, if the French were to pull out of
Algeria in the near future, “all that we give now, like the devil’s gold, will be turned to
dry leaves.”118
In many ways, the return of Soustelle to the government in late 1958 and the
adoption of the five-year Constantine Plan (1959–63) gave Soustelle and Tillion
hope that the French state could finally work to realize their ideas: the Constantine
Plan, an investment plan adopted in 1959, exemplified how a gift exchange economy
linking the two countries could work. The Plan called for massive investments in
Algeria in order to solve the “problems of industrialization and modernization of the
Algerian economy,” in large part “thanks to the exploitation of natural gas in Lacq
and the exploitation of the Sahara for oil extraction,” which led to the decision of the
French government “to sell oil and gas at such a cheap price to Algeria that Algeria
will be one of the countries where energy is the cheapest in the world.”119 In parallel,
back in the government, Soustelle lobbied for the “suppression of the absurd
financial autonomy” of the Algerian population, the integration of Algerian expenses
into the French budget, and the maintenance of a distinct fiscal policy, as “the
Algerians’ standard of living being much lower than in the metropolis, the Algerians
could not bear the burden of French taxes to the same extent as the
metropolitans.”120 This integration of the Algerian and metropolitan budgets
meant, de facto, that the Algerian (present and future, if not past) debt would be
erased, and that the French metropolis would pay, according to Tillion and
Soustelle’s plan, to train 400,000 people in Algeria and to develop oil extraction in
the Sahara at a cost of 2 trillion francs.
As Minister of the Sahara, Soustelle also put in place the reform of the oil code
in November 1958, which was inspired by the “regimes in place in the Middle East
and Venezuela, which equally distributed the benefits to the public authorities
[granting the concession] and the shareholders of the companies.”121 Soustelle
believed the new code would encourage the French (and foreign) oil companies
to invest in oil extraction in Algeria and provide cheap energy to Algerians rather
than import it at a high price. It was ironic that Mauss’s student hailed the moder-
nized system of concessions as a benefactor to the colonial society, when his former
mentor and the previous generation of solidarists had spent so much time campaign-
ing against the abuses of chartered companies in the colonies and writing in favor of
their nationalization. Soustelle’s plan of massive investment in Algeria (shouldered
by metropolitan taxpayers) was supposed to open a new phase of post-national
political integration in the relations between the two societies, and close the gap
between rhetoric and reality.
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But the Constantine Plan came too late, and amounted to too little.
The uncertainty over de Gaulle’s commitment to keeping Algeria in metropolitan
France certainly did not help the political elites solve the problem of underinvest-
ment in Algeria. The investments to which France consented as part of the
Constantine Plan were largely insufficient to balance the free movement of capital
that was observed in 1959 and 1960: as an editorialist noticed, “during its first two
years, the Constantine Plan injected 56 billion francs in Algeria, 18.3 billion coming
from Algeria, and 38.4 from metropolitan France. But,” the journalist added,
“each year, Algeria exports about 250 billion francs of capital to the French metro-
polis, which means that the overall mass of capital in Algeria has decreased.”122
The trend, far from decreasing, accelerated, as the rich Algerians anticipated the
possibility of independence and hedged their bets by investing their money in
metropolitan France. Thus, the only solution to turn the flow of capital investment
upside down was to introduce “capital controls” and strictly restrict the export of
capital away from Algeria, on behalf of an “economic patriotism, which translated
‘pro-French Algeria’ slogans into investments in Algeria.”123
5 THE GIFT AS DISSIMULATION: PIERRE BOURDIEU AND THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE GIFT IN ALGERIA
Tillion and Soustelle’s 1957 public interventions provoked many disputes in aca-
demic and intellectual circles: they were widely commented upon and criticized by
other intellectuals, like historian Pierre Nora (1931–), for deploying a purely rheto-
rical defense of colonial administration in Algeria, and downplaying the role of the
institutionalized racism against Arabs found among European populations in
Algeria.124 The idea that Algeria could remain attached to the French Republic as
part of a multicultural and giving post-national society began to look like a mirage.
As the decoupling between the rhetoric of the gift and the reality of Franco-Algerian
relations grew even wider, a new generation of anthropologists started to question
whether the model of gift exchange could be applied to international relations
without merely being a form of colonial propaganda.
Within the academic field, the scission between the generation of Soustelle and
Tillion and the new generation grew wider as their slogans, and their application of
the model of gift exchange to international relations, were increasingly associated
with the defense of the French presence in North Africa. Then, it was no longer
Berque or Aron who wrote against their use of Mauss’s model of the gift, but
a doctoral student whose pre-independence writings reshaped the political and
anthropological discourse on Algeria and the gift: Pierre Bourdieu. As various
historians of sociology like Julian Go and Johan Heilbron have recently demon-
strated, the years that Bourdieu spent in Algeria were deeply formative for his later
writings.125 A freshly graduated philosophy student from the ENS, Bourdieu began
thinking about the Algerian issue during his military service, for which he worked in
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the information service of the Minister-resident in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, who had
replaced Soustelle in 1956.126 Bourdieu’s job gave him a particularly good vantage
point from which to assess the reality of Algerian society as well as the duplicity of
colonial propaganda: in the summer of 1957, thanks to his mother’s connection with
a colonel from his region (the Béarn, in the southwest of France), he participated in
the collection of information which rationalized the “psychological action” (aimed
at forcing the Algerian masses into compliance with French rule), and he wrote
various reports, one of which was designed to support the French position on “the
Algeria problem” at the United Nations. Then, from 1957 to 1960, he obtained
a lecturing position at the University of Algiers, in an academic context still heavily
marked by colonial ethnographic science, which insisted on the “fragmented”
ethnic space of Algeria rather than on a unified Algerian “national” society.127
As such, Bourdieu had a foot in both worlds: the academic one, where he defended
unorthodox positions, and the colonial field, where he wrote small essays that could
be useful to the French administration.
Still, Bourdieu did not endorse the French official position, and his rejection of
Soustelle and Tillion’s opinions on Algeria led him to naturally gravitate closer to
Aron, whom he met in 1959 when the latter delivered a lecture at the University of
Algiers. Bourdieu not only appreciated Aron’s expression of support for Algerian
independence but also his Weberian sociological orientation (quite different from
Soustelle and Sartre). He asked Aron to be his dissertation adviser (as Bourdieu
wanted to transform some ethnographic studies he did in Kabylia into a thesis).
Although Aron redirected Bourdieu toward another adviser, he did hire him as his
teaching assistant in 1960 at the Sorbonne, where Bourdieu also took his class on
international relations,128 and where Bourdieu became associated with Aron’s
Centre de sociologie européenne (a center whose direction Bourdieu later inherited
from Aron).
Thanks to this process of “hybridization” between different positions in the field of
ethnology and political science, Bourdieu thus managed to completely distance
Mauss’s mode of the gift exchange from Soustelle’s vision of post-national political
integration.129 Like Berque, Bourdieu argued in his first essay on Algeria (1958,
reprinted in 1961) that, in contrast to what Soustelle claimed, a certain unity existed
across Algeria: even if some of his books, either published alone or with coauthor
Abdelmayek Sayad (1933–98), were articulated around chapters devoted to different
ethnicities (Chaouia, Kabylia, Arabs, nomads from the Sahara, etc.),130 Bourdieu
assumed that there was such a thing as an Algerian “rule of law” or customary law,
and that the latter was different from the French “fact” which existed alongside (and
corrupted, from Bourdieu and Sayad’s point of view)131 the free operation of Algeria’s
rule of law. For Bourdieu and Sayad, the first step for ethnographers was thus to get
to know who the Algerians “really” were and what united them, rather than assume
that they could never coalesce as “a nation.” In their endeavor, they found inMauss’s
anthropological model of the gift a particularly useful heuristics: conformity to this
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system of customary law known as the gift characterized how the Algerians under-
stood economic exchanges as well as questions of sovereignty and morality, which
put them at odds with the Europeans, who clearly departed from (and subverted) this
logic of the gift, using it as a rhetorical tool in order to advance their narrow and
egoistic goals.
Bourdieu found in Kabylia many examples of “gifts” and “counter-gifts”
exchanged between families – in particular, “gifts of brides” through which alliances
were sealed between families within the same tribe (commonly) or between tribes
(in exceptional cases).132 To seal these marital alliances no paper was needed, as an
exchange of dowries manifested the alliance: the memory of the gifts exchanged was
preserved by the community, whose “collective opinion is the law, the tribunal and
the agent in charge of implementing sanctions”133 – the highest possible sanction
being exile and the loss of honor it represented.
According to this Algerian customary rule of law, the same logic of the gift that
ruled over the obligations between humans also ruled those between humans and
the land – even among the nomadic tribes from the Sahara, which Soustelle
believed to be a terra nullius,134 but where the boundaries of collective property
rights exercised by tribes were in fact fiercely negotiated, and sealed in a network of
tacit “contracts, each of which are overcome but latent conflicts.”135 The Algerian
gift economy was really a “total social fact” beginning with the seasonal rhythms of
nature, which required Algerian peasants to plant seeds in some parts of their fields
while leaving other parts unplanted in the expectation of some later higher return.
This counter-gift that the fields gave to them in exchange for the collective protec-
tion of the soil had its social correlation: among fellows of the same tribe, no
exchange was monetized. Bourdieu and Sayad cited Algerian peasants who stressed
that the “earth only gives to those who give to her” – and that peasants had
progressively fewer and fewer means to follow this prescription of their customary
rule of law.136
Thus, the Maussian inspiration in Bourdieu’s work was direct and clear, as
Bourdieu found a common customary basis in Algerians’ recognition of the “logic
of the gift” (and its three obligations), which for most tribes represented a form of
customary law – an observation he shared with Tillion and Soustelle. But compared
to Mauss’s former doctoral students, Bourdieu redefined the relation between
contracting agents (e.g. the relation characterized as a gift exchange, with its specific
ordering of time and reciprocity) and the types of contracting agents (whether the
latter were individuals or sovereign entities). Whereas Tillion and Soustelle asserted
that the logic of the gift applied (or should apply) to the relations between European
and non-European communities in Algeria, Bourdieu vehemently denied that this
was the case.
If Bourdieu and Sayad found that the logics of honor and gift exchange had ruled
most aspects of life in Algeria before French colonization, the colonial encounter
between Algerian tribesmen and the French Republic could not be characterized as
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a “gift exchange” except if by the latter, one meant a deceitful exchange during
which one party lost everything. For instance, as Bourdieu and Sayad underlined,
colonial legislation, from the Senatus-Consulte of 1865 to the Warnier law of 1873 –
sponsored by AugusteWarnier (1810–75), a longtime explorer of Algeria, geographer,
politician, and military planner – formalized and redistributed property rights in
Algeria so as to facilitate French colonists’ access to private property in France’s
closest and dearest colony.137 For them, the law of the Senatus-Consulte was the
most powerful instrument of economic warfare against the political economy of gift
exchange, as it created a system of formal individual property rights over land in
a region where most land had been managed under informal property rights
exercised collectively by tribes according to a logic of honor and gift.
The destruction of the solidarity between tribes and land was applied continuously
until it reached an apex with the military rule known as regroupement (1954–9),138
which led to the internal displacement of millions of Algerians – a massive breach of
human rights.
For Bourdieu and Sayad, these legal measures were emblematic of the colonial
enterprise, which consisted in breaking down collective solidarities between fellows
of the same tribe and between a tribe and a territory, relationships which were
organized juridically and politically through farming, cultivating, and exchanging
the products of the land.139 As a result of such colonial measures, backed by military
force, Bourdieu and Sayad observed the breakdown of the old customary rule of law:
old contracts of association are replaced with contracts of employment . . . and the
old community traditions – loans of service, collective labors, tacit conventions, in-
kind exchanges – fall into desuetude and when they do not, they are seen as
illegitimate constraints by individuals who have learnt to see inmoney the universal
medium of all human exchanges and in the form of a salary the universal compen-
sation for labor.140
For Bourdieu, this revolution in attitudes toward legal/economic obligations was
exemplified in the changing perception of migration to the cities (either in Algiers or
in the metropolis): whereas their ancestors migrated to help protect the land and
thus the tribe which collectively owned the rights to live on it (by providing
remittances that were invested in the protection or expansion of the land controlled
by the tribe), Algerians in the 1950s saw their migration as a permanent exit from the
original land – an exit with no return, as most of the time, they migrated after
a default on debt they had contracted with landowners.141 By the 1950s, migration
was thus “no longer the realization of a mission granted by the group but an
individual adventure by isolated individuals, forced to confront, with no protection,
and no possibility to return, a hostile environment.”142
Beyond the words of Soustelle and Tillion, which claimed that exporting capital
to Algeria and importing Algerian manpower to the metropolis would suffice to
maintain the system of gift exchange alive in Algeria, Bourdieu, and Sayad found
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a much darker reality in Algerian cities: marked by decades of alienation, accultura-
tion, and exploitation, Algerian populations were at risk of no longer being able to
practice gift exchanges among themselves and between themselves and others.
The corruption of gift exchanges in Algeria was made manifest for instance in the
changing relation known as the khammès:143 this system had long been used to
project a powerful family’s status in the public eye by providing gifts ensuring
subsistence for the poorer fellows employed to help farm the land on a seasonal
basis. In the 1950s this system continued to exist, but it took a decrepit form, as it
transitioned toward a system of written contracts of monetized exchanges between
employees and employers. The gift exchange had evolved: when poor farmers failed
to honor the contracted debts, they faced a loss of honor and fled to the cities,
preferring anonymity to shame, and becoming part of the internally displaced
population.144
For Bourdieu and Sayad, the socioeconomic and cultural outcomes identified by
Tillion – like “pauperization,” or the “acculturation” of Algerian peasants – were
thus the result of deliberate political and legal mechanisms meant to create poverty
and anomy rather than the result of natural market forces led by demographic
processes. As they wrote, “only by masquerading the context – e.g. the colonial
situation – in which economic exchanges take place can we interpret the present
revolutionary changes in Algeria in terms of acculturation”145 led by the natural
forces of capitalism. Generalizing from this example of the khammès, Bourdieu thus
asserted that in such “pre-capitalist” societies as colonial Algeria, he saw in the logic
of circulating gifts and debt the operation of a “symbolic violence,” e.g. a “violence
that is soft, invisible, unknown as such, chosen as much as suffered, a violence that is
full of trust, obligation, personal loyalty, gift and debt, from mutual recognition and
piety, and all these notions associated with the morality of honor.”146
Still, according to Bourdieu and Sayad, the gift exchange economy – based on
unwritten but binding rule – continued to exist in Algeria, even if it was limited to
local and hidden exchanges within theMuslim population. Its persistence was made
manifest with the difficulty with which Algerian Muslims adopted “modern” for-
mally written rules: unlike “market specialists, peasants ignore the market guaran-
tees, the witnesses, and the acts of writ in which market relations are now
embedded.” As they wrote, some Algerian peasants still ignored “economic calculus,
conceived both in terms of accounting techniques and in terms of speculation on the
future.”147
But, for Bourdieu, it would have been a travesty of truth to claim, like Tillion and
Soustelle did, that the Europeans (both in Algeria and Paris) partook in such a gift
economy: the French administrators and European settlers did not respect the logic
of honor, as they consistently violated their promises and sought to exploit the
Algerian (Muslim) population for short-term economic gains. For more than
a century, they had worked to destroy this native Algerian customary rule of law
known as the gift exchange, first, by explicitly denying that it was a “rule of law” as
152 Gift Exchange
the French considered the Muslims they encountered in Algeria to be
“savages”; second, by working to subvert it through a series of laws and policies,
like the creation of a capitalist market of property rights that weakened collective
Algerian landholding solidarities; and, third, and most perversely, by “mimicking”
the discourse of the gift through the colonial appropriation of the terms as Soustelle
and Tillion did in their writings.
For Bourdieu, when French administrators like Soustelle used the language of the
gift – with their emphasis on “honor,” “gift,” and “generosity” – to frame their pro-
integration projects, they went to new heights of cruelty by capturing the language
and concepts of that customary law and attaching new meaning to each term.
As Bourdieu and Sayad wrote, “politicians, administrators and military men cannot
conceive of a higher generosity as that which consists in granting to Algerians the
right to become what they should be [according to French standards], e.g. the right
to be like the Europeans, which, in fact, denies them the right to be who they really
are.”148This use of ethnology for propaganda purposes was absolutely illegitimate for
Bourdieu.
The act of mimicking – by using the language of the indigenous to frame
a proposal whose goal was the exact opposite of the preservation of the customary
rule of law – produced particularly tragic results, associated with what Bourdieu later
called the lifting of the “illusio.”149 Indeed, paradoxically, the Algerian peasants who
had developed strong moral notions of rectitude within their customary rule of law
were those who became the most cynical about the (European and Algerian)
discourses on the gift. As Bourdieu and Sayad wrote, those peasants who still
believed in notions of “good faith,” “honor,” and “tacit obligations” were now seen
as “fools” and “idiots”150 by the younger generations, who no longer saw in these
words the logic of honor of the customary law of their ancestors, but a ploy used by
the colonial administration to exert its rule over pauperized populations. Thus,
while some Algerians still understood social relations and relations with the land
as their ancestors had, and continued their practice of farming the land – although in
a disillusioned way, no longer believing in the magical link that united the tribe with
the land – others who left to the cities saw the Algerian peasants as “fools” or poor
fellows trapped in extreme poverty.
By usingMaussian concepts of gift exchange to analyze a specific local reality (e.g.
the working of a pre-capitalist customary rule of law), Bourdieu could claim to be
more Maussian than Tillion and Soustelle – but only by ignoring the “political
writings” on sovereign debt crises that Mauss had published in parallel to The Gift,
whose traces could be found in Tillion and Soustelle’s essays. In doing so, Bourdieu
managed to reclaim ethnology on the side of the realist political scientists who, like
Raymond Aron, had condemned France’s sustained involvement in Algeria while
keeping his distance from the FLN – in contrast to Aron’s former classmate at the
ENS, Jean-Paul Sartre, who wrote an apology of terrorism in Algeria in his preface to
Frantz Fanon’s Wrenched of the Earth.151
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Mauss’s analytical model gave Bourdieu a viewpoint from which to not only
criticize the rhetoric of Soustelle and Tillion, but also the abstract thinking of
revolutionary intellectuals like Sartre and Fanon,152 who wished to change reality
by applying great plans which assumed a liberty and freedom among individuals
that, according to Bourdieu, did not exist as such. Indeed, Bourdieu and Sayad
believed that one of the main dangers faced by Algeria when the latter became an
independent republic was a “petty bourgeoisie of bureaucrats who tend to magically
deny the contradictions of [the Algerian] reality, as if they were a shameful ghost of
the deceased colonial giant.”153 If they denied the permanence of weakened but still
persistent traditional expectations about land and social obligations, the new
Algerian rulers risked destroying the social pact that had long served to produce
peace between tribes, leading to an increasing tendency to act cynically, like the
younger generations who found no wisdom in Algerian customary law of gift
exchange. To prevent this tragedy fromhappening, Bourdieu thus proposed to revivify
Maussian concepts, but, this time, and in contrast to Soustelle and Tillion, to apply
them to the reality to which they claimed it belonged: at the local level.
6 THE TURN TO THE LOCAL IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY
OF GIFT EXCHANGES
Even if President de Gaulle accepted to govern under the framework defined by the
1958 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, which Soustelle’s theory of integration had
deeply influenced, he soon turned his back on Soustelle’s policy of post-national
integration of the metropolitan and Algerian societies into one republic. In the
summer of 1959, de Gaulle decided to instead give considerable “autonomy” to
Algeria, thus paving the way for a referendum on the question of Algerian indepen-
dence – whose terms he started to secretly negotiate with the FLN after 1960. De
Gaulle’s reversal signed the demise of Soustelle’s conception of integration, whose
economic translation would have taken the form of a vast system of gift exchanges
between the two sides of the Mediterranean Sea.
After de Gaulle started negotiating with the FLN, his new Algerian policy
reaffirmed the assimilationist and nationalist character of the concept of integration:
those citizens who chose to remain French after the independence had to decide to
live in the French metropolis and share the social and cultural mores of the majority
there. The support of the French population for de Gaulle at the end of the war in
Algeria, when they voted in April 1962 in favor of the Evian Agreements – signed
between the French government and the Provisional Government of the Algerian
Republic (GPRA, in French) in March 1962 – left him free to implement his vision
of France as a pure nation-state, characterized ethnically as a white Christian
majority,154 and free to apply a simple distinction at the time of independence: the
Muslims in Algeria were (except for a few exceptions) to be considered Algerians,
and the Europeans in Algeria (most of whom had migrated to the metropolis in the
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summer of the independence in any case) were to be considered part of the French
body politic.155 There was some Charles Maurras in Charles de Gaulle. Despite the
doubts of both Tillion and Soustelle as to the ability of a new Algerian state to
constitute a new independent “nation” – as they believed that distinction corre-
sponded to a stage of social and political integration that Algerians had not yet
achieved – de Gaulle’s views prevailed.
Sensing the swing of pendulum, Soustelle left the government in 1960, and when
he failed to publicly condemn the new attempted putsch in 1961 by four retired
generals in Algeria asking for de Gaulle’s resignation, he was forced into clandestine
exile for eight years.156 His exile did not stop him from denouncing the Evian
Agreements between the French government and the GPRA as a clear violation of
the constitution of the Fifth Republic, in its letter (as the president had to safeguard
the “integrity of the territory” rather than give away three departments in Algeria), in
its process (as any change to the Constitution had to be made by a supra-majority
vote of the Congress rather than adopted by referendum),157 and in its outcome (as
the result of the Evian negotiation with the FLN led to the stripping of French
citizenship of those (Muslim) French citizens who could not emigrate from Algeria
to the French metropolis between the summer of 1962 and the end of that year). But
he had lost the fight: the secession of Algeria put an end to his dreams of integration
of various communities in a post-national and postcolonial Republic.
The demise of Soustelle’s model of gift exchange in international (or rather,
intersocietal) relations did not mean that Mauss’s 1925 essay disappeared from the
range of classical studies in anthropology. In 1975, the President of the French
Republic, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing – son of Edmond Giscard d’Estaing and a center-
right and formerly pro-French Algeria politician – asked Jacques Soustelle, by then
deputy of Lyon at the National Assembly, to write a report on the future of French
research in anthropology and archaeology. As Soustelle acknowledged at the begin-
ning of his report, Mauss continued to determine the intellectual horizon under
which French anthropologists constituted their scientific agenda: “Mauss’s essay
The Gift had left a profoundmark on [his] generation of researchers in anthropology,”
even if the generations which came after Mauss often departed from the comparative
and “total anthropology that Mauss ambitioned to create,” and conducted in its stead
original fieldwork in specific communities: “Paul Rivet in Andean America, Maurice
Leenhardt inNewCaledonia,MarcelGriaule inEthiopia and Sudan, AlfredMétraux
in Chaco, Claude Lévi-Strauss in Brazil”158 – he could have, but did not, mention
Pierre Bourdieu in Kabylia.
In many ways, Soustelle’s 1967 The Four Suns – a book he published while in
exile, when he was chased away by de Gaulle’s hitmen – may have been the last
attempt by a French anthropologist to articulate the “total anthropology” that Mauss
had in mind: it was a comparative attempt to understand and explain “how civiliza-
tions die.”159 As he wrote, “all civilizations died”: “some, like the Aztecs, because
they were murdered by foreigners; others like the Mayas, because of an inner
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cancer”; and “there was no reason that our civilization would constitute an
exception.”160 It is not too hard to read his essay as an anthropological and political
reflection on the breakdown of the French Empire and the demise of the French
civilization. And, then, “when civilizations died,” Soustelle found, “the ethnic
groups which such civilizations had constituted fell back to the level of culture,
until their culture would constitute again the primary material that a new civiliza-
tion would rework, as had happened for the Gallo-Romans and the Germans after
the collapse of the Roman Empire.”161 Knowing Soustelle’s preoccupation for the
fate of Algeria, it is impossible to believe that he did not have in mind the fate of the
Algerian ethnic groups, which, after being reorganized by the French civilization for
a century or more, would now be integrated into new civilizations, either Muslim,
communist, or from a rising Third World.
In this context, what was left for ethnologists to study in the 1970s, Soustelle asked
in his report to the French president. If they could no longer study the intersocietal
gift exchanges that made the life of a civilization, they could study these cultural
practices that were observable within ethnic groups at the local level. Even Soustelle
came to legitimate the association between the study of gift exchanges and the local
level of action: as he wrote in his 1975 report, future ethnologists should focus on the
contemporary evolutions of ethnic groups in the French metropolis rather than
restrict ethnography to the study of “archaic societies” – a confusing notion which
“rested on the wrong perception that human evolution was linear.”162 Indeed, in the
“new context of cooperation with newly independent states, [which accelerated
migrations in both ways] French ethnographers should devote more resources to
studying their own populations” in their ethnic diversity, as was already being done
by a “rich body of ethnographic research which proved that the peasant of the
Dordogne and the city dweller of Montpellier constitute as legitimate objects of
ethnographic study as the African or the Indian.”163 In particular, Soustelle wrote,
echoing the xenophobic ideas of Giscard d’Estaing’s government, new generations
of ethnologists should observe local processes, be attentive to the local circulation of
gifts, and conduct ethnographies of “populations of allogenic workers” from Algeria
“whose high density in metropolitan city centers represented a threat to
integration,”164 now conceived in the contemporary sense of “assimilation.” Again,
many anthropologists who call themselves Maussian should be wary of the explicit
political goals that Mauss’s students have attached to their master’s research pro-
gram, even after former colonies gained their independence.
The “return of the gift”165 – to cite Harry Liebersohn – as a political discourse on
global or least intersocietal governance, grounded in the new disciplines of anthro-
pology and ethnology, was thus short-lived, at least in the French field of power.
The publication of The Gift opened this new era; Pierre Bourdieu’s writings on gift
exchange in Algeria, as well as Raymond Aron’s pamphlets, participated in closing
the parentheses. Between Mauss and Bourdieu, one generation of ethnologists and
colonial administrators had used the anthropology of the gift as a normative model
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for the economic and financial relationships between the metropolis and the
colonies. But after Algerian independence was granted in 1962, the reconfiguration
of the colonial field of power, which was disrupted overnight, largely relegated
Mauss’s influence on international economic exchange to the dustbin of history.
Or did it? If the end of the war in Algeria, and the shock waves it sent through the
colonial field, relegated the anthropology of the gift to the study of migrants’
assimilation at the local level, could it be that the gift exchange had survived as
a model of international economic governance, although in another form, and
attached to a discipline other than anthropology?
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Decolonizing The Gift
Nationalization and Sovereign Debt Cancellation in North–South
Relations
If 1962 put an end to the constitutional debates in France and Algeria, none of the
socioeconomic questions about which Mauss had written were solved by Algeria
gaining its political independence. With the Evian Agreements signed
in March 1962 by the French government and the provisional government of the
Algerian Republic, the negotiators organized both the independence of Algeria and
the sustained cooperation between Algeria and France. The Evian Agreements
represented the template of what the French negotiators had in mind when they
proposed international “cooperation” to their former possessions after indepen-
dence. Formally, the logic of cooperation was inspired by the model of gift
exchange: according to the Evian Agreements, cooperation was to be based on the
“reciprocity of advantages and interests between the two parties,”1 which was made
manifest by the granting of “in-kind ‘prestations,’ loans, financial participation, or
gifts,”2 from the old metropolis to the newly independent Algerian state.
The Evian Agreements were premised on the prediction that the one million
French citizens of European descent, most of whom had never lived in the metro-
polis, would remain in Algeria after independence, and that some form of financial,
economic, cultural, and political cooperation would need to continue to ensure
good relations between the Algerian citizens and these French citizens who
remained Algerian residents. For a renewable period of three years, the French
government thus agreed to maintain intact its financial obligations in Algeria, in
order to avoid the collapse of the newly independent state, which would have
resulted from an uncontrolled secession, according to the predictions that Jacques
Soustelle and Germaine Tillion expressed at the time.
With the Evian Agreements, the French government believed that France had
been faithful to its longstanding generosity toward Algeria. This cooperation was
costly for France, as it involved, for instance, paying the salaries of coopérants
(doctors, teachers, magistrates, etc.) who agreed to give a helping hand to the
Algerian people during the transition toward social, economic, and financial auton-
omy. In the Evian Agreements, the French government went as far as committing to
help the Algerian state sustain the financial burden of the future nationalization of
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land3 – a decision for which the Algerian Minister of Information, Redha Malek
(1931–2017), lauded the “realism” of the French delegation.4 As Jeffrey Byrne writes
about the Algerian revolutionary leaders’ economic program, the nationalization of
land was “perhaps their one clearly and consistently expressed goal after
independence,”5 so there was little doubt that following Algeria’s independence,
the new independent government would declare the redistribution and collectiviza-
tion of land ownership. The only realistic way to prevent land nationalization from
being implemented without compensation for the French landowners was for
France to cover some of the financial burden with its own operating budget.
In exchange, Algeria’s provisional government promised to enforce all acquired
private and private/public rights on land and subterranean resources.6 In the Evian
Agreements, the Algerian representatives committed to the principle that all natio-
nalization should be compensated in a “fair and fixed manner,”7 and that payments
should be promptly executed. The future Algerian government not only promised to
fairly compensate the large landowners, with the support of the French government,
but it also promised not to expropriate the immovable properties (buildings, houses,
or apartments) that French citizens owned in Algeria. At last, Algeria guaranteed the
integrity of the acquired rights on oil research and extraction,8 which were defined
by the 1958 Oil Code whose preparation had been overseen by Jacques Soustelle
when he was the Minister of Atomic Energy and the Sahara in the first government
of Michel Debré.
The Evian Agreements were emblematic of many other devolution and indepen-
dence agreements written by France in the early 1960s, inspired by the philosophy of
post-independence “cooperation.” If de Gaulle indeed believed that history would
naturally bring colonies to their independence, and that it was more economic for
France to accept it sooner rather than later,9 the notion of “cooperation” reintro-
duced the idea that a transitional period was necessary for postcolonial societies to
adapt after the moment of political independence and until the moment of eco-
nomic independence. The government did not yet speak of “failed states,” but,
clearly, the metropolis wanted to prevent its former colonies from experiencing
economic collapse as a result of achieving independence. During a transitional
period, newly independent states that emerged from the ashes of the French Empire
would march according to different rhythms, but along the same straight line and
with the benevolent support of the former metropolis, which would generously
provide expertise, financial support, and political guidance to these new nations as
the latter sought ways to organize themselves internally, to find resources on external
markets, and to form alliances within the orbit of France’s soft hegemony.
Still, the fact that the provisional Algerian government (or GPRA) accepted to
sign cooperation agreements that were inspired by this philosophy of coopera-
tion was a surprise – if it wasn’t just a temporary concession. Indeed, with the
Tripoli Declaration of 1962 in particular, the GPRA had rejected the concept of
“cooperation” with French economic interests, in which they saw the gravest
Decolonizing The Gift 159
danger raised to the revolution by “the seductive guises of liberalism and
financial cooperation that only purports to be disinterested.”10 Algerian revolu-
tionaries denounced in the post-independence philosophy of cooperation the
same paternalism they saw in the colonial mindset characteristic of the interwar
imperial administrators who believed that overseas societies had not reached the
highest point of maturity, and thus needed the continued support of the
metropolis, even after being granted their independence. Mohammed
Bedjaoui, eminent Algerian jurist, who served as a jurisconsult of the GPRA
in the Franco-Algerian negotiation,11 and who became the first secretary general
of the government after 1962 – a role similar to that of a prime minister, to the
extent that he organized the weekly Cabinet meetings with the Algerian minis-
ters and coordinated the implementation of decisions with the relevant
ministries12 – clearly opposed the Gaullist concept of “cooperation” in which
he saw the prolongation of colonial relations of interstate subordination in the
post-decolonization era.13
Even though the GPRA did sign the Evian Agreements in March 1962, the
Algerian diplomatic team fought hard against the general philosophy of bilateral
cooperation in other public venues, such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
Upon becoming Algeria’s first president, Ahmed Ben Bella (1918–2012) made it clear
that he saw in the French projects of cooperation a neocolonial project aimed at
ensuring the prolongation of France’s wrongly acquired rights on land expropriated
at the time of colonization.14 The French financial guarantees served the same
function as the continued presence of French military forces in the territory of
newly independent states: their overall goal was to insure French investors (espe-
cially in the oil business) against the threat that their investments might be natio-
nalized with no compensation.15 Citing the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal
(1898–1987) and his criticism of the “forced bilateralism” associated with the con-
tinued exploitation of the South’s natural resources by the Global North, Bedjaoui
repeatedly argued that French financial help was far from a disinterested gift: he saw
in “cooperation” a guarantee or “collateral” (contrepartie) that Algeria would protect
“the interests of the French state and the acquired rights of the legal persons on
Algerian territory.”16
In many ways, Bedjaoui implicitly agreed with Bourdieu and Sayad’s idea that the
language of gift, cooperation, and solidarity that the metropolitan statesmen spoke
before, during, and after the independence of former colonies was just a devilish
charade aimed at confusing the peoples of newly independent states.17 As Bedjaoui
wrote in 1978, the fake gifts that the North extended to the South under the guise of
“cooperation agreements” and “barter conventions signed on the side of aid agree-
ments [between North and South], perpetuate the illusion among the rich countries
that they deliver a truly authentic and disinterested aid to the countries of the Third
World,” when in fact, these “supposedly fair and freely accepted exchange contracts
perpetuate the soft exploitation of the latter.”18
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The Algerian statesmen who would later come to be associated with the fight for
a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970s, thus clearly distin-
guished between the bilateral cooperation between North and South proposed by
the French government, and the multilateral South–South and North–South rela-
tions they envisioned. Ben Bellah’s goal was to make Algeria the exemplary Third
World rebellious nation, which meant confronting head-on de Gaulle’s project of
postcolonial cooperation, and forming new alliances in the South, in particular with
Tito’s socialist Yugoslavia, in which he found a model for the redistribution of land
he announced in March 1963,19 or with Cuba and other countries of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. Indeed, upon gaining its independence, Algeria became
a “Mecca of Revolution,”20 to use Jeffrey Byrne’s title, as Algiers hosted some of
the most important conferences where the non-aligned movement came to an
agreement on the broad strategy needed to establish the NIEO.
In these debates, Algerian diplomats played a key role: the NIEO was launched
in September 1973 during the Algiers conference of heads of state and govern-
ment of the non-aligned countries, which concluded with a call by Algerian
President Houari Boumédiène (1932–78) to the UN Secretary General to convene
a special session of the UNGA to study problems of raw materials, sovereign debt,
and development.21 The subsequent UNGA session was organized in May 1974,
under the tenure of Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1937–), Boumédiène’s longtime
Foreign Minister (1963–79) who was also the UNGA’s president in 1974: during
this session the UNGA adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of the
NIEO, complemented by a program of action and the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States at the end of 1974. In parallel, Mohammed Bedjaoui
also called for states from the Global South to reject neocolonial cooperation
with their former metropolis and to engage with the Global North in honest
“global negotiations” covering the topics of debt, concession rights and economic
development on a multilateral basis, and recognize an inalienable right of all
nations over their “wealth, natural resources and economic activities”22 – an
inalienable right which was later referenced in the Convention on the
Succession of States in respect to State Property, Archives and Debts that was
adopted in 1983 by certain states of the Global South (but which never entered
into force). This Treaty was discussed within the group of expert lawyers chaired
by Bedjaoui himself, which had been tasked in the mid 1960s by the UNGA to
reflect upon economic transitions after independences: the International Law
Commission (ILC) and its sub-committee on the questions of nationalization of
property and cancellation of sovereign debt in the postcolonial context.23 With
the Evian Agreements, a new sequence was thus opened that led to the expression
of the demands that non-aligned nations tabled both at the UNGA (1974–9), with
the establishment in May 1974 of a Plenary Committee in charge of initiating the
NIEO, and at the ILC, in which legal scholars spent twenty years codifying the
legal doctrine on the economic rights of former colonies after independence.
Decolonizing The Gift 161
In these different debates, two models of the gift exchange clashed with one
another: the philosophy of bilateral cooperation between the former metropolis
and its former colonies, which was modeled after the Evian Agreements; and the
philosophy of multilateral and “global settlements,” which was articulated by emi-
nent jurists and diplomats of the Third World, among whom Algerian diplomats in
general, and Mohammed Bedjaoui in particular, figured prominently. As far as
Algeria was concerned, the support for the NIEO was premised on the recognition
that, with the Evian Agreements, French views had shaped the law on the books, but
that it wasn’t clear whose views would shape the law in practice in the years ahead.
The notion of “acquired rights” safeguarded by the Evian Agreements was immedi-
ately rendered meaningless by the unexpected and massive exodus of the French
Algerians in the summer of 1962, leaving behind all their possessions.24
The compromise reached on the transmission of sovereign debt and private rights
(of French companies) over natural resources also proved temporary, as the two
independent countries started to renegotiate the rights of oil concessions in Algeria
after 1965. By then, it was hard to predict whether Algeria would abruptly cut all
economic ties with the French economy and French oil concessions, or whether it
would leave unchanged the existing French economic interests in Algeria – or
whether it would look for a third solution, in between the two extremes. This was
the context in which the Algerian statesmen started to develop their own doctrine of
North–South relations, which eventually became the NIEO.
Thus, one can hardly say that the gift exchange disappeared as a model of
international economic governance with the end of the AlgerianWar in 1962: rather,
with decolonization in general, and the end of the war in Algeria in particular, the
gift exchange seems to have been translated into the discourse of international law,
and thus suffused with new meanings and novel political connotations. In this
chapter, I thus ask: how was the model of gift exchange, which anthropologists
quit using to analyze international exchanges around the time of Algeria’s indepen-
dence, recycled in the field of international law to frame the larger governance issues
raised by the age of economic independences?Which transformations in the French
field of power in general, and those affecting the relations between the French
metropolitan and colonial fields in particular, have made this translation of the gift
exchange in the language of international law possible? And with which larger
geopolitical and economic considerations have these changes been associated?
As Nico Schrijver observes, the promotion of the NIEO in international law pitted
the Global South – conceived at the time as encompassing Latin America, Africa,
and Asia – in its search of new economic rights, against Western states (the United
States and former European empires in particular), who defended the sanctity of
contracts securing the economic rights acquired by private companies like oil
concessions.25 But its promoters did not come from just anywhere. Tracing the
genealogy of the gift exchange in the Francophone context suggests that some
interesting and under-explored intellectual continuities and discontinuities existed
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between the Algerian intellectuals behind the NIEO and the French solidarists who
wrote about international economic relations in the 1930s. Indeed, the intellectual
and diplomatic movement in favor of the NIEO has taken to heart the questions that
prior generations of socialist policymakers interested in the legal, social, economic,
and political underpinnings of colonization and globalization had started to answer
in the 1930s, and even before, when they questioned the limits that should be placed
on the rights of concessionary companies. But they answered those questions
differently, as they drew upon different resources, and spoke from very different
positions within the French field of power, at least before 1962.
By focusing on the Francophone context, placed in a global perspective, this
chapter prolongs and deepens previous genealogical analyses of the NIEO.26 In so
doing, this chapter operates two intellectual shifts with respect to the current
historiography that has been elaborated on the NIEO by historians of ideas, like
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Gilbert Rist, Georges Abi-Saab, Matthew Craven, or
Sundhya Pahuja.27 First, in contrast to previous histories, which are not grounded
on sociological analyses of the fields in which the key ideas NIEO concepts were
elaborated, this chapter explores the transformations in the Francophone postcolo-
nial context in general, and in the complex relation that existed between French
metropolitan and colonial fields of power around the time of Algeria’s
independence. Second, this chapter operates a geographical shift, as it moves the
genealogy of theNIEO from the study of the development discourse produced in the
Anglophone and US-centered context (mostly in the disciplines of economics and
law)28 to the analysis of continuities between discourses on colonial and postcolonial
solidarity produced in the French field of international law. Therein lies its
originality.
To these two shifts, I would add a third, epistemological, repositioning. Indeed,
these first two moves require that a French-trained sociolegal anthropologist like
myself sit at a different distance from, and with a different attitude toward, the
discussed material: no longer from a position of externality, and with a critical tone,
but, rather, from a position of reflexivity, nourished by the recognition that my own
academic ideas and political heuristics derive in large part from the very same source
as the material presently under study. If certain of my predecessors (even at the
Graduate Institute, like eminent “post-development” theorist Gilbert Rist), could
judge from far above the blinding reductions of the US developmental discourse,
and its translation into some of the NIEO doctrines,29 I shall be much less critical of
the dead ends in which the NIEO found itself cornered, as these aporias are in fact
similar to those that, in turn, afflicted the sociolegal discourse on international law
produced in the wake of the NIEO’s demise.
To achieve such “reflexivity” and to understand the genesis of the ideas of the
NIEO and their emergence in the French field of international law, this chapter
proposes first to quickly expand on the field analysis already provided in Chapter 2,
in which I described the objective logics of the French metropolitan and colonial
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legal fields in the 1950s, at a time of deep intergenerational change. Then, the
chapter analyzes the discursive continuity between the solidarist understanding of
the notion of gift exchange and key NIEO concepts. Some continuity seems evident:
like solidarists, Mohammed Bedjaoui, for instance, articulated a scathing criticism
of economic liberalism, which he associated with the egoistic tendencies of homo
economicus, and against which he counterposed the value of “solidarity.”30 But I also
explain how the writings of Bedjaoui about the debt obligations of successor states
evolved throughout the 1970s, and how they departed from the solidarist doctrine.
By surveying the work of the NIEO thinkers at the United Nations, both in the
General Assembly and the ILC, this chapter thus shares Sundhya Pahuja’s twofold
objective to “show that international law [produced in the postwar era] has both an
imperial and anti-imperial dimension and to understand what kind of strategies that
engage with law are likely to ‘decolonize’ international law rather than enhance its
imperial quality.”31
1 ANTI-COLONIAL CAUSE LAWYERING IN THE FRENCH
METROPOLITAN AND COLONIAL FIELDS OF LAW
To understand how the model of gift exchange became associated with the defense
of decolonization as the use of such a notion traveled from anthropology to inter-
national law – precisely when eminent anthropologists of gift exchanges continued
to side for an integrated French Algeria –, it is important to explore in further detail
the main political divisions found in the French field of law before Algeria won its
independence.
The postwar period was marked by the rise of an anti-colonial disposition among
international law scholars, which was correlated with the emergence of a more
realist and interdisciplinary approach to international law, particularly in the emer-
gent law schools that attracted new talents outside Paris.32 For the dean of the
Grenoble Law School, Claude-Albert Colliard and other international law scholars
of his generation, like Suzanne Bastid-Basdevant (1906–95) – Jules Basdevant’s
daughter, the first woman to become a professor of law at the University of Paris in
1946 (like her father), and the president of the UN Administrative Tribunal from the
1950s to the mid 1970s, who sat on Bedjaoui’s doctoral dissertation defense – the
lawful actors of international society were indeed states and international organiza-
tions; and once statehood was formally recognized de facto and de jure, then, no
hierarchy existed between states based on their cultural or civilizational differences.
In the postwar context, Algerian students who came to study in themetropolis, like
the young Bedjaoui in Grenoble, could thus get a classical training in constitutional
law, administrative law, and international law, and publicly hold anti-colonial
positions without suffering any negative consequences from their professors.
Bedjaoui’s dissertation on the duties, privileges, and guarantees of independence
found in international secretariats (with particular emphasis on the League of
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Nations, UNESCO, and the ILO)33 followed the realist and formalist approach to
administrative international law, which Colliard had developed in his manual
International Institutions,34 and Bastid-Basdevant in her own work on administrative
agencies in the League of Nations.35 None of them defended colonialist positions:
quite the contrary, their realist perspective, which focused on the administrative
organization of the state and international organizations encouraged them to view
all states that had achieved a certain degree of administrative rationalization and
political organization through the organization of parties as equal.36
In contrast to Maussian ethnologists, who had drawn from Mauss the idea that
societies could be ranked according to their degree of integration, these interna-
tional law scholars were blind to the cultural context in which the states operated.
The formalist training in international law a student like Mohammed Bedjaoui
received may explain why he never paid any attention to the local customs that
were so central to the writings of legal pluralists inspired by Maussian principles. At
the same time, as a PhD student in Grenoble, Bedjaoui could organize many anti-
colonial meetings with student associations from Algeria and other overseas terri-
tories, and political leaders like, for instance the leader of the Tunisian indepen-
dence movement, Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000), a Tunisian lawyer trained in Paris
who was elected Tunisia’s first prime minister in 1956 (and then president one year
later), after thirty years of anti-colonial fight for his country’s independence.37 With
his professor Georges Lavau (1918–90), a native of Guadeloupe who taught classes
on constitutional law and political sociology at the Law School of the University of
Grenoble, Bedjaoui also organized meetings with radical left parties, like Michel
Rocard’s (1930–2016) Parti socialiste unifié, in favor of the independence of the
French colonies.38 As Bedjaoui concluded, “we, Algerians, were much better treated
in France than Algerians in Algeria: whereas the most minimal expression of pro-
independence feeling could cost an Algerian his life in Algeria, we benefited from
a great freedom of expression in metropolitan France, in Grenoble, where we
organized all these student meetings against colonialism.”39
In Grenoble, Bedjaoui could dream of upward mobility and benefit from the
solidarity between Algerian students, their law professors, and leaders of the anti-
colonial struggle. For instance, in 1951, Bedjaoui first took the test to enter the École
Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the elite metropolitan school created after the
war by Michel Debré to form France’s high administration – which he failed
because of a bad grade in Arabic, despite having the best grade in the test on general
culture, an irony that illustrates the pedagogical and political priorities of French
teachers in the Algerian colonial context in which Bedjaoui had been schooled.
Ferhat Abbas, an Algerian politician who later joined the FLN, and whom Bedjaoui
had met once in Tlemcen, was the one who originally advised Bedjaoui to enter the
ENA.40 As Abbas had made it clear to Bedjaoui, it was important that talented
Algerian students get a proper training in administrative law at the ENA to take on
responsibilities in a future independent Algerian Republic. Bedjaoui fully trusted
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Abbas, as Ferhat Abbas and Ahmed Francis had become famous in 1943 for publish-
ing the Manifesto of the Algerian People in which they and twenty-seven other
Algerians demanded the formation of a Constituent Assembly in charge of writing
a constitution for an independent Algeria. After spending a year in jail after
the May 1945 demonstrations in Algeria that were bloodily repressed by the French
colonists,41 Abbas and Francis were both elected to the Algerian Assembly in 1948
and together they created the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (Union
démocratique dumanifeste algérien, UDMA), which defended an anti-colonial line
close to that defended by Bedjaoui and his law professors.
International law professors from Sciences-Po and from the Law School of the
University of Grenoble not only helped create an academic environment where
young anti-colonial students couldmilitate, but also helped themwhen they ran into
trouble with the law, or when they suffered undue discrimination. For instance, in
1952, when Bedjaoui tried to pass the ENA exam for the second time, he was denied
the right to take the test: specifically, he was sanctioned for having organized pro-
independence conferences during his summers in Tlemcen, the city where he had
been raised by his mother and maternal uncle after the early death of his father, and
where he had taken his pre-university education.42The story did not end there, as the
ENA authorities also barred a communist from taking the exam: Yves Barel, who was
the son of a well-respected French communist parliamentarian. This was enough for
the SFIO journals, as well as L’Humanité, the journal that Mauss had helped found
but which had been under the control of the Communist party since 1920, to turn
the political discrimination into a public scandal, which, while not as polarizing as
the Dreyfus affair, was denounced in Parliament. In this context, it was Bedjaoui’s
professor Georges Lavau who wrote Bedjaoui’s legal defense pro bono andmobilized
his lawyer friends who submitted the case before the Conseil d’Etat, which ended up
affirming the right of public servants to hold public opinions (including communist
and anti-colonialist ones) in the famous “Barel, Bedjaoui and others” case of
May 1954.43 At that point, Bedjaoui could thus have continued with a career in
the high civil administration in the Frenchmetropolis, despite holding anti-colonial
opinions.
But in 1956, the FLN adopted a new strategy in relation to the Algerian students
who evolved in the metropolitan academic field, which affected their career prospects
as well as the anti-colonial solidarities between students and professors: as the FLN
called for a student strike during the annual exams, it forced Algerian university
students studying in the metropolis to lose one year of studies (and sometimes end
their studies there), or demonstrate lack of loyalty to the Algerian cause. This strategic
shift reflected the new diagnosis about the necessity to show a stronger oppositional
front, which was decided by the FLN leadership, whose composition had been
enlarged to include the leaders of the UDMA, like Francis and Abbas, who had
decided to dissolve their own party and join the FLN after reaching Cairo in
April 1956.44 The radicalization of the FLN’s strategy forced many young students
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to become involved more deeply and directly in the fight for Algeria’s independence.
Bedjaoui no longer considered a career as a French legal scholar or high civil servant.
Instead, in March 1956, he tried to reach out to Ahmed Francis, Ferhat Abbas, and to
the FLN’s representatives in Paris – Salah Louanchi (1923–90) and Bélaı̈d Abdessalam
(1928–), who would later become Houari Boumédiène’s powerful minister of energy
from 1965 to 1977, and Algeria’s prime minister in the early 1990s – asking them if they
had any use for a doctor in law, something they had not yet considered at that time.45
In January 1957, as Bedjaoui had not yet heard from the FLN leadership, he
joined the General Union of Algerian Muslim Students (Union Générale des
Etudiants Musulmans Algériens, UGEMA), created in 1955, which sent him to
the UN special session on Algeria in New York, where he delivered to the UN
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1905–61), the UGEMA’s declaration of
support to the FLN – in which the UGEMA declared the FLN to be the only
competent and representative authority in Algeria. The main goal of the UGEMA
was to prove, against Soustelle’s argument at the time, that there was an Algerian
nation, and that its political consciousness was expressed through the voice of the
FLN. In front of him, Bedjaoui faced the French government, which paraded some
notable Algerian Muslim nationals, like a handful of presidents of local bar associa-
tions in Algeria, who praised the “generosity” of the French government in Algeria
and its “non-colonial” character – some of whom were later assassinated by the FLN
for having done so46 – and who denied that the Algerian nation, if it existed, had
pledged allegiance to the FLN.
The divorce between the few Algerian lawyers who had played the rules of the
colonial game in order to access the legal profession in Algeria and the metropolitan
academic international lawyer whom Bedjaoui had become could thus not have
been greater in 1957, when the “battle of Algiers” was raging on the ground and on
the diplomatic scene. Even if Bedjaoui’s anti-colonial activities were known to the
French authorities, Bedjaoui continued to spend most of his time in Grenoble
organizing events against the French presence in Algeria. In March 1957, for
instance, when Jacques Soustelle visited the University of Grenoble to present his
views on the necessity to further integrate Algeria in the French Republic, Bedjaoui
publicly criticized the former governor-general in Algeria for failing to engage in
a debate with the students, and he was sued in court for threatening the “security of
the state.”47 Once, again, being a trained lawyer helped him find the means to
defend himself, as it was his former professor of criminal law, François Givord, who
wrote his (successful) defense and kept him out of French jails.48
2 THE IRONY OF HISTORY: NEUTRALIZING AND RECLAIMING THE
JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM FOR ALGERIA’S INDEPENDENCE
In 1958, after a year spent publicly combating Soustelle, Mollet and their postcolo-
nial ambitions for an integrated French Algeria, Bedjaoui was finally recruited as
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a jurisconsult by the GPRA, newly created in September 1958, with Ferhat Abbas as
its first president. Among other things, Ahmed Francis, named Minister of
Economic and Financial Affairs in the GPRA, tasked him with actively seeking
international legal recognition for the Algerian government in exile. This was the
most pressing issue for the Algerian leadership as de Gaulle’s return to power
in May 1958 and the organization of a referendum on the Constitution of the
Fifth Republic in both the French metropolis and Algeria raised a clear danger for
the Algerian leaders. The GPRA was created one week before the referendum, and
the massive vote in favor of the French Constitution of 1958 was interpreted in
Algeria as a demonstration of allegiance to a French Algeria. Indeed, the vote was all
the more dangerous for the FLN and the GPRA in that Muslim voters had been
included in the consultation: thus, for Soustelle, French Muslims who had partici-
pated in the vote, and who had answered positively to the question asked, had
rejected the GPRA’s claims to national representation one week after its
creation.49 Bedjaoui’s first task as jurisconsult for the GPRA was therefore to help
the Algerian government regain its credibility outside Algeria, by convincing foreign
chancelleries that the Algerian territories under FLN control were in fact under the
civilian authority of a government in exile, which claimed international legal
sovereignty.
Drawing from the legal capital he had accumulated in the French metropolitan
field of law – and from the research resources offered by the UN library in Geneva,
where he had spent long hours working on his dissertation – Bedjaoui started writing
a book, titled La Révolution algérienne et le droit, in which he justified Algeria’s
claims to independence on international legal principles. The book was published
in 1961 by the Association Internationale des Juristes Démocrates (AIJD) – an
international association located in Brussels that published essays by lawyers close
to the Communist party and the Soviet Union – thanks to the mediation of Pierre
Cot (1895–1977), a native of Grenoble, a doctor in law from that same university
fromwhich Bedjaoui graduated thirty-six years after him, and who hadmet Bedjaoui
at Sciences-Po Grenoble where Cot had delivered a lecture titled “Political Parties
and the State.” Cot had held various Cabinet positions in the interwar period in
various left-wing coalitions (including as Blum’s Minister of Air, where he sold
airplanes to the Spanish Republicans during the civil war), after which he partici-
pated in the Resistance from Washington and Algiers, and later represented the
departments of Savoie and then Rhone at the French Parliament in the postwar
era.50 It was Cot who, as the President of AIJD, agreed to publish and write the
preface for Bedjaoui’s 1961 book, as well as to brief the GPRA and Francis’s team in
Geneva when the negotiation with de Gaulle’s government started.51
With his book, Bedjaoui demonstrated that the GPRA qualified for international
recognition as the de jure government of Algeria,52 despite the opposition of
Soustelle. Not only had the GPRA already been granted de facto international
recognition by an expanding list of states in the communist bloc and non-aligned
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countries, but, for Bedjaoui, it qualified for de jure recognition as it had the formal
structures of a state, effective control over large portions of a territory, and it behaved,
as far as the conduct of the war was concerned, like a modern state adhering to the
Geneva Conventions – a claim that was largely overstated, considering the exactions
against Algerian civilians that the FLN committed. As Bedjaoui wrote, he could
have chosen to ground the Algerian claims for independence and economic auton-
omy on the “new law of decolonization” emerging in the principle of “equal rights
and self-determination of peoples” in the UN Charter (article 55) or in Resolution
1514 passed by the UNGA in 1960, which proclaimed the need to end colonialism
“with no pre-condition.”53 Instead, he showed how the GPRA respected interna-
tional public law while the French government violated these same commitments,
by conducting torture on a systematic and massive scale.
To accomplish his demonstration that the GPRA deserved the formal recognition
of statehood, Bedjaoui referenced only classical notions of statehood found in
European international public law. He thus hoped to convince American states
(the United States, for instance) as well as the French officials from theQuai d’Orsay
with whom the GPRA had started to engage in negotiations, to recognize the legality
of Algeria’s claim to independence and self-governance by translating these
demands into their language.54 For instance, he offered a scholarly review of the
legal instruments from which France had (wrongfully) concluded that Algerian
sovereignty had been extinguished (and replaced by France’s sovereignty) with the
1830 conquest.55 He demonstrated how, in view of the four criteria used in interna-
tional public law to prove such transfer of sovereignty (the end of a public authority,
independent from any other state, and recognized by a group of people, with
effective management over a territory), the Algerian state had never been extin-
guished despite the French occupation of some of the Algerian territory since
Charles X’s conquest.56 Neither were the Algerian state structures extinguished,
nor was the Algerian nationality suppressed at the time of the conquest: it was only in
1865 that the Algerian nationality was unilaterally suppressed by an act of the
Senatus-Consulte, which unilaterally declared the Muslim indigenous to be
French – but without any real effect on Algerians’ disposition toward acquiring
French nationality.57
Through Bedjaoui’s book, the GPRA’s defense of Algeria’s independence thus
shared the same goal as those of Aron and Bourdieu, even though each of them (a
legal scholar, a political scientist, and a sociologist, respectively) used very different
disciplinary tools, further consolidating the split between ethnology and interna-
tional public law. Since 1957, Aron had argued that the changing political economy
of Western Europe required that the French Republic let go of its less developed
colonies to accentuate commercial and financial integration with the leading
Western power, the United States.58 In 1960 and 1961, Aron’s teaching assistant,
Pierre Bourdieu, denied that Soustelle’s plan of massive French investments in
Algeria could solidify a postcolonial Franco-Algerian Republic and that Mauss’s
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model of gift exchange had any validity in the realm of modern international
relations.59 Bedjaoui’s anti-colonial charge thus ran parallel, but used a very differ-
ent language, as he argued that the new Algerian government in exile, whose
constitutional structure was well thought out, behaved just as classical public
international law required, even before being granted independence. Algerians
had demonstrated that they deserved independence not because their legal system
(customary rule of law) was different and irreconcilable withmodern public law, but
precisely because Algeria’s behavior as a state represented by the GPRA was in total
conformity with classical notions found in the jus publicum europeaum, against the
belief of ethnologists and colonialists who had long professed that the Algerian
nation was incapable of forming and adhering to the formal structures of
a classical nation-state.
When he analyzed the distribution of powers between the Algerian executive and
legislative branches and how the two were articulated within and around the FLN as
the single political party, Bedjaoui worked as if he were still a student writing an
essay in a constitutional law class of Georges Lavau.60 But when he articulated his
arguments in the context of multilateral UNGA discussion, he gave them
a performative effect that revealed the power of international and constitutional
legal knowledge as a force for progress and decolonization: the mere fact that an
Algerian legal scholar, speaking on behalf of the UGEMA, claimed that the Algerian
deep state represented by the FLN, and its government, the GPRA, obeyed the very
classical rules of statehood that had been used by colonial international law scholars
in the interwar period to deny Algerians the right to statehood, was a very effective
way to neutralize the French arguments in favor of France’s continued tutelage.
Still, some of Bedjaoui’s early critics deemed it an irony of history that Algerian
diplomats like Bedjaoui referred only to (European) international public law, or to
French law (in order to justify why the Sahara should be considered an integral part
of Algeria, for instance), when at the same time, they recognized that the jus
publicum europeaum and French administrative law had long been the main legal
sources of exploitation of the colonial subjects. Remarking on the absence of any
reference to precolonial Muslim law in Bedjaoui’s writings, and the plurality of
sources of law in any colonial society, some political sociologists who mixed
Weberian studies with ethnological studies of local societies reviewed his book
critically.61
Postcolonial theorists inspired by Franz Fanon and Albert Memmi may find in
this paradox the classical position of the colonized subject vis-à-vis the knowledge of
the colonizer: the former comes to read his own experience of a divided self through
the eye of the colonizer, for whom no knowledge coming from the colony is
legitimate.62 But prior training and intellectual trajectory, shaped by the evolutions
in the French academic field of in the 1950s, and the split between the metropolitan
and colonial fields, can also account for this paradox.63 Indeed, as the metropolitan
field of law, where no classes were offered on Muslim or Kabylian law, was the only
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place where a young Algerian of Muslim descent could study international law in
relative freedom, it was natural that Bedjaoui would mostly justify Algerian inde-
pendence in reference to key concepts of European international public law.
Furthermore, the mobilization of such knowledge by Algerian diplomats achieved
essential practical goals: to neutralize international law, and even turn it against the
imperialistic designs that it had long helped achieve in the interwar era.
More broadly, the neutralization of international law by anti-colonial legal
scholars who used the legal categories once used against them to their own advan-
tage was the preferred discursive strategy of the non-aligned movement. Until the
mid 1960s, the agenda of the Non-Aligned Movement gradually taking shape since
the Bandung Conference, and the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization, had
not yet moved beyond classical notions of international public law when it defended
the political independence of new nations from Africa and Asia.64 At Bandung, the
leaders of the non-aligned world had asked for political rights according to a classical
and universal conception of international law, as found for instance in the UN
Charter: new nations demanded the respect for fundamental human rights, the
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, the recognition of
the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, the settlement of all
international disputes by peaceful means, etc.65 They wanted a place at the table,
rather than to rock the table. Likewise, Bedjaoui managed to register the FLN as
a member to the four Geneva Conventions in 1960 – a legal success that was never
matched by any other decolonizing movement.66 In so doing, he helped the GPRA
assert its authority through international de facto recognition; this, in turn, helped de
Gaulle consider the GPRA as the only negotiating partner as he moved toward
a realist policy of first, autonomization and, second, acceptance of Algerian
independence.
3 THE EVIAN AGREEMENTS AND THE QUESTION OF ACQUIRED
RIGHTS: A TEMPORARY DEFEAT FOR ALGERIAN NATIONALISTS?
Until themid 1960s, and the creation of amultilateral arena in theUN architecture –
with the establishment of the UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which was created in 1964 under the impetus of Latin American
heterodox neo-Marxist economist Raúl Prébish (1901–86), who theorized the notion
of “dependence” through trade specialization – the non-aligned nations that would
create the Group of 77 in 1964 had not yet formed a consensus on the best way to
prolong political independence with economic independence. Nor had the officials
of the GPRA argued for the reform of international economic relations when they
tried to obtain the de jure and de facto recognition of Algeria’s independence from
foreign powers.
Discussions of the economic rights of the future Algerian nation, which con-
cerned the rights of the concessions, the protection of privately acquired rights in
Decolonizing The Gift 171
Algeria and the recognition of Algeria’s sovereign debt, were only discussed in the
highly secret context of bilateral talks between the French government and the
GPRA. It was in this context that Bedjaoui turned his attention away from classical
administrative and international public law – topics he addressed in his 1961 book –
to more immediate questions related to the economic and financial obligations of
successor states.
In 1958, Bedjaoui had found in Ahmed Francis a powerful political mentor who
could put the young law doctor’s vast erudition, sharp analytical mind, and hard-to-
match work ethic to good practical use. The experiencedMinister of Economic and
Financial Affairs of the GPRA overshadowed other political figures who worked
from Geneva, Cairo, and Tunis to advance the cause of a free and independent
Algeria. Even before his nomination as minister, in the spring of 1958, Francis sent
Bedjaoui to Morocco and Tunisia on a first mission to inquire about the positions of
nationalist leaders in exile: on the Constantine Plan launched by Soustelle, then
Minister of Atomic Energy and the Sahara; on the future of nationality and migra-
tion requirements in a post-independence Algeria; and on many other economic
topics that the future negotiation of the Evian Agreements would later explore.67
Then, Francis asked Bedjaoui to settle in Geneva and help him plan future
negotiations between the Algerian revolutionaries and the French government, as
he was sure that such a moment would arrive eventually.68 For Bedjaoui, the
connection to Ahmed Francis became a key marker of his path to a political career
first as jurisconsult, and then as minister in an independent Algeria – even more so
that, in 1962, Bedjaoui married the adopted daughter of Ahmed Francis, who was in
fact the natural daughter of Abdel Khader Francis and thus Ahmed’s niece.69
The bilateral negotiations between the GPRA and the French government started
after Soustelle was replaced as minister in charge of Algerian affairs by Louis Joxe
(1901–91), a career diplomat who had spent the SecondWorld War in Algiers. At the
beginning of the negotiations, it appeared clear to both delegations that one of the
main obstacles on the road toward Algerian independence was the issue of Algeria’s
claim of sovereignty over the Sahara and its oil resources, and the challenge that
such claims mounted against the acquired rights of French oil concessions.
The French government’s emissaries initially argued that independence would be
granted to the northern departments of Algeria but not to the Sahara, which was
considered French according to the theory of terra nullius, which had been pro-
moted, among others, by Soustelle, as Minister of the Sahara until 1960.70 If the
French government kept a military stronghold in the Sahara, it hoped that it could
reassure the one million pieds noirs in Algeria and make sure that their rights would
be guaranteed by the independent Algerian Republic. Furthermore, in May 1961,
during the first meeting between the two delegations in Evian, the French argued
that France had spent 512 billion francs for oil extraction in the Sahara and 60 billion
for roads and telecommunications, and therefore the Oil Code could not be
reformed unilaterally by the future Algerian state. Instead, a future independent
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Algeria should guarantee the “acquired rights” that such lavish spending had
secured for France, and recognize the continued sovereignty of the French
Republic over the Sahara.
In contrast, in May 1961, the Algerian delegation not only insisted that the Sahara
would fall under Algerian sovereignty, but it also envisioned a reform of the
“acquired rights”: those rights acquired by the French population of European
descent on Algerian lands, which were threatened by the GPRA’s willingness to
reform land ownership and property rights, but also the rights of research and
exploitation granted by the French state to its national oil company in the
Sahara.71 The Algerian delegation wanted to reform the Oil Code of 1958 in order
to decrease the price of oil for internal consumption, and renegotiate contracts of
exploitation and research – claims that de Gaulle’s emissaries did not want to hear.
The two delegations fiercely argued over the matter of “acquired rights,” especially
in the meetings of Lugrin (in July 1961), until a compromise was eventually intro-
duced by Louis Joxe’s aide, Yves Roland-Billecart (1936–): provided that the Algerian
people voted in favor of independence, France agreed to recognize the Sahara and
its oil fields as part of Algeria, and in exchange, an independent Algeria would
guarantee the acquired rights that France had obtained for the exploitation of
700,000 square kilometers in the Sahara, and a joint organization controlled by
the Algerians and the French would take over all matters relating to technical
cooperation in the oil sector, according to the post-independence model of post-
colonial cooperation that de Gaulle wanted to extend to all of France’s former
colonies.72
The negotiation took more time as a further complication emerged: when
Algeria’s neighbors Morocco and Tunisia, both claimed a right to oil extraction in
the Sahara – claims that meant that territorial boundaries might need to be redrawn
through regional negotiations after the end of the war.73 Security concerns were
added to this economic negotiation when Tunisia staked a claim on the prized
territory. Indeed, after the secret negotiations of Lugrin in July 1961, the negotiation
was put on hold for a few months to quash the anger of President Bourguiba of
Tunisia, who had not been informed by the French or the Algerian government of
the ongoing negotiation, and who was furious that neither had consulted him on the
question of the Algeria–Tunisia borders in the Sahara. Bourguiba made it known to
President de Gaulle that Tunisia wanted its share of the Sahara’s subterranean
resources,74 and after de Gaulle snubbed him, the Tunisian leader mounted
a military operation against Fort Saint in the Sahara, close to the border between
Tunisia and Algeria and still occupied by French forces, which ended in a bloodbath
after the French opened fire to defend themselves. The Algerian diplomats refused
to start negotiations anew to appease the Tunisian leader, but they did not change
their position on the question of the Sahara.75 Neither did the French diplomats,
who did not want to compromise the French ability to play guardian of the regional
security order in the Maghreb.
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But the French projects of bilateral cooperation in the business of oil extraction,
coupled with the French government’s insistence on maintaining intact the French
laws on oil concessions after Algeria’s independence, struck at the heart of the
Algerian delegation’s claim of independence for Algeria. How could Algeria declare
itself independent if its future sovereignty was limited by French laws that preexisted
its declaration of independence? This, as the members of the Algerian delegation
argued, was the mark of a neocolonial project aimed at ensuring the prolongation of
France’s wrongly acquired rights on land expropriated at the time of colonization.76
The GPRA claimed that the Algerian people had an “imprescriptible” right to self-
determination and “permanent sovereignty over [their] natural resources,” which, as
Redha Malek, Algeria’s Minister of Information, noted, sometimes led the negotia-
tion to take an “academic turn.”77
On this issue of acquired rights, Bedjaoui presented some of the most radical (if
sometimes contradictory) arguments in favor of Algeria’s absolute (rather than
limited) sovereignty over the Sahara and its natural resources. For instance,
Bedjaoui argued on the one hand that France’s decision to include the Sahara in
French Algeria made it impossible to deny the unification of the northern and
southern parts of Algeria now: Algerian boundaries were recognized by French law,
so it was hard for the French delegation to now declare that the Sahara was not part
of Algeria. On the other hand, Bedjaoui claimed that there could be no law (in
particular, the 1958Oil Code) imposed by French occupiers over Algerian territories
that would continue to bind how an independent Algeria would use its natural
resources.78 For Bedjaoui, the philosophy of postcolonial bilateral cooperation only
relayed in the post-independence age the claims that colonial lawmakers like Albert
Sarraut had made about the sources of imperial solidarity.79 In place of the recogni-
tion of acquired rights, he wanted to guarantee only French “legitimately acquired
rights”80 in the future independent Algeria.
Ultimately, the Evian Agreements of March 1962 did not endorse Bedjaoui’s
thesis that an independent Algeria should be completely free to decide all economic
matters concerning the repartition of debts, concessions, and public properties
claimed by France and Algeria, including those that concerned the rights acquired
by the metropolitan oil companies over the former colonies’ natural resources.
The solution initially proposed by Yves Roland-Billecart eventually found its way
into the final text: the French government agreed to recognize the integrity of the
Algerian territory, which included the Sahara; in exchange, the GPRA agreed to
recognize and guarantee the validity of “acquired rights” by also mentioning expli-
citly that “no one will be deprived of its acquired rights without an indemnization
determined in advance.”81 Furthermore, France’s “independence agreements were
followed by various protocols concerning property, under which the independent
state did not succeed to the whole property appertaining to sovereignty,” meaning
that “in exchange for French cooperation, a limited transfer of property was agreed
upon,”82 and some property (military bases for instance) was ceded to the French.83
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At last, the Algerian delegation accepted to create a Franco-Algerian cooperative in
the oil sector operating in the whole Saharan desert. In exchange, they received the
promise from the French government that it would extend some “financial help . . .
in the form of either in-kind ‘prestations,’ loans, financial participation or gifts,”84 to
Algeria’s projects of public investment in the oil sector, and in Algeria’s efforts to
integrate the hundreds of thousands workers among the “regrouped populations”
back into the economy. The promoters of the philosophy of bilateral and postcolo-
nial cooperation had stroked a first victory.
The Evian Agreements thus settled the matter of economic international relations
in the post-independence age in a way that was less progressive than what the
Algerian delegation had hoped for, based on other contemporary developments in
the international scene. In the debate over international obligations in a post-
independence Algeria, it was not so much the legitimacy of nationalizations of
either land ownership or concessions that distinguished the interwar solidarists, or
the Gaullist advocates of bilateral cooperation, from the thinkers from the Global
South, but the question of how to deal with debts associated with the nationalization
of concessionary companies or other forms of acquired rights. Should the latter be
reimbursed and should concessionary companies be compensated for the costs of
exploration and their investments in extraction technologies? Who would decide on
the amount of the reparation? And who would pay such indemnity: the former
metropolis or the newly independent state? As far as they were concerned, the
Gaullists were adamant that all acquired rights should be honored in the indepen-
dent Algeria, and that, should nationalization occur, the companies should be
compensated so that they could meet the debt obligations they had contracted to
develop oil extraction.
The Evian Agreements aligned with the Western dominant conception, by
repeatedly guaranteeing throughout the text that all acquired rights would be
honored in an independent Algeria. If international law had proved to exert
a powerful performative function when used by Algerian diplomats to claim political
independence in the multilateral scene, the developments of international law in
the economic field were too embryonic to compensate for the weakness of Algeria’s
position in the bilateral negotiation over economic matters. Indeed, as far as the
nationalization of oil concessions was concerned, the claim that economically weak
nation-states had a right to nationalize extractive concessionary companies was only
introduced in the international arena ten years before Algeria’s independence: in
1952, when Chile introduced a resolution at the Human Rights Commission, and
Uruguay at the UNGA, at the same time as the Iranians were discussing the decision
to nationalize the British oil trusts.85 But against the resolution proposed by Uruguay
in November 1952, which asserted the essential link between “complete indepen-
dence” and “the right of each country to nationalize and freely exploit its natural
wealth,” and declared the permanent sovereignty of states over their natural
resources,86 the United States and Western European states had claimed that the
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right for nation-states to decide nationalizations when vital necessities were at stake
did not erase their obligations to disburse “prompt, adequate and effective compen-
sation” to the aggrieved private parties,87 especially if the latter were foreign multi-
nationals. This lesson was not forgotten by the Algerian delegation, which decided to
mount a formidable diplomatic fight to change the international economic law of
decolonization.
4 THE QUESTION OF COLONIAL DEBTS IN THE ILC
In the context of Algeria’s independence, and, more broadly, the expansion of the
number of newly independent states represented in the UNGA, the UNGA passed
Resolution 1686 in December 1961 to put the ILC in charge of exploring the legal
issues associated with the economic problems affecting newly independent nations.
To study the topic of the succession of states and governments in view of the
phenomenon of decolonization, the ILC formed a subcommittee in 1962, which
divided the work into three topics: succession with respect to treaties, succession
with respect tomatters other than treaties, and succession of governments (not states)
with respect to membership in international organizations.88 The ILC had initially
nominatedManfred Lachs (1914–93), a Polish jurist, to serve as special rapporteur of
the subcommittee in charge of succession of states with respect to matters other than
treaties, but after the latter was elected to the ICJ, not much work was achieved until
the Yugoslav representative, Milan Bartos (1901–74), proposed the name of Bedjaoui
for special rapporteur. As Algeria’s Minister of Justice, and a promising scholar
previously trained in the French field of international law, Bedjaoui’s name gath-
ered the support of the representatives of non-aligned, Western and communist
nations. Even Paul Reuter (1911–90), a specialist in French law in overseas territory,
said of Bedjaoui that, “as the French representative at the ILC, he would not be able
to vote for Bedjaoui, but that he was personally in favor of his nomination.”89
After his nomination at the ILC, Mohammed Bedjaoui wrote twelve reports –
one per year90 – in which he gradually derived principles that should guide the
establishment of more equitable international economic relations. In so doing,
Bedjaoui, and with him, the ILC tried to finally redress the situation that the
interwar legal scholar, Alexander Sack had found wanting. Indeed, Sack had
deplored the anarchic nature of state successions, which were essentially left to
be determined through political compromises,91 in the absence of “universal
rules that could be recognized by all civilized states to govern matters related
with the public credit.”92 As Sack had added, without a clear doctrine to guide
the obligations of each state in the case of decolonization, secession, or merger
of sovereignties, the “non-repartition of old debts and the sustainability of ties of
solidarity and joint responsibilities [responsabilités solidaires] between the pre-
decessor and successor states cannot be said to represent a right for the creditors,
and not an obligation for the successor states.”93
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To remediate this situation, Sack had surveyed many treaties and conventions in
which the question of repartition of public and private debts and assets between
predecessor and successor was addressed, at a time when the Allied victors had just
dismantled the three long-lasting empires: the German Second Reich (with the
Versailles Treaty, 1919), the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Treaties of Saint-Germain
and Trianon, 1920), and the Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Lausanne, 1923). But he
had conducted the effort of codification with no mandate from any international
organization (like the League of Nations) and from a purely academic perspective,
and his theory of when, how, and why debts should be cancelled and acquired rights
ignored, was far from well respected, when it was known at all.
As far as Bedjaoui and other members of the ILC from the non-aligned world were
concerned – and in contrast to theWestern jurists in the ILC, in particular, Stephen
Schwebel (1929–), from the United States94 – the work of ILC was also supposed to
neutralize the power of international economic law, which, so far, had been
eminently conservative, to the extent that it had been based on the recognition of
acquired rights of former powers, except in exceptional circumstances. Indeed, the
“folk legal theory”95 that Sack had identified in the texts that the Allied powers had
imposed on Germany and its wartime allies, and that he rationalized, was that those
inherited debts should be “odious” (and thus cancelled) when three conditions were
found: lack of consent of the people when the debt was contracted in the first place,
lack of benefit for the people, and creditor awareness of the two first conditions
(although the latter condition, which concerned the lenders’ responsibility) was not
always required.96
For instance, the Versailles Treaty had assumed that “the colonies should not bear
any portion of the German debt, nor remain under any obligation to refund to
Germany the expenses incurred by the Imperial administration of the protectorate,”
especially if the debt incurred had been contracted for the “purpose of enslaving
indigenous populations or for the purpose of helping its own nationals colonize the
lands.”97 In fact, Sack had added “it would have been unjust to burden the natives
with expenditure which appears to have been incurred in Germany’s own interest,
and that it have would been no less unjust to make this responsibility rest upon the
Mandatory Powers which, in so far as they may be appointed trustees by the League
of Nations, will derive no benefit from such trusteeship.”98 In the interwar settle-
ment, this folk theory found its legal concretization in article 254 of the Versailles
Treaty, which left to the Reparations Commission the duty to measure the amount
of debt that the German and Prussian governments had contracted to help German
nationals colonize Polish lands, and to decide under which conditions colonial
debts had been contracted, before declaring some of them odious or not. Still, for
Sack, the Reparations Commission should not have cancelled the Polish debts to the
Germans: before the Great War, the Germans had bought the lands they colonized
from Poles at a very high price, and the Germans did not fund these land purchases
with loans, but on the Prussian budget, which meant that German taxpayers had
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already paid for these purchases.99The fact the debts were cancelled was a departure
from the solidarist principles implicit in Sack’s doctrine of “odious debt,” which
were held dear to the French-speaking international law scholars, most of whom,
like Mauss himself, believed in the sanctity of contracts except when the latter
blatantly violated rules of fairness.
In fact, the African debts contracted by the German colonial governments were
also cancelled after 1919, although Sack had found that it was not clear why they
could be called “odious” according to his own doctrine: indeed, Sack believed, some
of the debts incurred in Africa by the Germans had been used for the purpose of
developing railroads and other infrastructures, and should have been placed on the
debit of the local governments that succeeded to Germany’s colonial governments.
He thus wondered why the Versailles Treaty (article 257, 1) did not create any
obligations for the German colonies in Africa and elsewhere – or for the mandate
powers designated to administer their development – to repay the debts left by the
German state and which had been used for their development, despite express
German demands to the mandate powers.
If Sack criticized the Versailles Treaty for applying criteria for sovereign debt
cancellation that was too loose, the special rapporteur of the sub-committee of the
ILC in charge of codifying the doctrine on such issues, believed the Versailles Treaty
had not gone far enough to serve as a model for the new age of decolonization.100
Revisiting the history of interwar sovereign debt controversies, Bedjaoui arrived at
a position more radical than that of Sack and Mauss, as he strongly justified the
decision made by the Bolsheviks to unilaterally cancel their sovereign debt upon
taking power.101 For Bedjaoui, the Soviet debt cancellation “gave its letters of
nobility to the notion of express agreement,” which accompanied “the progressive
elaboration of a voluntary international law,”102 with which the anti-colonial lawyers
like himself were associated. He went even further, as for him, there was no temporal
limit to the period during which a new state could exert a “right of inventory”103 and
decide which legal obligations it would keep and which it would reject. The newly
independent states did not have to cancel illegitimate debt immediately after
independence: there was no “délai de dénonciation”104 (time limit for denunciation)
in the case of decolonizing states, especially as the latter were under too much stress
to focus on canceling any debt at the time of independence.
As far as the topic of debt transmission from metropolitan states to newly inde-
pendent states was concerned, Bedjaoui’s position at the ILC was as uncompromis-
ing as it had been during the negotiation of the Evian Agreements; but this time, he
had more room to maneuver and obtain support (if not consensus) from his
colleagues. Even if Bedjaoui praised the previous work of legal scholars, and
especially that of Alexander Sack, he was clearly opposed to Sack’s attempt to limit
the applicability of the concept of “odious debt.”105 For Bedjaoui, the criteria of
intended use (for development rather than war or expropriation of natives by
colonizers) that Sack had introduced to limit the applicability of the doctrine of
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“odious debt” to the most extreme cases were not useful guides to determine which
colonial debts contracted by the metropolitan state should pass on to the newly
independent states. Bedjaoui illustrated his point with the case of Algeria: during the
seven and a half years of war between France and the FLN, the administering power
had, for political reasons, been “overgenerous in pledging Algeria’s backing for
numerous loans.”106 These debts contracted to fund the great developmental
plans, like, in the case of France and Algeria, Soustelle’s 1959 Constantine Plan,
had in fact had the effect of “seriously compromising the Algerian Treasury” after
independence,107 to the point that he wondered if such generosity had not hidden
darker intentions: that of leaving a nation almost bankrupt at the time of its birth.108
For Bedjaoui, those debts that the metropolitan states had contracted at the end of
the colonial era, even for developmental purposes, were not to be transmitted to the
newly independent states: they were thus just one example of the “poisonous gifts”109
which Mauss had written about, and which Bedjaoui suspected to have caused the
“increasingly insupportable debt problem” among newly independent states in the
1970s.110
In the ILC discussions, Bedjaoui explicitly cited Algeria as a precedent, which
showed that even debts contracted for developmental purposes by a former colonial
state could be cancelled. At Evian, the Algerian delegation had fought to include in
the Evian Agreements a proposal for France to erase the totality of the external debt
that Algerian communities had contracted toward France, in compensation for all
the profits that France presumably had made during more than a century of
occupation, and for France to inherit part of the Algerian internal debt; but to no
avail.111 As Bedjaoui wrote, the Algerian delegation to the Evian negotiation had
argued: “that the [developmental] projects had been undertaken in a particular
political and military context, in order to advance the interests of the French settlers
and of the French presence in general, and that they were part of France’s overall
economic strategy, since virtually the whole of France’s investment in Algeria had
been complementary in nature.”112 The Gaullists had imposed their will during the
negotiation of the Evian Agreements, as Algeria’s negotiating position was weak at
that time. But Bedjaoui remarked that, even though the Evian Agreements did not
plan debt cancellation, Algeria rightfully “refused to assume debts representing
loans contracted by France for the purpose of carrying out economic projects in
Algeria during the war of independence.”113 This had been the situation as far as the
law-in-the-books was concerned. But Ahmed Francis, upon his arrival as Minister of
the Economy and Finance in Algiers, discovered that the partisans of a French
Algeria who rejected the Evian Agreements (the Organisation armée secrète or
OAS) had emptied the Bank of Algeria of its gold, cash, and foreign reserves, and
had absconded with it to Spain and Latin America.114 Algeria was completely
“bankrupt,” which led Francis and Bedjaoui to go to Paris (as Algeria was still in
the “zone franc”) and obtain Treasury-to-Treasury cooperation to give Algeria some
emergency relief and agree on debt cancellation solutions.115 Then,
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in December 1966, when Algeria and France settled debt issues after three years of
negotiations, Bedjaoui underlined that “Algeria does not seem to have succeeded to
the state debts of the predecessor state bymaking the payment of 40 billion old francs
(400 million new francs)”116 to France. Rather, Algeria and France had engaged in
a broad political negotiation, in which the payment was part of a broader economic
bargain, including a commitment by France to import certain goods that Algeria
had in surplus (oil and, most importantly at the time, wine).
As Bedjaoui argued in the ILC, in principle, all of the state debts owed to the
former metropolis should thus be disregarded, and debts owed to private citizens of
the former metropolis should be left for the metropolitan state to reimburse. In other
terms, in the case of decolonization, “the general principle of non-transferability of
the debts of the administering power, to which exceptions may be allowed . . . places
the burden of proof on the predecessor state rather than on the newly independent
state.”117 This conclusion derived from the general premise that, as far as territories
(as well as public properties) and sovereign debts were concerned, the idea that
elapsed time would turn wrongs committed during conquest and occupation into
contractual rights was not grounded in international public law. Even if more than
one hundred years had passed since the occupation had started, the revolution from
which a newly independent state emerged meant that the new state was free to act as
if history had started anew, as if no contractual development occurring after the
occupation had any legal basis. In this way, Bedjaoui’s discourse on the right of
conquest fell in the tradition – beautifully analyzed by Michel Foucault – of the
English revolutionaries of the seventeenth century, who argued against Hobbes that
the law imposed by the Normans on local landlords after William the Conqueror’s
invasion (in the eleventh century) had never been legitimate.118 Closer still,
Bedjaoui cited the precedent of Poland, whose sovereignty was “resurrected”119 in
1919 and until the Russo-German invasion of 1939, after more than a century of joint
occupation by the Germans and Russians – a time lapse comparable with the
French denial of Algerian sovereignty.120
This was a contentious idea: the French jurist Maurice Flory, who wrote his
dissertation under the supervision of Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960) and Charles
Rousseau (1902–93) – himself a former student of Jules Basdevant – argued that this
legal fiction according to which the revolutions of the decolonization era would be
in fact a series of restorations was nonsensical: for Flory and other French juriscon-
sults, the legal fiction according to which the Algerian independent state could have
survived intact despite a century of absence was unfounded.121 Even ILC members
from the Third World remarked that Bedjaoui’s analysis on that matter appeared to
“deal extensively with French colonial practice” but much less with Dutch or British
colonial practice, which, to amuch larger extent than the French, had left the ability
to raise taxes or loans to dependent but still “separate administrative units that were
largely fiscally autonomous.”122 To these arguments, which contradicted the notion
that colonialism had created no obligation for newly independent states,123 Bedjaoui
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contended that, even if Algeria was a separate case, as its administration had been
integrated into the government of the metropolis, whereas most colonies had
remained somehow separate, the lessons he drew from the Algerian experience
were valid elsewhere. As he wrote, “even though these colonial debts had formally
been contracted ‘freely’ by separate administrative authorities, all colonial era debts
could be held in suspicion (until metropolitan states demonstrated otherwise), since
the loans were guaranteed by the colonial power” – whose intentions were rarely
generous, despite their rhetoric invoking purity of intention and generosity – and
since “the ‘organs of the colony’ which have contracted the loan in the name of the
territory only belong to that colony by a legal fiction: they are in reality, the
representatives of the colonial power in the territory.”124
Due to his prominent involvement in the domestic situation in Algeria, it was not
surprising if Bedjaoui drew close analogies between the specific economic claims
that Algeria had made before and after the Evian Agreements, with regard to the
issues of nationalization, cooperation, and debt cancellation, and the general
recommendations he formulated at the ILC. Still, his arguments and those of his
critics reached a higher level of generality, which still has some relevance today.
Indeed, the wrong notion that developmental projects in the colonies were paid for
by the metropolis by taxpayer money, rather than out of the budget of local colonial
administrators, and then transferred as debts on the debit of new states at the time of
their independence, continues to dominate many popular narratives about coloni-
zation, which still use the tropes of “generosity” that Soustelle and other colonial
administrators used to justify their hegemonic designs outside Europe. Today, we
still hear the notion expressed by nostalgics of the Empire in France or in the United
Kingdom that colonialism produced many good things for which colonial subjects
should be grateful, in particular, the railroads and hospitals that colonial powers had
developed initially for themselves, but which ended up in the hands of newly
independent states: in February 2005, the French Parliament went as far as making
it mandatory for French history programs at the pre-university level to “emphasize
the positive aspects of the French presence overseas, including in North Africa”125 (a
sentence that was deleted one year later). With his reports to the ILC, Bedjaoui thus
tried to crush these notions, by placing the developmental objectives that European
powers entertained outside Europe in the context of sustained warfare and
occupation.
In general, the ILC members from the non-aligned world (Algeria, Yugoslavia,
Nigeria, India) supported the conclusions of the special rapporteur: they agreed with
Bedjaoui that “even in the case of loans granted to the administering power for the
development of the dependent territory (criterion of intended use and allocation),
the colonial context in which the development of the territory may take place thanks
to these loans disqualifies the undertaking.”126They followed Bedjaoui when he said
that “in these circumstances, it would be unjust to make the newly independent state
assume the corresponding debt even if that state retained some ‘trace’ of the
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investment, in the form, for example, of public works infrastructures.”127 In so doing,
Bedjaoui and other non-aligned scholars in the ILC acknowledged that the princi-
ple of intransmissibility of state debts to newly independent states128 that they wanted
to enshrine in the future convention represented less a “codification” of established
practice – as “the practice of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa is far
from uniform” – than a new principle of international public law which conformed
with the general principles of the NIEO.129
Methodologically, this conclusion meant to break with accepted principles
recognized by professional international law scholars. From the start, Bedjaoui
argued that codifying obsolete rules or devolution agreements that had been largely
imposed by former metropolises – as had been the case with the Evian Agreements –
would have been completely useless, or even counter-productive: diplomatic
arrangements found in decolonization cases “had to be interpreted with caution,
since some of them had been imposed by metropolitan states on new and weak states
and might lead the Committee astray if taken as typical examples” to form
a customary law.130 Even if Bedjaoui acknowledged that it was not the job of the
ILC to “create new law under the guise of progressive development,”131 it was also its
duty to analyze emerging “norms known and accepted by most [newly independent]
states to a greater extent than traditional law, in whose formulation most existing
states [which had come into being through decolonization wars] took no part.” For
instance, Bedjaoui noticed that the term “succession,”132 as in the “law of state
succession” which the ILC was in charge of codifying, was not neutral, but inher-
ently conservative: the law of state succession was based on the “as if”133 assumption
that private law could be extended to public law matters, and that sovereigns had
limited powers to change the order of private property; and that, if they did, they
should proceed diligently to compensate private victims of property changes with
fair indemnities.134 To Bedjaoui, such limits placed on the sovereignty of newly
independent states by international law prolonged the colonialist conception of
limited sovereignty expressed in the interwar period by the Versailles, Lausanne, and
Trianon treaties.135 Thus, international law scholars had to switch methodologies, if
they didn’t want to remain captive to the colonial biases of their discipline.
Instead of codification, Bedjaoui thus engaged the ILC in an effort of “progressive
development” of international law by basing his work “on legal constructions
embodying to the maximum extent possible the present trends of international
law, the principles of the Charter, the right to self-determination, sovereign equality,
ownership of natural resources, etc.”136 In contrast to what he did for his 1961 book on
Algeria and international law, which used the language of classical European
international law to claim a place at the table for Algeria, without changing the
doctrine, Bedjaoui claimed that with the age of political independences now almost
over, now had come the time to change legal doctrines, and to evaluate all prior
treaties and agreements by examining whether they represented new “progressive
developments” in the emerging law of decolonization.137 Otherwise, international
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law in general, and the work of the ILC in particular, would remain intrinsically
conservative and colonialist in spirit. Apart from some isolated voices, like that of
Shabtai Rosenne, a legal scholar from Israel who had initially “favored the formula-
tion of general principles,” the ILC members thus decided to prepare “terse and
brief articles of the type usually included in a convention,”138 in order to flesh out
which rights would fall to the economic North and South.
5 RISING DEMANDS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER IN THE CONTEXT OF OIL NATIONALIZATIONS
At the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian diplomats at the UNGA and the ILC
pursued a similar objective, which consisted in redistributing national debts and
assets between North and South in a broad and comprehensive manner. To do so,
they used different means: whereas the former tried to engage the North in
a political negotiation, the latter tried to obtain from the North the recognition of
a new legal doctrine, enshrined in a convention – although Bedjaoui still refrained
from explicitly calling it a doctrine of “odious debt,” not wanting to shock his
Western legal colleagues.139 Both opposed the attempts by French Gaullists to
organize a series of gift exchanges between North and South on a bilateral basis,
as they wanted to unite the South first, before engaging in global negotiations with
the North.
The Algerian diplomatic offensive started in October 1967, a few months after
Bedjaoui issued his first report to the ILC, when Algeria hosted an important
conference in Algiers, where non-aligned nations issued the Charter of Algiers, by
which they stressed the necessity of increasing the prices of raw materials through
revised trade conventions.140 Among many other actions aimed at rebalancing the
financial situation between the Global North and South, the conference of heads of
state and government of the non-aligned countries which took place
in September 1973 in Algiers was a key landmark during which the leaders of the
Global South concluded with a call to the UN General Assembly to agree upon
a program of action for the establishment of the NIEO, which recommended “debt
renegotiation on a case-by-case basis with a view to concluding agreements on debt
cancellation, moratorium, rescheduling or interest subsidization” (section II, article
2.g), starting with the “the least developed, land-locked and island developing
countries and to the countries most seriously affected by economic crises and natural
calamities” (section II, article 2.i).141 As President Houari Boumédiène said at the
conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers in 1973, the newly independent
countries were suffocated by the debt they inherited from the colonial past and the
low prices of raw materials such as oil, which made their economic models unsus-
tainable. Bedjaoui had similar claims: citing the Pearson Commission on
International Development, Bedjaoui underlined that “debt service alone, namely
annual amortization and interest payments, would exceed the total amount of new
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loans by 20 percent in Africa and by 30 percent in Latin America,”142 which meant
that the level of state indebtedness inherited by newly independent states from
metropolitan states left them crippled at birth.
As Nicole Grimaud writes, in the early 1970s, the Algerian oil diplomats became
not only the main defenders of the idea of debt cancellation for newly independent
nations, but also “the champions of the thesis of national sovereignty over natural
resources” on the world scene, which allowed the newly independent states to
nationalize oil concessions without inheriting the debts that such concessions had
contracted in the past to develop their activities.143 In particular, the UNGA Plenary
Committee affirmed the “permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural
resources and all economic activities.”144 The Plenary Committee, which was
charged by the UNGA to formalize concrete actions for the NIEO, planned to
integrate debt cancellation and debt renegotiation into the broader framework of
North–South negotiations for a:
just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials [oil in particu-
lar], primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported
by developing countries and the prices of rawmaterials, primary commodities, food,
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods and capital equipment imported by
them, and to work for a link between the prices of exports of developing countries
and the prices of their imports from developed countries.145 (section 1, article 1.d)
This Algerian diplomatic offensive, even if it didn’t always go as far as the NIEO
promoters wished, strengthened the latter’s position. In particular, the UNGA
Plenary Committee’s affirmation of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
echoed the May 1974 Declaration in favor of the NIEO, which entitled “each State
to exercise effective control over their [natural] resources and their exploitation with
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer
of ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full permanent
sovereignty of the State.” It complemented this right to nationalize with a “right of
all States under . . . colonial domination to restitution and full compensation for the
exploitation . . . and damages to, the[se] natural resources” as well as a right to
“supervise the activities of transnational corporations by taking measures in the
interest of the national economies of the countries.”146
In so doing, theUNGA rejected the position of theUnited States andWest European
states, which conditioned the right to nationalize to the “duty to conform with interna-
tional obligations.”147 Still, nine months later, when the rights of newly independent
states were further defined in the Charter of the Economic and Social Rights of States
adopted by the UNGA in December 1974, the absoluteness of the right to nationalize
multinational companies (without obligation to impose an immediate and fair indem-
nization), claimed by new oil-rich nations, was diluted under the pressures of the
United States and its European allies: the Charter declared that such indemnization
was no longer a decision under the control of the nationalizing state, but a decision that
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needed to conform to rules enshrined in international law.148 The change showed the
intensity of the fight taking place at the UNGA and the ILC on the questions of debt
cancellation, oil nationalizations, and the right to fair compensation.
These resolutions were not merely discourse, but were associated with extremely
controversial economic decisions and actions undertaken by newly independent
states in the 1970s, especially those who were members of the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was founded in 1960, but had
remained dormant until the late 1960s. The economic program that some of these
OPEC member states wished to implement in the 1970s had converged toward the
kind of socialist utopias that Mauss had dreamed about: public national companies
and land cooperatives would take over the properties of a few colonial magnates and
extractive conglomerates, which controlled vast swaths of land and their subterra-
nean resources. Algeria seemed a case in point: Algerian nationalists declared the
nationalization of land in 1963, soon after the 1962 exodus of around one million
pieds noirs who chose French nationality and emigration to the French metropolis.
A few years later, in 1971, the government of Algerian President Houari Boumédiène
was one of the first Arab League and OPEC countries to declare the nationalization
of gas and oil concessions – quickly followed by Qaddafi’s Libya, which nationalized
British Petroleum’s assets in 1971, and then by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, in retaliation against Western support for Israel in the 1973 war.149 Indeed,
in February of that year, the Algerian government decided to claim 51 percent of the
property rights of French oil companies operating in Algeria (and 100 percent of the
gas sector and the pipelines). This decision was a unilateral cancellation of the 1965
bilateral treaty by which the Algerian government had agreed to respect France’s
acquired rights150 regarding the exploration and exploitation of Algerian oil in the
Sahara, provided that the French would reinvest half of its oil revenues in Algeria.151
The 1965 Treaty, in line with the Gaullist philosophy of bilateral “cooperation”
found in the Evian Agreements, had indeed created a “Franco-Algerian cooperative
association for the exploration and exploitation of oil” in a vast region of the Sahara,
with the French contributing 400million francs each year to the industrialization of
Algeria (with 40million as gifts, 160 as governmental loans, and 200 as private debts
guaranteed by a French financial establishment).152 The Franco-Algerian Treaty
also planned that the French would reinvest a large part of their profits in exploring
the Sahara, but in 1970, the Algerians raised the bar of French companies’ reinvest-
ment of their profits in Algeria from 50 percent to 90 percent. The Algerians knew
that this bar was unacceptable to the French, but claimed that it respected the
preamble of the 1965 bilateral agreement, which sought to develop Algeria’s oil
extractive capacities in the “framework of Algerian sovereignty.”153 They thus
claimed that Algerian sovereign decisions trumped the technical clauses agreed
upon in the treaty itself, along lines that reflected the legal doctrine that Bedjaoui
pushed at the ILC.154 They forced the crisis to justify the nationalization that they
had long planned.
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Bedjaoui knew very well the file on the nationalization of oil concessions, as
President Boumédiène had requested Bedjaoui be “sent to the front line,”155 by
nominating him in 1970 to serve as Algeria’s ambassador in Paris, at the very time
when he was engaged, together with Foreign Minister Bouteflika, Energy Minister
Abdessalam, in the struggle against the French government and the French oil and
gas concessions. After Algeria’s 1971 decision regarding the oil concessions,
Bedjaoui, established as the new Algerian ambassador in Paris, soon received
a letter of protestation from the French government, followed by a memorandum
transmitted in March 1971 by French Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas that
listed all the French claims against the unilateral nationalization of the oil sector.156
In this memo, the prime minister recognized “Algeria’s right to nationalize,” but not
without preliminary and fair compensation for the nationalized assets (according to
what the Evian Agreements had planned), and he threatened to ask French com-
panies to immediately stop production in the Sahara if a committee charged with
determining such compensation was not set up – a demand that the Algerian
government rejected, first through the voice of Bedjaoui, on March 15, 1971, and
then through the voice of President Boumédiène, when the latter abolished all the
concessions in April 1971. Eventually, some agreement was found, in large part
thanks to the massive support that Algeria’s decision found in the OPEC, and
Algeria’s active diplomacy, which emphasized that Algeria had showed good will
before, when they agreed to destroy 400,000 hectares of vineyards that produced the
“red gold” that Algeria had exported to France and which de Gaulle’s Minister of
the Economy, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, had unilaterally prohibited from entering
the French territory in 1963 and 1964.157
The Franco-Algerian oil crisis of 1971 thus put an effective end to the idea of
bilateral cooperation between former metropolis and a newly independent state
conceived as a “total fact” – in which the private interests of oil concessions are
indistinguishable from the public interests of independent states – which Denise
Grimaud claims may have been for the better. Indeed, when new decisions clashed
with the philosophy of bilateral cooperation that had inspired the Evian Agreements,
economic disputes between Algeria and France were immediately turned into state
affairs that involved logics of honor and radicalization.158With this decision, Algeria
sought to signal that it no longer accepted to shape its economic relations with the
former metropolis according to the logic of bilateral gift exchange, when the
exchange of prestations, gifts, and loans was supposed to follow the logic of recipro-
city between two otherwise unequal partners. For Bedjaoui, the rights and obliga-
tions of newly independent states and former metropolises could not be
symmetrical, or reciprocal. For Bedjaoui and other French legal scholars who
accompanied the advances of the NIEO, like Charles Chaumont (1913–2001), the
“most favored” clauses and other boilerplates by which the French metropolis had
created some fake sense of reciprocity with its colonies just hid the continued
exploitation of the South by the North thanks to legalistic artifacts.159 To institute
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real (as opposed to fake) reciprocity between the two kinds of states, some time
needed to be given to the newly independent states to grow economically, and
become prosperous enough, before they could finally give back.
At the same time as Algeria decided to nationalize oil concessions, the ILC
addressed the question of debt in the context of the nationalization of private
property, especially the oil concessions granted by the former colonial powers to
private interests. In 1963, it had appeared that the ILC (despite its mandate that was
mostly limited to the codification of international public law) would extend its study
to cover how state succession affected the rights of private individuals,160 especially
those of “nationals of foreign states,”161 as these issues were at the center of negotia-
tions in the case of newly independent states – as illustrated by the Franco-Algerian
negotiation. But the issue had been swept under the carpet at the ILC, as it appeared
the most contentious ever since the former colonies had gained their political
independence. Realizing in 1970 that “the topic of acquired rights was extremely
controversial and that its study, at a premature stage, could only delay the
Commission’s work on the topic as a whole, most members had been of the opinion
that the codification of the rules should not begin with the preparation of draft
articles on acquired rights.”162 In order to minimize disputes with the ILC subcom-
mittee, Bedjaoui originally restricted the mandate of the ILC to study only issues of
transmission of state property – or rather “public property appertaining to
sovereignty”163 – and excluded the thorny issue of the private acquired rights of
foreign nationals and multinational (oil) companies.
Still, in 1971, the question of “acquired rights” returned to the ILC discussion, as
the definition of the “state property” which Bedjaoui proposed to include in the
future convention, and which “devolved automatically and without compensation
from the predecessor to the successor state,” was no longer restricted to “public
property” in the restrictive sense meant by the former metropolises (public build-
ings, etc.), but encompassed also the oil concessions and all the other items that
a newly independent state might declare to be “necessary for the exercise of
sovereignty.”164 The ambiguity of this criterion meant that it could more or less
include any property that the newly independent state wanted to nationalize if it
could claim it was necessary for the exercise of sovereignty. As Bedjaoui remarked,
after reviewing the vast body of precedents, he had found “no precise answers in
international contemporary law to the two following key questions: (1) what property
is required for the exercise of sovereignty? (2) what authority has the power to
determine such property?”165 The two questions were in fact intrinsically related.
If ambiguities remained as to which property could be called “state property,” then,
the main question was whether the law of the metropolitan state or that of the
successor state would serve as the source for the definition. Bedjaoui found in the
precedents – decisions made by the Reparations Commissions – that no interna-
tional body had been “in a position to carry out the task [of defining which properties
belonged to the sovereignty of the state] without reference to the municipal law of
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the predecessor state.”166 But he didn’t find that the Permanent Court of Justice, or
the ICJ, had recognized this principle as part of customary international law.167
To the contrary, Bedjaoui claimed that when the law of the predecessor state
differentiated between the “public” and “private” property of the state – like in Italy,
but also and most importantly, in France – based on the distinction between
property rights that were “necessary to the sovereignty” of the state and those that
came from commercial activities of the state and which were deemed to belong to
the “private” domain of state property, then, countries like France could not ask for
compensation from the successor state if the latter nationalized such “private”
properties that were in fact, “essential to the exercise of the sovereignty” of the
successor state.168Whether oil concessions could be considered one or the other was
thus ambiguous. The colonial history of the French Empire showed that France had
considered that natural resources in its colonies had been so “essential for the
exercise of its sovereignty” that it had invaded overseas territories to conquer such
resources. And even if France refused to acknowledge it now, Algeria believed oil
resources were “essential for the exercise of its sovereignty.” As a consequence,
Bedjaoui weakened the general rule according to which “public property should
be made by reference to the municipal law which governed the territory concerned”
by adding the following exception: “save in the event of a serious conflict with the
public policy of the successor state.”169 This was an important and broad exception,
as it was not completely clear who would decide the “seriousness” of the conflict of
law and thus, the ability of the successor state to impose its legal definition.170
This general exception found its most manifest illustration in the conflict of law
regarding the right to grant oil concessions. As Bedjaoui noted in his 1973 report to
the ILC, “it is quite inappropriate to consider the successor state as ‘subrogated’ to
the rights of the predecessor state, or as ‘succeeding’ the latter regarding the right in
respect to the authority to grant concessions.”171Citing the French jurist Lyon-Caen,
for whom a concession is the “juxtaposition of a contract and an act of sovereignty,”
Bedjaoui reintroduced the issue by leaving aside the “contractual aspect of the
concession,” in order to “deal exclusively with the act of sovereignty.”172 As far as
this public law aspect was concerned he “considered that the successor state
exercises its own rights as a new conceding authority, which replaces the former
conceding authority,” meaning that it could freely decide to grant or withdraw “by
virtue of its sovereignty, the title of owner of the soil and subsoil of the transferred
territory.”173 As Bedjaoui continued to work in 1971 and 1972 on these conflicts of law
between predecessor and successor states, he made it clear that “the fact that the
successor state ‘receives’ the internal juridical order of its predecessor state should
not automatically imply that the concessionary regime is thereby renewed.”174
After the Algerian decision to nationalize oil concessions in 1971, it was natural
that Mohammed Bedjaoui had turned again his attention to the limits that newly
independent states could impose on the rights of private companies like oil conces-
sions when he delivered his reports to the ILC.175 Even if Bedjaoui knew that his
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reflections on the superiority of the newly independent states’ sovereign “vital
interests” over the private (and even sometimes moral) rights of citizens and foreign
nationals (and the superiority of public law over private law) divided the ILC’s
subcommittee, the 1971 Algerian decision proved that the ILC could no longer
escape addressing the issue, for otherwise, it risked becoming completely
irrelevant.176 In his ILC reports, Bedjaoui made it clear that decolonizing states
could and should ignore “devolution agreements”177 (for instance, those decreed by
France for Algeria) and acquired rights of oil concessions when concessions had
been obtained during colonial times: then, they were inherently tainted by the
colonists’ lack of respect for the acquired rights of the colonial subjects (as the
colonists, like Soustelle, often used the terra nullius doctrine to appropriate natural
resources). Against the position that the French delegation had expressed during the
negotiations at Evian, Bedjaoui claimed that it was precisely when the newly
independent states were incapable of paying “just” reparations that the state needed
to expropriate large private interests. Newly independent states could not accept the
principle that all rights of foreign nationals should be compensated, as the “lands,
the buildings, the transport, the industry, the trade companies, etc., belonged to
private interests” during colonial administration, and thus, “compensating them for
the loss of their property in case of nationalization would mean that the new state
would have to buy its whole country back”178 which would be economically impos-
sible. In this case “the state would indebt itself in perpetuity, and even [if] the debt
was distributed over a very long period, no budget could service such a debt.” For
Bedjaoui, newly independent states, whose raison d’être was the protection of the
“vital interests of the nation”179 (a very Gaullist notion found under Bedjaoui’s pen),
had the right to reject the sanctity of public treaties when the latter protected
illegitimate private rights.180 Otherwise, the situation would look very much like
that of slaves “buying back their freedom.”181 The notion extended the kind of
expropriation beyond the question of “unjust enrichment”182: with the notion of
“vital interests,” there was no longer any need for the nationalizing state to prove
illegitimate acquisition, but just a need to prove the absolute economic need of such
nationalization. In that sense, his program did not focus on the notion of “odious
debt,” which implied a notion of immorality, but extended to concern all kinds of
unsustainable debts incurred by newly independent states: the criteria used to cancel
sovereign debt were to be purely economic and political.
6 A WAY OUT OF THE DEADLOCK BETWEEN THE GLOBAL SOUTH
AND NORTH? THE NOTION OF “GLOBAL SETTLEMENTS”
At the ILC, Bedjaoui’s perspective was far from consensual, and the countries of the
Global North strongly objected to the redistribution of property and debt between
the Global North and the Global South, and from private companies to publicly
owned national champions, that the NIEO entailed. The NIEO promoters’
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response to the North’s objections was that if newly independent states were ready to
consider compensating private concessions for the loss of their right to extract oil or
gas or minerals, the discussion of the value of that compensation had to take place in
the framework of what Bedjaoui called a “global settlement.”183 The latter was based
on a comprehensive assessment of the value of nationalized properties at the time of
the expropriation by the decolonizing nation, but also on the calculus of past
benefits realized by private interests and chartered companies in the colonies,
which were not reemployed for the good of the colonial subjects from whom profit
was extracted. Thus, only if reparations were to be calculated based on a long-term
view of the historical relations between metropolis and colonial territories was
Bedjaoui in favor of entertaining compensations and reparations for the
expropriation.
Turning the tables, Bedjaoui went even further as he cited the 1961Declaration by
the non-aligned states in Belgrade, which stated quite clearly that the decolonized
states were in fact “creditor states” rather than “debtor states” toward the old
metropolises.184 As he asserted that colonial economies were largely extractive and
exploitative, as the industrial development of the metropolises had depended upon
the ability of colonial private interests to funnel profits toward the metropolis and to
cut the local colonial populations off from the benefits of growth, the metropolis had
“contracted a debt” with its colonies, such that the nationalization of private interests
could be seen as a reparation paid by the metropolis to its colony. If the debtor state
was the metropolis, private individuals who sought compensation should turn to
their own state rather than to the new independent state.185
In the ILC, Bedjaoui’s proposition to refer to such global settlements was favor-
ably received among the other non-aligned members, who agreed to inscribe within
the article on state succession in respect to property for newly independent states
a clause on global settlements. Such clause introduced “the concept of the con-
tribution of the dependent territory to the creation of certain movable property of the
predecessor state . . . so that such property should pass to the successor state in
proportion to the contribution made by the dependent territory.”186 This principle
meant for instance that, if Algeria was to settle claims by companies like French oil
companies, French companies should also be accountable to claims by Algerian
interests.
As the 1979 oil crisis further hit the global economy, consensus between the
Global South and Global North became harder to reach on questions of interna-
tional economic governance. In 1975, Mohammed Bedjaoui had worked on the
project of a North–South conference to be organized in Paris when, as Algeria’s
Ambassador in Paris, he was in charge of organizing the official state visit of French
President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing to Algeria; but this idea was abandoned after
President Giscard d’Estaing’s disappointing official visit, to later be taken up by
Mexican President Lopez Portillo and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.
The North–South Summit which gathered the heads of state of twenty-two nations
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in Cancun in October 1981 – including President François Mitterrand, who had
ruled Algeria as Minister of Interior in the 1950s – showed to the G77 representatives
that the newly elected Anglo-American leaders, especially President Reagan, were
not interested in talking about the reform of international economic governance,
except when reform meant the implementation of neoliberal ideas, and the use of
international financial institutions as vehicles for imposing budget cuts and austerity
measures to the Global South as conditionalities to new loans. In Cancun, the
representatives of the G77were flabbergasted when they heard President Reagan tell
them that he was the real revolutionary because he was in favor of market
deregulation.187 The irony of seeing a former movie star talk about economic
revolution was not lost to the Algerian revolutionaries who had suffered from the
French repression during their revolution. Thirty-five years later, it would be
Emmanuel Macron, a former high civil servant who briefly worked for Bank
Rothschild, who cut the ground from under the socialists’ feet by launching his
presidential campaign with a book titled Revolution: it seems that not only US but
also French neoliberals like to fancy themselves as “revolutionaries.”
Within the ILC, controversies lingered until Bedjaoui released his last report to
the UN General Assembly, which decided in December 1981 to convene an inter-
national conference of plenipotentiaries to consider the draft articles of the interna-
tional convention on succession of states in respect to state property, archives, and
debts. The conference assigned to the Committee of theWhole the consideration of
the draft articles adopted by the ILC. Mohammed Bedjaoui had a very important
role in the debates as the special Rapporteur to the ILC on state succession.188
Unsurprisingly, representatives of theWestern states at the 1983Vienna Conference,
called to adopt (or reject) the resulting convention emerging from twenty years of
ILC work, heavily criticized the legal doctrine of the NIEO, and more specifically,
the principle of intransmissibility of state debts in the context of newly independent
states. Western legal scholars and diplomats in the Committee of the Whole did not
see how newly independent states could ground the principle of intransmissibility of
debts on established practice, except in extreme circumstances. Furthermore, they
questioned the link that Bedjaoui made between the cancellation of debts and the
nationalization of public assets by newly independent states.
When the text of the final convention was debated in 1983, the former imperial
states, led by the British and the French, expressed strong objections to clauses on
“global settlements” that could open up reparation debates. The British delegate
objected to the statement that newly independent states should inherit property
outside their territory (in the territory of the metropolis) “in proportion to the
contribution of the dependent territory” as the determination of such property
would “require mathematical calculations that were practically impossible to carry
out,”189 thus leading to intractable controversies about reparations – a position
which the Indian delegate criticized, but which the French delegate endorsed, as
the latter also claimed that “the term ‘contribution’ lacked precision.”190
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The French delegate even proposed deleting the article on newly independent
states, where delegates of the G77 had placed the only exception to the general
principle that debts should be transmitted to successor states: the French represen-
tatives argued that it created exceptional rules for a category of states defined
according to a “political” rather than “legal” criterion. He added that as the deco-
lonization process was almost over, it had lost its relevance for dealing with future
cases of state succession – a point which was rejected by the Algerian delegate and
the other representatives of the Group of 77.191 In so doing, the British and French
delegates wanted to prevent the imperial history of their states from being open to
scrutiny.
Already during the plenary conference the main lines of division appeared
between the liberal doctrine of the Western states, which refused to sign, and the
communist bloc and the non-aligned states (or Group of 77), which were in favor.192
The US representative, for instance, justified his opposition due to “the extent and
scale of the special treatment given to newly independent states and the unnecessary
vagueness of the formulation of a number of provisions,”193 on the question of debts.
The British delegate clearly rejected the view that “the principle of permanent
sovereignty over wealth and natural resources and certain so-called rights had the
force of jus cogens.”194 To take one example that best represents the liberal doctrine
on behalf of which the Western states mounted their opposition against the notions
of the NIEO embodied in this Convention, it suffices to quote the interventions of
the West German representative during the conference. Anticipating the rigid
defense of the sanctity of private contracts that the German Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble would later express during the Greek debt crisis, the German
delegate at the Vienna conference objected that a “conference like the present one,
which attempted to formulate existing rules of customary international law and to
reach agreements about rules of contractual international law [two different tasks]
could not be fulfilled if it did not take into consideration the views of a substantial
minority of states.”195 For him, the articles that related to the treatment of debts for
newly independent states (article 38) – which affirmed that no “state debt of the
predecessor state shall pass to the newly independent state, unless an agreement
between them provides otherwise” (article 38.1), and that the “agreement referred to
in paragraph 1 shall not infringe the principle of permanent sovereignty of every
people over its wealth and natural resources, nor shall its implementation endanger
the fundamental equilibria of the newly independent state” (article 38.2) – were
particularly inacceptable, a position shared by the representatives of all Western
states.
Among the articles on state property, the liberal West strongly objected to the
reference to the inalienability of natural resources in newly independent states and
the “principle of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and
natural resources,”196 as the latter represented the gravest threat to the sanctity of
private contracts. As the US delegate remarked, he did not believe that article 15 was
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“an accurate statement of existing law and that its provisions should be accepted as
progressive development of international law” – a position echoed by the Dutch
delegate, according to whom the term “permanent sovereignty” was not a legal but
a “moral” notion.197 As the Canadian delegate said, the “value of a treaty that did not
codify customary law but purported to create new rules, as was unquestionably the
case with that convention, depended upon the degree of support it could command
among states with different interests on the matter,” and as the French delegate
regretted, the method of work, which had consisted in voting on articles rather than
seeking consensus had imperiled the whole work of the conference, by departing
from the jurisprudence of international courts, like the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created in 1962 at the World Bank,
which protected the interests of foreign investors’ concerns against the risk of
nationalization with no compensation.198 For the Western representatives, the
adoption of the Convention could have created a precedent that ICSID would
have had to consider as it based its decisions on international standards rather than
on existing national laws.199
The Algerian delegate tried to counterattack by arguing that the “principle of
permanent sovereignty was already embodied in the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect to Treaties”200 and that the principles of “equi-
table compensation” were well-recognized principles of international law, and
that it was only fair to take a broad view of compensation if the global negotia-
tions were open; but from the discussion, no consensus emerged. As a last
attempt to salvage the twenty years of work at the ILC, the Committee of the
Whole tried to suggest that the Convention did not affect the private rights of oil
concessions and other foreign companies operating in newly independent states.
As Mohammed Bedjaoui remarked before delegates of the Committee of the
Whole, “many speakers had expressed the fear that a successor state might seize
property other than that which belonged to the predecessor state, for example,
property of a third state or of private persons,” but these (mostly Western)
delegates should be reassured by the strict definition of state property enshrined
in article 8, defined in accordance “with the internal law of the predecessor
state.”201 The Convention explicitly recognized that “a succession of States does
not as such affect the rights and obligations of creditors” (article 36), and as
Bedjaoui remarked before the Committee of the Whole, the articles on state debt
only concerned debts that “were governed by international public law and
therefore excluded debts owed by the predecessor state to private creditors.”202
Furthermore, Bedjaoui added that the ILC was of the opinion that “transnational
corporations [including oil corporations] were not subjects of international law”
and were thus not concerned by the articles on the intransmissibility of debts
from metropolitan states to newly independent states.203 But Bedjaoui’s demon-
stration was not sufficient to assuage the fears of Western delegates: the
US delegate, for instance, doubted the validity of the argument that the
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Convention protected private creditors, as by restricting itself to the succession of
state-to-state financial obligations, it left private creditors with no other choice
than to “resort to the general rules of customary international law, and those
rules were highly intricate, complicated, often ambiguous and unclear.”204
Others argued that the historical context of the 1970s had suggested that natio-
nalizations could take place with no fair and quick indemnity. 205
On April 7, 1983, led by the states of the G77, the conference adopted the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts
consisting of a preamble, fifty-one articles, and an annex. The Convention was
opened for signature from April 7 until December 31, 1983, but it has not yet entered
into force as it is missing the signature of key UN member states. In particular, the
articles that concerned the succession of rights on property and debts in the case of
“newly independent states” for which exceptional rules applied (articles 15 and 38,
respectively) continued to be the most controversial, as can be seen from a brief
survey of the objections of Western states to the Convention.206 The Algerian
delegate could only regret that Western states’ “negative attitudes to an instrument
which was fully in conformity with trends in the international community paralleled
the uncooperative approach which had led to difficulties in the negotiations of the
new international economic order,”207 which by the time the 1983 Convention was
open to signature, had lost all relevance since the election of President Reagan and
Prime Minister Thatcher.
7 CONCLUSION
Until now, most historians of the NIEO have failed to relate the key concepts of the
NIEO with the Gaullist conception of bilateral cooperation between postcolonial
nation-states, especially, between France and its former oil-producing former colo-
nies and overseas territories. Writing about Mohammed Bedjaoui in particular,
Balakrishnan Rajagopal underlines, for instance, that he had, like “no international
lawyer from the Third World, taken aim at the very nature of development and its
linearity and progressivism,”208 which may be right, but not precise enough to
capture the key contribution of the NIEO.209 It is true that Bedjaoui was character-
istic of the NIEO scholars from the Third World who stopped viewing history’s
progress as gradual, linear and oriented toward the end goal of socioeconomic
liberalism and democratic modernity. But Bedjaoui’s main target was not the
“modernization theory,”210 which was elaborated by MIT political economist Walt
Rostow (1916–2003) in his Non-Communist Manifesto211 – whose influence in shap-
ing the linear notion of “development” in the Anglophone world has indeed been
crucial but almost inexistent in the French field of law; rather, it was the kind of
forced bilateralism which he saw embodied in the Evian Agreements, and which
imposed limits to the economic sovereignty of Algeria after it was granted its
independence.
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Still, while rejecting the notion of postcolonial bilateral cooperation, NIEO
thinkers from Algeria didn’t intend throwing out the concept of “cooperation” and
gift exchange with themurky water of forced bilateralism between formermetropolis
and colonies. This is the reason why it is difficult to conclude that the NIEO thinkers
were responsible for the downfall of the model of the gift in international law, which
solidarists like Albert Sarraut, writing mostly on colonial law, had made fashionable
in the interwar period. In many ways, the NIEO thinkers promoted an organization
of the international system that was not unlike the one promoted in theory (but
rarely achieved in practice) by solidarist thinkers who lauded the model of gift
exchange as a method to organize relations between European nations or between
colonies and their metropolis in the interwar era – the difference being that NIEO
thinkers substituted the latter with the relations between independent states in the
Global North and the Global South. This chapter thus confirms the conclusion of
eminent international law scholars, who coined the “Third World Approach to
International Law,” like Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, and Obiora Chinedu
Okafor,212 or next-generation scholars like Sundhya Pahuja, for whom the NIEO
reformulation of sovereignty in “international law was neither still imperial nor
newly liberatory – it was both.”213
This chapter, thus, rehabilitates the attempt of NIEO thinkers to decolonize
international law, or at least, end its alliance with colonial prospects. The NIEO
thinkers not only defined a broad and ambitious new program for the Global South
but also decolonized the solidarist thinking of interwar law scholars, by reformulat-
ing international economic relations on the basis of peoples’ long-term needs,
international trust, and gift exchanges, rather than on the short-term speculative
logic of deregulated financial markets.214 They revived the idea that gift exchanges
work to create international solidarity, not only between sovereign parties but also
between peoples and private actors: they proposed that newly independent states
cement new contractual relationships with the Global North which would redefine
long-term exchanges between commodity and industrial products, as well as engage
in comprehensive sovereign debt renegotiation which NIEO thinkers coined as
“global settlements.”215
In fact, NIEO thinkers proposed that new international economic relations be
grounded on real rather than fake gift exchanges;216 that is, on long-term interna-
tional relations based on trust between sovereign nations practicing reciprocal
exchanges, rather than on contractual obligations between short-term-oriented
profit-seeking private actors (metropolitan oil concessions), or on “cooperation
agreements” by which former metropolises imposed a sustained cultural and eco-
nomic domination upon their former colonial subjects.217The reciprocity the NIEO
thinkers had in mind also involved some time lapse between the gift and the
counter-gift: the Global North would be asked to give first by cancelling debts
from their former colonies, in exchange for the gift of peace, stability, and sustain-
able development in the South, which would eventually benefit the North, as the
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South would gain from the initial gift and then buy more goods from the North.218
For these reasons, NIEO thinkers also promoted the wave of unilateral nationaliza-
tion of oil companies carried out by Arab states, the cartelization of the oil trade with
the creation of OPEC, and the rise in oil prices that would force the North to pay
more for oil but that would also allowOPEC to redistribute part of their profits to the
least developed countries through an OPEC fund.219
In the NIEO historiography, the importance of gift exchange as a model – when
used to argue against neoliberalism – and counter-model – when the circulation of
gifts was used to justify the bilateral cooperation that the Gaullist had in mind – is
rarely underlined,220 partly because its recycling in the field of international law by
the postwar generation of realist scholars made the continuities with anthropological
discourses on gift exchange hard to recognize. As this chapter demonstrated, these
discontinuities were entrenched in the different trajectories followed by the metro-
politan and colonial fields of international law before and after the Second World
War, with the former taking off and the latter coming to an abrupt end after Algeria’s
independence in 1962. The shift from gradualism and pluralism (as found in the
writings of Maussian legal anthropologists) to an association between the notion of
gifts and an anti-colonial and realist conception of international relations reflected
an original attempt to decolonize the model of gift exchange pioneered by interna-
tional public law scholars who were taught in the metropolitan (rather than colo-
nial) French field of law after the Second World War.
In so doing, this chapter offers a rebuke to hasty readings by post-development
thinkers like Gilbert Rist, for whom “the NIEO did no more than reinforce the
existing order of things.”221 Judging the NIEO from the surface, Rist indeed believes
for instance that its promoters mainly reinforced the US-led discourse in which
economic growth, expanding international trade and increased foreign aid to the
Global South formed the three main objectives of the US policy toward the South
since the famous publicization of the “Truman Doctrine” in 1947. For that reason,
Rist concludes, “it is therefore fortunate that the NIEO was stillborn, everything
having begun and ended on the same day, May 1, 1974,”222 when the UNGA issued
its Declaration. As a result of this misreading of the NIEO’s main claims, it is not
surprising to read under Rist’s pen that, “far from closing the gap between center and
periphery” as it proposed to do, “[the NIEO] actually widened it.”223 If the NIEO
only had to offer a defense of rising prices of oil and other raw materials thanks to
revised trade agreements, it would be fair to say that it indeed accentuated not only
the division between Western states and developing states, but also the division
between oil-producing countries and the least developed countries. But NIEO
thinkers did not just want to strengthen the power of the oil-producing or rare-
minerals-extracting countries, but to take the business of extractive industries outside
of the realm of geopolitical conflicts and economic speculation, and turn it into an
opportunity to arrive at a stable and peacefully negotiated compromise between
creditor and lender states, complementing the overall scheme with special funds
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that would redistribute some of the profits generated to the least developed
nations.224
Still, even if it had succeeded in establishing the 1983 Convention on
Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, it is
worth acknowledging conceptual limitations in Bedjaoui’s work at the ILC
and the associated NIEO program. In particular, some members of the ILC
rightfully regretted that “the definition of the term ‘newly independent state’ . . .
[which was] restricted to cases in which the territory of the state had been
a dependent territory immediately before the date of the succession of states”
seemed to eliminate cases which there was no reason to exclude, such as the
“emergence of a new state as a consequence of the separation of part of an
existing state or from the uniting of two or more existing states.”225 In many
ways, by creating rigid boundaries between different types of succession gath-
ered into two broad groups (transfer, union, separation, and dissolution on one
side, and newly independent states from Asia and Africa on the other side), and
creating two opposite sets of rules for each group (as far as the issue of state debt
was concerned), Bedjaoui restricted the principles of the NIEO to the newly
independent states of Asia and Africa – most of which had already been through
the process of independence at the time.226 In doing so, he assumed implicitly
that those state debts that could be deemed “odious” were those that exclusively
fell on the shoulders of the “newly independent states” (since those were the
intransmissible debts) and vice versa, so there was no need to add a separate
discussion of the doctrine of odious debt as related to the other categories of
state succession (transfer, union, separation, or dissolution) in other non-African
and non-Asian contexts. NIEO scholars thus excluded the possibility of applying
the principles they agreed upon for “newly independent states” to other states in
the future, for instance, those that would secede, for instance, from the Soviet
“Empire,” first in Eastern Europe and then in the Balkans,227 or from new
currency zones like the Eurozone, when the case of Grexit began to be
discussed in 2015. That may well have been a big mistake, which explains
why his theory remains little used in the present-day debates about the sustain-
ability and cancellability of the debts held by Cyprus, Greece, or other coun-
tries that have long suffered from a colonial or neocolonial domination.
With these limitations in mind, it is not surprising if direct references to the work
of the ILC on state succession in matters of state debts and assets and to the NIEO
more generally have largely been absent from more recent debates about the
sovereign debts of developing nations from South Asia and Latin America, or in
the case of the recent sovereign debt crisis in Greece. This is unfortunate, as
Bedjaoui’s contribution to the NIEO (with notions of “global settlement,” “perma-
nent sovereignty over natural resources” or the “principle of non-transmissibility of
debts” in a postcolonial context) would prove much more useful to contemporary
debt cancellation activists to defend their claims than Sack’s doctrine.228 We can
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thus only regret that Bedjaoui failed to associate his name with a new (and more
progressive) doctrine of “odious debt”: as some ILC members regretted, “although
the question of odious debts had been discussed by the Commission . . . and the
Special Rapporteur’s earlier proposals [were] quite interesting, no provisions relating
to it had been included in the draft articles.”229 In fact, Bedjaoui’s definition of
“cancellable” debts emphasized the notion of their unsustainability, as he proposed
to assess whether former debts should be cancelled or not based on economic and
political rather than moral criteria.
Whether one believes that it is unfortunate that neoliberal prescriptions
imposed themselves as the solution to the sovereign debt crises of the Global
South in the 1980s or not, it is true that the combination of both dealt the
NIEO a fatal blow. Still, calling it an utter failure would be wrong: indeed, the
rise of the NIEO participated in disentangling the newly independent states
from former imperial economic interests, and thus helped the former denounce
the devolution agreements which, like the Evian Agreements in the case of
Algeria, had organized the prolonged economic submission of former colonies
to the power of colonial concessions. In so doing, it showed how international
law could be used as a force for progress and revolution rather than as
a conservative endeavor, whose main methodological precepts serve the purpose
of ensuring continuity in the interpretation of international agreements, and
thus, continued recognition of the debtor states’ legal obligations that have been
inscribed by European great powers in generations of international agreements
since the colonial times.
In the history of ideas about global governance, the global mobilization of
neoliberal intellectuals in favor of the deregulation of financial markets and the
strengthened protection of the rights of private investors230 has often taken all the
attention, relegating the NIEO story to the dustbin of history.231 The sovereign debt
crises that have erupted since the 1980s certainly empowered the international
financial institutions of Bretton Woods (the IMF and World Bank) and their
Western state backers to impose neoliberal policies and stringent tools of monitoring
and control upon the domestic policies of borrowing nations, especially in Africa,
Asia, Latin America but now also in Europe.232 As Sundhya Pahuja writes, it is true
that the rise of the NIEO on the international stage in the 1970s was related to an
“economic boom in the North, a concomitant rise in commodity prices, a brief
moment of Third World unity brought on by the oil crisis, and finally a consequent
sense of vulnerability of the North,”233 followed by a quick downfall when the
solidarity between oil producers and non-oil producers in the Global South dis-
solved as a result of the debt crises of the early 1980s, starting with the Mexican debt
crisis of 1982. Except for Balakrishnan Rajagopal, who sees in the NIEO a story of
relative institutional success,234 the observed failure of the NIEO movement to stop
the rise of such neoliberal ideas of global governance is indeed presented as the
ineluctable result of a convergence between adverse external (economic and
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political) conditions rather than from inner intellectual flaws and contradictions,
whose content is thus often left in the background.235 Winners always get historians’
attention, except when the odd genealogist attempts to recover the history of losers.
But beyond the questions of whether the NIEO was successful or not, or why it was
not, the progressive ambition that the NIEO thinkers have ascribed to international
law certainly warrants that we pay more attention to its genesis in the Francophone
context from which it arose.
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International Solidarity and Gift Exchange in the Eurozone
Throughout the many iterations of this text, the full story told here has slowly
emerged as I genuinely attempted to connect the many pieces of this complex
transnational puzzle in the most objective manner. Writing such a transnational
history requires that, like Penelope, we social science history scholars – or historical
sociologists – no longer tell the story of Algeria and France as independent national
histories of state formation, and that we unravel in the night the lines that we weave
into our tapestry during the day. That being true, readers can understand why I find
it enjoyable that the time has come to close, finish the weave, tie off the warp ends
and hang the tapestry on a bookshelf.
But not so soon. It would be nice if my job as a historian would be over,1 but
readers should not conclude too quickly that the story of gift exchange as a model of
global governance has ended with the failed attempt by Third World scholars to
decolonize its ideological premises and concrete applications. The story of the gift
exchange as a model of global governance did not end in the 1980s with the rise of
neoliberalism and the worldwide liberalization of capital markets. It is true that in
the 1980s creditor states massively exported neo-liberal economic policies through
international financial institutions to the now-called “emerging world” with the zeal
of non-practicing gurus – austerity in the service of debt repayment has always been
better for the debtor states than for creditors, according to the creditor states. But
before we leave the founding fathers of anthropology to rest, we can gain some last
insights with a comparison between Mauss’s reflections and the considerations
about international economic governance expressed by contemporary French pol-
icymakers and economists who claim a filiation to Mauss and The Gift, and who
have in fact criticized neoliberal theses both from a theoretical and political
perspective.
The existence of such a filiation today may seem surprising, considering what I’ve
said about the demise of the gift exchange as an epistemic model used in ethnology
for the analysis of intersocietal exchanges with Pierre Bourdieu’s successful bid to
relocate the gift exchange to the local level. Indeed, the ethnologists who followed
Pierre Bourdieu, and others who argued against him – like Jacques Godbout and
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Alain Caillé and their Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste en sciences sociales (or
MAUSS) – pay particular attention to forms of gift-making organized at the local
level between individuals, and praise them for their generous motives when they
engage in non-utilitarian forms of exchange.2 I will not survey here the immense and
often very interesting production related to the MAUSS, as I purposefully have
limited my analysis to the history of the gift exchange conceived as a model of global
or at least international governance.
ButMauss’s essay seems, like a phoenix, to always rise from its ashes and appear in
the most unlikely places. Mauss’s latest influence on French ideologies of interna-
tional governance emerged from an improbable terrain: the political debate about
European financial governance in the post-Bretton Woods era and the related
theoretical debate among French economists about the hypothesis of market effi-
ciency. This debate opposed those “neoliberal” economists – broadly speaking –
who welcomed the liberalization of capital markets because “free markets are
efficient” and thus investors find the best productive niches when left unregulated;
and those indeed “neo-Maussian” economists who argued that, on the contrary,
financial markets only produce speculative bubbles built on thin air when the flow
of capital and money is left free to move without concern for national borders. After
the French ethnologists’ turn to the local, it was thus the turn of these heterodox
French economists to claim Mauss’s analysis of gift exchange as one of the main
inspirations for their interventions in debates on international and European finan-
cial governance.
Until now, I have tried to limit myself from multiplying excursions into contem-
porary politics, even though they could have made the story more appetizing. But
now has come the time to analyze more explicitly how one could apply some of
Mauss’s reflections on gift exchange to contemporary debates about global and
European economic governance. I will thus use the space of this conclusion to
review, even if briefly, some of these so-called “Maussian” interventions, which
I claim could in fact be better qualified as “neo-Soustellian” – even though these
scholars do not draw direct inspiration from Soustelle – as these contemporary
economists study constitutional and institutional mechanisms to contractualize
gift exchanges into hard law. In this chapter, I will highlight similarities and
differences between the recommendations of these French economic thinkers in
the debate about eurozone governance and what Mauss may have articulated,
should he have witnessed the sovereign debt crisis that not only affected Greece
after 2009, but also the whole eurozone – which is still struggling to find a pathway
leading Greece out of its sovereign debt impediment. In the following pages, I will
claim that, just like the jurists of the NIEO tried to decolonize the model of the gift
and requalify how it could be applied to shape North–South relations, the neo-
Maussian model of European financial and budgetary integration that French
economists have articulated in the debate on the eurozone governance should also
be examined with a critical and decolonial perspective. If there is much value in the
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critical perspective that the notion of gift exchange offers to stem the spread of
neoliberal ideas, we should also pay attention to the relations of domination that are
obfuscated by the simple application of notions of budgetary, fiscal, or financial
integration to the eurozone.
1 FRENCH SOCIALISM AND THE NEW FOUNDATION OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
The year for the beginning of this epilogue is 1993. This was the year when
a heteroclite group of scholars based in Paris started meeting to discuss the anthro-
pological and economic roles served by money, and the perspectives that could be
developed out of a comprehensive and multidisciplinary analysis of money, espe-
cially in political societies where the bond between the nation-state and the issuance
of currency is relaxed. These French scholars accepted the invitation extended by
Michel Aglietta (1938–), André Orléan (1950–) and Jean-Marie Thiveaud
(1947–2002), to meet every Friday afternoon, from 1993 to 1998, to discuss the
anthropological, historical, and financial aspects of money, trust, and gift
exchange – discussions which resulted in the collective volume La monnaie
souveraine, edited by Aglietta and Orléan.3 Aglietta and Orléan were two brilliant
economists and former students of École Polytechnique and the French École
Nationale de la Statistique et de l’Administration Economique (ENSAE) – two
institutions that trained many high-level public servants working in the French
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, or the Banque de
France4 – and were fellow travelers of the socialist party. Their five-year long seminar
was made possible by a generous grant of the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations
(CDC) – an independent state institution in charge of financing public invest-
ments – extended by Jean-Marie Thiveaud, who worked there as archivist and
historical adviser of the director of the CDC, Robert Lion (1934–), a high public
servant who had served for two years as the prime minister’s economic adviser in the
first socialist government of the Fifth Republic, which was constituted in 1981 after
the election of François Mitterrand to the French presidency.5
It is not surprising that the book that resulted from these interdisciplinary con-
versations not only nurtured deeply theoretical ambitions, but also addressed issues
very close to the preoccupations of the socialist government at the time. The date
when these conversations started was not a coincidence: 1993 was one year after the
Maastricht Treaty was signed. This treaty had momentous importance for European
political societies, as it imposed strict limits on Europe’s sovereign debt ceilings and
annual budgetary deficits – respectively reduced to 60 percent and 3 percent of each
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). It also required all European states to
renounce the right to devalue their currency and asked them to adopt fixed exchange
rates – with all European currencies pegged on the mark of the reunified Germany.
The mid-term goal was the formation of a common currency in Europe – what
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became the new currency known as the “euro,” which every eurozone citizen started
using in their daily transactions ten years later.
The Maastricht Treaty represented the last attempt by the socialist French
President François Mitterrand to reign over international politics and decide the
course of European history in the post-Cold War context.6 According to Jacques
Attali (1943–), who served as President Mitterrand’s adviser for ten years, the
Maastricht Treaty crystallized the bargain that the French president had put to
Chancellor Kohl in 1989: the French Republic would agree to support the West
German chancellor’s efforts to accelerate the reunification of the two Germanies,
but it insisted, first, that the reborn German nation-state would forever forego the
production and possession of nuclear weapons and recognize the sacred character of
the 1945 territorial frontiers – conditions that were agreed upon in the 1990 Treaty of
Moscow – and, second, that Germany would relinquish its financial sovereignty and
help France give to the European continent its first modern currency: the euro.7
With the creation of the euro, Mitterrand and Kohl changed the rules of financial
solidarity and political sovereignty in Europe.
The Maastricht Treaty thus represented a new foundation for the European
Union: it initiated changes in the realms of finance and politics that were as
profound and unexpected as those brought by the 1957 Rome Treaties to trade
relations in Europe. Accepted by referendum in France, it tied the new German
giant deeply to the European Union as well as hardened the rules of financial
responsibility that all future eurozone countries were asked to respect. But the
Maastricht Treaty was also the latest development in a decade of progressive
elaboration of common financial rules for the European Union. It was supposed
to tie up the loose ends of the European Monetary System (EMS), which had been
introduced by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1978, in
the context of the fluctuating exchange rates that followed President Nixon’s 1971
decision to let the dollar float. Since 1979, the EMS imposed limits on how much
the value of European currencies could vary, as it set up fixed but adjustable (within
the small margin of plus or minus 2.25 percent) exchange rates among European
countries. After the shock of rising oil prices in 1979, which convinced Giscard
d’Estaing to adopt the EMS, and the speculative attacks that followed the election of
a socialist president in France in 1981, President Mitterrand could have decided to
leave the EMS. But instead, he devalued the franc three times during his first
presidency, from 1981 to 1986, in order to remain within the authorized limits of
the European framework.8 His political and financial decisions remained steadily
driven by his desire to conserve and strengthen the nascent European monetary
order in order to isolate the European currencies from the speculative uncertainty of
the post-Bretton Woods era. The Maastricht Treaty indeed was a large step on the
road toward financial and political integration of Europe, as it not only fixed
exchange rates, but also planned the creation of a common currency and imposed
by treaty law some budgetary restrictions on all the future eurozone member states.
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Its elaboration thus confirmed the pro-European orientation that President
Mitterrand had maintained throughout his two terms.
This pro-European orientation of the French government in the 1980s and
1990s could have appeared surprising for the political commentators who did
not remember the long political career of François Mitterrand, and who only
saw in his ascent the result of skilled and pragmatic craftsmanship which led the
French socialist party back to power – the party which Mitterrand had resusci-
tated in the late 1960s after the slow death of the old SFIO following the end of
the Algerian War. Mitterrand’s election, which was made possible by
a temporary alliance between the French Communist and Socialist parties,
closed the fifty-year parenthesis opened when Blum and Mauss took over the
old SFIO in 1920 against the Communists who seceded. This party alliance
could have meant that France, under Mitterrand’s presidency, could be
expected to be more neutral – in the sense of not wanting to heighten military
tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States on the European
continent, and not advancing on the road toward European integration, as the
Soviet Union had always seen in the European Union project a program aimed
at pushing economic liberalism and keeping Russia out of the affairs of the
European continent.9
When he was elected president in 1981, Mitterrand was far from a newcomer in
French politics: his election occurred after more than twenty years spent in political
opposition, during which time he deletedmost of the historical traces that associated
his name with the Algerian history of colonial repression in the 1950s,10 or with his
collaboration with the government of Vichy, which favored Franco-German colla-
boration during the Second World War,11 as well as his prewar involvement in
rightwing proto-fascist movements. With the dissolution of the colonial field after
1962, which was accelerated with the rise of the ideology of the NIEO among former
French and non-French colonies, Mitterrand managed to present himself as the
wise oldman who would lead the ideas ofMay 1968 to power, in a Frenchmetropolis
that was more curious about its European neighbors than about its past overseas
possessions. But this superficial facelift did not determine his actions as president:
his direct experience of the Second World War, combined with his robust anti-
Communism, drove his sturdy determination to accentuate pressure on the Soviet
Union until the latter would eventually collapse, and led him to consistently side
with the United States in all the major military confrontations between the East and
West, from the Euro-missile crisis to the Iran–Iraq War and the first Gulf War.
The events of 1989 gave Mitterrand the unlikely opportunity to prepare the condi-
tions for what he foresaw as a new century of Franco-German peace sustained by
tight financial cooperation between, and integration of, European central banks and
finance ministries on the European continent. He saw it as his generation’s duty to
close the chapter that the Allied victory in the Second World War had opened in
European history and to bring forth the reunification of Europe, in which
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a reunified Germany was no longer a threat but France’s strongest economic,
financial, and political partner.12
This necessity was well understood by a group of young left-wing technocrats
who worked around Mitterrand, or around one of his closest advisers, Jacques
Attali. Attali, before he became known for having chaperoned future President
Emmanuel Macron when the latter entered politics in the 2000s, was one of the
central forces in Mitterrand’s presidential cabinets from 1981 to 1991, after which
he became the founder and first Director of the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development – the only post-1989 international organiza-
tion that included Russia in a club of European member states – and then
a consultant, prolific author, and promoter of microfinance initiatives world-
wide. Like many other high public servants, Attali graduated from
Polytechnique – but also from the ENA – and quickly accessed Mitterrand’s
inner circle in the 1970s, after he expressed his admiration for Mitterrand, the
only man he saw as capable of pushing de Gaulle out of power: Attali’s distaste
for the Gaullists came from the shock he had experienced of having to flee
Algiers, where he had spent the first part of his life as the privileged son of a rich
Jewish perfume merchant, who managed to relocate to Paris before 1962.13 Attali
was only one of the young and brilliant intellectuals in the future president’s
inner circle, along with Jean-Pierre Cot (1937–), the son of Pierre Cot, who had
obtained a PhD in international law under the supervision of Suzanne Bastid-
Basdevant – who helped Mitterrand run for president both in 1974 and in 1981.
Cot became one of the youngest ministers of the Fifth Republic in 1981, as
Minister of Cooperation and Development – a position he kept for only a year,
during which he prepared Mitterrand’s participation for the Cancun conference
of 1981,14 until he resigned when realizing that Mitterrand was intent on main-
taining intact the neocolonial relations between France and its former posses-
sions in Africa. Conversely, Attali never accepted to become a minister. Instead,
he remained in the Elysée Palace where he worked as President Mitterrand’s
powerful adviser, in charge of international economic and military affairs,
especially in Europe and North America.
During the entire decade from 1981 to 1991, Attali consistently argued before
President Mitterrand and against some of the ministers that France should remain
within the EMS rather than let the franc float like the dollar, despite the social
sacrifices that such a pro-European policy entailed at the time, especially when the
franc was the object of various speculative attacks. After 1985, the French President
also had a key ally in the European Commission (EC) when it came to negotiations
within the French government about European and financial policies. Indeed,
despite the fact that it was the turn for a German official to occupy the post,
Mitterrand obtained the nomination of Jacques Delors (1925–) to the presidency
of the EC in 1985 – a post Delors kept until 1995. A Christian democrat, Delors had
been Mitterrand’s Finance Minister from 1981 to 1985, after having served as a high
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civil servant in the French Planning Commission15 and a member of the Governing
Board of the Banque de France in the 1970s.
These men’s pro-European orientation may look surprising for an observer of
French socialist history, who certainly remembers the opposition of the old
SFIO against the Atlanticist and liberal orientations of the European integration
projects pushed by Jean Monnet and some of his associates, like René Pleven,
who had (unsuccessfully) presented the European Defense Community Treaty
to the French Parliament in 1954, where it was killed by the French socialists.16
Since the beginning, the old SFIO nourished skepticism toward the European
Community project, which it saw as the creation of industrialists, bankers, and
liberal statesmen, who were more inspired by liberal and Christian democratic
values than by left-wing ideals. But, in the 1950s, neither Mitterrand, nor Attali
(who was too young to have a political opinion), nor Delors were members of
the SFIO: Mitterrand had been the president of the Union démocratique et
socialiste de la Résistance (UDSR), a small center-right party that he and Pleven
had created; Delors went to work at the Planning Commission for most of the
1960s, where Monnet’s ideas and framework of action were being put into
action. If these men represented the socialist governmental coalition in the
1980s, their socialism had different roots than the old SFIO cardholders who
had defended the Fordist model of high wages for workers, and its extension to
Algeria, against the integration of the French economy into competitive
European markets.
Still, these men considered themselves to represent voices from the left, and
Attali especially, who was more an intellectual than a statesman, embedded
their political ideas in the socialist intellectual past, marked by the stellar figures
of Jaurès and Blum. In the 1970s, while teaching at Polytechnique and working
to prepare Mitterrand’s presidential campaigns, Attali wrote various essays with
his colleague Marc Guillaume in which the two young economists criticized
the misplaced simplicity and the unrealistic assumptions of neoclassical eco-
nomics, which they blamed for the rise of the “monetarist” perspective –
according to which states should intervene in the economy only to make the
mass of money created predictable to unregulated financial markets – in the
United States, leading to the demise of the Bretton Woods system with the end
of gold–dollar fixed convertibility, the push for the deregulation of capital
markets and the unraveling of welfare state spending.17 Although Attali and
Guillaume’s language, which was inspired by systems theory and a few anthro-
pological references, minimally influenced Mitterrand – who told Attali that his
books were hardly readable18 – their essays gave a wide public audience to
academic writings that chastised the utilitarian logics of the neoliberal ideas of
the Chicago School of economics whose monetarist views were being experi-
mented in Latin America, after the US-backed coup of General Pinochet in
Chile.19
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2 FROM GIRARD TO MAUSS: WHEN ECONOMISTS REINTERPRET
THE NOTIONS OF “RECIPROCITY” AND “GIFT EXCHANGE”
Among the young “socialist” intellectuals who criticized the rise of deregulated
financial markets and the monetarist ideas associated with neoliberalism, Jacques
Attali was certainly one of the most well-known public figures, but Michel Aglietta
was one of most respected voices in this complex nebula, whose reach extended far
beyond the strict confines of the French socialist region and well into the French
pro-European movement at the French Planning Commission and the Banque de
France. While leading a brilliant academic career as a professor of economics at the
University Paris-Nanterre, he maintained important positions first in the French
Planning Commission in the 1960s, and later in the most important French think
tank specialized in international economic relations – the Centre d’Etudes
Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). At the CEPII, which was
created in 1978 to renew the French long-term economic thinking, Aglietta worked
on various forecasts that anticipated the effects of a globalized economy on the
French economy, and the advent of the euro on European economies – in parallel,
he served as an adviser to the Banque de France.20 Like Attali, Aglietta tried to renew
the interdisciplinary discussion by extending it in the direction of anthropology,
where he found new ideas to intervene in policy discussions on European financial
governance after 1993.
The French academic scene is sometimes a village, and it will not come as
a surprise that some of the men who were gathered by Michel Aglietta from 1993
to 1998 to develop a genuinely interdisciplinary perspective on currency formation,
and on the relations between financial solidarity and political sovereignty, were
related to some of the characters with whom readers are now familiar. Indeed, the
group not only included economists, of course, but also philologists, financial
historians, and a few anthropologists. Among the anthropologists, we find for
instance Marcel de Coppet’s son, Daniel (1933–2002), who was raised in
Madagascar where his father was named governor general just before the Second
World War: Daniel de Coppet later worked under Claude Lévi-Strauss on
a dissertation on gift exchanges in Melanesian islands, before continuing his career
as an anthropologist at the EHESS.21 The philologist in the group was Charles
Malamoud (1926), whose family had fled to France from Romania in the 1930s, and
who married Léon Blum’s granddaughter, Catherine Blum (1928–96), before work-
ing under the supervision of Emile Benveniste (1902–76) and becoming the holder
of the chair of Indian philological studies at the EPHE, following in the footsteps of
Mauss’s PhD adviser, Sylvain Lévi.22
Jean-Michel Servet, my former colleague at the Graduate Institute, who brought
his knowledge of post-independence African financial history to the group of neo-
Maussian economic thinkers,23 makes a clear distinction between the participants
who came from anthropology or philology and who entertained a long and deep
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relationship withMauss’s essay The Gift – in which group he included himself, as he
discovered Mauss’s text thanks to his mentor in Lyon, Jean Marie Auzias
(1927–2004), and then continued to discuss notions of gifts and sharing in the context
of activities organized by the Cultural Center Thomas More in Lyon24 – and the
more technocratic elites like Michel Aglietta, André Orléan, and Bruno Théret – an
engineer from École Centrale, who worked for fifteen years at the Ministry of
Finance before becoming a renowned economic historian – who were less inter-
ested inMarcelMauss’s sometimes-confusing anthropological writings.25 In fact, the
economists who organized these meetings with anthropologists in the post-
Maastricht context were less interested in Mauss’s ideas than in the model of
antagonistic mimetism developed by René Girard (1923–2005), a Catholic literary
theorist and anthropologist. For Servet, Mauss’s long historical footnotes bored the
young economists who preferred the elegance of Girard’s stylized model, which
emphasized the essentially antagonistic nature of mimetic desire.26
Thus, to understand how Mauss’s model of the gift was reappropriated by econ-
omists in the post-Maastricht debates on financial European governance, one needs
to know more about the philosophy that René Girard developed on the mimetic
nature of man’s desire, which he discovered by commenting, first, French canonical
novels,27 and then the Bible and biblical commentary.28 Indeed, from Mauss,
French economists took only the notion that some exchanges, which Mauss called
“gift exchanges,” are particularly “antagonistic,” as in Mauss’s explanation of the
potlatch.29But for Aglietta andOrléan, the reason why these specific exchanges were
antagonistic had less to do with the politics of war and peace between sovereign
communities and political societies – as in The Gift – than with particularly
individual psychological features that emerge in specific forms of market exchanges:
in particular, in financial markets. Here was the psychological reason for the violent
antagonism between exchanging partners on speculative markets: when sellers of
a specific commodity (or currency) can also act as buyers of the same commodity, as
Girard explains well, “the annihilation of rivals is then the product of this confusion
between twins.” Indeed, so Aglietta and Orléan added, “anyone who seeks in the
Other her model can only meet an obstacle, who in reflection, sends him back the
image of his own desire.”30 This is the case when financial speculators manipulate
the mimetic desires of other market agents, who can both sell and buy goods (gold or
diamond, paper or now crypto currencies, real estate, or artistic goods, etc.), and who
then turn these goods into fetishes whose price is no longer fixed by their use value
for the customers who are likely to buy them, but by the expected profit that buyers
hope to make once they resell them for money, especially during bubbles or panics.
To understand the origins of the desire to obtain the goods owned by someone
else, even despite a lack of strong use value, Aglietta and Orléan used René Girard’s
notions of “antagonistic mimetism” and “mimetic desire.”31 Indeed, they wrote
“antagonistic mimetism” or “reciprocal violence lets the desire of exchange partici-
pants float without fixing itself on a specific object.”32 The intellectual debt that
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these French economists owed to Girard was already apparent in the first book, titled
La violence de la monnaie, that Aglietta and Orléan published together in 1982, as
well as in the collection that Jacques Attali edited, and for which Attali wrote
a laudatory preface in which he praised his colleagues for their efforts to move
beyond Marx’s and Walras’s theories of value, and to ground economic thinking on
a more complex anthropological theory of desires.33 Focusing on antagonistic
mimetism and speculative logics led Aglietta and Orléan to break away not only
from Marx’s theory of value but also from the kind of Walrasian “neoclassical”
subjective view of value,34 which postulates that exchange participants are always
rational, in the sense that they pay for merchandise at the price that is commensurate
with the subjective utility they would derive from the consumption of equally useful
goods.35
Their indirect reading of Mauss through the philosophy of Girard thus comple-
tely changed the interpretation that French scholars have given to the notion of gift
exchange until then, as the latter was no longer a solution to the problem of
international order – or a solution to the disorders created by globalized financial
markets – but now part of the problem to be solved: these extraordinary forms of
exchange that were premised on an antagonism between exchanging partners, like
gift exchanges, were precisely what these French economists feared would grow in
the neoliberal era, with the deregulation of financial markets. To them, these
antagonistic and mimetic processes that proliferated in unregulated financial mar-
kets were precisely the kind of processes that could only be tamed thanks to re-
regulation, as the Maastricht Treaty ambitioned to do by creating a common
currency zone.
Based on the distinction between rational desires and mimetic desires, Aglietta
and Orléan introduced the idea that there are in fact two kinds of market exchanges.
First, there are those market exchanges in which market participants are clearly
distinguished, with sellers on one side and buyers on the other, and where spec-
ulative logics are indeed limited, as buyers settle on prices according to the logics of
neoclassical Walrasian economics. Then, market relations are pretty harmonious:
unhappy buyers can walk away from greedy sellers, who are punished by immediate
market sanctions (loss of gains or reputation). In these ordinary markets, money then
serves its role as a unit of commensuration and as a transparent intermediary for
merchandise exchanges.36 Second, there are those market exchanges in which
participants have “reciprocal” positions – a Maussian term, but here understood in
a non-Maussian manner – in the sense that they are both buyers and sellers at the
same time.37 When buyers and sellers occupy “reciprocal” (in the sense of inter-
changeable) positions,38 their situation vis-à-vis one another is intrinsically antag-
onistic. They can only make profit if the others lose money, either because they have
sold too quickly during a bubble, or too late during a panic. This situation is typically
what happens in financial markets, which started to grow tremendously in the 1970s
and 1980s as a result of the deregulation of capital movements, and where the
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opportunities to act both as seller and buyer of the same financial instrument – e.g.
recycled debts – became a great source of instability.39 In these markets, as Aglietta
and Orléan write, “everything conspires to re-create rivalries between twins, the
convergence of desires on the same object and the symmetry between subject and
rival.”40
The opposition between ordinary and financial markets, in some sense, could
map onto the opposition that one finds in The Gift, between ordinary exchanges and
gift exchanges – where the sovereignty of the parties of the exchange is at stake, as
a refusal to partake in the exchange of debts and accept gifts can be interpreted as
a decision to go to war.41 The rise of speculative market logics, which dominated
after the collapse of the Bretton Woods rules, explains why French economists
believed it was urgent to develop a new intellectual framework to explain bubbles
and panics in financial markets. From 1981 to 1983, and then again in 1992,
speculative attacks repeatedly tested the resistance of the new European system of
pegged currencies (the nascent EMS), forcing devaluations of the franc and creating
tensions within governments – including the French, but also the Italian govern-
ment, in which various positions on the EMS coexisted – as well as panics among
small investors. To explain these deleterious dynamics,42 Aglietta and Orléan found
that Girard’s anthropological reflections on antagonistic mimetism – and Mauss’s
notion of gift exchange, to the extent that it could be related to the latter – could
bring important complementary insights to neoclassical economics.
Published fifteen years after their 1982 book, Aglietta andOrléan’s second volume,
titled La monnaie souveraine, which resulted from their conversation with anthro-
pologists and philologists, gave an even more visible presence to Mauss’s model of
gift exchange, even if their theories of “antagonistic mimetism” did not profoundly
change as a result of these discussions. The reference to Mauss’s model of antag-
onistic gift exchange, which they reinterpreted in largely unorthodox (and
Girardian) ways, presented two advantages. First, the little attention Mauss paid to
relations of domination in the sphere of production, combined with his exclusive
focus on the rules of trade and gift exchange, and the fact that Mauss was
a canonical reference of the non-Communist left because of his involvement in
the French socialist party of Jaurès, allowed Aglietta and Orléan to remain at a safe
distance from the Marxist tradition, which, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
was not the most attractive influence to claim. Still, and second, while not being
tainted by any Communist appropriation, the reference to Mauss anchored their
research closer to the left, whereas René Girard, a French Catholic philosopher
expatriated at Stanford, was far from being a recognized trademark in French left-
wing circles. Thus, using Mauss’s name to refer to a Girardian notion of “mimetic
antagonism” offered many political advantages in the French academic and poli-
tical fields.
But Aglietta and Orléan introduced a subtle but profound change of meaning to
the Maussian notion of gift exchange. The distance between Mauss and Girard was
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obliterated by Aglietta and Orléan when they put the two authors in the same
theoretical boat. It was as far a reading of Mauss as one could possibly imagine,
and not a small paradox, to claim that Mauss’s notion of antagonistic exchanges
could be used precisely to define the operations of speculative markets between
“twins.” Mauss insisted, especially in his writings in The Nation, that the notion of
gift exchange serves to understand heterogeneous systems of international trade and
finance in which contracting parties are characterized by very different forms of
political sovereignty (from tribes to empires and nation-states). Furthermore,
remember that Mauss had originally developed his model to provide a paradigm
of international financial relations that could isolate Europe’s political economies
from the speculative attacks waged against European currencies, and through which
European trade centers could build sustainable and mutually advantageous rela-
tions with their non-European Others in the colonies. It is hard to see how Mauss’s
prescription that states should follow the logic of the gift when exchanging debt
obligations and other services known as “prestations” could have been applied to
describe operations of unregulated markets in a world in which currencies were free
to float at a value fixed by the rational or whimsical – but always speculative –
expectations of private capital market actors. But so do circulating references travel
across disciplines: sometimes, they produce both misinterpretations as well as inter-
esting new meanings when they are used by to intervene in distant disciplinary
debates.
3 THE EUROZONE AT RISK: A GREEK TRAGEDY IN MAASTRICHT
Even if their reading of Mauss proved hugely paradoxical, Aglietta and Orléan
proposed solutions that seemed to converge with the political recommendations
that Mauss and Blum had expressed in the 1920s, when they wrote about the
speculative attacks against the franc and the mark in the 1990s, and the need for
European financial cooperation against the international contagion of fears. In 1924,
when massive speculation was waged against sovereign currencies, Mauss lauded
the renewal of old alliances through noncontractual forms of gift exchange, which
took the form of joint action by the Banque de France and the Lazard Frères bank to
buy up francs on Austrian and Italian financial markets where speculators attacked
the French currency. In central banks, we trust! That could be the motto of all
Maussian theorists.
In 1982, as the election of President Mitterrand was followed by waves of spec-
ulative attacks, Aglietta and Orléan similarly insisted on the necessity to strengthen
the role of central banks as lenders of last resort. In case of panics, the value of
a currency cannot be guaranteed against the value of collaterals held by private
citizens and public authorities in the vaults of their banks.43 Indeed, during panics,
financial intermediaries face a choice between two alternatives: they can either
accentuate the turbulence by selling quickly what they anticipate to be increasingly
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“bad debts,” which entails the risk that they devalue further the capital of their
debtors, as the latter include the same bad debts in their accounting books; or they
can seek help from a lender of last instance (e.g. the central bank) to refinance their
bank bymonetizing, or mutualizing, their losses.44 As Aglietta andOrléan insisted in
all of their writings, central banks are needed not only to calculate the right amount
of monetary creation during normal times (in a counter-cyclical manner), but also,
and especially, during international panics, to restore trust in the ability of nations to
honor their debts.45Only a central bank acting as a lender of last resort can monetize
the unsolvable debts of a community, ensure the loyalty of creditors, and save the
financial system from a crisis of confidence.46 If no lender of last resort exists to back
a currency in times of crisis, then nations lose their “monetary sovereignty”47 and
their power to stop financial panics from degenerating into all-out destruction of
wealth.
Based on this core idea, which runs through all their work, these economists
expressed their ambivalence toward the new governance structure planned for the
eurozone by the 1993Maastricht Treaty, as well as subsequent treaties like the 2007
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), later integrated into the
2007 Lisbon Treaty. For Michel Aglietta, financial integration offered a welcome
response to the general deregulation of capital flows in Europe, but it also created at
least two major vulnerabilities for Europe’s financial stability.
First, the Maastricht Treaty increased financial cooperation, but it did not turn
the European Union into a real European federal compact, with mastery over the
issuance of its debt and the control of its budget.48MarcelMauss never addressed the
topic of budgetary integration in his writings on international financial cooperation,
but in 1958, Jacques Soustelle had already warned French policymakers and econ-
omists that if the French metropolis did not integrate in a common budget the
expenses that the French Republic planned to spend to develop the Algerian
economy, there was no point in fighting to keep Algeria in a common currency
zone with metropolitan France, and in the integrated French Republic he wished to
defend. Half a century later, it seemed that this lesson, applied to European
integration, had been forgotten by the eurozone’s architects. Indeed, it was the
committee that elaborated the drafts of the Maastricht Treaty, set up by EC
President Jacques Delors, which called on European member states to address the
problems of a singlemarket of financial services in February 1986 (in the Single Act),
by adopting a common currency, without a fiscal compact. For the “Delors com-
mittee” members, the decade-long experience of the EMS, which worked relatively
well when the value of the deutsche mark – and thus of the other European moneys,
which were pegged on the mark – was low, seemed to suggest that a quasi-monetary
zone could function without common budgetary policy.49 By abandoning the
objective of true budgetary integration, the EC had aligned its views with the
dominant monetarist ideology, and departed from recommendations in its own
previous reports.50 This decision was viewed as a tragic mistake by Aglietta, who
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believed that the eurozone thence condemned its most vulnerable parts, which
would sink if capital started to massively move from Europe’s periphery to its
German core (as ultimately happened, beginning in the 1990s). Looking back on
the Maastricht Treaty after the 2009 financial crisis in the eurozone, Aglietta
concluded in 2013 that if presidents Delors and Mitterrand could be lauded for
having engineered a “great strategic success” at Maastricht, they could also be
blamed for having created a flawed architecture which “led to the European tragedy
twenty years later.”51
Second, and equally important, it was planned in the post-Maastricht delibera-
tions that the future European Central Bank (ECB) of the eurozone was not
supposed to serve the function of lender of last resort. Whereas national central
banks could issue more paper money and thus monetize public debts in the 1980s,
with the advent of the euro, these national central banks relinquished their power to
act as lenders of last resort, as no one planned for the ECB to buy at low rates the
public debt issued by its member states. For instance, in 2010, based on this reading
of the ECB statutes, the first ECB President, Jean-Claude Trichet, refused to buy
sovereign bonds that Greece needed to issue to refinance, when financial markets
were convinced that Greece would eventually default on its debt and when private
actors no longer bought Greek bonds, except at usurious rates.52Not surprisingly, the
constrain imposed this legal restriction was later released in 2012 by the second ECB
President, Mario Draghi; when the continuing Greek crisis threatened to extend
fromGreece and Portugal to Italy and France, President Draghi announced a policy
called “quantitative easing,” which allowed the ECB over the next four years to
inject more than €1 trillion in the eurozone, which helped keep the sovereign bonds
issued by eurozone member states (with the notorious exception of Greece)53 at
interest rates close to zero or even negative.
The creation of the euro on such feeble foundations thus seemed a tragedy to neo-
Maussian economists, as the European zealots were immediately warned that the
architecture of the new European Union founded in 1993 was deficient.54 Indeed,
the Maastricht Treaty architects justified their decision to create a disempowered
ECB based on the alleged success of the EMS in the mid-1980s, precisely at the time
when financial speculation proved that an EMS-like model of governance failed to
protect European economies during financial panics. When, before Maastricht,
Chancellor Kohl decided to convert East German marks at parity with West
German marks – a very political decision that did not reflect the dire economic
differences in the former two Germanies55 – he allowed German citizens from the
East to consume otherwise inaccessible West German products, but he increased
inflation and unemployment in the Eastern parts of the reunified Germany. To end
unemployment in Eastern Germany, the German Central Bank unilaterally
increased interest rates, which attracted capital into Germany and out of countries
like Spain (initially with high interest rates), Italy (with huge budget deficits and
rising interest rates which only aggravated such deficits), and the United Kingdom
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(hit by a severe real estate crisis), thereby aggravating economic crises elsewhere in
Europe. Predicting a drop in the value of the pound and Italian lira, the financial
speculation against the pound started by George Soros revealed the lack of monetary
cooperation between the German and British central banks: the speculation forced
the pound and the lira to leave the EMS in the fall of 1992. When the attacks then
moved to the franc, its fixed parity with the mark was first defended by Franco-
German initiatives in late 1992. But when speculation started again in July 1993, the
French Central Bank could no longer defend the franc due to its lack of foreign
reserves, leading to the decision that currencies would fluctuate within margins of
plus or minus 15 percent within the EMS.56Thus, the EMS imploded because of the
“incompatibility between free capital movements, fixed exchange rates and the
absence of cooperative economic policies.”57 The lesson was clear, but its validity
was denied, or forgotten, by the Euro-zealots who campaigned for the adoption of
the Maastricht Treaty.
As Aglietta and Brand write, it is fascinating to see that the speculative attacks
against Greece, Ireland, or Italy, which occurred when markets started asking much
higher rates for the purchase of their sovereign bonds, mimicked the 1990s attacks
against the British pound, the Italian lira, and the French franc.58 In 2009, in the
wake of the disastrous financial crisis that hit the United States first and then the rest
of the world, the financial markets succeeded in provoking a major panic, bringing
Greece to its knees before moving on to Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. The analogy
between the 1992–1993 crisis and the 2008–10 crisis is almost perfect; one must only
change the names of the four countries to reveal the same sequence of events: 2009
Greece played the role of 1992 Italy; and 2009 Ireland, Portugal, and Spain that of the
1992 United Kingdom.59 But whereas in 1992–3, the EMS allowed states under
attack to leave the common framework, leading to its implosion, after the creation
of the eurozone, such temporary “exit” strategies were no longer an option –
although certain country creditors, like Germany, and its Finance Minister
Wolfgang Schäuble, may have wished such options existed.60 This legal rigidity,
combined with the fact that Greece’s ability to reimburse its debt was not adequately
assessed, neither by European institutions nor by credit rating agencies,61meant that
markets did not see the eurozone as providing any credible solution to the Greek
financial problems until a comprehensive (but still insufficient) institutional reform
was adopted, which reinforced the principle of financial solidarity among eurozone
member states.
Fifteen years after the Maastricht Treaty, the institutional architecture that was
supposed to ensure European financial solidarity in times of crisis proved too fragile
to protect the weakest eurozone member states from the new wave of speculative
attacks. In 2009, the panic started when it was revealed that Greece had vastly
underestimated its budgetary deficit and debt-to-GDP ratio (capped at 3 percent
and 60 percent), thus clearly violating the golden rules of the Maastricht Treaty.
Found in noncompliance with eurozone treaty rules, financial markets panicked
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when the ECB President, Jean-Claude Trichet, claimed that, contrary to what they
had expected, he was unable to help Greece by buying Greek debt on primary
markets – as that would allow Greece, which was seen as a delinquent state by the
German Finance Minister, to force the ECB to create money. Faced with this
disastrous announcement, in early 2010, the other eurozone member states reluc-
tantly agreed to extend new loans to buy back (in proportion to their GDP) Greek
debt on a state-to-state basis, although at high interest rates (close to 5 percent) and
with short maturities – at a time when countries like Germany or France borrowed at
rates close to zero, and could thus make some profit out of this program, if Greece
did not default, of course. This Securities Markets Programme (SMP) left France
and Germany more exposed than other eurozone member states, which was only
fair, as the coordinated rescue program allowed the two countries enough time for
French and German systemic banks, which owned massive amounts of “junk”
Greek bonds, to sell the latter on the secondary market, and thus avoid bankruptcy
and forced nationalization – as had happened in the United States when the Obama
administration was forced to buy the financial giant AIG for about $180 billion
(approximately the level of Greek public debt at the time of writing, ten years after
the crisis). From 2010 to 2012, the SMP gave these Franco-German banks time to
reduce their exposure to Greek debt, after which the eurozone governments forced
the remaining private creditors in possession of Greek bonds to accept a €37 billion
haircut on the value of the bonds.62 While this package represented a small cut for
the private sector, considering that Greece’s ability to repay the €110 billion that
European creditors extended to Greece in 2011 was very much dubious at the time,
public authorities were signaling to the markets that they were not ready to see
European banks collapse as a result of too optimistic – if not aggressive – lending
practices.63
Still, as Greece went into a deep economic and humanitarian crisis, which
contributed to the 2015 election of the left-wing party Syriza, the ECB pushed the
lack of solidarity to its limits: eurozone finance ministers and ECB President Mario
Draghi did not accept any haircut on the SMP bonds bought on the secondary
market, even though theGreek payments generatedmore than €7 billion of profit for
the eurozone central banks over the 2015–18 period. After the election of Syriza, the
ECB president refused to give these profits back to Greece to pay other loans, in
violation of the initial promise made by the eurozone finance ministers to the
negotiators of the “haircut” accepted by private creditors. As Eric Toussaint writes,
the eurozone member states indeed did not show much solidarity with the Greek
people.64
The European reaction to the Greek crisis revealed the extent to which the
Maastricht Treaty architects had failed to plan for the mere possibility that
a eurozone member state could, one day, find itself insolvent. As a result of their
lack of foresight, when the financial crisis hit Greece, the proper structure of
incentives to induce eurozone cooperation with the insolvent member of the
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European family was lacking. The blindness of theMaastricht Treaty founders came
in large part from their legalistic culture. Indeed, from a purely legal point of view,
the Maastricht Treaty seemed self-sufficient. As it imposed the golden ceilings of
3 percent budgetary deficit and 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, no treaty signatory
should ever default on its debts, as long as it respected the conservative spending
treaty terms, which meant there was no need to add to the common currency
a common European lender of last resort. Planning for the latter would have
meant that the Maastricht Treaty architects planned that countries could be found
in noncompliance of their treaty commitment – heresy for a lawyer.65 Thus, in the
midst of the Greek crisis, the eurozone leaders realized that the finance ministers in
the Eurogroup and the ECB president lacked the necessary instruments to fight the
crisis, which is why heads of state sitting in the European Council then agreed to
create, by treaty, various structures that would complement the Lisbon Treaty.
The institutional response to the Greek crisis was driven by the notion that the
crisis had purely financial origins, which did not require eurozone member states to
adopt a common budget in order to fight the increasing economic divergence in the
eurozone. A new structure known as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was
created, which in 2012 replaced the European Financial Stability Mechanism that
had been created in the midst of the crisis, to which eurozone member states
committed up to a limit of €500 billion in order to fend off future solvency issues
in the eurozone. After its creation, and as the Greek crisis worsened – in large part
because of the austerity measures which the “Troika” of international financial
institutions (the ECB, the EC, and the IMF) had imposed on Greece since 2010 –
the ESM started lending to Greece at a rate much more beneficial for Greece than
the creditor states who participated in the SMP, and with much longer maturities,
which meant that the operation of the ESM offered a semblance of financial
solidarity in the eurozone.
In addition to the ESM, the Greek crisis, followed by the Cypriot crisis, convinced
the eurozone states to form a Banking Union, as banks started to reevaluate the value
of their collaterals (usually comprising government bonds, such as Greek bonds), as
well as those of other banks in the midst of the crisis. Due to banks’ reluctance to
assess the devaluation of their own assets suffered as a result of the Greek crisis, the
EC ordered eurozone member states to ensure full transparency on the value of the
assets held by European banks. The exercise was largely aimed at creating a self-
reassuring image of the European banking sector, as “stress tests” organized in 2011
did not even plan for the possibility of a Greek default.66 With these tests, the EU
aimed at avoiding the transformation of the solvency crisis in Greece into a liquidity
crisis: if banks stopped trusting each other’s capacity to meet payments, then the
whole interbank system of credit could have suddenly ceased to function, provoking
a huge liquidity crisis. A few years later, in 2014, collective reflection led to the
adoption of another European treaty which created the Single Resolution
Mechanism (SRM), by which eurozone regulators sought to steer an orderly
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restructuring of private banks – some of which had nearly gone bankrupt as a result
of the Greek sovereign debt crisis – should they be affected by another crisis of
solvency in the European Union. European banks were also asked to diversify the
kinds of sovereign debt obligations in their portfolio and raise capital requirements.
Adding the ESM as a (limited) lender of last resort for countries with solvency
issues, helping those economies that were underperforming but were still largely
solvent with the ECB program of quantitative easing,67 and creating a Banking
Union with the SRM to restructure possibly bankrupted private financial institutions
represented three complementary aspects of the coordinated response given by the
eurozone creditor states to the Greek crisis. In many ways, their creation worked to
tame the financial speculation on the downfall of Portugal, Spain, and Ireland: the
latter did not suffer as much as Greece as they benefitted from stronger protections
offered by the new mechanisms. In many ways, the case of Greece stands out as
a particularly bad example of mismanagement by the eurozone authorities, for
reasons that were as much institutional as political. First, Greece was indeed, the
first to suffer, and as the eurozone gained experience in crisis management with this
case, it learnt from its mistakes and was better able to channel solidarity efforts to
help Portugal, Spain, and Ireland recover from the crisis. Second, political reasons
also explained the continuation of the human disaster in Greece, as the conservative
governments of the eurozone wished to make an example out of Greece, by punish-
ing a people who had dared to elect a radical left-wing party with harsh austerity
measures that were doomed to fail.68
Still, for Maussian French economists, even if the new structures may have
temporarily halted the toxic progress of financial panics, none of the eurozone
responses addressed the economic roots of the problem: the divergence between
the economic performance in the center and periphery of the European Union,
which was spurred by the free flow of capital in a eurozone that lacked budgetary
integration. It was not a surprise if, even after the passing of austerity packages, the
Greek disaster continued to worsen: rather than coming back to Greece to invest
resources, capital market actors anticipated that austerity packages alone – without
redistribution from the richer to the poorer regions of Europe – would fail to restore
Greece’s ability to reimburse its debts, and that deflation would continue to aggra-
vate budgetary deficits.69 The eurozone countries (like Greece) which would have
benefitted from a devaluation of currency (but no longer could, since the advent of
the euro) were no longer able to attract capital, whereas robust exporting states (like
Germany) presented a greater attractiveness for capital. This vicious spiral then
aggravated deficits in the periphery, leading to more capital flight to the center, and
more crises in the weaker states of the Union.70
Nowhere better than in Greece can this self-defeating mechanism be found.
As the arm-wrestling competition between finance ministers in the Eurogroup
heightened in 2015, and the scenario of “Grexit” became a real possibility – as the
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and his pro-austerity allies in the
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Eurogroup believed that the eurozone could weather such a shock and that the
expulsion of Greece would actually cleanse the eurozone of its least respectable
member – foreign investors fled the country. Then, Greece was not only unable to
attract investors to buy the prized properties which the Greek state had to privatize to
obey the commands of the Troika, but it also faced a banking crisis spurred by rich
Greek citizens who transferred their deposits from Greek to German, Swiss, or
French banks, in anticipation of bank defaults and the imposition of capital controls
and quantitative restrictions placed on private deposits.71 The panic was so dramatic
that private actors and international financial institutions (including IMF Director
Christine Lagarde) were not sure that the German finance minister’s strategy would
not lead to the death of the currency zone. There was no end in sight to capital flight
if the budgetary capacities of the eurozone did not massively increase to allow
redistribution to Greece.
4 DECOLONIZING “GENEROUS” PROPOSALS TO SOLVE THE
EUROZONE CRISIS
For Aglietta and Brand, the maintenance of all countries within the eurozonemeans
that there must be a “European social contract,” which necessitates the existence of
a “common consciousness” and a “sense of belonging to the same community of
destiny.”72 They argue that a European Budgetary Union should be formed to
complement the EuropeanMonetary Union, whose central institution could decide
to mutualize all member states’ debts.73This would be a similar gesture to that made
by Alexander Hamilton when the US federal government was given the power to
raise taxes: as Aglietta and Brand write, “union is created by the mutualization of
budgets and public debts and not by a reliance on market exchanges.”74 This was
also the solution that Soustelle had proposed in 1958: to integrate the budgets of
metropolitan France and Algeria, to make their communities of destiny manifest.
Today, if no budgetary union is created in Europe, and if the European Monetary
Union remains a simple intergovernmental treaty, governed by the ECB, which
artificially sets its monetary policy for “a country that does not exist” (e.g. the average
eurozone country),75 the eurozone is bound to replicate the same mistake that the
Europeans made in the interwar period, when they tried to maintain the creed that
moneys were pegged on the gold standard by artificially placing some reparation
debt on the debit of Germany and the credit of France and its Allies – a creed that
was shattered by the failure of the Reparations Conference of 1933 and the German
default on Reparations.76
Their Eurofederalist approach leads them, as well as other economists like
Thomas Piketty and his coauthors, Stéphanie Hennette and Antoine Vauchez –
two constitutional and European law scholars77 – to elaborate complex proposals
which would give flesh to their dreams of a complete European Budgetary Union.78
In their view, a European budget, larger than the current amount administered by
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the entire EU – and not just the eurozone –, which is limited to 1 percent of the GDP
of all member countries, should be negotiated not only by the Eurogroup, but also
approved by a new eurozone Parliament, composed in its majority of elected
members of national parliaments and a minority of members of the European
Parliament (EP).79 The main argument made in favor of the eurozone Parliament
is that the adoption of the euro – and the subsequent eurozone crises – have created
a giant leap forward in terms of financial and political integration, which has not yet
led to the creation of a democratic structure at the level of the eurozone. Indeed, the
eurozone decision-makers are mostly finance ministers acting, with the president of
the ECB, in the Eurogroup: they largely evade accounting for their decisions before
their own national parliaments when their decision concerns another EU member
state (for instance, Greece); or before the EP, which lacks the prerogative to question
the Eurogroup on its decisions (as the latter is not mentioned in the EU treaties).
While their proposal has received a lot of attention – and a lot of skepticism80 –
especially after the endorsement of the French Green-Socialist candidate to the 2017
presidential elections, its intellectual genesis and content structure conjures the
memory of Jacques Soustelle’s proposals to democratize the management of
the Franco-Algerian economic zone, which he did by transforming (for four years)
the French Parliament into a parliament of the Franco-Algerian zone. Like
Soustelle, who claimed generous redistributive and democratic ambitions and
who lambasted the greed and irrationality of financial markets, Piketty and his
coauthors now claim that their proposal is the only way to end the drastic austerity
measures of the Troika in Greece, and improve the democratic character of the
decision-making process in the Union. But its structure is criticized as a setback for
the Union, as its proposed indirect mode of election would bring the EU back to the
early days of the Common Market Community and would make the only body
directly representing European citizens (e.g. the EP) largely irrelevant in the
management of the eurozone economic, fiscal and social matters.81 A new eurozone
Parliament also runs the risk of complicating the European policymaking structure,
making it even more incomprehensible than it is today to most European citizens.
At last, in focusing the attention away from the Eurogroup, it fails to tackle the most
important reform today, which is the reform of the Council of the EU, and the
broader cultural battle to fight racist prejudices against Europeans from the South.82
Like Soustelle’s proposals, which largely ignored the ideological and social context
in which the new political structures of representation were supposed to operate – an
Algerian society that had been marked by years of political oppression and that
demanded political independence before economic support – the proposal for
a eurozone Parliament does not seem grounded on a realistic analysis of the present
ideological landscape in Europe.
Proposals to solve the problem of economic divergence in the eurozone with
budgetary integration may appear both adequate and generous. But as we have
learned from surveying the history of the gift exchange in international economic
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relations, “generosity” has long been associated with the paternalism inherent to
colonial and neocolonial modes of thinking. There is no guarantee that, without
a direct intellectual and political confrontation of the neoliberal precepts that most
eurozone governments take at face value, an institutional innovation such as the
creation of a eurozone parliament will upset the austerity measures in Greece. Far
from it. With more budgetary integration will come more demands for fiscal
conservatism and disciplinary oversight of the most economically vulnerable
democracies by the stronger economic powers. More budgetary integration in
a context where neoliberal ideas reign will mean more control exercised by the
European center on its peripheries. The battle is first and foremost ideological and
cultural rather than purely institutional.
In European peripheries, economic policy decisions have often been under the
control of Troika-like structures rather thanmade in complete independence, as was
the case in former colonies and semi-independent states of Africa – such as Egypt or
Tunisia. As Eric Toussaint writes, since the collapse of Napoleon’s empire and its
replacement by the British Empire, the economic administration of the southeast-
ern parts of Europe – Greece and Cyprus especially – has long fallen under the
control of British, French, German, or other core powers, particularly when these
semi-sovereign states failed to reimburse the usurious loans extended to them by
private and public financial actors.83 To this extent, European citizens need to
reappropriate the story of debt formation, to understand which interests debt accu-
mulation has served, and to fight against the neoliberal command that all debts
should be honored, based on the solidarist principle that illegitimate debts – those
that servedmostly the short-term interests of financial speculators – can be forgiven if
their cancellation works to increase the intersocietal cooperation between European
citizens or if the initial loans which resulted in accumulated debts were poisonous
gifts in the first place.
This legal, cultural, and ideological battle needs to take place before any
institutional reform of the eurozone can be launched. In the Greek debt crisis,
the numerous assertions by European policymakers that the “Greeks were
different,” that they did not know how to administer themselves, that they
lacked the modern cultural ethos that would make them compatible with the
demands of eurozone conditionalities and capitalistic societies, betray the
strength of racial prejudices and sustained hierarchies upon which colonial
and neocolonial thinking has long flourished in the south of Europe. Thus,
while Mauss’s thinking or Soustelle’s institutional reflections may be applied to
rethink international economic relations between North and South, both within
Europe and outside Europe, we should be wary of imposing their lessons on the
present context, as the discursive context in which European economic policy
in Greece is being discussed has not been cleansed of the many racial and
cultural stereotypes that have long isolated a European core from the rest of the
world.
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If Mauss’s model of the gift exchange may still represent a source of inspiration in
the context of the eurozone reform, it may be because ofMauss’s adamant defense of
the humanist creed according to which all societies – however differently orga-
nized – are capable of honoring legal obligations, when the latter are formed
through genuine manifestations of gift exchange. Equally important, Mauss
emphasized in his political and anthropological writing the necessity for gift-givers
to give time to the gift-debtors: whether such time needs to be contracted in the form
of an agreed-upon moratorium on the payments of either interest or principal (or
both), or left implicit, Mauss demonstrated that values of trust, patience and wisdom
are key qualities that sovereign rulers must demonstrate to defend the causes of
peace and solidarity in international economic relations. This emphasis on trust in
para-contractual informality and long-term thinking may constitute Mauss’s most
important lessons, which should continue to inspire future generations of intellec-
tuals interested in changing the rules of global governance for the better. In some
sense, it already has: in his “Modest proposal” for the eurozone crisis, future Greek
Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis proposed a plan that was quite aligned with
Maussian principles, as he proposed to extend maturities of Greek loans perma-
nently, which had the advantage of avoiding a Greek default while releasing the
fiscal burden fromGreek shoulders.84Unfortunately, his proposal failed to grasp the
attention of eurozone creditors.
To “decolonize” the proposals presently extended for the governance of the
eurozone, one may also turn to the attempts by NIEO thinkers to ground the
operation of international economic relations after decolonization on new princi-
ples of international law. Those who, after David Graeber or Eric Toussaint,85 wish
to decolonize the relation between Greece and its European creditors would do
better to turn to the international law precepts formulated byMohammed Bedjaoui,
in his attempt to decolonize the vision of international law promoted by the
advocates of French postcolonial “cooperation,” rather than to the solidarist doc-
trine thatMauss espoused in the interwar period. Even if present-day anthropologists
like Graeber claim to be inspired byMauss when they argue, for instance, in favor of
unilateral debt cancellation, readers will now know that Mauss wrote in the interwar
period on the sacred duty of all nations to honor their debt and respect the obligation
to give back, provided that they were the recipients of true gifts – something that
could be, and is, disputed in the case of Greece. Decolonizing the principles of
financial responsibility in the case of Greece would mean not only reviving
Bedjaoui’s thinking on sovereign debt legacies in neocolonial contexts, but also
extending it beyond the African and Asian territories where it has remained circum-
scribed. This is indeed an ambitious task; to which, I hope, this bookmay contribute.
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36. Caillé 1989; Godbout 2000.
37. In many ways, these French scholars from Pierre Bourdieu to Jacques Godbout
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45. Bouglé 1924: 84.
46. Renaudel 1910; Mauss 1938.
47. Pénin 1997: 103.
48. Pénin 1997: 105.
49. Berstein 2006: 227.
50. Mauss 1997 [1924a]: 539.
51. A pro bono job, since he paid his secretaries’ salaries out of his own pocket
(Soustelle 1986: 18).
52. These ties were all the more important since David David-Weill was also
a member of the committee of French museums which overlooked the
Museum of Ethnology.
53. Mauss 1925a: 2.
54. Still, Mauss (1939) did not like Thérèse Rivière, calling her “crazy.”
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21. At that conference, Boumédiène succeeded in obtaining an unlikely consensus
from Arab leaders and the Shah of Iran, as well as Mexican President Luis
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4. Fourcade Gourinchas 2009.
5. Servet 2016.
6. Attali 2016 [1986]: 324.
7. Attali 2016 [1986]: 321, 338; on the long history of the European negotiations that
led to the denuclearization of Germany, see Mallard (2014).
260 Notes to Pages 195–203
8. Attali 2016 [1986]: 146–59.
9. Mallard 2014.
10. Malye and Stora 2012.
11. Attali 2016 [1986]: 408.
12. This was more easily said than done. With the breaking down of the BerlinWall
in 1989, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Republic of Yugoslavia
melted: civil war and ethnic cleansing in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo
demonstrated the fragility of the new international European order and the
necessity to maintain strong Franco-German relations to avoid the escalation of
local conflicts into pan-European all-out war.
13. Attali 2016 [1986]: 14, 408.
14. Attali 2016 [1986]: 277.
15. Andersson and Prat 2015: 12.
16. On this episode and its consequences in French political history, see Mallard
(2014), especially chs. 4 and 5.
17. Attali and Guillaume 1975.
18. Attali 2016 [1986]: 28.
19. Dezalay and Garth 2002.
20. Moatti 2008.
21. De Coppet 1998.
22. Malamoud 1998.
23. Servet 1998. Servet’s expertise in financial history was much larger, as it ranged
from postcolonial currencies in Africa to the origins of antique moneys, which
he studied in his dissertation (Servet 1984).
24. Servet 1980.
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48. Aglietta and Brand 2013: 177.
49. Aglietta and Brand 2013: 42.
50. In particular, the reports presented by Raymond Barre, the Vice-President of the
EC, in February 1969, followed by the 1970 report of Pierre Werner, Prime
Minister of Luxembourg, called for both budgetary and monetary integration
(Aglietta and Brand 2013: 37).
51. Aglietta and Brand 2013: 37.
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Bourgeois, Léon. 1919. Le Traité de paix de Versailles. Paris: Alcan.
Bouyahia, Malek and Maria Eleonora Sanna. 2013. La polysémie du voile. Politiques et
mobilisations postcoloniales. Paris: Editions archives contemporaines.
Burnett, Philip Mason. 1965. Reparations at the Paris Peace Conference. From the Standpoint
of the American Delegation. New York: Octagon Books.
Burrin, Philippe. 1986. La dérive fasciste, Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933–1945. Paris: Le Seuil.
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Chaumont, Charles. 1970. “Cours général de Droit international.” Recueil des cours de
l’Académie de droit international. 1: 335–527.
Chaussade, Pierre. 1958. Que représente l’Algérie pour les finances et l’économie de
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1998. Lettres à Marcel Mauss, presented by Philippe Besnard and Marcel Fournier. Paris:
Presses universitaires de France.
Durkheim, Emile and Ernest Denis. 1915. Qui a voulu la guerre? Les origines de la guerre
d’après les documents diplomatiques. http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k113193s.r=
qui+a+voulu+la+guerre.langFR
Dzimira, Sylvain. 2007. Marcel Mauss, savant et politique. Paris: La découverte.
Eichengreen, Barry and Richard Portes. 1987. “The Anatomy of Financial Crises.” NBER
Working Paper No. 2126. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227380
Elbaz, Sharon. 2003. “L’avocat et sa cause en milieu colonial. La défense politique dans le
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négociations secrètes, 1956–1962. Paris: Seuil, http://imedb.blogspot.ch/2008/01/blog-post
_25.html
Fanon, Frantz. 1952. Peau noire, masques blancs. Paris: Le Seuil.
1961. Les damnés de la terre. Paris: Maspéro.
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Foltz, David Albert. 1978. “The War Crimes Issue at the Paris Peace Conference.”
Dissertation, College of Arts and Sciences, American University, Washington, DC.
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage.
2003. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76. Translated by
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Frazer, James. 1890. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
1898. “Letter to Mauss, August 21.” Paris: Collège de France (Fonds Mauss, 57CDF 65–5).
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Lagrange, Hugues. 2010. Le déni des cultures. Paris: Seuil.
Laniol, Vincent. 2012. “Ferdinand Larnaude, un ‘délégué technique’ à la Conférence de la paix
de 1919 entre expertise et Culture de guerre.” Relations Internationales. (149): 43–55.
Larnaude, Ferdinand. 1917. “La réparation des dommages de guerre. Comment doit
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57 CDF 81–14).
1934b. “Letter to Mauss, August 22.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1934c. “Letter to Mauss, October 29.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1935a. “Letter to Mauss, Jan. 27.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1935b. “Letter to Mauss, April 22.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1935c. “Letter to Mauss, July 13.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1937a. “Letter to Mauss, May 1.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1937b. “Letter to Mauss, October 2.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1938a. “Letter to Mauss, July 10.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1938b. “Letter to Mauss, July 14.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
1938c. “Letter to Mauss, July 23.” (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF 81–14).
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1956a. “Création de l’Union pour le Salut et le Renouveau de l’Algérie Française (USRAF),
July.” (Fonds Soustelle, 112AJ/3).
1956b. “Letter to a MP, October 5.” (Fonds Soustelle, 112AJ/3).
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(Fonds AT 94AP/381).
1922a. “Letter of April 4, to Hubert.” (Fonds AT 94AP/381).
1922b. “Letter of August 26, to Hubert.” (Fonds AT 94AP/381).
1922c. “Letter of September 14, to Hubert.” (Fonds AT 94AP/381).
1924. “Letter of January 24, to Hubert.” Paris: Collège de France (Fonds Mauss, 57 CDF
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Voyage au Congo, by André Gide. Paris: Gallimard.
Weber, Max. 1978 [1922]. Economy and Society. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Willis, James F. 1982. Prologue to Nuremberg. The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War
Criminals of the First World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Winock, Michel. 1992. Le socialisme en France et en Europe. Paris: Seuil.
Zelizer, Viviana. 1994. The Social Meaning of Money: Pin Money, Paychecks, Poor Relief and
Other Currencies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2002. “Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns:
A History of Ideas, 1976–2001.” IMF Staff Papers, 49(3): 470–507. Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 49(3).
Bibliography 283
Index
Abbas, Ferhat, 165, 166
Aglietta, Michel, 202, 207, 208–211, 218
Algeria
colonization of, 90, 115, 169
debt diplomacy, 183–184
economy, 146–147, 179
ethnic diversity, 121, 130, 156
and French citizenship, 125, 154
and French debt, 179–180, 256
French investment in, 140–143, 148
independence
legal claim for, 168–170
and integration with France, 122–123
referendum, 154
justice system, 41
law profession, 28–29, 41
national consciousness, 130–131
and New International Economic
Order, 161
and oil, 147, 159, 160, 172–173, 185, 188
Regroupement law, 144
violence against Muslims, 132, 166
workforce training, 135
Algerian Assembly, 127, 128, 166






in colonial administration, 4
difference from ethnology, 30
and economics, 202, 209
French, 103, 104, 132
and global governance, 46
and integration, 134
and intersocietal exchange, 118
Marcel Mauss’s legacy, 149, 156
and model of the gift, 4
place among disciplines, 79
and political science, 137–138
and The Gift, 207
see also ethnography; ethnology
anti-Semitism, 26, 27, 53, 65, 80
Aron, Raymond, 18, 123, 138, 143, 149,
169
Asad, Tal, 97
Attali, Jacques, 205–206, 209
Augagneur, Victor, 102, 107–108, 118
Aurès, 133, 134
Auzias, Jean Marie, 208
Banque de France, 50, 77
Barel, Yves, 166
Barrès, Maurice, 88
Basdevant, Jules, 37, 180
Bastid-Basdevant, Suzanne, 164, 205
Battle of Algiers, 135
Bedjaoui, Mohammed
and Algerian independence, 166–167,
168–170
as Algerian Minister of Justice, 41
career trajectory, 39–40
and Evian Agreements, 172
and French cooperation, 160, 161
and New International Economic Order, 39,
161, 186, 197
and oil crisis, 186
and solidarism, 164
as Special Rapporteur, 176, 181–183, 187–190,
191, 193
at University of Grenoble, 38, 164
Ben Bella, Ahmed, 160
Berbers, 133
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